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Profiles of American Youth: Generational Changes in Cognitive Skills compares the results of 
two major studies, both known as “Profile of American Youth.” The first of these was a 
nationwide administration of the U.S. military’s paper-and-pencil enlistment test, the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), in 1980. A generation later, in 1997, a computer-
adaptive version of ASVAB, known as CAT-ASVAB, was administered to a nationally 
representative sample of young people, employing a similar methodology. The first “profile 
study” is often called simply PAY80, while its successor goes by PAY97. Both of these studies 
were funded by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) primarily to assist in revising national 
norms for scoring the ASVAB. Additionally, these studies were undertaken to assess the 
vocational aptitudes of American youth and to determine more accurately how the cognitive 
abilities of military personnel compared with those of the civilian youth population.  
The U.S. military is a pioneer in the world of testing, introducing two large-scale, group-
administered aptitude tests for Army personnel in World War I. These tests were used as 
prototypes for many tests of cognitive ability that followed in the United States and throughout 
the world. The evolution of the profile studies actually began some years later, in July 1950, 
when DoD implemented operationally a new enlistment test, called the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT’s introduction corresponded with a reinstitution of the 
Selective Service System draft after World War II. Norms for the new test were statistically 
linked to scores used for standardizing a previous enlistment test – the Army General 
Classification Test - used during World War II. The so-called “reference group” for norming the 
AFQT was called the “1944 Mobilization Population” (the presumed pool of men available to 
serve in the military during a massive mobilization).  
This “1944 Mobilization Population” remained as DoD’s reference group for norming the enlistment 
test and for assessing the aptitudes of military recruits for over three decades. In 1980, DoD 
announced that the ASVAB had been “miscalibrated,” that scoring procedures were artificially 
inflating scores in the lower aptitude ranges. As a result of these errors, approximately 360,000 
young people, ineligible for enlistment due to their low test scores, were permitted to enter the 
military between 1976 and 1980. This miscalibration, and the enlistment of so many otherwise 
“unqualified” applicants (representing one-quarter of all recruits during the period), created a sense 
of urgency for updating norms and dramatically changing screening procedures.  
PAY80 was conceived in the dust of this storm and a prevailing view at the time that the U.S. 
military had become a haven for “society’s losers.” Many called for Selective Service to restore 
the military’s strength—while others claimed that the miscalibration had been a fortuitous 
mistake, ultimately saving the nation from a military draft. New norms were needed both to 
correct the ASVAB miscalibration and to provide accurate information on the aptitude levels of 
young people joining the military in the early 1980s. As it turned out, the introduction of the 
PAY80 norms as a replacement for the World War II standard coincided with a remarkable 
renaissance in recruiting for the All-Volunteer Force, thanks to an infusion of funds by the 
Reagan Administration for enlistment bonuses and education benefits. 
The memory of circumstances leading to PAY80 was still fresh in the minds of DoD 
psychologists when the first plans were developed to conduct another profile study in the mid 
1990s. At that point, the PAY80 ASVAB norms were almost 15 years old, there were indications 
that the youth population might have changed in terms of aptitude levels, and the dominant 
ASVAB administration was via computer rather than paper-and-pencil. It seemed like the right 
time to develop new norms for the youth population. However, without a sense that the testing 
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system was “broken,” PAY97 could be accomplished quietly and paced deliberately, without the 
pressures attached to its predecessor. In July 2004, DoD launched new norms for its enlistment 
test based on the results of PAY97. 
After the latest norms had been introduced, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
contracted with the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) to further analyze 
PAY97 data and to compare the results of the two profile studies. HumRRO assembled a group 
of national authorities from a variety of fields to conduct the research. The objective was to build 
a team of scholars who could look at the results of the two PAY studies from different angles 
and interpret the broader meaning of those results for both the military and society. The group 
was led by Dr. W. S. Sellman of HumRRO, a military psychologist who had served in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense for many years as its Director for Accession Policy. Dr. Paul R. 
Sackett, an industrial-organizational psychologist and Professor of Psychology at the University 
of Minnesota, directed the data analysis and investigation of results. Dr. Mark J. Eitelberg, a 
military manpower analyst and Professor of Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
served as the group’s policy analyst and provocateur.  
Additional support, guidance, and contributions were provided by Dr. Thomas E. MaCurdy, 
Professor of Economics at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution. 
Rounding out the group was Dr. Martin E. Frankel, a survey sampling authority and Professor of 
Statistics and Computer Information Technology at Baruch College, City University of New York. 
Of added interest and value to the project, both Sellman and Eitelberg had worked previously as 
principal analysts of PAY80 data through the darker days of military recruiting and revival; 
Frankel had served as principal sampling statistician and analyst during the formative stages of 
PAY80; MaCurdy had worked closely with DoD in developing PAY97 weighting procedures; and 
Sackett, previously a member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing 
as well as chairman of the National Research Council’s Committee on the Youth Population and 
Military Recruiting, brought a wealth of expertise and experience from directing many previous 
studies of DoD testing.  
Preparation of this book was aided by a number of other people. Most notably, Dr. John R. 
Welsh of DMDC served as the DMDC technical representative, and as such participated in most 
project meetings and discussions, contributing his insight and invaluable ideas as the effort 
progressed. Dr. Shonna D. Waters assisted first as a graduate assistant at the University of 
Minnesota; the project lasted long enough to see her earn a doctorate and continue helping as a 
Research Scientist at HumRRO. Of note—and further evidence that the two PAY studies 
spanned a generation—Dr. Brian K. Waters, Shonna’s father, had worked closely with Sellman 
and Eitelberg in the early days of PAY80, and his name appears on many related publications.  
Further support and guidance was provided by Dr. Daniel O. Segall, Ms. Kathleen E. Moreno, 
and Dr. Richard A. Riemer of the Personnel Testing Division at DMDC, and Dr. Jane M. Arabian 
of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Special 
recognition and appreciation goes to Mr. Jeffrey D. Barnes of HumRRO for his exceptional 
database management throughout the life of this project. In addition to his extensive knowledge 
of the variables contained in both the PAY80 and PAY97 datasets, Mr. Barnes proved 
invaluable in researching the use of design effects in the analyses of complex survey data.  
The final manuscript benefits from the expert assistance of Dr. Joy T. Oliver, Dr. Adam S. 
Beatty, and Dr. Amanda J. Koch, all of HumRRO, and Ms. Barbara Minich, the book’s technical 
editor. Dr. Beatty assisted with the comparative analyses of the PAY80 and PAY97 data while 
Dr. Koch was instrumental in preparing the numerous data displays, including tables, charts, 
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graphs, and figures. Dr. Oliver focused on quality control, ensuring data consistency and 
accuracy across all chapters and appendices. 
Special thanks also go to the Defense Advisory Committee for Military Personnel Testing. 
These nationally known experts in test development, norming, and validation; personnel 
selection and job classification; career counseling and guidance; and computer adaptive testing 
emphasized and encouraged DoD to revise the PAY80 norms in accordance with professional 
testing standards, and provided scientific oversight of all aspects of PAY97 from the earliest 
planning stages to implementation of the revised norms. Committee chairpersons during the 
PAY97 period (1995 – 2002) included: Dr. Mark D. Reckase (American College Testing 
Program), Dr. Kevin R. Murphy (Colorado State University), Dr. Michael J. Kolen (University of 
Iowa), and Dr. Wayne J. Camara (The College Board).1 
Chapter 1 lays a foundation for understanding the background and context of the two PAY studies, 
first summarizing the history of military aptitude testing and then describing the evolution of the two 
PAY studies in somewhat greater detail. Chapter 2 expands upon the history of PAY80, chronicling 
the turbulence when PAY80 results were initially released, the related themes of greatest interest 
over the years, and the role of PAY80 in an enduring controversy. Chapter 3 looks at changes in the 
testing format from PAY80 to PAY97, as well as test-taker motivation, to assess the possible impact 
of these factors on the results of the two PAY studies. Chapter 4 compares data from the two PAY 
studies, including changes in mean test scores and score distributions by various demographic 
factors. Chapter 5 looks at the implications of the PAY97 data on the All Volunteer Force (AVF) with 
regard to recruit quality and socio-demographic factors. Results of a study on the quality and 
representativeness of the AVF are presented in Chapter 6, including factors affecting enlistment 
probability versus school enrollment or employment. Chapter 7 examines military service 
participation for both the PAY80 and PAY97 samples by age, race/ethnicity, gender, educational 
attainment, and aptitude. Chapter 8 looks at the relevancy of PAY97 findings as of 2007, using data 
from ongoing youth longitudinal studies. Chapter 9 draws the study to a close by summarizing the 
main findings of the data analysis, exploring the implications of these findings for the military and 
society, and offering “lessons” from the PAY80 and PAY97 experiences for those who might be 
engaged in planning the next profile study. 
A number of appendices are presented that expand upon information and conclusions in the 
chapters. The PAY and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data have been used 
extensively by researchers from several scholarly fields. Appendices A and B review a relatively 
small selection of literature from psychological and economics research, respectively, to provide 
a “taste” of the types of work that have used two PAY and NLSY datasets. Appendix C contains 
an overview of the PAY80 and PAY97 sample and weighting procedures. Appendix D includes 
findings from a “virtual symposium” that considered the prospects for the AVF, including a 
discussion of the role of research.   
This study marks a continuing effort to explore the results of the two PAY studies and to 
encourage future research. The work presented here is rather straightforward—only scratching 
the surface of complicated issues and merely probing otherwise hidden relationships in the 
data. From the very start, as noted throughout the study, it was the authors’ intent to break 
ground and present at least as many questions as answers to those questions. It is hoped that 
the research questions will some day be resolved, if not through the combined results of the two 
existing PAY studies, then through those that follow. 
                                                
1 Please note that the organizational affiliations presented were the affiliations of the Defense Advisory 
Committee on Military Personnel Testing chairpersons during their tenure as chair. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PROFILE OF AMERICAN YOUTH IN CONTEXT MILITARY ENLISTMENT 
SCREENING AND APTITUDE TESTING 
 
The colonial forces of the Revolutionary War accepted almost any volunteer who could walk, 
talk, see, and hear (Hayes, 1982, p. 61). As some observers suggested, with tongue in cheek, 
the personnel demands of the time were such that any one of these abilities often was 
considered enough for enlistment. By the 19th Century, however, volunteer enlistment standards 
included specific requirements regarding race, age, height, language ability, and general 
physical condition. During the Mexican War of 1847, for example, enlistment in the Army was 
restricted to “all free White male persons, above the age of 18, and under 35 years, being at 
least 5 feet 3 inches high, who are effective, able-bodied, sober, free from disease, and who 
have a competent knowledge of the English language” (Hayes, 1982, pp. 61-62). These 
selection standards, with the exception of height, varied little over subsequent years when 
recruits’ physical attributes were more valued than their mental acumen. 
The “typical recruit” of World War I, according to official records, stood about 5 feet 7 inches, 
weighed approximately 141 pounds, and was in his early twenties. He was the first recruit to go 
through a genuine “selective process” in the sense of getting “the round men for the round tasks, 
the strong men for the strong tasks, and the delicate men for the delicate tasks” (Coffman, 1968, 
p. 59). The so-called selective process was aided by the first large-scale group-administered 
testing instruments—the Army’s Alpha and Beta tests—designed to screen individuals for 
enlistment and to assign new recruits to military occupations. With these tests the U.S. military 
became a pioneer in employment screening, particularly in the field of aptitude testing. 
Developed in 1917-1918 to give World War I military commanders some measure of their men’s 
ability (Waters, 1997), the Army Alpha test measured a recruit’s verbal ability, numerical ability, and 
ability to follow directions and understand information. The nonverbal Army Beta test evaluated the 
aptitude of illiterate, unschooled, or non-English speaking draftees (Yerkes, 1921). Both tests are 
recognized prototypes for subsequent group-administered cognitive ability tests.  
Records show the Army administered more than 1.5 million examinations to new recruits from 
May 1918 through January 1919 (Eitelberg, 1988). Nearly one-third of the soldiers tested were 
illiterate; 47 percent of Whites and 89 percent of Blacks scored below what was categorized as 
the “mental age of thirteen.” As many as 18 percent of the men drafted for World War I were born 
in another country—including nearly 500,000 immigrants representing 46 different nationalities—
most of whom had limited understanding of the English language (Ford, 2001).  
While the Army’s pioneering effort was the first of its kind and influenced the development of the 
group-administered tests that followed, criticisms about the value of the military’s testing, and 
large-scale testing of this type in general, have persisted since these first attempts at selective 
processing. As one historian commented: 
Either this pioneering testing venture was invalid or most men in their twenties were very 
stupid. . . . Rather than intelligence, the psychologists were ascertaining in such tests the 
soldier’s social and educational background, to the disadvantage of the majority of men 
from rural areas and the urban slums. (Coffman, 1968, p. 61)  
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The Army General Classification Test (AGCT), implemented for World War II draftees, replaced 
the tests of World War I. The AGCT, described as a test of “general learning ability,” 
superseded the Army Alpha test as an aid in assigning new recruits to military occupations. 
According to an Army publication of the time, the AGCT was aimed at “reliably sorting new 
arrivals according to their ability to learn quickly the duties of a soldier” while “keeping at a 
minimum items greatly influenced by amount of schooling and by cultural inequalities” (Staff, 
Personnel Research Section, 1945, p. 760). Clearly the test’s developers focused on 
strengthening the predictive accuracy of matching men to a rapidly expanding number of 
challenging occupations, given the relatively little education possessed by so many draftees.  
In 1941, the minimum standard for draft induction was “the ability to comprehend simple orders 
given in the English language.” One year later the standard was raised—inductees had to “read 
and write the English language as commonly prescribed for the fourth grade in grammar school” 
(Eitelberg, Laurence, & Waters, 1984, p. 137). Even with this revised standard, more than 
217,000 illiterate men and another 82,000 scoring in AGCT Grade V (the lowest aptitude 
category, with a percentile score of approximately 5.5), had been drafted for wartime duty 
(Eitelberg, Laurence, & Waters, 1984, p. 9). 
After World War II, each of the Services developed its own aptitude tests for enlistment. As 
Eitelberg, Laurence, and Waters (1984, p. 15) observed, “Though different in structure, primarily 
with respect to qualifying scores, the Service tests essentially were the same with respect to content 
areas, relying on the time-honored items of vocabulary, arithmetic, and spatial relationships.” The 
development of these new aptitude tests occurred during a period of massive demobilization, 
including the suspension of military inductions for all but a three-month period in late 1948 (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1996b, p. 60). The focus was more on “firing” than on “hiring” and on 
reorganizing remaining units rather than large-scale recruiting and applicant assessment. 
With the reinstitution of the Selective Service System draft in 1950, the Services returned to a 
single test, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT, modeled after the AGCT, 
basically measured the same constructs. Unlike the AGCT and the aptitude tests of World War 
I, however, the AFQT was designed specifically as a screening device (Karpinos, 1966). Indeed, 
the new test had dual purposes: first, to measure an applicant’s general ability to absorb military 
training within a reasonable length of time, thereby allowing for the elimination of those who did 
not possess such ability; and second, to provide a uniform measure of an applicant’s potential 
usefulness, if qualified on the test (Uhlaner & Bolanovich, 1952).  
According to a Selective Service System report in 1953, World War II helped usher in a new era that 
reflected the “technological advance of civilization,” when the most advanced scientific knowledge 
was used to create a new breed of weapons, equipment, and other materials of war: 
The use of such devices required men who had reasonably basic education and 
intelligence with requisite aptitudes and skills. The world, and especially the United 
States, had gone forward in the art of war to a point where it was necessary for “the rank 
and file” of the armed forces to have a higher minimum of ability and learning. (p. 153.)  
 
In addition to the AFQT, the individual Services also developed new testing instruments to address 
this trend. Thus, in addition to the AFQT, applicants were required to take Service-specific tests for 
job classification. The Army Classification Battery, the Navy Basic Test Battery, and the Airman 
Qualification Examination, to name just a few, were used from the late 1950s to the mid 1970s to 
place male recruits in military occupations. Female applicants for military enlistment took a separate 
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test, called the Armed Forces Women’s Selection Test (AFWST), which was used Service-wide 
from 1956 to 1974. By the time the draft ended in 1973 efforts were well underway to adapt the 
AFQT for screening women as well as men (Vitola & Wilbourn, 1971).2 
In 1976, the Department of Defense (DoD) combined screening and classification testing by 
requiring all Services to use a single test battery, called the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) (Sellman & Valentine, 1981). Previously, the ASVAB had been used in DoD’s 
high school testing program and by both the Air Force and Marine Corps in their enlistment 
screening. The resulting process was more expedient, improved the matching of applicants with 
available occupations, and allowed job guarantees for qualified recruits at the time of enlistment. 
This was a departure from previous procedures that called for selection testing to be conducted 
at military examination and entrance centers located across the country and for subsequent 
classification testing to be conducted at Service basic training centers preparatory to sending 
new enlistees to specific job skill training.  
Recruit Assessment and Occupational Placement 
Discussions of present and future military personnel procurement policies consider the way in 
which individuals are selected for service and assigned to and trained for military occupations. 
The Services have devoted considerable effort to developing reliable and valid methods for 
assessing individuals’ abilities and aptitudes before they enlist in the active-duty force or join a 
Reserve component, with aptitude historically defined as a measure of trainability for the various 
military occupations.  
Today, the ASVAB measures several constructs, such as general trainability as well as science 
and technical skills. The resulting aptitude profiles, normed to a nationally representative sample 
of young men and women ages 18 to 23 years, allow DoD to compare the aptitudes of 
individuals interested in enlisting with the civilian youth population as a whole.  
Established entrance standards that are based on personnel requirements and are compatible 
with available personnel resources enable DoD to rapidly make decisions about who should be 
permitted to volunteer or be drafted, should the nation ever be compelled to reinstitute military 
conscription. Knowledge of the aptitudes and abilities of American youth also allow Service 
personnel planners to focus on occupational placement and training issues, such as whether 
Service members have the required skills and knowledge to effectively operate increasingly 
complicated military hardware.  
All-Volunteer Force Enlistment Standards and Entrance Process 
The United States has relied on volunteers to fill the ranks of its military since 1973. Each year 
approximately 200,000 young people are recruited for the full-time, active-duty military and 
another 150,000 for the Reserve components. Military leaders are grown from the junior ranks; 
the Services do not hire people to enter the ranks as sergeants. Therefore, enough qualified 
privates must be recruited to sustain a flow of seasoned leaders for the future. Over the past 
several years the military’s selection ratio has hovered at about 2:1; that is, about two 
                                                
2 Studies showed that women scored considerably below their male counterparts on the AFQT, 
attributable largely to much lower scores on the Mechanical Comprehension test. As noted in a 1971 
analysis, “These findings suggest that the AFQT can probably be adapted for use in screening WAF 
[Women in the Air Force] applicants if appropriate keys and norms are developed to accommodate for 
recognized sex differences in certain aptitude areas” (Vitola & Wilbourn, 1971; 8). 
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individuals apply for every recruit opening. This has allowed the Services to enlist highly 
motivated youth who are well qualified in a variety of areas. 
Enlistment standards are established under the authority of Title X of the United States Code. 
Enlistment criteria are based on the needs of the Services and are designed to ensure accepted 
recruits qualify for general military duties. Recruits must be able to cope successfully with a 
wide range of demands that occur in military situations, including exposure to danger, emotional 
stress, harsh environments, and the handling or operation of dangerous equipment. 
Furthermore, the Services require all members to be available for worldwide duty 24 hours a 
day without restriction or delay, frequently in remote areas devoid of normal outside support. 
The Services select new recruits on the basis of age, aptitude, citizenship, education, moral 
character, and physical fitness (Sellman, 1997). Aptitude and education are used to define 
recruit quality. These quality surrogates are used in lieu of evaluating past work experience—a 
criterion most military applicants rarely have because the majority are recent high school 
graduates. 
Young men and women interested in joining the Services enter the enlistment process by 
contacting a recruiter who can provide information about military life, opportunities, and benefits. 
Recruiters also begin the initial screening process by asking questions regarding age, 
citizenship, education, involvement with law enforcement authorities, drug use, and physical and 
medical conditions that might preclude enlistment (Sellman, 2004).  
Recruit Eligibility Testing 
Today, DoD uses the ASVAB, the AFQT—a composite of the ASVAB Word Knowledge and 
Paragraph Comprehension (verbal abilities) and Arithmetic Reasoning and Mathematics 
Knowledge (mathematics abilities) tests—and education credentials to determine applicants’ 
enlistment eligibility for each of the Services, as well as their respective Reserve components. 
These criteria also are used to assign successful applicants to military occupations. (Although 
part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard also uses the ASVAB for 
personnel selection and occupational placement.)  
As a scientifically developed and validated tool, the ASVAB—a battery of 10 tests that measure 
verbal, mathematics, science, and technical knowledge and skills—has proved valuable in 
identifying enlistees who have a reasonable probability of completing basic military and job skill 
training and then performing successfully in their assigned occupations (Wigdor & Green, 
1991a). The tests comprising the current ASVAB and a brief description of the abilities, or 
constructs, they measure are shown in Table 1.1 (Segall, 2004). 
AFQT scores are expressed on a percentile scale and grouped into five categories for reporting 
purposes. Table 1.2 shows the percentile score ranges and percent of civilian youth that 
correspond to each AFQT category. Individuals who score in Categories I and II tend to be 
above average in cognitive ability; those in Category III, average; those in Category IV, below 
average; and those in Category V, markedly below average. Category III is divided at the 50th 
percentile into subcategories A and B to facilitate the reporting of the proportion of scores above 
and below the mean of the AFQT distribution. By law, Category V applicants and those in 
Category IV who have not graduated from high school are not eligible for enlistment.  
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Table 1.1. ASVAB Tests and Measured Constructs  
TEST CONSTRUCT 
Verbal  
Word Knowledge (WK) Ability to select the correct meaning of words 
presented in context and to identify the best 
synonym for a given word. 
Paragraph Comprehension (PC) Ability to obtain information from written passages. 
Mathematics  
Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) Ability to solve arithmetic word problems. 
Mathematics Knowledge (MK) Knowledge of high school mathematics principles. 
Science/Technical  
General Science (GS) Knowledge of physical and biological sciences. 
Electronics Information (EI) Knowledge of electricity and electronics. 
Auto Information (AI) Knowledge of automobile terminology and 
technologies. 
Shop Information (SI) Knowledge of tools and shop terminology and 
practices. 
Mechanical Comprehension (MC) Knowledge of mechanical and physical principles. 
Assembling Objects (AO) Ability to figure out how an object will look when its 
parts are put together. 
 
Table 1.2. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Categories by Corresponding 
Percentile Score Ranges and Percent of Civilian Youth Population 
AFQT Categories Percentile Score Range Percent of Civilian Youth 
I 93-100 8 
II 65-92 28 
IIIA 50-64 15 
IIIB 31-49 19 
IV 10-30 21 
V 01-09 9 
 
Prior to taking the ASVAB, most individuals take an enlistment screening test at a recruiting 
office that is used to predict the likelihood of passing the AFQT. An estimated 10% to 20% of 
these individuals do not continue beyond this point (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004). 
Once recruiters complete the preliminary screening and individuals decide to enlist, they go to 
either a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) or a Military Entrance Testing (MET) site to 
take the ASVAB. In 2008, more than 450,000 applicants for military service took the ASVAB. A 
computer-adaptive version of the ASVAB (Sands, Waters, & McBride, 1997) was administered to 
approximately 70% of applicants at 65 MEPSs across the country. The remaining 30% of 
applicants took a paper-and-pencil version of the ASVAB at 650 remote MET sites.  
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Military Occupation Classification 
In addition to determining enlistment eligibility, ASVAB scores are used to assign new recruits to 
military occupations. Research shows a strong relation between ASVAB (including AFQT) 
scores and success in military occupational skill training and hands-on performance across a 
range of occupations (Campbell, 1990; Dunbar & Novick, 1988; Earles & Ree, 1992; Green & 
Wigdor, 1988; Mayberry & Carey, 1997; Welsh, Kucinkas, & Curran, 1990; Welsh, Watson, & 
Ree, 1990; Wigdor & Green, 1991b; Wise, Campbell, & Arabian, 1988).  
Using statistical validity analyses, the Services combine various ASVAB tests into aptitude area 
composites, which then are used to assign new recruits to military occupations (Campbell & 
Knapp, 2001). Standards for assignment to occupations, and their corresponding job skill 
training courses, are set in terms of minimum scores on these aptitude area composites.  
Each Service develops and validates its own set of aptitude area composites based on the 
combination of tests that correlate most closely with performance criteria for its occupational 
clusters (Rumsey, Walker, & Harris, 1994). Each Service’s composites take into account the 
distinct functions required to fulfill its respective missions. For example, the Army and Marine 
Corps have extensive ground combat responsibilities that are quite different from most Navy 
and Air Force activities. Consequently, for ostensibly the same occupations, such as electronic 
repair specialists, motor mechanics, cooks, supply technicians, or clerks, the particular 
equipment used by personnel in the different Services or the environment in which they serve 
might dictate a different mix of abilities (Sellman, 2004; Waters, Laurence, & Camara, 1987). 
Table 1.3 shows the composites currently used by the Services (Diaz, Ingerick, & Lightfoot, 
2004; Lightfoot, Diaz, Heggestad, Darby, & Alley, 1999; U.S. Department of Defense, 2003).  
Service-specific recruit-occupation algorithms match new recruits to specific occupations. The 
algorithms are necessary because occupational standards represent only the minimum 
acceptable scores for qualification and cannot be used solely to determine the occupations for 
which recruits are best suited, particularly when multiple jobs must be filled. In addition to 
matching occupational aptitude requirements with recruit aptitude scores, the algorithms also 
may include Service priorities for filling demanding and hard-to-fill occupations, desired 
proportions of minorities and women, projected attrition costs, job skill training class schedules, 
and recruit preferences. These components are weighted and integrated to produce a decision 
index for each occupation for which a recruit is qualified (Sellman, 2004).  
Each Service attempts to assign the highest quality recruit possible to its various military 
occupations. Consequently, composite “cut-scores” for occupational classifications become a 
compromise between Service ideals and fluctuating supply-demand pressures. Service 
personnel planners set cut-scores on the basis of personnel requirements, equipment that will 
be used, training curricula, retention, the economy, and the availability of recruits with various 
composite aptitudes (Sellman, Born, Strickland, & Ross, 2010).  
During the classification process, high-scoring recruits are discouraged from choosing jobs that 
require low aptitude. Recruits who want to enter occupations for which they barely meet the 
standard but who have high aptitudes in other areas, are encouraged to choose occupations for 
which they are better qualified. Each Service has incorporated its algorithms into computerized 
occupational reservation systems that Service counselors at MEPSs use to match individuals’ 
desires with the needs of the Services.  
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Table 1.3. ASVAB Tests Used for Classification by Service 
COMPOSITE TESTS ASVAB TESTS 
ALL SERVICES  
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) AR + MK + (2 X VE) where VE = WK + PC 
  
ARMY  
General Technical AR, WK, PC 
Clerical GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Combat GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Electronics Repair GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Field Artillery GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
General Maintenance GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Mechanical Maintenance GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Operators/Food GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Surveillance/Communications GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
Skilled Technical GS, AR, AI, SI, MK, MC, EI, WK, PC 
  
NAVY  
General Technical WK, PC, AR 
Electronics AR, MK, EI, GS 
Basic Electricity & Electronics AR, MK, GS 
Engineering MK, AI, SI 
Mechanical AR, MC, AI, SI 
Mechanical 2 AR, MC, AO 
Nuclear Field WK, PC, AR, MK, MC 
Operations WK, PC, AR, MK, AO 
Hospitalman WK, PC, MK, GS 
Administration WK, PC, MK 
  
AIR FORCE  
Mechanical AR, WK, PC, MC  
Administrative WK, PC, MK 
General WK, PC, AR 
Electronic AR, MK, EI, GS 
  
MARINE CORPS  
Mechanical Maintenance AR, EI, MC, AI, SI 
General Technical WK, PC, AR, MC 
Electronics Repair AR, MK, EI, GS 
Note. With the exception of the AFQT, weights for the tests are not included in the above composites. 
The formula for computing the AFQT is AR + MK + (2 X VE), where VE (Verbal) = PC + WK. The VE 




WK   Word Knowledge 
PC    Paragraph Comprehension 
AR    Arithmetic Reasoning 
MK    Mathematics Knowledge 
GS    General Science 
EI      Electronics Information 
AI      Auto Information 
SI      Shop Information 
MC    Mechanical Comprehension 
AO    Assembling Objects 
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Once individuals qualify for entry based on ASVAB and AFQT scores and level of education, among 
other criteria, they meet with Service counselors at MEPSs to discuss enlistment options. To this 
point applicants have made no commitments. The Service counselors have records of the 
applicants’ qualifications and computerized information on current and future (near-term) vacancies 
in their Service’s job skill training schools and corresponding occupations, as well as available 
enlistment incentives such as bonuses, education benefits, favorable assignment locations, and so 
forth. By considering applicants’ occupational interests and background and promoting the highest-
priority occupational training slots for which applicants qualify, the counselors consummate each 
recruit-occupation match before applicants sign the enlistment contract. Ideally, the assignments 
meet the requirements of both the Service and the applicant (Sellman, 2004). 
Education Credentials 
The best single predictor of successful adjustment to military life is possession of a high school 
diploma. Consequently, DoD uses a three-tier system to classify education credentials. The 
system was developed after research indicated a strong relationship between level of education 
and successful completion of the first term of military service (Laurence, 1997; U.S. Department 
of Defense, 1996a). Tier 1 includes regular high school diploma graduates, adult diploma 
holders, and nongraduates with at least 15 hours of college credit. Tier 2 comprises alternative 
credential holders such as those with a General Education Development (GED) certificate, or 
certificates of completion or attendance. Tier 3 is composed of non-high school graduates (see 
Table 1.4). Education standards call for the application of progressively higher aptitude test 
score requirements for high school diploma graduates, equivalency credential holders, and 
nongraduates, respectively (Laurence, 1984). Higher aptitude requirements for Tiers 2 and 3 
are used to accept only the best from the statistically less successful and thus less preferred 
group of applicants (Sellman, 1998; U.S. Department of Defense, 1996a).  
The rationale for this policy is based on the differential attrition rates of these three education 
groups. That is, members of Tiers 2 and 3 are nearly twice as likely to leave service prematurely 
as those in Tier 1. Approximately 80% of recruits who are high school diploma graduates (Tier 
1) complete their first 3 years of service, compared with only 50% of recruits who are high 
school dropouts (Tier 3). Completion rates for enlistees who hold an alternative credential such 
as a GED certificate (Tier 2) fall in between the rates for Tier 1 and Tier 3 recruits (Elster & 
Flyer, 1981; Laurence, 1997; U.S. Department of Defense, 1996a). By combining aptitude and 
education achievement, the Services hope to select Tier 2 and Tier 3 applicants who are more 
trainable and who have a better chance of successfully fulfilling their contracted terms of 
enlistment (Sellman, 1984).  
Occupational Performance Model 
The Services seek to maximize recruit quality (aptitude and education) while minimizing 
recruiting, training, and attrition costs. In conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences, 
DoD developed a mathematical model that links occupational performance to recruit quality and 
recruiting resources. This model specifies the number of high-quality recruits required to provide 
the desired level of occupational performance for the least cost (Harris, McCloy, Dempsey, 
Roth, Sackett, & Hedges, 1991; McCloy, 1994; Smith & Hogan, 1994; Wise, 1984). Scores on 
hands-on occupational performance tests define the performance variable (Green & Mavor, 
1994; Wigdor & Green, 1991a, 1991b). Costs reflect training expenses, compensation, and 
recruiting outlays, such as recruiter compensation and money for advertising, education 
benefits, and enlistment bonuses.  
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Using these relationships, the model allows “what-if” analyses to examine how changes in one 
or more of these variables affect the other variables. For example, the model can answer how 
decreasing the military’s advertising budget by $20 million would affect recruit quality and 
occupational performance. Recruit-quality benchmarks are used to help ensure recruit 
performance is sufficient to complete military missions. How much quality is enough, however, 
is a policy decision determined by DoD policy analysts. Nevertheless, the model can help 
specify a recruit cohort that will provide the desired level of performance for the lowest cost 
(Gilroy & Sellman, 1995).  
Table 1.4. Education Credentials by DoD Tier 
Tier Education Credentials 
1 
High school diploma graduates, adult diploma holders, nongraduates with at 
least 15 hours of college credit 
2 
Holders of General Education Development (GED) certificates or certificates 
of completion or attendance 
3 Non-high school graduates 
 
The performance level identified by DoD policy analysts is the minimally acceptable value. The 
current performance level is based on the 1990-1991 enlisted cohort, a group that produced 
more than satisfactory performance during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The 
recruit quality benchmarks call for 60% of recruits to score at or above the 50th percentile on the 
AFQT (Categories I to IIIA) and for 90% to have high school diplomas (Sellman, 1994).  
Career Exploration Program 
In addition to its use as an enlistment test, the ASVAB is offered to high school and post-
secondary students as part of the DoD Career Exploration Program (CEP) (Baker, 2002; U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2005c). The CEP is designed to help students explore careers in both 
the civilian and military worlds of work. At the same time, CEP results can be used by military 
recruiters to identify individuals who qualify for service (Baker & Styer, 2002; Sellman, 2001; 
Rohrback, Barnes, Laurence, & Wall, 1996). In School Year 2007-2008, the CEP, including the 
ASVAB, was provided to more than 643,000 students in about 12,250 schools nationwide.  
The CEP provides a comprehensive vocational assessment package at no cost to participating 
schools or their students. Funded entirely by DoD, the CEP’s primary target audience is 11th 
and 12th graders. Students complete two instruments—the ASVAB and Find Your Interests - 
using paper-and-pencil administration. (To maintain test security, separate but parallel versions 
of ASVAB are given in high schools and military testing centers.) The CEP has two major 
purposes. First, the program provides guidance and counseling to help students identify and 
investigate occupations for which they show interest and ability. In this regard, the CEP assists 
students in planning for their post-secondary school years. Whether these plans include the 
pursuit of post-secondary education, civilian job training opportunities, or military service, the 
CEP enhances students’ career exploration and career choices. The second purpose is to aid 
the Services in the process of identifying interested students who meet the qualifications for 
enlistment (Laurence, Wall, Barnes, & Dela Rosa, 1998; U.S. Department of Defense, 2005c).  
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Like the enlistment version, the student ASVAB uses several composites formed from different 
combinations of ASVAB tests. Scores from verbal, mathematics, and science/technical 
composites, known as Career Exploration Scores, are provided to help students get a good 
sense of how they compare to other students. To facilitate career exploration, students receive 
their results in terms of same grade/same sex, same grade/opposite sex, and same 
grade/combined sex norms (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005c). Students also receive a 
Military Entrance Score (the AFQT) and a Military Careers Score (a composite of results from 
the Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics 
Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information tests) that allow them to 
match their skills and abilities with the skills and abilities of job incumbents in various military 
careers (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002).  
Find Your Interests (FYI) is an occupational interest inventory based on John Holland’s (1997) 
theory of career choice (Pommerich, 2004; Quenette & Bayer, 2007; Styer, 2003; U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2005b). A predecessor interest inventory – Interest-Finder – was 
administered along with the student ASVAB during PAY97. The Interest-Finder (Wall, 1994; 
Wall & Baker, 1997; Wall, Wise, & Baker, 1996) was later replaced by Find Your Interests. 
Students respond to FYI items by indicating a preference for the various activities, education 
and training, and occupations presented. Based on answers to questions, the inventory 
determines a student’s resemblance to each of six interest types—realistic, investigative, 
artistic, social, enterprising, and conventional. Find Your Interests is self-administered and 
scored. After scoring, students identify their three highest Interest Codes along with their 
ASVAB Career Exploration Scores to identify potentially satisfying occupations to explore.  
Qualified test administrators from MEPSs or the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
administer the student ASVAB. From the students’ perspective, participation in the CEP is 
straightforward. When students sign up to take the ASVAB at their high schools they receive 
brochures for themselves and their parents that explain the program in easily understandable 
language. After completing the ASVAB, students also sign up for post-test interpretation. In 
these sessions students receive their ASVAB scores and complete the Interest Finder. 
Throughout the test interpretation sessions, ASVAB program personnel help students 
understand the meaning of their scores in the context of students’ subsequent career 
exploration and development.  
A central concern of high school counselors is whether the DoD tests are valid for career 
counseling. Just as extensive research has shown the enlistment ASVAB to be a valid predictor 
of success in military training and on-the-job performance, numerous validation studies also 
have demonstrated the validity of the student ASVAB in predicting civilian criteria. In addition to 
civilian education and training programs (Fairbank, Welsh, & Sawin, 1990), research indicates 
the student ASVAB is a valid predictor of performance in various civilian occupations (Claudy & 
Steel, 1990; Holmgren & Dalldorf, 1993; Jensen & Valentine, 1976). The usefulness of ASVAB 
scores for predicting performance in civilian occupations also is supported by data linking 
ASVAB scores to scores on the U.S. Department of Labor’s General Aptitude Test Battery, a 
test with extensive validity data for civilian workers (Hunter, Crosson, & Friedman, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TWO PROFILES OF AMERICAN YOUTH  
REASONS, ROUTES, RESULTS, AND RUMINATIONS 
 
In the fall of 1979, three seemingly disparate policy and research activities within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) converged to shape and define the Profile of American Youth 
(PAY) studies. The first was the conclusion by a group of military psychometricians that all 
forms of the ASVAB in use since 1976 had been calibrated incorrectly. A series of studies 
showed this miscalibration had inflated the test scores of applicants at the lower end of the 
ability continuum (Jaeger, Linn, & Novick, 1980; Maier, 1993; Sims & Truss, 1980). As a result, 
nearly 360,000 men who did not meet minimum standards were enlisted in error between 1976 
and 1980 (Eitelberg, 1988). This represented approximately one-quarter of all male recruits who 
entered military service during the period. 
Based on this finding, psychometric activities proceeded in two areas. Studies were 
commissioned to develop precise conversion tables that would correct the calibration problem, 
and DoD psychometricians began designing a study that would provide an updated norming 
reference population for score interpretation on the 1980 version of the ASVAB (Boldt, 1980; 
Jaeger, Linn, & Novick, 1980; Maier & Grafton, 1981). 
Initially, the design for the new norming study appeared straightforward. As with previous research, 
the proposal called for a standardized administration of the ASVAB to a sample of military-eligible 
youth. The complexities of the proposed study became apparent, however, during discussions 
about sample parameters. The previous reference population was the approximately 12 million male 
officers and enlisted personnel on active duty as of December 31, 1944 (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1980a). The underlying assumption, accepted for 35 years, was that these men were a 
reasonably representative cross-section of the American youth population. The only other sample 
reference populations readily available for testing in 1979—individuals in educational institutions or 
applicants for military service—did not meet DoD’s statistical definition of representativeness. 
Consequently, the researchers faced the prospect of a complex, lengthy, and expensive research 
project to design and select a sample (Sellman & Doering, 1982). 
The second activity, unrelated to the incorrect calibration of the ASVAB, was the increasing scrutiny 
within DoD and from external critics of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Fiscal Year 1978 marked the 
first time since the end of the draft that all four Services had failed to achieve their recruiting goals. 
While recruiting in 1979 seemed somewhat improved, some recruiting goals still were not being 
met. The concern over recruit quantity led to discussions and debate about recruit quality. 
Complicating the issue were concerns about the AVF’s social representation, in particular its 
racial/ethnic composition. In 1979, for example, Blacks accounted for nearly 37 percent of new 
recruits in the Army, triple their proportion in the general population. This raised questions about the 
fairness and appeal of all-volunteer service across the greater society (Sellman & Doering, 1982). 
The third factor to define the PAY studies was the strong support within DoD for high-quality 
military personnel research. Beginning in 1977, DoD initiated several projects aimed at 
substantially upgrading social science research conducted in-house or by contractors under its 
auspices. The commitment was to short-term research as well as the institutionalization of long-
term research programs. The main objective of one of these projects was exploring 
opportunities for DoD to cooperate with civilian agencies, both public and private, to collect 
military-related survey data. In late 1978, DoD worked out a cooperative arrangement with the 
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U.S. Department of Labor (DoL) to participate in its National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) as a vehicle for collecting data on DoD personnel issues. As of 1979, the baseline year, 
the NLSY was an annual survey of more than 12,000 American youth. 
From DoL’s perspective, the NLSY79 had three main objectives related to the nation’s youth: (a) 
evaluate various types of public programs designed to improve the labor market position; (b) 
explore in greater depth than previously possible the complex economic, social, and psychological 
factors responsible for variations in the labor market experience; and (c) analyze the impact of the 
changing socioeconomic environment on the education and labor-market experiences of the 
nation’s youth. (Many economists have used the robust NLSY79 data to study the behavior and 
characteristics of youth in the labor market and their labor-market decisions. See Chapter 6 for a 
discussion of factors affecting enlistment probability versus school enrollment or employment and 
Appendix B for a review of economics literature using NLSY79 data.) 
NLSY79 data were collected during a one-hour personal interview conducted each year 
between January and May. Three independent probability samples were developed, with two of 
the samples designed to cover the noninstitutionalized civilian population, ages 14 to 22, as of 
January 1, 1979 (Frankel & McWilliams, 1981). The third sample was designed specifically to 
cover the cohort serving in the military, ages 17 to 21, as of January 1, 1979. 
The questionnaire covered the respondent’s education and family history, work experience, 
training, and income, with additional questions about a number of related variables such as self 
esteem, knowledge of the world of work, and time utilization. Military respondents were asked a 
special set of questions pertaining to military education and occupational experience. Questions 
about interest in and contact with the military were asked of all civilians.  
To enhance the dataset, the U.S. Department of Education funded the collection of high school 
transcripts by the National Center for Research in Vocational Education (NCRVE) at Ohio State 
University. Complete four-year transcripts were collected for more than 8,000 sample members. 
Additional transcripts were collected in the fall of 1982 when the youngest respondents to the 
civilian samples graduated from high school. 
DoD participation in the NLSY79 was important because it provided data on youth for a broad 
spectrum of military personnel research areas. Data areas included enlistment behavior, military 
attrition, social representation, All-Volunteer Force (AVF) viability, and the value of military 
training in the civilian sector. 
In late 1979, DoD policy analysts and researchers began exploring the possibility of 
administering the ASVAB to the NLSY79 sample. The intent was to provide data to develop 
current national norms for the ASVAB, to assess the vocational aptitudes of American youth, 
and to gain a better understanding of the quality and representativeness of new enlistees 
compared to the general youth population. 
DoD’s inquiries got an enthusiastic reception from DoL, the NCRVE, and the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, the contractor responsible for 
administering the NLSY. The value of enriching the NLSY79 by adding the results of an aptitude 
test to the dataset excited the imagination of the many economists, sociologists, and 
psychologists consulted. Within DoD, the convergence of the need to recalibrate the ASVAB, to 
respond to increasing criticism about the makeup of the AVF, and to support quality research 
provided the impetus for a unique and comprehensive study (Sellman & Doering, 1982). 
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Profile of American Youth 1980 (PAY80) Study 
After a set of working and cooperative agreements between DoD and DoL was concluded in 
January 1980, the Profile of American Youth 1980 (PAY80) study was launched. The existence 
of a suitable sample, the availability of a test, and the goodwill of the agencies involved made it 
possible to start fieldwork in the summer of 1980 between the scheduled 1980 and 1981 NLSY 
surveys. DoD and NORC were responsible for the study—and for taking every precaution to 
ensure respondents continued to participate in future annual NLSY surveys. DoL and NCRVE 
agreed to give DoD access to the sample and selected demographic information for each 
respondent. In return, DoD test data were transferred to NCRVE for linkage to the main NLSY 
dataset and release in the public domain. 
The PAY80 study marked the first time a vocational aptitude test was given to a nationally 
representative sample of American youth. Undertaken to calculate updated norms for the 
ASVAB, the PAY80 sample replaced the World War II norming population (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1982a). While the earlier norms included only men, the PAY80 sample included both 
men and women. 
From July through October 1980, NORC representatives administered the ASVAB to 9,173 
young people, ages 18 to 23; thereby comprising the profile sample. Testing generally was 
conducted in groups of 5 to 10 individuals. More than 400 test sites, including hotels, community 
centers, and libraries throughout the United States and abroad were used (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1982a; Martin & Welsh, 1999; Martin, 1998). The test was administered according to 
strict guidelines conforming to ASVAB procedures to assure the accuracy and consistency of 
the results. Great care also was taken to assure test score confidentiality. 
In May 1981, NORC sent all PAY80 respondents a copy of their ASVAB test results, information 
to interpret their scores, and a brochure providing vocation and education information. In 
addition, respondents were paid an honorarium of $50 for completing the test. The decision to 
pay an honorarium was based on experience in similar studies that indicated a powerful 
incentive was needed to get young people to travel up to an hour to a testing site, spend three 
hours or more taking a test, and then travel home. 
The decision to provide an incentive honorarium also was influenced by the importance of the 
annual NLSY and an obligation to ensure the added demands of the PAY80 study on NLSY 
respondents would not affect further NLSY participation. The hope was the monetary incentive 
offered for participating in the PAY80 study would keep NLSY respondents from opting out of 
the longitudinal study and perhaps even generate goodwill. 
To maximize representation, oversampling targeted several specific demographic categories: 
Hispanics, Blacks, economically-disadvantaged Whites, and women in the military. Service 
members were explicitly sought for inclusion, resulting in 1,158 PAY80 respondents (13%) from 
the Services. Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of the PAY80 sample by racial/ethnic group. 
The sample included 40% Black and Hispanic youth. 
PAY80 participants took the paper-and-pencil version of the 10 tests comprising the ASVAB 
(Form 8a) in use in 1980: Arithmetic Reasoning, Paragraph Comprehension, Word Knowledge, 
Mathematics Knowledge, General Science, Electronics Information, Mechanical 
Comprehension, Automotive-Shop Information, Numerical Operations, and Coding Speed. 
Individuals also provided sociodemographic information, such as gender, race/ethnicity, level of 
education, mother’s education (as a proxy for socioeconomic status), and geographic region. 
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of PAY80 Sample by Race/Ethnic Group 
 
Profile of American Youth 1997 (PAY97) Study 
A second PAY study was initiated in 1997, again to update the norms for the ASVAB. At the 
time planning began for PAY97, the primary concern within DoD about the PAY80 norms was 
that they might be outdated and no longer appropriate for young people in the mid-1990s. The 
need to revise and update the 1980 norms was emphasized and encouraged by DoD’s testing 
advisory panel – the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing (DACMPT). 
This committee was established in 1980 in the aftermath of the ASVAB miscalibration at the 
behest of Congress (U.S. Department of Defense, 1980b). Comprised of experts in test 
development, norming, and validation; personnel selection and job classification; career 
guidance and counseling; and later computer adaptive testing, the DACMPT was chartered to 
review all aspects of DoD’s enlistment testing process and, if necessary, to recommend ways to 
enhance and streamline the ASVAB system. In truth, its major purpose was (and remains) to 
ensure that another ASVAB miscalibration and the resulting enlistment of unqualified youth will 
never happen again. Consequently, the DACMPT played an important role in reviewing PAY97 
from its earliest planning stages to the implementation of revised norms.  
As a component of DoL’s larger NLSY97 study, NORC conducted the PAY97 study, which 
comprised two samples—the Enlistment Testing Program (ETP) and the Student Testing 
Program (STP). The ETP sample was designed to develop norms for the version of the ASVAB 
used to determine enlistment eligibility and to assign successful recruits to military occupations. 
The STP sample was used to develop norms for the Career Exploration Program (CEP), or 
student version of the ASVAB (see Chapter 1). 
The PAY97 sample was drawn between February and October 1997. A total of 5,660 youth, 
ages 18 to 23, participated in the study, compared to the 8,133 young people screened for 
eligibility, resulting in a participation rate of 75%. The PAY97 ETP participation rate of 75% was 
7 percentage points below the PAY80 participation rate of 82%. As with PAY80, the PAY97 
study oversampled Hispanic and Black youth—the sample included 42% Black and Hispanic 
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women or to include Service members. As a result, only 261 respondents (4%) in the PAY97 
sample were in the military, which represented a 9 percentage-point drop from the PAY80 
sample. This undersampling of military youth did not present a problem, however, since 
inclusion of a representative military sample was not required to design and weight a national 
probability sample of American young people. Of the eligible minority respondents, 75% took 
part in the PAY97 study (Martin, 1998). Hispanic youth had the lowest response rate (63%), 
followed by Black youth (73%). Participants not of Hispanic or Black race/ethnicity were most 
likely to participate (80%). 
 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of PAY97 Sample by Race/Ethnic Group 
 
Figure 2.2 presents the distribution of the PAY97 sample by racial/ethnic group. The sample 
included 42% Black and Hispanic youth. 
PAY97 participants took four computer-administered instruments—an Initial Questionnaire, a 
computer-adaptive version of the ASVAB (CAT-ASVAB) (Form 04D), the Interest-Finder, and an 
Exit Questionnaire. The Initial Questionnaire asked for birth date and school grade, while the 
Exit Questionnaire collected background information including education and racial/ethnic origin, 
as well as data on a set of items that addressed the respondent’s testing experience. (The 
Interest-Finder was the vocational interest inventory used in the Career Exploration Program at 
the time of the PAY97 study.)  
The CAT-ASVAB administered for the PAY97 study consisted of 10 tests, which differed 
somewhat from the paper-and-pencil battery taken in PAY80: Arithmetic Reasoning, Paragraph 
Comprehension, Word Knowledge, Mathematics Knowledge, General Science, Electronics 
Information, Mechanical Comprehension, Automotive Information, Shop Information, and 
Assembling Objects. Assembling Objects, a nonverbal perceptual test in the PAY97 ASVAB, 
replaced the speeded tests—Numerical Operations and Coding Speed—which were part of the 
PAY80 ASVAB. In addition, by the time PAY97 was conducted, the Automotive-Shop 
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Youth identified for the PAY97 ETP and STP samples were tested during a nine-month period 
from June 1997 through March 1998. Testing took place at 149 permanent Sylvan Prometric 
Test Centers and 120 temporary facilities located throughout the continental United States and 
Alaska (Martin, 1998). Due to the limited number of NORC field interviewers, which caused 
screening to proceed slowly, and fewer than expected test sites willing to offer the CAT-ASVAB, 
which led to delays in test scheduling, the PAY97 testing effort lasted longer than initially 
planned. As a result, by mid-July 1997, with one third of the summer over, only about 6% of the 
ASVAB testing had been completed (Martin, 1998). Despite the additional time allocated to 
identifying participants within the required age range, the resulting ETP sample was neither as 
large as desired nor as representative as expected (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003; Martin, 1997) 
and the overall participation rate was relatively low compared to PAY80 (Martin, 1998, 1997; 
Martin & Welsh, 1999). 
The STP comprised a nationally representative sample of U.S. students who were in grades 9 
through 11 in the spring or summer of 1997 and were expected to be in grades 10 through 12 in 
the fall of 1997 (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003; Martin & Welsh, 1999; Martin, 1998; Curran, 1996). 
Because the primary purpose of PAY97 was to develop norms for the enlistment version of the 
ASVAB, results are not presented in this book for the ASVAB or the associated interest 
inventory used in the STP. Indeed, due to screening issues, DoD suspended data collection for 
the STP sample in October 1997 because many of the potential examinees were six to eight 
weeks into the new school year and thus beyond the sample parameters. Ultimately, 4,644 
young people out of the 6,081 eligible for the STP sample were tested for a participation rate of 
76% (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003). 
Several studies were conducted to help ensure that the norms developed through PAY97 testing 
were not biased (Martin, 1999; Curran & McBride, 1995). Three potential sources of bias were of 
special concern. The first concern was possible bias due to non-response. Although a rigorous 
sampling procedure was used, inevitably some members of the PAY97 sample would choose to not 
participate; this could skew the norms. The second potential source was bias due to unmotivated 
responding, where people in the sample would purposely under perform on the military’s aptitude 
test. If a significant number of test-takers did not perform at their best, the new ASVAB norms could 
underestimate the distribution of abilities in the youth population. The third source was bias due to 
the conditions of test administration. Here, the computer equipment and the testing environment of 
PAY97 might differ from the actual testing conditions of enlistment screening. In this case, as well, 
the resulting norms could be somewhat inaccurate because of lack of standardization in the testing 
environment (Martin, 1999; McBride, Waters, & Curran, 1995). 
To encourage maximum participation in PAY80, members of the 1979 NLSY sample were 
offered $50 to take the paper-and-pencil ASVAB. This incentive proved effective in achieving a 
participation rate of 83%. Since the monetary incentive was so successful for PAY80, a similar 
approach was adopted for PAY97. However, the matter of how much money should be offered 
for PAY97 was uncertain, given the effects of inflation since 1980, modified testing conditions, 
and the different demands placed on participants.3  
The Human Resources Research Organization (McBride, Waters, & Curran, 1995; McBride & 
Waters, 1996) studied the question of how much to offer by estimating the effects of three levels 
of incentives on ASVAB participation. The three incentive levels were $50, $75, and $100. 
                                                
3 Simply calculating for inflation, a $50 incentive in 1980 was equivalent to $99 in 1997. For added 
perspective, a $50 incentive in 1980 was worth about $130 in 2008. See “inflation calculator” at 
http://www.westegg.com/inflation. Accessed 5 February 2010. 
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Results of the study showed an overall participation rate of 87% could be achieved by using the 
$75 level. This compared with a nearly equal rate of participation when $100 was offered. 
Subgroup analysis indicated no large differences in participation as a function of either 
race/ethnicity or gender (Martin, 1997). Consequently, DoD decided to use the most cost-
effective incentive of $75 for the PAY97 study. 
A second study was designed to determine if ASVAB scores would be affected by differences 
between PAY97 testing conditions and those employed by DoD operationally. Tests such as the 
ASVAB are usually administered under standardized conditions. Further, norms obtained under 
one set of conditions are not necessarily appropriate for the same tests if they are administered 
under different conditions. This raised an important question at the time concerning the basic 
methodology of PAY97: Would norms derived from PAY97 testing, using computer equipment, 
be fundamentally different from norms obtained in operational enlistment testing or by other test 
administration media, such as the paper-and-pencil ASVAB? 
Another study attempted to determine the potential impact of different testing conditions on 
PAY97 results, but the sample size for this study fell short of the number of respondents 
necessary. Nevertheless, researchers were able to resolve several procedural problems. These 
included developing identification procedures for the study’s participants and the scheduling of 
ASVAB examinees by NORC field interviewers with Sylvan’s National Registration Center. One 
of the most important lessons learned was that the Sylvan Testing Centers’ usual weekday 
business hours were not adequate for PAY97 examinees, requiring extended weekday evening 
and Saturday hours (Martin, 1997). The issues of testing locations and mode of testing (e.g., 
paper-and-pencil vs. CAT-ASVAB) are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3. 
In addition to conducting special, pre-PAY97 studies, the Human Resources Research 
Organization, on behalf of DoD, also organized and managed a PAY97 Norming Advisory 
Group to provide technical guidance and oversight. The group comprised five nationally 
recognized authorities in the fields of test and norm development, test equating, computerized 
testing, item response theory, sampling and weighting, and survey methodology. The PAY97 
Norming Advisory Group members included Dr. Fritz Drasgow and Dr. Lenore Harmon (both 
from the University of Illinois), Dr. Michael Kolen (American College Testing Program), Dr. Ben 
King (Florida Atlantic University), and Dr. Norman Bradburn (University of Chicago). 
An important difference between the PAY80 and PAY97 samples, as discussed by Martin and 
Welsh (1999), should be highlighted here. In PAY80 the NLSY79 sample was already 
established. The DoD made the determination that PAY80, a sampling program already in 
progress by DoL, could serve as a nationally representative sample of American youth for 
ASVAB norming purposes. For PAY97, however, a conscious decision was made by DoD to 
participate in the sampling strategy from the beginning to ensure that the sample design and 
sample would be representative of young people comprising the military-age population. Thus, 
despite some problems later encountered regarding data collection (see Appendix C for a full 
discussion of these issues), it was determined that the sample plan for PAY97 was acceptable, 
but the study execution was poor. In contrast, the sampling plan and execution of PAY80 were 
deemed more successful.  
PAY Study Data and Public Debate 
Just as the support for and the administration of the PAY80 and PAY97 studies differed, the 
public reaction to the PAY80 and PAY97 data has been dramatically different. Released during 
a period when military recruiting was particularly difficult, the media were quick to associate the 
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PAY80 data with questions related to the racial/ethnic composition of the AVF compared to 
society in general. PAY97 data, however, have generated little public debate. 
PAY80 Data Spark Controversy 
Beginning in the spring of 1981, a small group of researchers took on the task of analyzing the initial 
results of the PAY80 study and presenting the information in a series of conference papers, 
monographs, and a DoD report. Even before the data were available for review, NORC was asked 
to document all aspects of the study in a series of technical reports (Frankel & McWilliams, 1981; 
McWilliams, 1980). Peer-review committees and other teams of experts were formed to study 
various aspects of the PAY80 data (Sellman & Hagan, 1981), including the suitability of the ASVAB 
and its fairness with regard to women and minorities (Bock & Mislevy, 1981).  
In addition, several researchers were asked to conduct studies that could be used as 
background or “literature reviews” to accompany or supplement the anticipated PAY80 results. 
Among these was a brief evaluation and annotated bibliography of previous studies on 
differences in the tested abilities of various demographic groups (Eitelberg, 1981; Eitelberg, 
Laurence, Waters, & Sellman, 1981). Although this particular review considered a number of 
demographic variables, the main intent was to examine studies of White-Black differences and 
historical findings on test-score differences between men and women. Indeed, the researcher 
who conducted this particular review was instructed by a DoD official at the outset:  
The PAY80 study will likely show that Blacks and Hispanics score well below Whites on 
the AFQT. Notable differences are likewise expected between men and women, with 
women scoring higher on verbal components and men scoring higher on math, 
mechanical, and other subtests. We want to have background research in hand showing 
that these differences are ‘nothing new,’ that they correspond with previous studies and 
existing trends in standardized testing. (W. S. Sellman, personal communication, 1981) 
 
At the same time, other researchers from the Human Resources Research Organization 
(HumRRO) were asked to describe the so-called “test-score decline” that had been observed on 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and several other standardized tests (Waters, Eitelberg, & 
Laurence, 1981). The main reason for examining the national trend in declining test scores was 
similar to the reason for analyzing test-score differences among selected demographic groups—
the general expectation was that score distributions on the PAY80 study would be narrower 
than the score distributions for the World War II population, the results of which were still being 
used for AFQT norming at the time of the PAY80 study. 
The preliminary reviews of the PAY80 data were not widely distributed, nor were they discussed 
beyond a small circle of researchers and testing authorities. They did prove useful, however, 
when the PAY80 data were analyzed. The initial study of PAY80 data conformed somewhat to 
expectations. Wide differences were found between the test scores of Blacks and Whites and 
between men and women on certain tests. On the other hand, PAY80 test score distributions 
were surprisingly similar to the World War II score distributions. Of these initial analyses, DoD 
was most concerned with the rather substantial White-Black gap in the AFQT scores. 
Even though White-Black score differences were within the expected range, which was 
supported by dozens of previous studies, many people associated with the PAY80 study were 
worried about public reaction. After all, this was not the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), 
American College Test (ACT), or some other standardized test that was produced commercially 
 
Chapter 2 19 
and distributed through private channels. This was DoD’s military enlistment test, financed at 
public expense and used to screen military recruits who would defend the nation. Further, 
PAY80 marked the first time a vocational aptitude test had been administered to a nationally 
representative sample of American youth. In this respect PAY80 was unprecedented and truly 
historic. Consequently, the feeling was the PAY80 results would provide a government 
imprimatur or institutional recognition of racial and other differences in the cognitive abilities of 
American youth. Acknowledging this, DoD officials took great care to try to shape the findings 
before releasing them for public consumption. 
Most of the initial analyses were completed well before the first set of study papers were 
presented in October 1981 at a meeting of the Military Testing Association (MTA) in Arlington, 
Virginia. Rather than having a group of PAY80 researchers discuss preliminary results at the 
MTA conference, however, DoD officials decided to meet with various minority interest groups 
to provide them a preview of the findings. The meetings were intended primarily as a courtesy to 
offer advance information of the PAY80 findings so minority interests could prepare for a 
possible storm of media coverage and to soften the anticipated focus on racial/ethnic 
differences. The meetings also were intended to convey DoD’s principal reasons for conducting 
PAY80—namely, to compare military recruits with their civilian counterparts and to establish 
new norms for scoring the ASVAB. 
Many of the researchers who presented papers at the MTA conference subsequently submitted 
papers as part of a panel at the annual conference of the American Educational Research 
Association (AERA) held five months later in New York City in March 1982. The evening before 
the AERA panel was to convene, however, DoD officials decided certain findings could not be 
revealed publicly and that the papers prepared for the conference would be withdrawn 
indefinitely. DoD took this action in response to the growing media controversy that began with 
a Washington Post front-page article that appeared on Sunday, February 21, 1982. 
In an article titled, “Blacks Score Below Whites in Pentagon Test,” the Washington Post’s 
Pentagon reporter George C. Wilson summarized the PAY80 results with an emphasis on the 
White-Black differences and recounted the events leading to his discovery of the study: 
The Reagan Administration has been treating the test results like political land 
mines, trying to keep them from going off by meeting privately over the past 
several days with representatives of such groups as the National Urban League, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the 
Mexican-American Legal and Educational [sic] Fund. The administration had 
planned to hold off releasing the report until March 1.  
However, after learning that the Post had found out the test results, Pentagon 
officials agreed to discuss them Friday and yesterday. They also called in 
specialists over the weekend to whip up a summary report for earlier public 
release, perhaps Monday (Wilson, 1982). 
 
As Wilson correctly states, DoD officials met privately with several minority interest groups 
before publicly releasing the PAY80 results. These meetings had two major objectives: first, 
they were intended to provide context, in the sense that PAY80 results on racial/ethnic 
differences were generally similar to results obtained from previous scientific studies; and 
second, DoD officials wanted to ensure that prominent minority groups and their representatives 
would understand the background and motives for conducting PAY80. In typical Washington, 
 
Chapter 2 20 
DC fashion, selected information was purposely leaked to Wilson before the official release of 
the PAY80 results in an attempt to help frame the news media’s report—but this approach 
backfired. Instead of focusing on the comparative quality of new recruits, as DoD officials had 
hoped, Wilson’s account centered squarely on the racial/ethnic differences found in military-
sponsored nationwide testing.  
By implying the release of the data was somehow being orchestrated by the “Reagan 
Administration” rather than by DoD, Wilson’s “exclusive” article initiated a media storm. Even 
before the Monday morning press conference arranged by DoD, the Post’s front-page story was 
picked up by news wire services worldwide and a legion of other media outlets hungry for a hot 
item on a slow weekend. Thus, the PAY80 study gained almost immediate notoriety. Jane 
Pauley, on NBC’s “Sunday Night News,” reported the study was “sure to become controversial.” 
Diane Sawyer pumped up the controversy Monday morning on the “CBS Morning Show”: “The 
scores for Whites averaged almost twice as high as the scores for Blacks.” In addition, because 
Wilson and the Post had covered the episode as a breakthrough of investigative journalism—
unearthing a “semisecret” document from an anxious Reagan Administration that was fearfully 
dodging “political land mines” and embarrassment—the media covered the PAY80 study as 
“hard news” (Eitelberg, Doering, & Sellman, 1982). 
In fact, by the time Wilson wrote about the meetings with minority interest groups, a Joint 
Service panel of testing experts, senior researchers at HumRRO, and several others had all but 
finished the DoD summary report. The Joint Service panel of testing experts had reviewed 
various drafts of the report in painstaking detail over the course of many weeks. Drs. W. S. 
Sellman and M. J. Eitelberg were among the “specialists” involved in preparing and finalizing the 
summary report, including a fact-sheet for the White House, a press statement for the news 
media, and several camera-ready photocopies of the report. The camera-ready copy was 
delivered to DoD’s printing office, which produced 250 copies for distribution at the press 
conference on Monday, February 22, 1982. The first run of newly printed copies were so “hot off 
the presses” they were bound with a blank sheet of paper over the red, white, and blue cover to 
minimize the smudging of the still-wet ink. 
The events leading to the release of the PAY80 results and the media’s treatment are 
chronicled in a paper by Eitelberg, Doering, and Sellman (1982), prepared for the American 
Psychological Association’s (APA’s) 1982 annual convention.4 As the authors observe, DoD 
officials had hoped press coverage of PAY80 would focus primarily on how the test scores of 
new recruits compared with those of their counterparts in the general population. Instead the 
PAY80 findings stoked the national debate surrounding military recruiting—from the viability of 
the AVF “experiment” to the demographics of enlistees as compared to the general population. 
Although the PAY80 results clearly showed the test scores of new volunteers compared 
favorably with those of youth from across the nation on all standard measures of quality, as 
Eitelberg, Doering, and Sellman (1982) wrote, news accounts of PAY80 generally did not relay 
DoD’s upbeat message. Instead, a number of news reports emphasized racial differences (such 
as the article in the Washington Post and a similar piece, “Blacks Score Half as Well as Whites 
in Pentagon Test,” in the Chicago Sun Times). 
                                                
4 Perhaps the most telling indicator of the current and future controversy was the presence of Arthur 
Jensen, conspicuously sitting in the front row at the APA presentation. At the time, protestors openly 
stalked Jensen, a UC-Berkeley research psychologist and “father” of what was called “Jensenism” (a 
derisive term equated with “scientific racism.”). 
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The St. Paul (Minnesota) Pioneer Press, in an article titled “Study Revives Ethnic Inferiority 
Controversy,” introduced its description of PAY80 as follows: “Whites tend to outscore Blacks 
and Hispanics on standard military qualifying tests because of ‘social separation’ of ethnic 
groups, according to a controversial Pentagon study released Monday” (Greve, 1982, February 
23). Meanwhile the Philadelphia Inquirer reported “Pentagon Says Low Test Scores Fault of 
Culture,” and further explained: “A pentagon study showing that Whites tend to outscore Blacks 
and Hispanics on standard military qualifying tests cites ‘social separation’ of the ethnic groups 
as a principal cause but also mentions possible genetic factors” (Greve, 1982, February 24). 
A few news outlets covered the story from an angle that virtually no one had anticipated. Typical 
of these was an article in the Los Angeles Times (reprinted in at least 25 other newspapers 
through the Times wire service) that introduced genetic factors in its account of the PAY80 
results with the lead sentence: 
The Defense Department Monday released an independent analysis of its 
nationwide youth achievement test that cited genetic factors as one reason for 
the relatively poor performance of Blacks and Latinos on the test (Los Angeles 
Times, 1982 as cited in Eitelberg, Doering, & Sellman, 1982). 
 
As it turned out, most of the authors of the newspaper articles were picking up on other press 
accounts and had never seen the DoD report. (And in fairness to all concerned, the vast 
majority of news articles on the PAY80 results did not mention the genetics issue.) 
Most disturbing to DoD officials (particularly senior civilians in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense) were the news stories that introduced the “nature-nurture” debate as a possible 
reason for the lower scores achieved by minorities. Ironically, this reporting was the exact 
opposite of what DoD had hoped to accomplish through the meetings with the minority groups 
and their efforts to manage public and media perceptions of PAY80 data. In fact, these news 
stories were the result of two mistakes, one made by DoD and one by the news media.  
In 1980, DoD commissioned Darrell Bock, a well-known, highly respected psychologist at the 
University of Chicago to study the possible factors affecting majority-minority and other 
demographic differences in test performance. This study was to be the first, “initial contribution 
to scholarly investigation of the new database,” as Eitelberg, Doering, and Sellman (1982) 
note—and, most importantly, an independent investigation “that in no way reflected the official 
policy or opinion of the sponsoring agency.” Because the study was unavailable for distribution 
when the PAY80 results were released in February 1982, DoD officials opted to share with the 
press an “executive summary” from the work to illustrate the potential types of research that 
could be executed with PAY80 data. 
Distributing the executive summary of an independent study on the reasons behind majority-
minority differences in testing at the PAY80 press briefing, with the national press focused on 
the White-Black gap, gave the mistaken impression that DoD was invested in exploring the 
nature-nurture debate. Ironically, DoD officials had decided at the outset of PAY80 that no 
interpretative studies would be conducted internally; the data were to be presented as they were 
with explanations left to outsiders. This tact is apparent in DoD’s own, rather terse report on the 
PAY80 findings (U.S. Department of Defense, 1982b). Nevertheless, some newspaper 
columnists and editorial writers erroneously connected the work of the independent scholar, 
which was sponsored by DoD, with the Department’s own policy and positions. For example, a 
writer with the Chicago Tribune argued that PAY80 could be perceived as a “return to the 
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American-style racism that had diminished but never disappeared”—a “comeback” for theories 
of genetic inferiority that would ultimately buttress renewed racial segregation. “The 19th Century 
is back,” he wrote, thanks to the Department of Defense (Jarrett, 1982). 
Eventually, the manner in which the press treated the PAY80 data became a story of its own. 
The Washington Post was harshly criticized for its approach by many of the newspaper’s 
readers. Some weeks after the appearance of the front-page story the Post’s ombudsman 
apologized, admitting the story received “too much attention” when it was reported, that the 
headline and story were “tilted,” and that the article discounted the “principal conclusion” of 
PAY80: “the All-Volunteer Force is ‘above average.’” “Altogether,” the Post’s ombudsman wrote, 
“I conclude the story was misplayed” (from Eitelberg, Doering, & Sellman, 1982; McCloskey, 
1982). Added to this unusual admission of error was an erratum by the Associated Press 
regarding its report that “young Blacks scored half as well as young Whites.” According to the 
Associated Press, “the story erroneously mixed percentile ratings with percentage scores.” 
Included with the erratum was a short explanation of the percentile scores. 
One final experience regarding the PAY80 results is worth noting. On Easter Sunday 1982, Dr. 
W. S. Sellman received a telephone call from Nobel Laureate in Physics William B. Shockley, 
inventor of the transistor. Late in his career, Shockley had become interested in questions of 
race, intelligence, and eugenics. He believed that there were racial differences in intelligence as 
a function of genetics and that the scientific community should investigate questions of heredity, 
intelligence, and demographic trends, and suggest policy changes based on the findings. 
Having heard about PAY80, and having experienced similar negative publicity in the media, 
Shockley wanted DoD to join him in his pursuit of the “truth” in this very sensitive area. Although 
flabbergasted and yet flattered that Shockley would call him, Sellman declined his offer. 
The media’s coverage of the PAY80 results was the subject of a study by Lynne Sussman 
presented in a paper at the1983 convention of the American Association of Public Opinion 
Research (Snyderman & Rothman, 1988). Sussman interviewed journalists, social scientists, and 
government officials and analyzed nearly 50 stories on PAY80 results from various news and media 
sources. Years later, Snyderman and Rothman, drawing heavily on Sussman’s work, used the 
PAY80 media coverage to address the central question of “why expert opinion and public views 
toward intelligence testing are so widely divergent” (Snyderman & Rothman, 1988). According to 
Snyderman and Rothman (1988, p. 178), “numerous aspects of press coverage of the Profile of 
American Youth Study demonstrate the way organizational constraints placed on journalists, as well 
as their own values, can interfere with accurate and balanced coverage of scientific issues.” 
The Washington Post “exclusive” on the PAY80 study emphasized the White-Black differential 
because it was “more newsworthy and more interesting to readers than what turned out to be the 
Pentagon’s lead in its press release” (the civilian-recruit comparison), according to Wilson, who 
reported the story. Nevertheless, Snyderman and Rothman (1988) ultimately concluded: 
Despite some indication that the news media may be presenting stories concerning 
testing in a somewhat slanted manner, the majority of all print and broadcast stories 
are rated as neutral in the overall impression with which they leave the reader. This 
is not to say that the media are generally accurate and objective in their coverage of 
testing issues. As many who have studied the news media have noted, media bias is 
more often reflected in the selection of stories than in a biased accounting within any 
given story. To this we would add that inaccuracies in technical stories result when 
there is more concern with appealing to the audience than with objectively reporting 
what the technical experts have to say (p. 201). 
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(It should be noted that the full study by Snyderman and Rothman, The IQ Controversy: The 
Media and Public Policy, although impressive empirically, based on the responses of 661 
scholars to a survey on IQ-related issues, is itself a significant source of controversy.)5 
To a noticeably lesser extent, news organizations did report improvements in recruiting, such as 
“Volunteers in Armed Forces Test ‘Above Average,” from the New York Times and “Pentagon 
Finds Recruits More Trainable,” from the Christian Science Monitor. Not until recruiting 
improved beyond anyone’s expectations in the early 1980s, however, was DoD able to use the 
PAY80 results to publicize recent successes in recruiting and reverse what had become a 
widely held view that the AVF was on the verge of collapse. 
PAY97 Data Receive Little Fanfare 
The lesson from PAY80 for PAY97 is not tied directly to the research of Snyderman and 
Rothman—nor to the way in which the media handled PAY80 data or to the conclusions of 
those who examined events surrounding the release of findings from PAY80. The principal 
lesson for PAY97 is perhaps more simply that the times change. In the case of PAY80, it could 
be argued that the past is not necessarily prologue to the future because there has been 
relatively little interest in the PAY97 results. One reason may relate to the age of the PAY97 
data—the results from PAY80 were still “hot” when reported in 1982, while PAY97 data have 
cooled considerably as the first decade of the 21st Century draws to a close. Further, PAY80 
was the first vocational aptitude battery administered to a nationally representative sample—a 
characteristic proudly emphasized by DoD in almost every official description. PAY97, although 
pioneering in its use of computer technology, is what researchers refer to as reiteration or 
replication. 
Another reason might relate to the times. Since 1982, recruiting has seen its ups and downs, 
but the AVF has survived quite well and never reached a point where discussions of “low test 
scores” or the “poor quality of recruits” have stimulated truly serious debate about returning to 
compulsory military service. Finally, although one still can find scholarly disagreement over the 
meaning, causes, and possible cures for racial differences on tests of cognitive ability, the 
intensity, frequency, and content of the debate seems to have changed. 
Ruminations on Race and Testing 
The contemporary debate over the causes and consequences of racial differences in testing 
has produced both heat and light since Arthur Jensen asked, “How Much Can We Boost IQ and 
School Achievement?” in a 1969 edition of Harvard Educational Review. “Dozens of books and 
hundreds of articles” appeared thereafter, “denouncing the use of IQ tests and arguing that 
mental abilities are determined by environment, with the genes playing a minor role and race 
none at all” (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 9). Numerous works over the past 40 years also 
have argued both for and against Jenson on his basic themes, particularly regarding the White-
Black test-score gap. At no point since the mid-1990s, however, has the debate been quite as 
heated as with the publication of The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American 
Life, by Herrnstein and Murray (1994). 
                                                
5 See, for example, a review in Commentary (Seligman, 1989) and an essay from Society by Gottfredson 
(1994). Perhaps the best evidence of “controversy” is that Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, includes a 
special entry for the Snyderman and Rothman study—and within this, a section on “Criticism”—in its 
comprehensive coverage of “Race and Intelligence.” Rothman, with Lichter and Lichter, is the coauthor of 
a somewhat related study and equally controversial work, The Media Elite: America’s New Powerbrokers, 
published in 1986. 
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In drawing conclusions regarding PAY97 and its connections to PAY80, one cannot avoid 
mentioning The Bell Curve and its influence on discussions of testing differences and outcomes, 
since a primary source of data for the study by Herrnstein and Murray is PAY80 (and the 
NLSY)6. The authors posit, among other points, that intelligence is the “great predictor” of those 
who succeed economically, socially, educationally, and the like; and that our polity and society 
have become increasingly divided based on cognitive ability. “Throughout The Bell Curve,” the 
authors write, “we use the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a measure of IQ” 
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 603)7. As stated here: 
[T]he AFQT is what psychometricians call ‘highly g-loaded,’ meaning that it is a good 
measure of general cognitive ability. . . . [Furthermore], the AFQT is an excellent test, 
with psychometric reliability and validity that compare well with those of other major tests 
of intelligence.” (p. 120.) 
 
In fact, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) present AFQT scores throughout the book in the IQ metric 
and even refer to AFQT scores as “IQ scores” (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 120). The authors 
purport to show in a technical appendix that: “the AFQT is one of the most highly g-loaded 
mental tests in common use;” it “seems to do what a good IQ test is supposed to do . . . as well 
or better than its competitors;” and it “is more highly correlated with a wide range of other mental 
tests than those other mental tests are with each other.” Thus, the authors conclude, “the AFQT 
qualifies not just as an IQ test, but one of the better ones psychometrically” (Herrnstein & Murray, 
1994, p. 604). 
The paperback edition of The Bell Curve, published in 1996, contains an “afterword” by Charles 
Murray in which he comments on reactions to the PAY80 study and also attempts to refute 
criticisms. Murray describes The Bell Curve as likely to become “one of the most written-about 
and talked-about works of social science since the Kinsey Report 50 years ago” (Herrnstein & 
Murray, 1994, p. 553). In his comments, Murray asks: “Why did the book cause such a stir?” He 
answers: “The obvious answer is race, the omnipresent backdrop to discussion of social policy 
in the United States” (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, p. 554). This is, of course, a gross 
simplification as Murray looks more closely at various other lines of scholarly (and unscholarly) 
attacks on the work. 
The depth of controversy surrounding The Bell Curve was evidenced by the collective actions 
and reactions of psychologists and other scientists soon after the book’s publication. Early in the 
debate, 52 professors signed a statement supporting the book, titled Mainstream Science on 
Intelligence. The statement was published in The Wall Street Journal (Gottfredson, 1994) and 
                                                
6 Analyses in The Bell Curve use NLSY in conjunction with the PAY80 component, including later 
administrations of the NLSY (through the 1990 interview wave) as well as special studies linked with PAY80. 
7 The Bell Curve preceded PAY97 by about three years; however, its influence on discussions of testing 
differences and outcomes extends even to the present-day. The paperback version of The Bell Curve was 
published in 1996 and several books responding to The Bell Curve (positively or negatively) were published in 
1997 and years later. The paperback version of The Bell Curve reinvigorated the debate about race and 
cognitive ability testing around the time of PAY97 and thereafter despite the fact that its findings were based 
largely on the results of PAY80. This debate continued into the first decade of the 21st century; even the 
current president, Barack Obama, was involved in the debate during the later half of the 1990s. Without 
PAY80 data, the Herrnstein and Murray book may not have existed, or it would have been a minor blip of a 
monograph in the history of testing research. Commencing PAY97 testing at a similar point in time with the 
release of the paperback version of The Bell Curve refocused attention on the continuing debate on race and 
cognitive ability testing that is still going on in the popular and academic literature.  
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later in the academic journal, Intelligence (Gottfredson, 1997). At the same time, the APA’s 
Board of Scientific Affairs convened a special task force devoted solely to evaluating points in 
the book. The task force report, Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns (APA, 1995), was 
published in August 1995. A modified version of the report, which offered a mixed review of 
material in The Bell Curve, also appeared in the American Psychologist in early 1996. A flurry of 
related books—such as The Bell Curve Wars: Race, Intelligence, and the Future of America 
(Fraser, 1995), The Bell Curve Debate (Jacoby & Glauberman, 1995), Measured Lies 
(Kincheloe, Gresson, & Steinberg, 1997), and Intelligence, Genes, and Success (Devlin, 
Fienberg, Resnick, & Roeder, 1997)—fueled and extended the heated discussions. 
Also of note was Stephen Jay Gould’s revised and expanded version of The Mismeasure of 
Man, originally published in 1981.8 Gould elected to modify and reissue his own best-selling, 
controversial book to join the renewed debate over intelligence, heritability, and group 
differences while arguing against findings presented in The Bell Curve. Two years later, another 
entry in the policy side of the debate came from the Brookings Institution, The Black-White Test 
Score Gap, a collection of essays edited by Jencks and Phillips (1998).9 
Time magazine described The Bell Curve as “845 pages of provocation with footnotes”; 
Newsweek said it was “frightening stuff”; The National Review felt it was “magisterial”; New York 
Magazine claimed it was “grist for racism”; and Forbes praised the authors for their Jeffersonian 
vision (media quotes are from Fraser, 1995). Even Chicago civil rights lawyer, Barack Obama, 
entered the fray with a commentary for “All Things Considered” on National Public Radio in 
October 1994. According to Obama10: 
The idea that inferior genes account for the problems of the poor in general, and 
Blacks in particular, isn’t new, of course. Racial supremacists have been using IQ 
tests to support their theories since the turn of the century. The arguments 
against such dubious science aren’t new either. Scientists have repeatedly told 
us that genes don’t vary much from one race to another, and psychologists have 
pointed out the role that language and other cultural barriers can play in 
depressing minority test scores, and no one disputes that children whose 
mothers smoke crack when they’re pregnant are going to have developmental 
problems. 
. . . With one finger out to the political wind, Mr. Murray has apparently decided 
that White America is ready for a return to good old-fashioned racism so long as 
it’s artfully packaged and can admit for exceptions like Colin Powell. It’s easy to 
see the basis for Mr. Murray’s calculations. After watching their income stagnate 
or decline over the past decade, the majority of Americans are in an ugly mood 
and deeply resent any advantages, real or perceived, that minorities may enjoy. 
 
  
                                                
8 The 1981 book sold 250,000 copies and was translated into 10 languages. Discover magazine named 
Gould’s book the 17th “greatest science book of all time.” 
9 One should also mention The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability, by Arthur Jensen (1998). 
According to a reviewer in the Wall Street Journal, Jensen’s 650+ page “brick of a book” makes The Bell 
Curve “look like a biography of Leonardo DiCaprio. 
10 Transcript appears at http://www.gnxp.com/blog/2008/09/barack-obama-on-bell-curve.php. Accessed 
January 2009. 
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It seemed that no serious scholar could avoid, as a matter of conscience or conviction, weighing 
in on what one writer called “clearly the most incendiary piece of social science to appear in the 
last decade or more” (Fraser, 1995, p. 1). As it turned out, this applied to the faculty in the 
Department of Sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, where a team of six 
professors felt compelled to reexamine The Bell Curve data for a book titled Inequality by 
Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth (Fischer, Hout, Jankowski, Lucas, Swidler, & Voss, 1996). 
The authors used the same PAY80/NLSY79 data to “refute the claims of the incendiary 
bestseller . . . through a clear, rigorous re-analysis of the very data its authors used to contend 
that inherited differences in intelligence explain inequality” (Fischer et al., 1996, p. xi).  
One of the main areas of disagreement in this work is the AFQT itself, which the authors 
contend is a test of schooling and instruction—an achievement test rather than a measure of 
native intelligence. As if on a crusade to defeat a dangerous adversary, as a matter of 
professional and civic responsibility, the authors explain their position at the very start: 
But the ideology The Bell Curve represents is too pervasive; the book’s shock waves are 
too great to ignore. As social scientists, we feel responsible for correcting the record. As 
university teachers, we are painfully aware that The Bell Curve has unsettled our 
students. As citizens, we must participate in the national debate. So we set aside much 
of our ongoing work to write this book (Fischer et al., 1996, p. xi). 
 
While heated debates may subside over time, familiar voices of past debates may reemerge or 
continue to speak out. For example, a scholarly discussion in Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law begins with an article titled, “Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive 
Ability” (Rushton & Jensen, 2005), followed by “Heredity, Environment, and Race: A 
Commentary on Rushton and Jensen (2005)” (Nisbett, 2005). Added to this list is Race 
Differences in Intelligence by Lynn (2006), What Is Intelligence?: Beyond the Flynn Effect by 
Flynn (2007), and an unusual work that seems to complete the circle of the modern-day 
controversy, Intelligence, Race, and Genetics: Conversations with Arthur R. Jensen (Miele, 
2008). 
Unfairly or not, The Bell Curve has a reputation that places it alongside other works on the 
“nature” side of the nature-nurture debate. Fifteen years after publication, one does not need to 
look far to find references to The Bell Curve linking it to “inherited differences” or scientific 
racism. In San Francisco, for example, comedian/writer/director W. Kamau Bell presents a one-
man show called “The W. Kamau Bell Curve: Ending Racism in About an Hour.” Considering 
the popular Bay Area comedian’s name is Bell and that he is Black, one might conclude such 
references to “bell curve” and “racism” have little or nothing to do with a book of the same name, 
except that Bell’s publicity photo shows him with a rather stern expression, staring down at the 
camera, while clutching a hardback copy of The Bell Curve.11  
One important lesson from the past, dating well before PAY80, is that everything comes down to 
race in the end for many Americans. Racial/ethnic differences were the “hot story” to come out 
of PAY80, and not just for the news media. Scholars and other researchers were similarly drawn 
to the PAY80 data largely because of its new information on the White-Black gap. As Charles 
Murray observed, when explaining why The Bell Curve became the center of a fierce storm, 
race has been the “backdrop” for discussions of social and economic policy, fairness, 
                                                
11 See Bell’s Web site at: http://www.wkamaubell.com. The one-man show ran in 2008 and 2009 to good 
reviews. Bell was named the “2008 Bay Area Comedian of the Year” by San Francisco Weekly. 
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opportunities, civil rights, and other matters of concern to Americans for a long time (Herrnstein 
& Murray, 1994).  
In March 2008, presidential candidate Barack Obama asked why so many American are so 
interested in race in an attempt to defuse a controversy regarding his relationship with an 
outspoken pastor from Chicago. Obama opined that progress notwithstanding, the nation has 
yet to achieve racial equality: 
The fact is that the comments that have been made and the issues that have 
surfaced over the last few weeks reflect the complexities of race in this country 
that we've never really worked through - a part of our union that we have yet to 
perfect. . . . Understanding this reality requires a reminder of how we arrived at 
this point. As William Faulkner once wrote, "The past isn't dead and buried. In 
fact, it isn't even past." We do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice 
in this country. But we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the 
disparities that exist in the African-American community today can be directly 
traced to inequalities passed on from an earlier generation that suffered under 
the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. Segregated schools were, and are, 
inferior schools; we still haven't fixed them, fifty years after Brown v. Board of 
Education, and the inferior education they provided, then and now, helps explain 
the pervasive achievement gap between today's Black and White students 
(Obama, 2008).12 
 
Racial differences in testing have become a sort of barometer over the years for gauging 
the success or failure of fairness and racial equality—indeed, for measuring progress 
toward eliminating racial disparities throughout the nation. Further, these differences are 
essentially a marker for the nation’s self-image as a just society. A rosier view of 
progress toward a just society comes easily for those who see the White-Black gap in 
testing as a long-standing, immovable outcome, resistant to environmental or cultural 
forces. Those who see differences in testing as a dividing line between advantage and 
disadvantage might have a far different perspective.  
Looking Anew at the Data: Generational Changes in Cognitive Skills 
Even though White-Black differences have dominated PAY80 discussions for more than 25 
years, scores of researchers have employed the data for numerous other studies in the social 
and behavioral sciences, many of which are referenced in this book. When DoD first reported 
the results of the PAY80 study in 1982, analyses of population subgroup differences comprised 
but a secondary area of interest. DoD’s primary interest was to develop a new basis for norming 
the enlistment test and evaluating the comparative quality of Service recruits. Indeed, 
race/ethnicity was just one of the six areas of subgroup differences considered important and 
closely examined in the first look at the PAY80 results. As DoD reported (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1982a, p. vii), a number of interesting findings were discovered aside from differences 
in race/ethnicity: 
  
                                                
12 Text of speech from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/18/obama-race-speech-read-
th_n_92077.html. Accessed 3-18-09. 
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 The average (mean) AFQT percentile scores of the 1980 youth population increased 
with age. Estimates of reading grade level also increased with age. 
 The average AFQT percentile scores of males and females were similar. Average test 
scores on the aptitude composites differed. Males scored higher than females on the 
tests that measure cognitive ability in general trainability, and mechanical and 
electronics skills; females outscored males on tests measuring verbal and administrative 
skills. 
 AFQT percentile scores showed a clear relationship to levels of educational attainment. 
Non-high school graduates had the lowest average scores; high school graduates had 
the highest scores. GED recipients scored between these two groups. 
 Average AFQT percentile scores were highest for youth in New England and the West 
North Central regions of the country and lowest in the three southern regions. Youth in 
the East North Central, Middle Atlantic, Mountain, Pacific, and West South Central 
regions scored at approximately the level of the overall population median. 
The PAY97 study offers a rare opportunity to compare results from PAY80 and PAY97 and to 
measure changes in test performance 17 years later. Although there is no precise definition of a 
“generation,” given methods employed to demarcate population or cultural differences, a 17-
year span fits roughly within the bounds currently applied. In fact, participants in the PAY80 
sample, born between 1957 and 1962, fall within the latter years (1946 through 1964) of what 
demographers have called the “Baby Boom Generation.” Participants in the PAY97 sample, 
born between 1974 and 1979, fall mostly within the beginning years (1976 through 2001) of 
what is known as “Generation Y.”13 Consequently, however one defines a “generation” or a 
distinct span of birth years—whether by name or time—comparing PAY80 and PAY97 data 
allows researchers to identify generational changes in cognitive skills based on widely used and 
highly respected tests administered to nationally representative samples of American youth. 
Given the great cost, enormous difficulty, and extended effort involved in conducting these 
studies, it is easy to see why the present comparison of one generation to another is so 
compelling. 
 
                                                
13 “Generation X” falls between the “Baby Boom” and “Y” generations. No formal process exists for 
delimiting generations, and definitions of the precise years may vary across various studies, societies, and 
nations. 
 





Before comparing test scores from the PAY80 and PAY97 samples, consideration must be 
given to alternative explanations for any observed differences, rather than immediately 
attributing differences to changes in the ability of the nation’s youth. One alternative explanation 
for the observed differences is that the ASVAB was administered in paper-and-pencil (P&P) 
mode in 1980 and as a computer-adaptive test (CAT) in 1997. Additional explanations include 
the comparability of testing purpose, administration conditions, and the motivation of individuals 
taking the tests across the two administrations. 
Effects of the Test Administration Format 
In traditional testing, all individuals taking a given form of a test receive the same set of test 
items. Multiple forms of a test may be developed and used simultaneously or sequentially. For 
example, college admissions tests that are administered every month use a different form at 
each administration to prevent later test takers from learning about item content from earlier test 
takers. Techniques for preparing parallel or sequential test forms are well developed in the 
testing field. Nonetheless, in traditional testing only a few forms of a given test are in use at any 
time, and large numbers of individuals receive the same test form. 
Computerized test administration allows for automated real-time scoring and improved test 
security through the elimination of paper forms. While traditional P&P tests can be uploaded to a 
computerized format, the CAT format offers a more radical approach that takes greater 
advantage of the possibilities presented by computerization. This form of testing tailors items to 
an individual’s ability level based on answers to an initial set of items with known difficulty levels. 
This allows the test items that are given to high-ability individuals, for example, to focus on more 
difficult items to identify where an individual falls in the above-average score range. With a 
traditional test, individuals receive a full set of items ranging from easy to hard. High-ability 
individuals waste considerable testing time on items that are easy for them to answer. Data from 
CAT testing are not lost because the assumption is that high-ability individuals would get 
virtually all the easy items right in the traditional test. By using an item administration algorithm, 
the information learned about an individual can be maximized in a short period of time. 
Assuming nothing is known about an individual in advance, a test using an item administration 
algorithm might start with an item at the 50th percentile in difficulty. If the individual gets the item 
correct, one at the 75th percentile in difficulty is given next. If the individual again gets the item 
correct, an even more difficult item is administered, say at the 85th percentile. If the individual 
answers incorrectly, an item of lower difficulty is administered. The strategy is to quickly hone in 
on an individual’s ability level. 
Computer-adaptive tests have the potential to obtain an estimate of an individual’s ability 
comparable to that obtained from a P&P test in much less time, and/or to obtain a more precise 
estimate of the individual’s ability by administering the same number of items as in a traditional 
test, but tailoring those items to the individual’s ability level. Put another way, easy items provide 
little useful information about high-ability individuals, and hard items provide little information 
about low-ability individuals. Paper-and-pencil tests must cover the full range of item difficulty 
because individuals comprising the full ability range will take the test. Computer-adaptive tests 
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allow for the selection of items that will provide the most useful information about an individual’s 
ability level, given his or her performance on the initial items. 
Between the PAY80 and PAY97 studies, the military conducted extensive research on CAT 
development and administration. DoD moved from administering the ASVAB in P&P format to a 
computer-adaptive format in 1997 (Waters, 1997). Thus, ASVAB was administered in P&P form 
in 1980 and as a CAT in 1997. Consequently, the question of whether any differences between 
PAY80 and PAY97 findings are attributable to this change in test administration format must be 
answered. Two lines of research are relevant. The first is research on whether the format 
change resulted in a change in the constructs measured by the ASVAB. The second is research 
on equating scores across the two formats. 
Research on Construct Comparability 
A significant body of research addresses the question of whether CAT-ASVAB and P&P-ASVAB 
assess the same constructs. Three studies that comprise the core basis for drawing conclusions 
are highlighted. 
Moreno and Segall (1997) randomly assigned a group of Navy recruits to either a P&P 
condition, where 726 individuals took alternate forms of P&P-ASVAB with a five-week interval 
between forms, or to a CAT condition, where 744 individuals took alternate forms of CAT-
ASVAB with a five-week interval between forms. The study compared the reliability of the 
scores on alternate formats of the ASVAB (P&P and CAT) in a non-operational setting and also 
compared the non-operational scores to the recruits’ operational scores from the P&P-ASVAB 
taken during the enlistment process. 
The experimental CAT and P&P tests correlated to a comparable degree with the operational 
P&P-ASVAB, except for the Coding Speed test, which showed a slightly lower correlation. The 
correlations, when corrected for unreliability, between the experimental CAT-ASVAB and the 
operational P&P-ASVAB, were extraordinarily high; only for Coding Speed (0.86) was the 
correlation significantly different from 1.0. Thus, with the possible exception of the Coding 
Speed test, the CAT-ASVAB administered in a non-operational setting measured the same 
constructs as the P&P-ASVAB administered under operational conditions. 
In a study that randomly assigned 5,670 Navy recruits to take the CAT version and 5,721 Navy 
recruits to take the P&P version (experimental CAT and P&P) of the ASVAB, Wolfe, Moreno, 
and Segall (1997) correlated the recruits’ test scores with their operational P&P-ASVAB scores. 
Like the results found by Moreno and Segall (1997), the experimental CAT and P&P scores 
correlated with operational scores to a comparable degree for all but the two speeded tests, 
Numerical Operations and Coding Speed. These two tests produced a significantly lower 
correlation with the operational test for CAT-ASVAB than for P&P-ASVAB. Wolfe, Moreno, and 
Segall also found a comparable pattern of correlations with training school grades for the P&P-
ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB. 
A third study, conducted by Segall, Moreno, Kieckhefer, Vicino, and McBride (1997), obtained 
operational P&P-ASVAB scores and experimental CAT-ASVAB scores for a sample of 6,710 
recruits. The scores were compared using factor composites—Verbal, Quantitative, Technical, 
and Speed. The factor composites correlate like tests in the ASVAB to succinctly summarize 
and present the data (see Chapter 4). The four-factor analysis of the PAY80 and PAY97 studies 
found comparable data. 
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These three studies provide strong evidence that, at least in military recruit samples, the switch 
from the P&P format to the CAT format does not change the constructs measured by the 
ASVAB, with the possible exception of the two speeded tests, Numerical Operations and 
Coding Speed. The findings that (a) CAT-ASVAB correlates as highly to a P&P-ASVAB as does 
an alternate P&P-ASVAB, (b) P&P and CAT formats produce comparable factor structures, and 
(c) P&P and CAT formats correlate to a comparable degree with subsequent training grades, 
provide evidence that score differences in PAY80 and PAY97 are not attributable to the format 
differences across the two test formats. 
Note, however, that samples of military recruits have higher means and lower variances than 
the PAY80 and PAY97 samples because these individuals have been screened directly using 
AFQT scores and indirectly based on education credentials that correlate with the AFQT. The 
overall AFQT mean in the PAY97 sample is 52.35, with a standard deviation (SD) of 27.33. In 
contrast, the CAT-AFQT mean in the Wolfe, Moreno, and Segall (1997) military recruit sample is 
58.39, with a SD of 17.32. Thus, some caution is advised when asserting the comparability of 
P&P-ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB because comparability has not been examined at the lower tail 
of the distribution. 
Research Equating P&P-ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB 
In addition to examining whether P&P-ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB measure comparable constructs, 
test scores must be equated, or put on a comparable scale, such that individuals can expect to 
obtain the same score regardless of test format. Two tests might be perfectly correlated with one 
another, yet one format might produce higher raw scores in terms of items answered correctly than 
the other. That is, one format might prove slightly more difficult than the other. 
Equating ensures scores obtained from the two formats are comparable. For example, consider a 
situation in which individuals are randomly split into two groups, with one taking Form A of a test and 
the other taking Form B. Due to random group assignment, the expectation is that the two groups 
will be equal in ability. Thus, if a score of 25 is at the 50th percentile on Form A and a score of 27 is 
at the 50th percentile on Form B, the scores will need to be converted to a common scale such that 
individuals at the 50th percentile in ability receive the same score regardless of form. 
Segall (1997) described the process of equating P&P-ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB. Conceptually, 
the equating proceeded in two stages. During Stage 1, recruits were assigned randomly to take 
the ASVAB under non-operational P&P or CAT conditions. Equipercentile equating then was 
used to equate the P&P and CAT scores. Since random assignment was expected to result in 
individuals of equal ability in the two groups, scores at common percentile points in the 
distribution for each test were viewed as comparable and put on a common scale to create a 
provisional equating. During Stage 2, military applicants were assigned randomly to take either 
the P&P-ASVAB or CAT-ASVAB as the operational test for military enlistment. The resulting 
data then were used to revise the equipercentile equating to ensure the formats were equated 
using motivated samples. 
An additional set of analyses examined whether the equating proved reliable for two subgroups 
of interest—women and Black youth. Just because tests can be effectively equated for the total 
group does not ensure the equating is effective for each subgroup. Subgroup scores that are 
significantly different for an equated test in P&P and CAT formats would indicate subgroup 
members at a given ability level should be expected to obtain a different score on one format 
than the other. In other words, the scores of the subgroup members would be contingent on the 
format, and the equating would not be effective for that subgroup. 
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Segall (1997) reported significant differences for the Black group on two tests—Mathematics 
Knowledge and Automotive-Shop Information. In both cases, Black youth scored higher on 
CAT-ASVAB than on P&P-ASVAB. Segall reasoned that because the initial issue of concern 
was that moving the ASVAB from a P&P to CAT format would harm minority group members, 
the higher scores on CAT-ASVAB demonstrated the CAT format favored the minority group and 
was not an impediment. 
While this is a reasonable view when considering the use of ASVAB for military enlistment, the 
implications are different when comparing PAY80 and PAY97 results. The difference (d) in the 
scores achieved by Black youth taking the Mathematics Knowledge test in P&P and CAT 
formats translates to a d of 0.10 in reference to the PAY97 Mathematics Knowledge SD. The 
Mathematics Knowledge d for Black youth between PAY80 and PAY97 is 0.45 (as will be shown 
in Chapter 4). Thus, if a 0.10 change is attributable to the format change from P&P to CAT, then 
the change attributable to the cohort (1980 versus 1997) can be estimated as 0.35. Similarly, 
the difference in the scores achieved by Black youth taking Automotive-Shop Information (a 
combined test in PAY80 and two separate tests in PAY97) in P&P and CAT formats translates 
to a d of 0.07 in reference to the PAY97 SD. If a 0.07 change is expected due to the format 
change, then the d of 0.00 between the 1980 and 1997 PAY data can be reestimated as -0.07. 
Segall (1997) also reported women scored lower on the Paragraph Comprehension and 
Automotive-Shop Information tests on CAT-ASVAB. Unlike the above scenario where a format 
change produced differences favoring Black youth, here the format change was to the detriment 
of women. Reporting on a series of analyses about the impact of these differences on the 
enlistment opportunities for women, Segall concluded the effect is minimal because these tests 
were never used alone but rather in conjunction with other tests. 
These differences do, however, have implications for comparing PAY80 and PAY97 results. The 
difference in the female means for Paragraph Comprehension under P&P and CAT formats 
translates to a d of -0.09 in reference to the PAY97 Paragraph Comprehension SD. The 
Paragraph Comprehension d for females between PAY80 and PAY97 is -0.07. If a -0.09 change 
is attributable to the format change, the change attributable to the cohort (1980 versus 1997) 
can be estimated as 0.02. Similarly, the difference in the female means for Automotive-Shop 
Information under P&P and CAT formats translates to a d of -0.26. If a -0.26 change is expected 
due to the change in format, then the observed d of -0.23 between the PAY80 and PAY97 data 
can be reestimated as 0.03. 
The investigation of equating by subgroup was done only for the subgroups of Black youth and 
women; no comparable investigation was performed for the Hispanic subgroup14. Thus, no 
observed test differences for the Hispanic cohort (PAY80 versus PAY97) exist to estimate 
changes attributable to the ASVAB format. 
Minimal Effects from Test Format 
Strong evidence exists that changing from P&P to CAT format did not affect the constructs 
measured by the ASVAB tests, with the exception of the two speeded tests—Numerical 
Operations and Coding Speed. For all other tests, the results achieved using the experimental 
                                                
14 Segall (1997) did not provide rationale for why Hispanics were not included in the subgroup equating of 
p&p and CAT-ASVAB, although one can assume that it is because he stated that the equating sample 
“was expected to provide nationally representative samples with respect to race, gender, and AFQT 
distributions”, and Hispanic is not considered a “race”. 
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CAT-ASVAB correlate as highly with those from an operational P&P-ASVAB as do results from 
an operational and non-operational P&P-ASVAB. The modestly lower correlations between 
operational P&P scores and experimental CAT scores for the two speeded tests suggest some 
change, albeit small, in the meaning of Numerical Operations or Coding Speed scores when 
obtained in CAT format. 
CAT-ASVAB and P&P-ASVAB scores also can be equated effectively in overall samples. In 
samples of military recruits, individuals at a given ability level can expect to obtain the same 
ASVAB scores regardless of whether they take a P&P or CAT version of the battery. Score 
differences for select ASVAB tests, however, can be expected due to format for two 
subgroups—Black youth and women. Black youth of equal ability score somewhat higher on the 
CAT-ASVAB than on the P&P-ASVAB on the Mathematics Knowledge and Automotive-Shop 
Information tests. Women equal in ability score somewhat lower on CAT-ASVAB than on P&P-
ASVAB on the Paragraph Comprehension and Automotive-Shop Information tests. These 
differences, which are due to test format, should be taken into account when interpreting 
observed differences between the PAY80 and PAY97 studies. 
Attempts to adjust individual test scores in light of these findings were considered, but rejected. 
If equally able Black youth score on average 0.10 SD higher on the CAT format of Mathematics 
Knowledge than on the P&P format, one might attempt to adjust scores to accommodate this 
difference. But knowing that the mean difference is 0.10 SD does not mean the effects are 
comparable throughout the test score range. Rather than making this strong assumption and 
adjusting scores, the preferred option is to present the observed data and keep the lack of 
complete comparability in mind when interpreting results. 
One way to minimize the effects of format differences when interpreting PAY80 and PAY97 
comparisons is to focus on test composites, such as the AFQT, and the Verbal, Quantitative, 
and Technical factor score composites. The AFQT, for example, is a composite of four tests, 
including the Mathematics Knowledge test that has apparent format effects for Black youth. 
While there might be a mean d of 0.10 for the Black subgroup on this test due to the change in 
test format, effects on the four-test AFQT composite, of which this test is one component, will be 
much smaller. Analysis is encouraged at the composite level rather than the individual test level. 
It is important, though, to note that the format differences under discussion here are very small, 
relative to the magnitude of the White-Black mean differences observed in both the P&P CAT 
formats. Testing formats are not major contributors to the observed score differences in the 
youth population. 
One additional caveat is that research on the comparability of P&P-ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB 
formats is based on military recruit samples that have higher means and less variance than the 
broader youth population. Score comparability has not been investigated in the lower tail of the 
score distribution for the full youth population. 
Administration Conditions and Test-Taker Motivation 
An additional issue that should be considered when comparing PAY80 and PAY97 scores is the 
comparability of test-taker motivation across the two studies. Generally, individuals’ motivation 
appears comparable in the two studies. In both cases, youth were invited to participate in the 
project and paid for their time. Participation in both studies was purely for research purposes; 
individuals faced no consequences for high or low test performance. While testing sessions took 
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place in a variety of settings—from schools to testing centers to an individual’s home—all 
testing sessions were proctored and standardized. 
One concern is that low-ability individuals might have found the P&P format frustrating, thereby 
creating a difference in motivation between the P&P and CAT format (Neal, 1999). Because 
everyone receives the same items in the P&P format, low-ability individuals would be expected 
to encounter more items they are unable to answer correctly. These individuals might give up 
and simply respond randomly. In contrast, because the CAT format tailors items to the abilities 
of each individual, test takers would not be expected to encounter as large a number of items 
they could not answer correctly, which might lead to higher test-taker motivation. 
Neal (1999) reexamined the raw scores on the four tests comprising the AFQT from the P&P-
formatted PAY80 data. Random responses to the 105 items, with four response options per 
item, would be expected to generate a raw score of approximately 26. Neal (1999) noted a 
substantial proportion of the Black subgroup in the PAY80 sample scored within this range. 
Whether this score represented low ability or a random response pattern due to low motivation, 
however, was unclear. This finding led to speculation that PAY80 data underestimated Black 
mean scores due to this random response pattern (Murray, 2005). Murray suggests substituting 
a mean-analytic mean White-Black d of 1.10 drawn from Roth, Bevier, Bobko, Switzer, and 
Tyler (2001) for the White-Black d in PAY80, a value that is estimated at 1.18. 
Several observations are offered in response. First, comparable education credentials were 
found for Black and White youth scoring in the range for which random response is a plausible 
basis for the observed score. Of the Black youth in this range, 24% were high school graduates, 
while 75% had not completed high school. Of the White youth in this range, 28% were high 
school graduates, while 72% had not completed high school. Thus, for both groups low scores 
in the range that cannot be differentiated from random responding are obtained by students with 
low levels of educational attainment. It is clearly not the case that sizable numbers of high-ability 
students (e.g., students who might pursue higher education) are responding randomly due to 
low motivation. 
Second, note that a substantial proportion of Black test takers fall within the range that cannot 
be differentiated from random responding on the basis of test score alone does not per se 
suggest a test motivation problem. Consider the following thought experiment based only on 
White test data, where White mean and SD on the raw score composite are 71 and 22, 
respectively. A score two standard deviations below the mean would be 29, which is close to the 
value of 26 that would be expected by random responding. The bottom 1-2% of the White score 
distribution would be expected to score at or below chance levels. The subtests making up the 
AFQT are not designed to differentiate at the extreme low end of the distribution (recall that 
those below the 10th percentile on AFQT are not eligible for military service). 
Now note that data on cognitive tests show a White-Black d in the range of 1.10 SD based on 
the Roth et al. (2001) meta-analysis discussed above. The value which is two SDs below the 
White mean would be about one SD below the Black mean. If scores were normally distributed, 
one would expect about 16% of Black scores to be below this score of 29. In fact, in the PAY80 
data, 16.3% of the Black distribution scores were below this point. Thus, the percentage of the 
Black test taker population scoring at near-chance or below-chance levels is not higher than 
would be expected without any appeal to a motivational mechanism causing some proportion of 
test takers to give up and adopt a random response strategy. Accordingly, no persuasive case 
has been made that PAY80 underestimates the Black AFQT mean. 
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CHAPTER 4: PAY80 AND PAY97 DATA COMPARISONS 
Sociodemographic differences in test performance on the two PAY studies is just one area of 
interest to the Department of Defense (DoD) as it plans for the future of the All-Volunteer Force 
and responds to persistent questions regarding population representation in the military. 
Comparing data from the two studies also helps inform Service personnel planners and others 
responsible for recruiting individuals with the specific aptitudes and cognitive skills required by 
each of the Services. The renorming of AFQT and ASVAB scores to the PAY97 score-scale 
also affects enlistment standards and occupational placement, both of which are obviously 
important to maintaining a high-quality force. 
Demographic Factors 
Six demographic variables—race/ethnicity, gender, age, region, education, and mother’s 
education—are considered key to comparing PAY80 and PAY97 sample data. Table 4.1 
provides the weighted percentage of the two samples for each of these demographic variables. 
Table 4.1. Sample Demographics by PAY Year 
 Percent   Percent 
 1980 1997   1980 1997 
Race/Ethnicity   Education   
 Black 13.66 13.55   Not a HS Grad 35.88 14.25 
 Hispanic 6.08 15.10   HS Grad 38.74 38.84 
 Non-White/other 8.31 4.31   Some College 22.26 40.66 
 White 71.95 66.96   College Grad 2.63 6.24 
 Total  99.92   Total 99.51  
 Missing  0.08   Missing 0.49  
 Total 100.00 100.00   Total 100.00 100.00 
        
Gender   Mother's Education   
 Male 50.73 50.09   Not a HS Grad 29.66 13.13 
 Female 49.27 49.91   HS Grad 44.68 39.55 
 Total 100.00 100.00   Some College 10.81 10.93 
     College Grad 9.80 16.02 
Age    Total 95.07 87.22 
 18 16.31 17.47   Missing 4.93 12.78 
 19 16.53 17.27   Total 100.00 100.00 
 20 16.72 17.14      
 21 16.75 15.61      
 22 16.89 16.96      
 23 16.81 15.55      
 Total 100.00 100.00      
        
Region       
 Northeast 20.15 16.36      
 North Central 28.87 28.65      
 South 32.50 31.62      
 West 16.49 22.05      
 Total 98.01 98.68      
 Missing 1.99 1.32      
 Total 100.00 100.00      
Note. The percentages reported above reflect values derived from PAY80 and PAY97 weighted data.  
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Of note is the increased representation of Hispanic youth from 6.08% in PAY80 to 15.10% in 
PAY97. In addition, the region variable shows a decline in the percentage of respondents from 
the Northeast and an increase in the percentage from the West. The education and mother’s 
education variables for PAY97 also show substantial increases relative to PAY80. It should be 
noted that, because of the sizable amount of missing data (12.78%) for mother’s education in 
PAY97, this variable is not examined further. 
Test Performance Comparisons 
Given the operational role of test performance in determining enlistment eligibility, data analysis 
focused on individual ASVAB test scores and AFQT composite scores. Table 4.2 presents the 
correlations between the AFQT scores and the 10 ASVAB test scores in both the PAY80 and 
PAY97 samples, as well as the correlations among the ASVAB test scores. 
Table 4.2. Correlations between AFQT and ASVAB Tests by PAY Year 
  AFQT AR MK WK PC NO CS GS AS MC EI 
AFQT 
PAY80 -           
PAY97 -           
AR 
PAY80 0.92 -          
PAY97 0.90 -          
MK 
PAY80 0.91 0.83 -         
PAY97 0.88 0.80 -         
WK 
PAY80 0.87 0.71 0.67 -        
PAY97 0.83 0.65 0.58 -        
PC 
PAY80 0.81 0.67 0.64 0.80 -       
PAY97 0.84 0.70 0.65 0.76 -       
NO 
PAY80 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 -      
PAY97 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.48 0.51 -      
CS 
PAY80 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.70 -     
PAY97 0.53 0.48 0.51 0.43 0.49 0.54 -     
GS 
PAY80 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.80 0.69 0.52 0.45 -    
PAY97 0.83 0.72 0.68 0.79 0.72 0.44 0.39 -    
AS 
PAY80 0.52 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.42 0.31 0.22 0.64 -   
PAY97 0.38 0.40 0.21 0.45 0.33 0.14 0.12 0.51 -   
MC 
PAY80 0.68 0.68 0.60 0.59 0.52 0.41 0.34 0.69 0.74 -  
PAY97 0.67 0.65 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.32 0.32 0.69 0.66 -  
EI 
PAY80 0.70 0.66 0.59 0.68 0.57 0.42 0.34 0.76 0.75 0.74 - 
PAY97 0.63 0.59 0.47 0.64 0.56 0.30 0.29 0.70 0.71 0.72 - 
Note. AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge 
test; WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; NO=Numerical Operations test; 
CS=Coding Speed test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; 
MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test. 
 
The initial analysis also examined performance on various composites of ASVAB tests 
developed by the Services to identify recruits with the aptitudes and skills required for 
occupational placement. For example, the Air Force uses four composites, known as MAGE: 
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 Mechanical (M) = Arithmetic Reasoning + Mechanical Comprehension + Automotive-
Shop Information + Word Knowledge + Paragraph Comprehension 
 Administrative (A) = Mathematics Knowledge + Word Knowledge + Paragraph 
Comprehension 
 General (G) = Arithmetic Reasoning + Word Knowledge + Paragraph Comprehension 
 Electronic (E) = General Science +Arithmetic Reasoning + Mathematics Knowledge + 
Electronics Information 
While the notion of comparing varying test composites is conceptually appealing, considerable 
commonality exists between composites, such as MAGE, and the AFQT. For example, the 
Mechanical, Administrative, and General composites in MAGE include the same verbal and 
quantitative tests included in the AFQT. Table 4.3 shows that each of the MAGE composites for 
PAY80 and PAY97 correlates 0.89 or higher with the AFQT. The Administrative and General 
composites both correlate 0.97 or higher with the AFQT. Given the high correlations between 
these occupational composites and the AFQT, data at the level of occupational composites 
were not examined further. 
Table 4.3. Correlations between MAGE Composites and AFQT by PAY Year 













Note. M=Mechanical composite; A=Administrative composite; G=General composite; E=Electronic 
composite. 
Instead, factor scores are analyzed. Factor analysis is the generic label for a broad class of 
methods, one use of which is data reduction. Given a set of intercorrelated tests, factor analysis 
seeks to identify composites that can efficiently capture the relationships among the tests. 
The ASVAB has been divided into four factors—Verbal Ability, Quantitative Ability, Speeded 
Performance, and Technical Knowledge (Kass, Mitchell, Grafton, & Wing, 1983). This allows the 
ASVAB to be described in terms of scores for four underlying factors, rather than the 10 original 
tests. The four-factor structure was successfully replicated in both the PAY80 and PAY97 data 
using the Kass et al. technical method comprised of a principal axis factor analysis with varimax 
rotation, a method which forces factors to be uncorrelated.15 However, the goal was to obtain a 
set of composites that met two criteria: (a) summarized the information in the 10 tests in a 
succinct way; and (b) reflected the correlations among the tests in the composites. To achieve 
this, principal components and an oblique (oblimin) rotation were used that revealed substantial 
correlations among the four factor scores. 
                                                
15 A varimax rotation seeks to maximize the factor variance on the new axes to obtain as much diversity 
as possible and facilitate interpretation. 
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Table 4.4 shows the factor loadings from our analysis of the 10 ASVAB tests on the four factor 
scores using data from both PAY80 and PAY97. The data show the tests with the highest 
loadings on the factors do not change across years—Word Knowledge and Paragraph 
Comprehension for Verbal Ability; Arithmetic Reasoning and Mathematics Knowledge for 
Quantitative Ability; Numerical Operations and Coding Speed for Speeded Performance; and 
General Science, Automotive-Shop Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics 
Information for Technical Knowledge (note Automotive-Shop Information was a single test in 
PAY80 and two separate tests, Automotive Information and Shop Information, in PAY97). Table 
4.5 shows the correlation between each of the ASVAB tests and the four factor scores with the 
factors uncorrelated to one another. Table 4.6 shows the correlations among the factor scores.16 
Table 4.4. Factor Loadings of ASVAB Tests on ASVAB Factor Scores by PAY Year 
  AR MK WK PC NO CS GS AS MC EI 
V 
PAY80 0.27 0.26 0.73 0.56 0.20 0.21 0.46 0.15 0.17 0.34 
PAY97 0.31 0.27 0.76 0.58 0.18 0.20 0.58 0.12 0.28 0.36 
S 
PAY80 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.79 0.75 0.26 0.11 0.20 0.19 
PAY97 0.50 0.55 0.37 0.46 0.72 0.65 0.27 0.03 0.21 0.18 
T 
PAY80 0.45 0.31 0.40 0.30 0.18 0.12 0.58 0.87 0.76 0.75 
PAY97 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.28 0.09 0.09 0.47 0.90 0.68 0.73 
Q 
PAY80 0.61 0.74 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.17 0.40 0.09 0.34 0.26 
PAY97 0.56 0.67 0.16 0.31 0.20 0.13 0.42 0.01 0.36 0.22 
Note. V=Verbal Ability factor; S=Speeded Performance factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; 
Q=Quantitative Ability factor; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word 
Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; NO=Numerical Operations test; CS=Coding Speed 
test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension 
test; EI=Electronics Information test. 
Table 4.5. Correlations between ASVAB Factor Scores and Tests by PAY Year 
  AR MK WK PC NO CS GS AS MC EI 
V 
PAY80 0.72 0.69 0.95 0.92 0.61 0.56 0.86 0.51 0.58 0.71 
PAY97 0.71 0.66 0.93 0.92 0.49 0.48 0.87 0.41 0.61 0.68 
S 
PAY80 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.89 0.94 0.46 0.25 0.35 0.35 
PAY97 0.53 0.57 0.47 0.53 0.82 0.92 0.38 0.12 0.30 0.27 
T 
PAY80 0.60 0.47 0.58 0.44 0.32 0.26 0.72 0.95 0.87 0.87 
PAY97 0.51 0.31 0.53 0.41 0.18 0.19 0.64 0.93 0.84 0.86 
Q 
PAY80 0.92 0.95 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.42 0.69 0.40 0.67 0.58 
PAY97 0.90 0.95 0.55 0.64 0.62 0.40 0.70 0.23 0.62 0.48 
Note. V=Verbal Ability factor; S=Speeded Performance factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; 
Q=Quantitative Ability factor; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word 
Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; NO=Numerical Operations test; CS=Coding Speed 
test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension 
test; EI=Electronics Information test. 
                                                
16 A technical note: Principal components analysis was used because the goal was data reduction rather 
than common factor estimation. For reading ease, the term factor scores is used to describe the resulting 
composites with the recognition that component scores technically is the correct term given the use of 
principal components analysis. 
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Table 4.6. ASVAB Factor Intercorrelations by PAY Year 
  V S T Q 
V 
PAY80 -    
PAY97 -    
S 
PAY80 0.59 -   
PAY97 0.49 -   
T 
PAY80 0.56 0.26 -  
PAY97 0.52 0.16 -  
Q 
PAY80 0.63 0.49 0.50 - 
PAY97 0.64 0.49 0.36 - 
Note. V=Verbal Ability factor; S=Speeded Performance factor; 
T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
 
The factor scores are useful for summarizing the complex pattern of relationships among the 10 
ASVAB tests. Thus, the factor scores are relied on heavily to interpret and compare the PAY80 
and PAY97 findings. 
Speeded Tests Removal 
For a variety of reasons, subsequent analyses exclude the Speeded Performance factor score 
that is based on the Numerical Operations and Coding Speed tests. Research has shown the 
move from the paper-and-pencil (P&P) format to the computer adaptive testing (CAT) format 
might have changed the construct measured on the two tests (see Chapter 3). 
As noted in Chapter 3, the research on equating results from P&P-ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB 
was done using military recruit samples, from which the extreme lower tail of the distribution is 
missing. Thus, score change is concentrated in the region with the greatest uncertainty about 
the equivalence of the P&P and CAT formats. In addition, the Services no longer use the 
Numerical Operations and Coding Speed tests. In 1989, Numerical Operations was dropped, 
and the AFQT was reconstituted to exclude the Numerical Operations and Coding Speed tests. 
Thus, the Speeded Performance factor and the Numerical Operations and Coding Speed tests 
are not included in subsequent analyses (a new perceptual test, Assembling Objects, was 
added to the ASVAB and the Automotive-Shop Information test was split into two tests by the 
time of the PAY97 study). 
d as an Index for Mean Score Change 
As an aid to interpreting cross-study differences, the well-established metric of the standardized 
mean d is used (Cohen, 1988). This index divides the mean difference—the PAY97 mean 
minus PAY80 mean—by the test standard deviation (SD). The PAY80 SD is used because it 
permits change to be expressed relative to the test mean and SD at the first testing period. 
Therefore, the d index expresses change in SD units. For example, a d of 0.00 indicates no 
mean difference; a d of 1.00 indicates the mean has increased by 1.00 SD; a d of -0.50 
indicates the mean has decreased by 0.50 SD. 
When comparing test means between races/ethnicities and between genders, difference scores 
are typically expressed in the directionality of the reference group; that is, a positive value of d 
indicates that the mean score for the referent group of interest (e.g., Whites, males) is larger 
than the mean score for the minority group of interest (e.g., Blacks, Hispanics, females). The 
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use of this metric allows comparisons across tests measured on different scales. For example, 
AFQT scores range from 1 to 100, while the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) used for 
college admissions has scores ranging from 200 to 800 (see Chapter 8). Expressing change in 
the d metric avoids the confusion of trying to compare a 50-point change on the SAT with a 20-
point change on the AFQT. A 50-point change on the SAT, for example, results in a d of 0.50, 
while a 20-point change on the AFQT results in a d of 0.69. 
No single standard exists for answering questions such as: “How large does d need to be to be 
considered meaningful?” Cohen (1988) offered values of 0.20 as small, 0.50 as medium, and 
0.80 as large, with the caveat that these are approximate benchmarks and the specifics of a 
given research setting might affect what is viewed as a meaningful effect. As an alternative way 
to interpret the meaning of a specific d value, Table 4.7 presents the percentage of individuals 
whose scores in the new test score distribution would meet or exceed the 50th percentile point 
in the original distribution (assuming a normal distribution of test scores). 
If test scores change by d = 0.10, for example, then 54% of the scores in the new distribution 
would exceed the mean of the original distribution. If test scores change by d = 0.50, then 69% 
of the scores in the new distribution would exceed the mean of the original distribution. 














Note. d=standardized mean difference, expressed in SD units. The table is provided to illustrate the 
estimated standardized differences between two samples based on a normal distribution of test scores. 
 
Standard Error of d 
The above discussion focuses on the practical significance of d values of a given magnitude. 
Another relevant issue when interpreting d values is the standard error of d. The standard error 
is an indication of the margin of error when estimating d. Like the margin of error in a public 
opinion poll—for example, 43% prefer candidate X over candidate Y, with a 3% margin of 
error—the standard error can be used to estimate the range within which d might fall had a 
different sample been drawn than the one actually used. The formula for the sampling error 
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The standard error is a function of the following: (a) total sample size; (b) the degree of 
departure from equal sample size in each of the two groups being compared, with the standard 
error minimized with equal numbers in each group and given a fixed total (N); and (c) the value 
of d. Given the PAY80 and PAY97 sample sizes, the first two factors dominate, with the impact 
of the d variation negligible (Laczo, Sackett, Bobko, & Cortina, 2005).  
Adjusting the Standard Error of d for the Design Effect 
The standard error of d can be interpreted directly as representing the population in studies in 
which the research design involves simple random sampling from the population and no 
significant non-response or non-coverage occurs, which would necessitate the use of weights to 
mitigate sampling bias. In studies where stratified or cluster sampling strategies are used, 
variances may be affected by the sampling strategy. In the PAY studies, census-based 
metropolitan statistical areas served as “primary sampling units (PSUs)”, and individuals were 
selected for participation from within the selected PSUs. As individuals within a given PSU may 
be more similar than individuals selected completely at random without regard for PSU, it is 
commonly the case that variances are smaller in the observed sample than in the population. 
The effect of the sampling strategy on the variance is referred to as the “design effect (DEFF)”, 
and estimates of the DEFF are used to adjust the standard errors to reflect population values. 
Procedurally, the DEFF can be used to obtain the “effective sample size” using the formula 
“effective sample size = observed sample size/DEFF”; the effective sample size can then be 
inserted in the formula presented above for the standard error of d (Lohn, 1999, pp. 240-242). 
A difficulty in carrying out the present analyses is that the data available to us did not include 
each individual’s PSU membership for the PAY80 sample, though we did have PSU information 
for the PAY97 sample. Thus, for PAY80 we relied on published information about design effects 
in the original PAY80 reports. Sims and Hiatt (2001) present DEFFs for several comparisons 
that were calculated by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) for AFQT. This was 
done using the full PAY80 sample and included some cases that were not used to establish the 
1980 ASVAB norms (9,173 vs. 11,914). In general, DEFF increases with sample size. As such, 
the DEFF for the larger sample would be slightly greater than the DEFF for the norming sample. 
Sims and Hiatt used the published DEFFs to estimate a regression equation to predict DEFF 
based on sample size. This equation was used to estimate DEFF for comparisons involving 
PAY80 samples and is shown below: 
Design effect for PAY80 = 1.441+.0005056*(number of cases) 
DMDC calculated DEFF for a variety of subgroups in the PAY97 sample (R.A. Riemer, personal 
communication, January 24, 2013). Where possible, we used these calculated DEFFs directly. 
For other groups, we fitted a regression equation to the PAY97 values. The equation is shown 
below: 
Design effect for PAY97 = 1.7940201 +.001053*(number of cases) 
Table 4.8 reports DEFF and the standard error of d adjusted for DEFF for the various 
comparisons of interest within and across the PAY80 and PAY97 samples. We note that DEFF 
does vary by the variable of interest. However, the differences are very small for continuous 
variables (e.g., test scores). Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the DEFF obtained using AFQT 
to the other ASVAB tests and composites.  
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Table 4.8. Approximate DEFF Estimates and Relevant Standard Errors for All 






Comparing PAY80 and PAY97 in the total sample 6.66 0.04 
Comparing PAY80 and PAY97 in the male sample 4.48 0.05 
Comparing PAY80 and PAY97 in the female sample 4.20 0.05 
Comparing PAY80 and PAY97 in the White sample 4.29 0.04 
Comparing PAY80 and PAY97 in the Black sample 2.92 0.08 
Comparing PAY80 and PAY97 in the Hispanic sample 2.75 0.09 
Comparing males and females in the PAY80 sample 3.76 0.04 
Comparing males and females in the PAY97 sample 4.71 0.06 
Comparing Black and White youth in the PAY80 sample 3.08 0.06 
Comparing Black and White youth in the PAY97 sample 3.55 0.08 
Comparing Hispanic and White youth in the PAY80 sample 2.57 0.07 
Comparing Hispanic and White youth in the PAY97 sample 3.63 0.07 
 
Using two standard errors as an approximation for a 95% confidence interval for a given d 
value, the relatively large samples in the PAY studies produce reasonably tight confidence 
intervals for the total sample, the White subgroup, and the male and female subgroups (+/-0.08 
to 0.10). Confidence intervals are not as tight for comparisons within the Black or Hispanic 
subgroups, or when comparing the Black or Hispanic subgroups with the White subgroup (+/-
0.12 to 0.18). Values exceeding two standard errors can be viewed as significantly different 
from a d value of zero. 
Based on the general guidelines for interpreting d, including data on the impact of a given 
change in d on the percentage in one subgroup exceeding the mean in another subgroup, and 
the computation of the standard error of d, the differences between ds for a given subgroup over 
time or the differences between ds when comparing one subgroup with another generally are 
not interpreted in this report as meaningful unless the value exceeds 0.10. This clearly is a 
judgment call and complete information is provided such that readers wanting to make different 
choices about the threshold for interpreting differences are able to do so. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cross-Study ds by Race/Ethnicity and Gender 
Table 4.9 presents means and SDs for the AFQT, the individual ASVAB tests, and the Verbal 
Ability, Quantitative Ability, and Technical Knowledge factor scores for the total PAY80 and 
PAY97 samples and by gender and by race/ethnicity subgroups. Table 4.10 presents these 
means and SDs by gender within race/ethnicity subgroups. These tables are the basis for a 
number of subsequent tables that transform these means and SDs into metrics that are useful 







Table 4.9. Means and Standard Deviations of ASVAB Composites and Tests by Subgroup and PAY Year 
   Overall  Males  Females Black Hispanic White 
   X  σ  X σ  X σ X  σ X σ X σ 
 
AFQT 
1980 50.41 28.91  51.86 29.97  48.91 27.71 24.64 22.14 31.35 25.74 56.33 27.20 




1980 49.96 10.01  51.32 10.23  48.57 9.59 41.46 7.32 43.85 8.98 51.92 9.55 
1997 49.91 9.78  51.13 9.92  48.69 9.48 43.70 8.79 45.80 8.93 52.04 9.28 
MK 
1980 50.01 9.99  50.69 10.33  49.30 9.58 43.42 7.72 44.51 9.20 51.61 9.80 
1997 51.62 9.96  51.71 10.07  51.54 9.86 46.89 9.01 47.16 9.36 53.34 9.63 
WK 
1980 49.98 9.96  49.91 10.25  50.05 9.66 40.25 10.76 43.16 11.07 52.12 8.43 
1997 51.02 8.66  51.14 8.75  50.91 8.58 45.52 9.66 46.76 8.91 53.32 7.07 
PC 
1980 50.04 10.04  49.11 10.42  51.00 9.54 41.75 10.80 43.54 11.50 51.95 8.82 




1980 49.90 10.01  51.67 10.48  48.08 9.16 40.92 9.06 42.73 10.87 51.94 9.00 
1997 49.78 9.99  51.30 10.06  48.27 9.68 42.58 9.10 44.23 9.86 52.57 8.74 
AS 
1980 49.97 10.00  55.19 9.82  44.60 6.83 41.08 7.41 44.12 10.09 51.89 9.38 
1997 47.42 8.83  51.77 8.73  43.06 6.45 41.05 7.19 43.92 8.48 49.70 8.22 
MC 
1980 50.00 10.04  53.78 10.23  46.12 8.19 41.28 7.15 44.03 9.55 51.92 9.53 
1997 48.36 10.16  51.74 10.31  44.97 8.79 40.34 8.36 44.60 9.25 50.89 9.53 
EI 
1980 49.97 10.00  53.56 10.04  46.28 8.51 41.10 8.33 43.30 10.18 51.98 9.25 
1997 47.25 9.15  50.60 9.38  43.88 7.52 41.67 8.23 43.81 8.96 49.25 8.56 
Factors 
V 
1980 -0.01 1.02  -0.04 1.06  0.02 0.97 -0.97 1.08 -0.74 1.15 0.21 0.87 
1997 0.01 0.97  0.01 1.00  0.02 0.95 -0.61 1.03 -0.48 0.98 0.27 0.83 
T 
1980 0.11 1.02  0.64 1.00  -0.43 0.70 -0.83 0.71 -0.53 0.99 0.32 0.96 
1997 -0.18 0.94  0.28 0.92  -0.65 0.68 -0.90 0.73 -0.55 0.89 0.06 0.87 
Q 
1980 -0.04 0.99  0.08 1.01  -0.16 0.95 -0.67 0.69 -0.57 0.87 0.12 0.98 
1997 0.06 1.02  0.12 1.04  0.00 0.99 -0.47 0.88 -0.36 0.92 0.24 0.99 
Note. AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; 
PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; 






Table 4.10. Means and Standard Deviations of ASVAB Composites and Tests Crossed by Subgroup and PAY Year 
 
 Black Hispanic Whites 
Overall Males Females Males Females Males Females 
X σ X σ X σ X  σ X σ X σ X σ 
 
AFQT 
1980 50.41 28.91 24.51 23.25 24.76 20.95 34.14 27.37 28.50 23.63 58.15 28.12 54.41 26.05 
1997 52.35 27.33 35.28 24.06 34.03 23.55 39.72 24.54 35.87 24.10 59.79 25.97 58.74 25.22 
AFQT Tests 
AR 
1980 49.96 10.01 42.03 7.74 40.88 6.81 45.40 9.64 42.27 7.95 53.44 9.57 50.33 9.27 
1997 49.91 9.78 44.43 9.18 43.07 8.39 47.11 9.19 44.38 8.42 53.18 9.34 50.89 9.08 
MK 
1980 50.01 9.99 43.44 7.85 43.40 7.58 45.63 9.60 43.37 8.62 52.45 10.11 50.74 9.38 
1997 51.62 9.96 46.95 9.01 46.84 9.02 47.63 9.36 46.65 9.33 53.22 9.82 53.45 9.43 
WK 
1980 49.98 9.96 39.77 11.25 40.73 10.22 43.71 11.30 42.60 10.80 52.11 8.70 52.12 8.14 
1997 51.02 8.66 45.85 9.86 45.25 9.48 47.20 9.13 46.28 8.63 53.21 7.30 53.44 6.84 
PC 
1980 50.04 10.04 40.69 11.06 42.83 10.43 43.40 11.62 43.67 11.38 51.02 9.34 52.93 8.13 




1980 49.90 10.01 41.43 9.69 40.40 8.33 44.42 11.61 41.01 9.77 53.99 9.17 49.79 8.30 
1997 49.78 9.99 43.60 9.41 41.71 8.73 45.72 10.07 42.64 9.38 54.02 8.75 51.10 8.49 
AS 
1980 49.97 10.00 43.63 8.29 38.50 5.27 48.50 10.64 39.66 7.11 57.54 8.30 45.94 6.24 
1997 47.42 8.83 44.43 7.80 38.19 5.11 47.89 8.49 39.63 6.02 54.26 7.68 45.07 5.80 
MC 
1980 50.00 10.04 42.96 8.11 39.59 5.54 47.46 10.41 40.53 7.04 56.01 9.16 47.62 7.89 
1997 48.36 10.16 42.47 9.23 38.55 7.07 47.93 9.43 41.00 7.54 54.37 9.32 47.35 8.38 
EI 
1980 49.97 10.00 43.27 9.23 38.91 6.62 46.58 10.82 39.97 8.24 55.83 8.75 47.93 7.93 
1997 47.25 9.15 43.73 8.97 39.93 7.09 46.99 9.17 40.37 7.32 52.83 8.46 45.62 6.98 
Factors 
V 
1980 -0.01 1.02 -1.03 1.12 -0.90 1.02 -0.71 1.19 -0.78 1.11 0.19 0.92 0.23 0.81 
1997 0.01 0.97 -0.64 1.05 -0.60 1.01 -0.45 1.00 -0.51 0.96 0.24 0.87 0.29 0.78 
T 
1980 0.11 1.02 -0.56 0.81 -1.11 0.45 -0.08 1.06 -0.99 0.66 0.89 0.85 -0.28 0.65 
1997 -0.18 0.94 -0.57 0.80 -1.18 0.52 -0.12 0.88 -1.01 0.62 0.55 0.81 -0.44 0.62 
Q 
1980 -0.04 0.99 -0.63 0.72 -0.72 0.67 -0.43 0.93 -0.71 0.78 0.25 0.99 -0.02 0.95 
1997 0.06 1.02 -0.43 0.91 -0.50 0.84 -0.27 0.95 -0.46 0.89 0.29 1.01 0.19 0.97 
Note. AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; 
PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; 
EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
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Overall Changes in Mean Test Scores 
Table 4.11 presents cross-study d values for the full sample and separate values by gender and 
race/ethnicity subgroups. The data show an overall d of 0.07 for the AFQT. Note that this small 
positive change in mean AFQT scores between PAY80 and PAY97 is not significantly different 
from zero, as the standard error is 0.04, and two standard errors equal 0.08. For the four tests 
comprising the AFQT, all ds are equal to or less than 0.16 in absolute value, with one 
(Paragraph Comprehension) showing a negligible decline, one showing no change (Arithmetic 
Reasoning) and two (Mathematics Knowledge and Word Knowledge) showing small increases. 
While the AFQT contains two quantitative tests and two verbal tests, because one test in each 
domain increases and one in each domain essentially remains unchanged, there is no 
identifiable trend. The four technical knowledge tests all show a decline in mean scores from 
PAY80 to PAY97. The decline is minimal for General Science (d = -0.01), but more substantial 
for Automotive-Shop Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information (d = 
-0.26, -0.16, and -0.27, respectively). The composite factor scores show virtually no change for 
Verbal Ability (d = 0.02), a small positive change for Quantitative Ability (d = 0.10), and a 
decrease for Technical Knowledge (d = -0.29). Table 4.12 presents these d values by gender 
within race/ethnicity subgroups. 
Several observations about these overall findings are in order. First, note that the findings are 
only descriptive; they offer no insight into causes for the observed changes. For example, a 
given change might be the result of changing demographics, such as an increase in the 
representation in the population of a subgroup that scores higher than other subgroups. In 
contrast, the same change might be the result of a true improvement of one or more subgroups 
in the skills measured by the tests. Subsequent analyses examine changes within subgroups 
and changes in demographic factors that provide a more nuanced understanding of these 
observed changes. 
Second, note that these findings focus on changes in the mean of test score distributions. A d of 
0.00 indicates no mean change, but does not necessarily indicate no change. For example, the 
distribution might remain centered around the same mean, but become flatter with more scores 
in the extreme tails or more peaked with more scores in the central part of the test score 
distribution. Should a given test be used for decision purposes, such as determining whether a 
score exceeds a given cut-score required for enlistment eligibility or for assignment to a 
particular occupational specialty, the percentage of the population meeting a given standard 
might change, even if the mean remains the same. Subsequent analyses also examine changes 
in the percentage of the population falling within various regions of the score distribution. 
Cross-Year Changes in Mean Test Score by Gender 
As Table 4.11 shows, the overall pattern of test score change is in most respects similar for men 
and women. Each population shows the same pattern—a near-zero positive mean change in 
the AFQT, a mix of positive and negative small changes on the verbal and quantitative tests 
making up the AFQT, and declines in test scores on the Automotive-Shop Information, 
Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information technical knowledge tests. One 
notable difference is the larger increase in Mathematics Knowledge for women (d = 0.23) than 
for men (d = 0.10). Another notable difference is the larger score decline for men (d = -0.35) 
than for women (d = -0.23) on the Automotive-Shop Information test. As shown later, the 
Automotive-Shop Information test has the largest gender gap in favor of men in PAY80. The 
decline in test scores on the technical knowledge tests might be linked to the greater proportion 
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of high-achieving students taking college-prep courses in high school rather than vocational 
education courses (National Center for Education Statistics, 2000). 
The above pattern of results is summarized succinctly in the Factors section of Table 4.11. 
Findings show negligible changes for men and women on the Verbal Ability factor, small 
positive changes for both groups on the Quantitative Ability factor, and declines for both groups 
on the Technical Knowledge factor (d = -0.36 for men and -0.31 for women). 
Cross-Year Changes in Mean Test Score by Race/Ethnicity 
Table 4.11 also shows that the pattern of changes in mean scores is markedly different across 
race/ethnicity subgroups. The overall AFQT d is 0.07, the d is 0.45 for the Black subgroup, 0.25 
for the Hispanic subgroup, and 0.11 for the White subgroup. The seemingly puzzling finding of 
larger change in all three subgroups than in the population overall reflects a change in the 
subgroups’ proportional representation in the population. Black and Hispanic youth made up a 
larger proportion of the PAY97 population than the PAY80 population. These subgroups also 
have lower AFQT mean scores than Whites. Thus, an increase in Black and Hispanic 
population representation can result in the finding of larger mean score increases within each 
subgroup than in the overall population. This pattern of increased Black and Hispanic scores, 
paired with much smaller score increases for the White subgroup, also is found for each of the 
quantitative and verbal tests comprising the AFQT. 
Table 4.11. Cross-Year Standardized Mean Differences by ASVAB Composites and Tests 
  Overall Males Females Black Hispanic White 
 DEFF 6.66 4.48 4.20 2.92 2.75 4.29 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.04 
 AFQT 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.45 0.25 0.11 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.31 0.22 0.01 
MK 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.45 0.29 0.18 
WK 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.49 0.33 0.14 
PC -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.18 0.16 0.01 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.07 
AS -0.26 -0.35 -0.23 0.00 -0.02 -0.23 
MC -0.16 -0.20 -0.14 -0.13 0.06 -0.11 
EI -0.27 -0.29 -0.28 0.07 0.05 -0.30 
Factors 
V 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.23 0.07 
T -0.29 -0.36 -0.31 -0.10 -0.02 -0.27 
Q 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.24 0.12 
Note. PAY80 SD used in denominator; positive values indicate a higher value for PAY97 cohort; standard 
errors should be used to interpret all d values ; two times the standard error, which approximates the 
confidence interval or margin of error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance of all d 
values; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics 
Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science 
test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics 
Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
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The General Science test, with an overall d of -0.01, shows positive ds of 0.18 and 0.14 for the 
Black and Hispanic subgroups, respectively, while the White subgroup shows negligible mean 
difference (d = 0.07). The finding of positive ds for all subgroups, despite an overall negative d, 
reflects the change in the proportional representation of the subgroups in the population. 
Examination of the Automotive-Shop Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics 
Information technical knowledge tests, each of which showed an overall decline in mean d, 
revealed the decrease is driven largely by the White subgroup, with the Black and Hispanic 
subgroups largely unchanged. Data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2003) 
show a comparable reduction in vocational education credits between 1982 and 1998 for Black, 
White, and Hispanic youth. Thus, differential course-taking is not an explanation for these 
findings. 
Findings for the factor scores summarize the test-specific results. Mean scores for the Black 
and Hispanic subgroups on the Verbal Ability and Quantitative Ability factors increased, with the 
White subgroup showing virtually no change. Mean scores for the White subgroup decreased 
on the Technical Knowledge factor (d = -0.27), with the Black and Hispanic subgroups showing 
little change. 
Table 4.12. Cross-Year Standardized Mean Differences by ASVAB Composites and Tests  
  Black Hispanic White 
  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
 DEFF 2.23 2.36 2.08 2.13 3.08 3.19 
 Std. Error 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.05 
 AFQT 0.46 0.44 0.20 0.31 0.06 0.17 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.31 0.32 0.18 0.27 -0.03 0.06 
MK 0.45 0.45 0.21 0.38 0.08 0.29 
WK 0.54 0.44 0.31 0.34 0.13 0.16 
PC 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.03 -0.01 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.16 
AS 0.10 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.40 -0.14 
MC -0.06 -0.19 0.05 0.07 -0.18 -0.03 
EI 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.05 -0.34 -0.29 
Factors 
V 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.24 0.06 0.08 
T -0.02 -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.39 -0.23 
Q 0.27 0.32 0.17 0.32 0.04 0.22 
Note. PAY80 SD used in denominator; positive values indicate a higher value for PAY97 cohort; two 
times the standard error, which approximates the confidence interval or margin of error, should be used to 
interpret the statistical significance of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic 
Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph 
Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; 
MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; 
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Changes in Mean Test Scores between Women and Men 
To compute female-male ds, the raw mean differences were divided by the pooled SD across 
the subgroups. Findings are presented in Table 4.13. 
The AFQT mean for women is slightly lower than the mean for men in both PAY80 and PAY97 
(d = 0.10 and 0.08, respectively), though the 1997 value is not significantly different from zero. 
The verbal and quantitative tests making up the PAY80 AFQT show men outscore women on 
the quantitative tests and women outscore men on the verbal tests. Differences in PAY80 are 
greatest on Arithmetic Reasoning (d = 0.28) and Paragraph Comprehension (d = -0.19), a 
pattern that continues in the PAY97 data. The Verbal Ability factor score shows women have a 
minimal advantage in PAY80, but there is virtually no gender difference in PAY97; neither value 
is significantly different from zero. The Quantitative Ability factor score shows men have a 
smaller advantage in PAY97 than in PAY80. 
The quantitative test findings parallel other studies of gender differences, though the verbal test 
findings show less of a gender difference than is typically found. Generally, differences favor 
women in the verbal ability domain in the range of 0.10 to 0.25 SD and men in the quantitative 
ability domain in ranges of similar magnitude. Variability exists across studies and among tests 
and item types within the verbal and quantitative domains. Overall conclusions are based on 
meta-analyses of the verbal (Hyde & Linn, 1988) and quantitative (Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon, 
1990) domains and on an analysis by Hedges and Nowell (1995) of six large national probability 
samples. Willingham and Cole (1997) reviewed the literature on gender differences in 
standardized tests and came to similar conclusions. 
Among the technical knowledge tests, gender differences vary widely. Three of the tests—
Automotive-Shop Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information—cover 
domains traditionally of greater interest to men than to women. All three show large mean 
differences in favor of men in PAY80 (d = 1.25, 0.83, and 0.78, respectively), with the gap 
narrowing by a small amount on Automotive-Shop Information and Mechanical Comprehension 
in PAY97 (d = 1.14. and 0.71). The General Science test, which represents a body of 
knowledge that is the subject of academic coursework, shows a smaller gender difference than 
the other technical knowledge tests that reflect knowledge addressed in a vocational course of 
study. The General Science differences between men and women (d = 0.36 and 0.31 in 1980 
and 1997, respectively) show essentially an unchanged mean difference. 
Changes in Mean Test Scores between White-Black and White-Hispanic Subgroups 
When examining the magnitude of White-Black and White-Hispanic ds in PAY80 and PAY97 for 
each test and test composite, the raw mean differences were divided by the pooled SDs across 
the subgroups being compared. Findings are presented in Table 4.13, with race/ethnicity and 
gender subgroup findings presented in Table 4.14. 
To set the stage for a discussion of these findings, it is useful to put them in the context of the 
literature on White-Black and White-Hispanic differences. Mean ds of approximately 1.00 SD 
between White and Black subgroups and approximately 0.67 SD between White and Hispanic 
subgroups on tests of general ability have been consistently reported, though conflicting 
evidence exists about whether these gaps have changed in recent years. The largest-scale 
summary of this literature is a meta-analysis by Roth, Bevier, Bobko, Switzer, and Tyler (2001). 
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Table 4.13. Standardized Mean Differences by ASVAB Composites and Tests 
  Male-Female White-Black White-Hispanic 
  1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 
 DEFF 3.76 4.71 3.08 3.55 2.57 3.63 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 
 AFQT 0.10 0.08 1.20 0.97 0.92 0.84 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.28 0.25 1.13 0.91 0.85 0.68 
MK 0.14 0.02 0.86 0.68 0.73 0.65 
WK -0.01 0.03 1.34 1.03 1.03 0.88 
PC -0.19 -0.12 1.11 0.87 0.93 0.71 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS 0.36 0.31 1.22 1.13 1.01 0.93 
AS 1.25 1.14 1.19 1.07 0.82 0.70 
MC 0.83 0.71 1.16 1.13 0.83 0.66 
EI 0.78 0.79 1.19 0.89 0.93 0.63 
Factors 
V -0.06 -0.01 1.30 1.02 1.06 0.87 
T 1.24 1.15 1.24 1.13 0.88 0.70 
Q 0.24 0.13 0.84 0.73 0.70 0.61 
Note. Pooled SD used in denominator; positive values indicate a higher value for the referent group (e.g., 
Whites, males); two times the standard error, which approximates the confidence interval or margin of 
error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces 
Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word 
Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and 
Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal 
Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
 
Table 4.14. Standardized Mean Differences by ASVAB Composites and Tests by PAY Year 
  White-Black White-Hispanic 
  Male Female Male Female 
  1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 
 DEFF 2.27 2.62 2.26 2.91 1.99 2.59 2.02 2.77 
 Std. Error 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 AFQT 1.23 0.95 1.17 0.99 0.86 0.78 1.00 0.91 
AFQT Tests 
AR 1.24 0.95 1.07 0.88 0.85 0.66 0.89 0.74 
MK 0.93 0.65 0.82 0.71 0.68 0.58 0.80 0.73 
WK 1.37 0.97 1.36 1.13 0.95 0.80 1.15 1.02 
PC 1.08 0.85 1.20 0.94 0.81 0.61 1.11 0.85 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS 1.37 1.19 1.15 1.12 1.03 0.93 1.06 0.99 
AS 1.70 1.30 1.25 1.25 1.08 0.83 1.02 0.96 
MC 1.47 1.29 1.08 1.10 0.93 0.70 0.92 0.78 
EI 1.44 1.08 1.19 0.83 1.05 0.69 1.02 0.76 
Factors 
V 1.27 1.40 1.33 1.23 0.95 0.82 1.20 0.92 
T 1.71 0.98 1.33 1.07 1.11 0.77 1.09 0.98 
Q 0.92 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.73 0.67 
Note. Pooled SD used in denominator; Positive values indicate a higher value for the referent group (e.g., 
Whites, males); two times the standard error, which approximates the confidence interval or margin of 
error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces 
Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word 
Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and 
Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal 
Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor.  
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Regarding the White-Black mean difference, Roth et al. (2001) report large-scale meta-analytic 
mean d values of 0.99 for the SAT, 1.02 for the American College Test (ACT), 1.34 for the Graduate 
Record Examination (GRE), 0.99 for employment tests of general ability, and 1.10 for military tests 
of general ability. Regarding the White-Hispanic mean difference, they report meta-analytic mean d 
values of 0.77 for the SAT, 0.56 for the ACT, 0.72 for the GRE, 0.58 for employment tests of general 
ability (N = 6,133), and 0.85 for military tests of general ability. Academic and military sample sizes 
analyzed range from 221,233 to more than 2.3 million. Roth et al. further note that differences are 
larger in unscreened applicant samples than in screened incumbent samples, and that differences 
are smaller for tests of a single specific ability, such as verbal or mathematics, than for composite 
scores. Roth et al. (2001) do not address changes in these ds over time. 
In the PAY80 findings presented in Table 4.13, White-Black ds are large, typically larger than 
1.00 SD for all tests. Without exception, ds are smaller in PAY97 than in PAY80, which is a 
finding of great interest. Another striking finding is that the magnitude of reduction in d varies 
substantially by test type. For the AFQT and each of the four tests comprising the AFQT, d 
decreases by roughly 20% (d decreases from 1.20 to 0.97 for AFQT, from 1.13 to 0.91 for 
Arithmetic Reasoning, from 0.86 to 0.68 for Mathematics Knowledge, from 1.34 to 1.03 for Word 
Knowledge, and from 1.11 to 0.87 for Paragraph Comprehension). Of the four technical 
knowledge tests, three show a pattern of slight decreases (d decreases from 1.22 to 1.13 for 
General Science, from 1.19 to 1.07 for Automotive-Shop Information, and from 1.16 to 1.13 for 
Mechanical Comprehension). The fourth test, Electronics Information, shows a 25% decrease (d 
decreases from 1.19 to 0.89). Thus, from a relatively undifferentiated pattern of large White-
Black ds in PAY80, the PAY97 findings show the largest ds for the technical knowledge tests 
and somewhat smaller ds for the verbal and quantitative tests. The factor scores show this 
clearly with a d decreasing by 9% (from 1.24 to 1.13) for Technical Knowledge, by 22% (from 
1.30 to 1.02) for Verbal Ability, and by 13% (from 0.84 to 0.73) for Quantitative Ability. 
The decreases in the White-Black d on the verbal and quantitative tests are consistent with 
other findings. Hedges and Nowell (1998) examined ds from various nationally representative 
samples gathered at varying points in time (1965, 1972, 1980, 1982, and 1990). While different 
tests were used in these different studies, all included a composite of verbal and quantitative 
components. Hedges and Nowell estimate the White-Black gap is decreasing by 0.13 SD per 
decade. They project a Black gain of 0.22 SD from 1980 to 1997 on a composite measure, 
which corresponds closely with the 0.23 SD finding for the AFQT. 
Comparisons can also be made with National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
data, using NAEP data on youth at age 17 as a point of comparison. Interpolating NAEP 
Mathematics scores between 1978 and 1982 to estimate 1980 values and then comparing 
those values with the 1996 scores17 resulted in ds of 1.04 and 1.00, respectively. This 3% 
decrease in the White-Black gap is inconsistent with the decreases of 19% on the Arithmetic 
Reasoning test and 21% on the Mathematics Knowledge test. Findings are also inconsistent for 
reading. A 44% reduction (ds of 1.24 and 0.69) was found after computing d values for NAEP 
reading when comparing 1980 and 1996 scores. This reduction is greater than reductions on 
the two ASVAB verbal tests—23% for the Word Knowledge test and 22% for the Paragraph 
Comprehension test.18 
                                                
17 NAEP tests are not administered every year, so PAY97 was compared to NAEP 1996. 
18 It should be noted that any direct comparison between test scores on NAEP and ASVAB may be influenced 
by differences in the motivational levels of examinees on the two tests (cf. Bloxom and colleagues, 2006). 
Motivational level differences between tests can impact the distribution of scores across individuals within 
tests, thereby impacting comparisons between mean changes over time in both the NAEP and ASVAB. 
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The reduction of White-Black differences on the technical knowledge tests is noteworthy in that 
it reflects a different phenomenon than that observed for the other tests. Based on the results 
presented in Table 4.11, the reduction in d for the verbal and quantitative tests is driven by an 
improvement in scores for the Black subgroup, with scores for the White subgroup remaining 
relatively unchanged (as in the case of the verbal, quantitative, and General Science tests). For 
the Automotive-Shop Information and Electronics Information tests, however, the reduction in d 
is a function of Black subgroup scores remaining essentially unchanged while White subgroup 
scores declined. This suggests the consistent narrowing of the White-Black gap across a broad 
range of tests is reflective of a number of different patterns of test score change. 
The White-Hispanic ds parallel the White-Black ds in that there is a consistent narrowing of 
White-Hispanic ds across the entire ASVAB battery. The pattern of scores changes, however, is 
different in many ways from the White-Black pattern. While the White-Black comparison shows 
a clear pattern of small changes on the technical knowledge tests and greater changes on the 
verbal and quantitative tests, no clear pattern exists in the White-Hispanic comparison. 
For the verbal and quantitative tests, White-Hispanic differences in PAY80 were greater for the 
verbal than the quantitative tests—a pattern that continues in PAY97. Findings parallel NAEP 
data, which also show a reduction in White-Hispanic differences for both reading (0.79 to 0.64) 
and mathematics (0.86 to 0.71), with slightly larger differences in reading scores than 
mathematics scores. 
For the General Science test, the gap narrowed slightly from 1.01 to 0.93 (8%). This is 
consistent with NAEP findings that show an interpolated 1980 White-Hispanic d of 0.94 and a 
1996 d of 0.79, a reduction of 16%. Although the reductions in the White-Hispanic differences 
are comparable, the difference in the means between the populations is very high. General 
Science is the ASVAB test with the greatest White-Hispanic d in PAY97, which may be a 
reflection of a difference in exposure to a science curriculum. 
For the technical knowledge tests (Automotive-Shop Information, Mechanical Comprehension, 
and Electronics Information), the narrowing of the White-Hispanic gap reflects constant Hispanic 
scores from PAY80 to PAY97 and declining White scores. As is the case of the White-Black ds, 
the consistent pattern of reduction in ds across tests reflects differing phenomena. In this case, 
the pattern reflects improving Hispanic scores and relatively unchanged White scores for the 
verbal and quantitative tests and relatively unchanged Hispanic scores and declining White 
scores for the technical knowledge tests. 
Changes in Mean Test Scores by Education Level 
Test means and SDs by education level for both PAY80 and PAY97 are presented in Table 
4.15; ds showing changes in mean ability across education levels—non-high school graduate 
versus high school graduate, high school graduate versus some college, and some college 
versus college graduate—are presented in Table 4.16. Differences between each successive 
education level are substantial. High school graduates score 0.68 SD higher than nongraduates 
on the AFQT in 1997. Individuals with some college score 0.87 SD higher than those with a high 
school diploma, and those with a college degree score 0.59 SD higher than those with some 
college. The ds are additive as well. To compare non-high school graduates with college 
graduates, the successive ds can be added. For example, for the AFQT, the d for non-high 
school graduate versus college graduate in PAY97 equals 0.68 +0.87 +0.59, or 2.14 (versus 







Table 4.15. Means and Standard Deviations for ASVAB Composites and Tests by Education Level and PAY Year 
  Overall Non-HS Grad HS Grad Some College College Grad 
   X σ X σ X σ X σ X σ 
 AFQT 
1980 50.41 28.91 36.03 26.82 49.52 25.33 71.50 23.20 81.71 15.56 
1997 52.35 27.33 28.46 19.69 44.30 24.48 64.44 23.87 78.20 17.65 
AFQT Tests 
AR 
1980 49.96 10.01 45.69 9.33 49.69 9.25 56.28 8.56 59.40 6.75 
1997 49.91 9.78 42.69 7.98 47.60 9.28 53.52 8.81 57.33 7.33 
MK 
1980 50.01 9.99 45.88 9.19 49.11 8.89 57.05 8.78 60.31 6.04 
1997 51.62 9.96 42.92 7.46 48.37 9.01 56.42 8.36 60.52 5.86 
WK 
1980 49.98 9.96 44.92 10.83 50.71 8.61 55.85 6.22 58.44 3.54 
1997 51.02 8.66 44.85 8.95 49.35 8.81 53.83 7.02 57.28 4.46 
PC 
1980 50.04 10.04 45.49 11.23 50.61 8.81 55.52 6.31 57.17 4.01 




1980 49.90 10.01 45.66 10.27 49.96 8.68 55.61 8.42 58.86 6.77 
1997 49.78 9.99 42.56 9.00 47.81 9.48 53.10 9.05 56.98 7.26 
AS 
1980 49.97 10.00 47.43 9.99 50.86 9.95 52.06 9.33 53.83 8.25 
1997 47.42 8.83 45.00 9.42 47.88 9.24 47.70 8.31 48.26 6.91 
MC 
1980 50.00 10.04 46.96 9.77 50.27 9.73 53.82 9.44 55.62 8.79 
1997 48.36 10.16 43.10 9.43 47.38 10.07 50.47 9.77 52.66 9.07 
EI 
1980 49.97 10.00 46.19 9.92 50.61 9.47 54.20 8.90 56.55 7.28 
1997 47.25 9.15 42.61 9.23 46.47 9.14 49.06 8.61 50.83 7.46 
Factors 
V 
1980 -0.01 1.02 -0.52 1.11 0.05 0.86 0.61 0.65 0.86 0.42 
1997 0.01 0.97 -0.76 0.96 -0.19 0.96 0.37 0.78 0.76 0.52 
T 
1980 0.11 1.02 -0.18 1.00 0.19 1.01 0.39 0.96 0.60 0.85 
1997 -0.18 0.94 -0.50 0.95 -0.18 0.97 -0.10 0.90 0.00 0.78 
Q 
1980 -0.04 0.99 -0.41 0.90 -0.14 0.90 0.63 0.90 0.92 0.68 
1997 0.06 1.02 -0.76 0.75 -0.24 0.94 0.51 0.90 0.90 0.70 
Note. AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word 
Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; 
MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; 
Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
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Table 4.16. Standardized Mean Differences for ASVAB Composites and Tests by 
Education Level and PAY Year 
  2-1 3-2 4-3 
  1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 
 DEFF 3.28 3.12 2.61 3.97 1.63 2.76 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.10 
 AFQT 0.54 0.68 0.87 0.87 0.40 0.59 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.44 0.56 0.73 0.67 0.34 0.43 
MK 0.36 0.65 0.89 0.96 0.37 0.49 
WK 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.29 0.44 
PC 0.56 0.66 0.53 0.61 0.18 0.39 
Knowledge Tests 
GS 0.47 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.35 0.43 
AS 0.35 0.33 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.06 
MC 0.34 0.44 0.37 0.32 0.19 0.22 
EI 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.20 
Factors 
V 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.28 0.45 
T 0.37 0.35 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.12 
Q 0.30 0.59 0.86 0.86 0.33 0.44 
Note. Pooled SD across all 4 groups used in denominator; two times the standard error, which approximates 
the confidence interval or margin of error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance of all d values; 
1=Non-HS grad, 2=HS grad, 3=Some College, 4=College grad; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification test; 
V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
 
To examine cross-study change within education levels, ds were computed for the difference 
between PAY97 and PAY80 means using the PAY80 SD as the denominator. These ds are 
presented in Table 4.17. The data show a general tendency for PAY97 scores to be lower than 
PAY80 scores at all education levels. 
Table 4.17. Cross-Year Standardized Mean Differences for Education Level by Test 
  Overall 
Non-HS 





 DEFF 6.66 2.89 3.58 3.10 1.78 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.11 
 AFQT 0.07 -0.28 -0.21 -0.30 -0.23 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.00 -0.32 -0.23 -0.32 -0.31 
MK 0.16 -0.32 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 
WK 0.10 -0.01 -0.16 -0.32 -0.33 
PC -0.03 -0.35 -0.32 -0.32 -0.02 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS -0.01 -0.30 -0.25 -0.30 -0.18 
AS -0.26 -0.24 -0.30 -0.47 0.52 
MC -0.16 -0.39 -0.30 -0.35 0.15 
EI -0.27 -0.36 -0.44 -0.58 -1.14 
Factors 
V 0.02 -0.22 -0.28 -0.38 -0.25 
T -0.29 -0.32 -0.36 -0.52 -0.70 
Q 0.10 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.03 
Note. PAY80 SD used in denominator; positive values indicate a higher value for PAY97 cohort; two 
times the standard error, which approximates the confidence interval or margin of error, should be used to 
interpret the statistical significance of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic 
Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph 
Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; 
MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; 
T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
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At first glance the findings appear puzzling. The overall AFQT change between PAY80 and 
PAY97 was 0.07, yet the averaged d for the four education levels was approximately -0.25. This 
is the result of a sizable increase in the education levels attained by the nation’s youth. As Table 
4.18 shows, from 1980 to 1997 the proportion of individuals not completing high school dropped 
from approximately 36% to 14%, and the proportion with at least some college rose from 22% to 
41%. 
Table 4.18. Cross-Tabs for Percentage in Education Level by Subgroup 
 Non-HS grad HS-grad Some College College grad 
 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 
Black 44.87 19.72 35.73 42.68 18.12 34.26 1.29 3.34 
Hispanic 52.48 29.52 29.44 39.82 16.83 28.96 1.25 1.70 
White 33.30 10.01 39.92 38.51 23.76 43.78 3.02 7.70 
Total 36.06 14.25 38.93 38.84 22.37 40.66 2.64 6.24 
Note. Percentages are row percentages. 
 
If one’s conceptualization is that education drives test scores, then one would expect a different 
pattern: as education levels have risen substantially, overall test scores should increase, though 
there would be no reason to expect the mean at any given level of education to increase. 
However, an alternative conception is that the causal arrow goes largely from ability level to 
educational level, rather than from educational level to ability. In this case, overall ability level 
may be relatively unchanged (as the current data show), and an increase in the proportion of 
the population who pursue higher levels of education results in a lowering of the mean ability 
level at each level of education. Thus, these findings suggest that a push for high levels of 
education has led to a relaxing of the ability levels needed to attain each successive level of 
education. 
Changes in Mean Test Scores by Region 
Table 4.19 presents test means and SDs by region. Table 4.20 presents cross-study ds for each 
region. The clearest trend is for greater score decreases (or smaller score gains) for the 
Northeast region. Table 4.21 compares each region’s mean with the overall mean for both 
PAY80 and PAY97. The overall trends show above average scores for the Northeast region in 
PAY80, but roughly average scores in PAY97; consistently above average scores for the North 
Central region in both PAY studies; below average scores for the Southern region in PAY80, 








Table 4.19. Means and Standard Deviations for ASVAB Composites and Tests by Region and PAY Year 
  Overall Northeast North Central Southern Western 
   X  σ X σ X σ X  σ X σ 
 
AFQT 
1980 50.41 28.91 55.38 29.41 53.64 28.01 44.76 28.94 50.67 27.81 
1997 52.35 27.33 52.37 26.09 57.42 27.01 48.62 27.41 51.19 27.57 
AFQT Tests 
AR 
1980 49.96 10.01 51.26 10.18 51.26 9.96 48.07 9.74 50.08 9.80 
1997 49.91 9.78 49.81 9.30 51.76 9.76 48.55 9.69 49.56 9.94 
MK 
1980 50.01 9.99 51.87 10.21 50.90 9.89 48.54 9.72 49.35 9.94 
1997 51.62 9.96 51.45 9.72 53.25 9.80 50.73 9.86 50.91 10.25 
WK 
1980 49.98 9.96 51.32 9.66 51.08 9.02 47.86 10.82 50.91 9.25 
1997 51.02 8.66 51.28 8.55 52.17 8.10 49.89 9.17 50.99 8.53 
PC 
1980 50.04 10.04 51.29 9.42 50.93 9.41 48.65 10.71 49.94 9.90 




1980 49.90 10.01 50.84 10.16 50.86 9.43 48.30 10.29 50.50 9.87 
1997 49.78 9.99 49.99 10.00 51.54 9.67 48.46 10.03 49.36 9.96 
AS 
1980 49.97 10.00 49.40 9.89 51.19 9.94 48.35 9.82 51.80 9.92 
1997 47.42 8.83 46.61 8.84 48.72 8.77 46.63 8.77 47.52 8.70 
MC 
1980 50.00 10.04 50.14 10.00 51.34 9.91 48.26 9.87 51.18 10.12 
1997 48.36 10.16 47.93 10.28 50.18 10.08 46.97 10.03 48.33 10.04 
EI 
1980 49.97 10.00 50.96 10.06 51.27 9.66 48.20 10.08 50.24 9.83 
1997 47.25 9.15 47.44 9.00 48.25 9.22 46.51 9.10 46.88 9.13 
Factors 
V 
1980 -0.01 1.02 0.14 0.98 0.09 0.93 -0.19 1.10 0.03 0.96 
1997 0.01 0.97 0.06 0.95 0.15 0.93 -0.11 1.01 -0.01 0.97 
T 
1980 0.11 1.02 0.09 1.02 0.25 1.01 -0.07 1.01 0.27 1.02 
1997 -0.18 0.94 -0.23 0.94 -0.04 0.94 -0.28 0.93 -0.18 0.92 
Q 
1980 -0.04 0.99 0.12 1.02 0.06 0.99 -0.19 0.94 -0.08 1.00 
1997 0.06 1.02 0.04 0.98 0.24 1.02 -0.05 0.99 0.00 1.05 
Note. AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; 
WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop 
Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; 
T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
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Table 4.20. Cross-Year Standardized Mean Differences for Region by ASVAB Composites 
and Tests 
  Overall Northeast North Central Southern Western 
 DEFF 6.66 2.65 3.01 3.57 2.77 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 AFQT 0.07 -0.11 0.13 0.14 0.02 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.00 -0.15 0.05 0.05 -0.05 
MK 0.16 -0.04 0.24 0.22 0.15 
WK 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.01 
PC -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.11 
AS -0.26 -0.29 -0.26 -0.18 -0.46 
MC -0.16 -0.22 -0.12 -0.13 -0.28 
EI -0.27 -0.37 -0.32 -0.18 -0.35 
Factors 
V 0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.04 
T -0.29 -0.33 -0.30 -0.22 -0.46 
Q 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.14 0.08 
Note. Pooled SD across all 4 groups used in denominator; positive values indicate a higher value for 
PAY97 cohort; two times the standard error, which approximates the confidence interval or margin of 
error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces 
Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word 
Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and 
Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal 
Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
 
Table 4.21. Standardized Mean Differences for Region by ASVAB Composites and Tests 
by PAY Year 
  1-Overall 2-Overall 3-Overall 4-Overall 
  1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 
 DEFF 2.95 3.42 3.18 4.12 3.93 4.62 2.90 3.80 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 
 AFQT 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.19 -0.20 -0.14 0.01 -0.04 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.13 -0.01 0.13 0.19 -0.19 -0.14 0.01 -0.04 
MK 0.19 -0.02 0.09 0.16 -0.15 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 
WK 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.13 -0.21 -0.13 0.09 0.00 
PC 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.18 -0.16 -0.13 0.06 -0.04 
AS -0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.15 -0.16 -0.09 0.18 0.01 
MC 0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.18 -0.17 -0.14 0.12 0.00 
EI 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.11 -0.18 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 
Factors 
V 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.14 -0.18 -0.13 0.04 -0.03 
T -0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.15 -0.18 -0.11 0.15 0.00 
Q 0.16 -0.02 0.10 0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 
Note. Overall SD used in denominator; two times the standard error, which approximates the confidence 
interval or margin of error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance of all d values; 
1=Northeast, 2=North Central, 3=Southern, 4=Western; positive values indicate that a region’s mean 
score is higher than the overall mean; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning 
test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; 
NO=Numerical Operations test; CS=Coding Speed test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and 
Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal 
Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative ability factor. 
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Changes in Mean Test Scores by Age 
Table 4.22 presents test means and SD by age. Table 4.23 presents cross-study ds for each 
age group. Table 4.24 presents d values comparing the youngest group—18-year-olds—in each 
PAY study with the oldest group—23-year-olds—as an overall indicator of age effects. With the 
exception of Mathematics Knowledge scores and Quantitative Ability factor scores in PAY97, 
23-year-olds score higher than 18-year-olds, with the difference generally greater in PAY80 data 
than in PAY97 data. 
Changes in Score Distributions 
As noted previously, a d of 0.00 indicates no mean change, but does not necessarily indicate no 
change. Improvements in the educational system aimed at the least academically prepared 
students might result in a substantial reduction in the proportion of students scoring in the range 
that defined the lowest score quartile in a previous time period. Assume, for example, that these 
students score in the second quartile. The result would be an improvement in mean test score. 
Now consider an employer, university, or a branch of the military that wishes to select 
individuals with a score greater than the score that represents the national mean in the original 
test score distribution. While the mean score has increased over time, the proportion of youth 
meeting this selection standard has not changed. Thus, an examination of score distributions is 
of interest to institutions with a particular interest in individuals in a specific portion of the test 
score range. 
The proportion of youth falling into six score ranges for the AFQT, for each ASVAB test, and for 
the Verbal Ability, Technical Knowledge, and Quantitative Ability factor scores are presented in 
the next series of tables. The ranges used are 0 to 10th percentile (10th), 11th to 25th percentile 
(25th), 26th to 50th percentile (50th), 51st to 75th percentile (75th), 76th to 90th percentile 
(90th), and 91st to 100th percentile (100th). The score ranges defining these categories are 
based on PAY80 data. Therefore, the percentage of scores falling into the 10th percentile range 
for the PAY97 data represent the proportion of the PAY97 sample that would fall within the 
score range that defined the bottom 10% in the PAY80 data. Percentile values are approximate 
due to scale coarseness. The discrete score values on a test generally make it impossible to 
find scores that precisely define the interval of interest. For example, for Arithmetic Reasoning in 
PAY80, the interval that represents the closest available approximation to an interval containing 








Table 4.22. Means and Standard Deviations by Age and PAY Year 
   18 19 20 21 22 23 
    σ  σ  σ  σ  σ  σ 
 
AFQT 
1980 45.02 27.87 48.68 29.00 49.56 28.68 50.83 29.33 54.70 28.77 53.43 28.75 
1997 49.72 28.67 50.49 27.20 55.05 27.02 53.67 27.08 51.41 26.94 54.10 26.46 
AFQT Tests 
AR 
1980 48.40 9.57 49.27 9.91 49.73 10.00 50.11 10.17 51.20 10.15 51.01 9.97 
1997 48.82 10.35 49.53 9.76 50.60 9.79 50.36 9.62 49.63 9.68 50.66 9.25 
MK 
1980 49.51 9.79 50.40 10.28 49.66 9.87 50.02 10.07 50.56 10.15 49.87 9.72 
1997 52.23 10.42 52.14 9.98 52.77 9.79 51.90 9.89 49.97 9.79 50.64 9.56 
WK 
1980 47.69 9.72 49.00 9.85 49.68 10.11 50.21 10.01 51.82 9.45 51.37 10.04 
1997 49.42 9.13 49.86 9.04 51.50 8.47 51.42 8.60 51.72 8.15 52.43 8.08 
PC 
1980 48.59 10.38 49.45 9.98 49.90 10.11 49.98 10.02 51.28 9.57 50.98 9.92 




1980 48.05 10.04 49.15 9.74 49.79 10.12 49.95 9.96 51.13 10.09 51.29 9.76 
1997 49.20 10.20 49.36 10.03 50.70 9.67 50.01 9.90 49.62 10.13 49.86 9.89 
AS 
1980 47.79 9.19 48.86 9.72 49.81 9.86 50.56 10.08 51.16 10.44 51.57 10.10 
1997 45.27 8.62 46.29 8.78 47.15 8.47 48.19 8.76 48.65 9.06 49.28 8.58 
MC 
1980 48.44 9.50 49.60 9.86 49.75 10.07 50.31 10.02 50.92 10.47 50.94 10.08 
1997 47.03 10.46 47.42 9.83 49.31 10.03 48.99 10.09 48.75 10.43 48.79 9.87 
EI 
1980 47.45 9.84 48.74 9.86 49.56 10.11 50.67 9.77 51.48 9.85 51.82 9.85 
1997 45.46 9.45 46.69 9.04 47.49 8.92 47.85 8.93 48.08 9.28 48.08 8.90 
Factors 
V 
1980 -0.22 1.02 -0.10 1.00 -0.03 1.03 0.00 1.01 0.16 0.97 0.13 1.02 
1997 -0.14 1.05 -0.09 1.00 0.10 0.93 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.12 0.92 
T 
1980 -0.13 0.95 0.00 0.99 0.09 1.02 0.18 1.01 0.24 1.06 0.29 1.03 
1997 -0.39 0.93 -0.29 0.91 -0.18 0.91 -0.11 0.94 -0.06 0.98 -0.05 0.90 
Q 
1980 -0.08 0.96 -0.01 0.99 -0.06 0.99 -0.05 1.01 0.02 1.01 -0.04 0.96 
1997 0.10 1.06 0.11 1.02 0.17 1.02 0.09 1.01 -0.09 1.01 -0.02 0.97 
Note. AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; 
PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; 
EI=Electronics Information test; V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
X X X X X X
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Table 4.23. Cross-Year Standardized Mean Differences for Age by ASVAB Composites 
and Tests 
  Overall 18 19 20 21 22 23 
 DEFF 6.66 2.69 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.49 2.47 
 Std. Error 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 AFQT 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.10 -0.11 0.02 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.15 -0.04 
MK 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.32 0.19 -0.06 0.08 
WK 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.12 -0.01 0.11 
PC -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.11 0.04 -0.14 -0.02 
Knowledge 
Tests 
GS -0.01 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.15 -0.15 
AS -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 
MC -0.16 -0.15 -0.22 -0.04 -0.13 -0.21 -0.21 
EI -0.27 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.29 -0.35 -0.38 
Factors 
V 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.11 -0.01 
T -0.29 -0.27 -0.29 -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 -0.33 
Q 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.24 0.14 -0.11 0.01 
Note. Positive values indicate a higher value for PAY97 cohort; two times the standard error, which 
approximates the confidence interval or margin of error, should be used to interpret the statistical significance 
of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification test; AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics 
Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; 
AS=Automotive and Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information 
test; V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
 
Table 4.24. Within-Year Standardized Mean Differences for Age by Test (Age 18 and 23 Only) 
  1980 1997 
 DEFF 2.22 2.77 
 Std. Error 0.05 0.08 
 AFQT 0.30 0.16 
AFQT Tests 
AR 0.27 0.18 
MK 0.04 -0.15 
WK 0.38 0.33 
PC 0.23 0.23 
Knowledge Tests 
GS 0.32 0.06 
AS 0.41 0.47 
MC 0.26 0.17 
EI 0.44 0.28 
Factors 
V 0.35 0.24 
T 0.44 0.37 
Q 0.05 -0.12 
Note. Positive values indicate a higher value for 23 year olds; two times the standard error, 
which approximates the confidence interval or margin of error, should be used to interpret 
the statistical significance of all d values; AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification test; 
AR=Arithmetic Reasoning test; MK=Mathematics Knowledge test; WK=Word Knowledge 
test; PC=Paragraph Comprehension test; GS=General Science test; AS=Automotive and 
Shop Information test; MC=Mechanical Comprehension test; EI=Electronics Information 
test; V=Verbal Ability factor; T=Technical Knowledge factor; Q=Quantitative Ability factor. 
 
PAY80 and PAY97 values are provided overall, by race/ethnicity, by gender, and across 
race/ethnicity and gender. Because of the operational use of the AFQT Category system (Category 






Table 4.25. AFQT Category Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
AFQT 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Category 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
CAT V 0 to 9 
% 9.28 5.83 30.92 15.69 23.55 9.93 4.48 2.88 10.00 5.99 8.54 5.66 
Cumulative 
% 
(9.28) (5.83) (30.92) (15.69) (23.55) (9.93) (4.48) (2.88) (10.00) (5.99) (8.54) (5.66) 
CAT IVC 10 to 15 
% 5.82 4.22 14.42 9.30 11.40 8.08 4.11 2.18 5.73 3.85 5.91 4.59 
Cumulative 
% 
(15.10) (10.04) (45.34) (24.98) (34.95) (18.02) (8.58) (5.06) (15.74) (9.84) (14.44) (10.24) 
CAT IVB 16 to 20 
% 4.88 4.77 9.54 8.58 9.20 9.64 3.78 2.91 4.76 4.08 5.00 5.46 
Cumulative 
% 
(19.98) (14.81) (54.88) (33.57) (44.15) (27.66) (12.37) (7.97) (20.49) (13.92) (19.44) (15.71) 
CAT IVA 21 to 30 
% 10.34 10.60 15.06 15.82 14.93 19.71 8.99 7.52 9.91 10.44 10.78 10.76 
Cumulative 
% 
(30.31) (25.41) (69.94) (49.39) (59.08) (47.37) (21.36) (15.49) (30.40) (24.35) (30.22) (26.47) 
CAT IIIB 31 to 49 
% 18.28 21.06 15.52 23.47 17.05 21.77 19.01 20.37 15.89 20.38 20.75 21.74 
Cumulative 
% 
(48.60) (46.47) (85.46) (72.85) (76.12) (69.15) (40.37) (35.85) (46.29) (44.74) (50.97) (48.21) 
CAT IIIA 50 to 64 
% 15.30 16.90 6.51 13.96 9.44 14.10 16.74 18.05 14.39 16.94 16.23 16.87 
Cumulative 
% 
(63.89) (63.37) (91.97) (86.82) (85.56) (83.25) (57.11) (53.90) (60.68) (61.68) (67.21) (65.07) 
CAT II 65 to 92 
% 28.16 29.06 7.49 12.25 12.57 14.48 32.90 36.16 29.35 29.87 26.94 28.25 
Cumulative 
% 




% 7.94 7.57 0.55 0.93 1.87 2.27 9.99 9.94 9.97 8.45 5.86 6.68 
Cumulative 
% 






Table 4.26. AFQT Category Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
AFQT 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Category 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
CAT V 0 to 9 
% 34.86 15.46 26.95 15.88 22.23 9.70 24.90 10.19 4.79 3.48 4.14 2.27 
Cumulative % (34.86) (15.46) (26.95) (15.88) (22.23) (9.70) (24.90) (10.19) (4.79) (3.48) (4.14) (2.27) 
CAT IVC 10 to 15 
% 12.29 9.68 16.57 8.97 10.01 5.81 12.81 10.54 4.48 2.09 3.72 2.27 
Cumulative % (47.15) (25.14) (43.52) (24.85) (32.24) (15.51) (37.70) (20.73) (9.27) (5.57) (7.86) (4.54) 
CAT IVB 16 to 20 
% 9.10 8.53 9.98 8.63 9.44 6.39 8.96 13.16 3.64 2.80 3.93 3.03 
Cumulative % (56.25) (33.67) (53.49) (33.48) (41.68) (21.91) (46.66) (33.88) (12.92) (8.37) (11.80) (7.57) 
CAT IVA 21 to 30 
% 14.59 14.83 15.53 16.66 12.92 22.51 16.97 16.68 8.63 6.87 9.37 8.17 
Cumulative % (70.84) (48.50) (69.02) (50.14) (54.59) (44.42) (63.63) (50.56) (21.55) (15.24) (21.17) (15.74) 
CAT IIIB 31 to 49 
% 13.86 22.36 17.20 24.41 16.61 21.72 17.49 21.84 16.08 19.69 22.09 21.05 
Cumulative % (84.70) (70.86) (86.22) (74.54) (71.21) (66.14) (81.12) (72.40) (37.62) (34.93) (43.26) (36.79) 
CAT IIIA 50 to 64 
% 6.78 15.78 6.23 12.43 10.66 16.62 8.20 11.37 15.59 17.37 17.96 18.73 
Cumulative % (91.48) (86.64) (92.45) (86.97) (81.87) (82.76) (89.32) (83.77) (53.21) (52.30) (61.21) (55.52) 
CAT II 65 to 92 
% 7.52 12.88 7.45 11.72 15.36 14.70 9.73 14.24 34.14 36.87 31.59 35.44 
Cumulative % (99.00) (99.52) (99.91) (98.69) (97.23) (97.46) (99.05) (98.01) (87.34) (89.18) (92.80) (90.96) 
CAT I 93 to 100 
% 1.00 0.48 0.09 1.31 2.77 2.54 0.95 1.99 12.66 10.82 7.20 9.04 
Cumulative % (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
 
Chapter 4 62 
AFQT Score Distributions 
Table 4.27 shows score distributions for the AFQT overall and by race/ethnicity and gender. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the data in the table for the overall group. Consistent with the overall d of 
0.07, the distributions are very similar. In Figure 4.1, the PAY97 data show a slight increase in 
the number of individuals in the middle of the distribution and a slight decrease at both tails. 
Figure 4.2 (PAY80) and Figure 4.3 (PAY97) show distributions by race/ethnicity. These figures 
clearly show that Black and Hispanic youth are more prevalent at the lower tail and less 
prevalent at the upper tail. Figures 4.4 through 4.6 show cross-study comparisons for Black, 
Hispanic, and White youth, respectively. For both Black and Hispanic youth, the pattern is one 
of fewer individuals at the lower tail, more in the middle of the distribution, and very little change 
in the number of individuals in the upper quartile of the distribution. The data on White youth 
parallel the overall distribution. 
The PAY80 data in Figure 4.7 show women more prevalent in the middle of the distribution and 
less prevalent in the top quartile. The PAY97 data in Figure 4.8 show nearly identical 
distributions for both groups. In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, cross-study comparisons are shown for 
men and women. For men, the pattern in Figure 4.9 shows more individuals in the middle of the 
distribution and fewer at either tail in PAY97 than in PAY80. For women, the distributions are 
nearly identical in shape in both studies, with slightly fewer women in the bottom decile, and 








Table 4.27. AFQT Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
   AFQT 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 1 to 10 
% 10.03 6.42 32.66 16.87 24.96 11.15 5.05 3.16 10.81 6.64 9.24 6.21 
Cumulative % (10.03) (6.42) (32.66) (16.87) (24.96) (11.15) (5.05) (3.16) (10.81) (6.64) (9.24) (6.21) 
25th 11 to 25 
% 15.40 14.15 30.80 25.25 28.05 26.77 11.84 9.15 15.09 13.01 15.72 15.29 
Cumulative % (25.43) (20.57) (63.46) (42.12) (53.01) (37.92) (16.89) (12.31) (25.89) (19.64) (24.96) (21.50) 
50th 26 to 50 
% 24.20 26.85 22.53 32.20 23.60 32.04 24.56 24.42 21.24 26.05 27.25 27.66 
Cumulative % (49.64) (47.43) (85.99) (74.32) (76.61) (69.96) (41.45) (36.73) (47.14) (45.70) (52.21) (49.16) 
75th 51 to 75 
% 25.40 27.65 9.88 18.98 15.04 20.63 28.51 31.14 25.05 28.21 25.76 27.09 
Cumulative % (75.03) (75.07) (95.87) (93.30) (91.66) (90.59) (69.97) (67.87) (72.19) (73.90) (77.97) (76.25) 
90th 76 to 90 
% 15.11 15.69 3.29 4.85 5.84 6.80 17.75 20.15 15.49 16.01 14.72 15.37 
Cumulative % (90.15) (90.77) (99.16) (98.15) (97.50) (97.39) (87.71) (88.02) (87.68) (89.92) (92.69) (91.62) 
100th 91 to 100 
% 9.85 9.23 0.84 1.85 2.50 2.61 12.29 11.98 12.32 10.08 7.31 8.38 
Cumulative % (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
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Figure 4.2 Overall AFQT Distributions by Race/Ethnicity (PAY80) 
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Figure 4.6 White AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.8 AFQT Distributions by Gender (PAY97) 
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Figure 4.10 Female AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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ASVAB Test Score Distributions 
Test score distributions for each of the ASVAB tests are provided in Tables 4.28 through 4.43. 
The scores are shown by percentile and score range by gender and race/ethnicity. 
Factor Score Distributions 
Findings are presented for the three factor scores in tabular and graphic format. 
Verbal Ability Factor Score Distributions 
Table 4.44 shows Verbal Ability factor score distributions overall and by race/ethnicity and 
gender. Figure 4.11 shows the overall Verbal Ability factor score distribution in PAY80 and 
PAY97. Consistent with the near-zero d value, the distributions are very similar. The PAY97 
data show a slight increase in the number of individuals in the lower-middle of the distribution, a 
slight decrease at the lower tail, and a slight decrease above the middle of the distribution. 
Tables 4.44 and 4.45 show distributions by race/ethnicity for PAY80 and PAY97; Figures 4.12 
and 4.13 illustrate the data in the tables. In 1980, Figure 4.12 shows markedly higher 
proportions of Black and Hispanic youth in the lower tail.  
Figure 4.13 tells a similar story for PAY97. In Figures 4.14 through 4.16, cross-study 
comparisons are shown for Black, Hispanic, and White youth, respectively. Comparing PAY97 
to PAY80, fewer Black and Hispanic youth are at the lower tail, more are in the middle of the 
distribution, and approximately the same number of individuals can be found in the upper 
quartile of the distribution. Data on White youth, however, indicate a slight increase in the 
number of individuals in the second quartile with little change at the tails. 
PAY80 gender distributions for the Verbal Ability factor, displayed in Figure 4.17, show women 
are more prevalent than men in the middle of the distribution and less prevalent in the top and 
bottom tails. In comparison, the PAY97 data in Figure 4.18 show nearly identical distributions for 
both groups, with slightly more women in the second quartile. Cross-study comparisons show 
more men in the middle of the distribution and fewer at either tail in PAY97 than in PAY80 (see 
Figure 4.19). Women show a slight decrease in the lower tail, a slight increase between the 11th 
and 50th percentile, a slight decrease between the 51st and 90th percentile, and a slight increase 







Table 4.28. Arithmetic Reasoning Test Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Arithmetic Reasoning Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 26 to 36 
% 10.92 10.17 30.28 25.14 25.14 16.18 6.51 5.76 9.83 9.56 12.03 10.78 
Cumulative % (10.92) (10.17) (30.28) (25.14) (25.14) (16.18) (6.51) (5.76) (9.83) (9.56) (12.03) (10.78) 
25th 37 to 40 
% 13.04 12.00 27.91 19.03 20.84 19.59 9.78 9.06 10.94 9.15 15.21 14.86 
Cumulative % (23.96) (22.17) (58.19) (44.17) (45.98) (35.77) (16.29) (14.83) (20.77) (18.71) (27.24) (25.64) 
50th 41 to 49 
% 24.47 25.74 27.20 29.13 28.56 31.32 24.01 23.79 21.90 23.13 27.11 28.35 
Cumulative % (48.43) (47.91) (85.38) (73.30) (74.54) (67.09) (40.30) (38.62) (42.67) (41.84) (54.35) (53.99) 
75th 50 to 58 
% 26.54 30.03 11.93 20.76 17.35 23.80 29.27 33.49 26.54 31.76 26.53 28.29 
Cumulative % (74.96) (77.93) (97.32) (94.05) (91.88) (90.89) (69.57) (72.11) (69.21) (73.60) (80.88) (82.28) 
90th 59 to 64 
% 16.08 13.93 1.75 4.54 5.99 6.53 19.24 17.44 18.87 16.23 13.21 11.62 
Cumulative % (91.05) (91.86) (99.07) (98.59) (97.87) (97.42) (88.81) (89.55) (88.08) (89.83) (94.09) (93.89) 
100th 65 to 66 
% 8.95 8.14 0.93 1.41 2.13 2.58 11.19 10.45 11.92 10.17 5.91 6.11 







Table 4.29. Arithmetic Reasoning Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race and Gender 
Arithmetic Reasoning Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 26 to 36 
% 29.25 25.52 31.31 24.81 22.36 12.83 27.98 19.80 5.51 5.99 7.56 5.54 
Cumulative % (29.25) (25.52) (31.31) (24.81) (22.36) (12.83) (27.98) (19.80) (5.51) (5.99) (7.56) (5.54) 
25th 37 to 40 
% 25.83 14.99 30.01 22.45 17.21 17.77 24.52 21.55 7.70 6.17 11.97 12.00 
Cumulative % (55.08) (40.51) (61.32) (47.26) (39.57) (30.61) (52.50) (41.35) (13.21) (12.16) (19.53) (17.54) 
50th 41 to 49 
% 27.50 27.12 26.89 30.83 28.44 30.90 28.68 31.78 20.57 20.57 27.62 27.07 
Cumulative % (82.58) (67.63) (88.21) (78.09) (68.01) (61.50) (81.18) (73.12) (33.78) (32.73) (47.15) (44.61) 
75th 50 to 58 
% 13.60 24.79 10.25 17.34 19.53 26.60 15.13 20.78 28.96 34.77 29.61 32.19 
Cumulative % (96.19) (92.43) (98.46) (95.43) (87.54) (88.10) (96.31) (93.90) (62.74) (67.50) (76.76) (76.80) 
90th 59 to 64 
% 2.32 6.36 1.16 3.00 8.85 8.08 3.07 4.86 22.53 19.74 15.77 15.09 
Cumulative % (98.51) (98.79) (99.63) (98.43) (96.38) (96.18) (99.38) (98.76) (85.27) (87.24) (92.53) (91.90) 
100th 65 to 66 
% 1.49 1.21 0.37 1.57 3.62 3.82 0.62 1.24 14.73 12.76 7.47 8.10 







Table 4.30. Mathematics Knowledge Test Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Mathematics Knowledge Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 29 to 37 
% 8.59 8.15 20.92 14.74 21.41 14.00 5.40 5.72 8.26 8.15 8.92 8.15 
Cumulative % (8.59) (8.15) (20.92) (14.74) (21.41) (14.00) (5.40) (5.72) (8.26) (8.15) (8.92) (8.15) 
25th 38 to 41 
% 18.17 12.45 32.21 18.87 27.48 20.25 15.15 9.54 17.74 12.32 18.61 12.58 
Cumulative % (26.76) (20.60) (53.13) (33.61) (48.89) (34.25) (20.55) (15.26) (26.01) (20.48) (27.53) (20.73) 
50th 42 to 48 
% 22.76 20.10 25.51 26.65 23.73 26.68 22.27 17.81 21.60 20.10 23.95 20.10 
Cumulative % (49.52) (40.70) (78.65) (60.26) (72.62) (60.93) (42.82) (33.07) (47.61) (40.58) (51.48) (40.83) 
75th 49 to 58 
% 27.18 30.65 15.56 27.99 16.79 24.80 29.56 32.67 25.70 30.59 28.69 30.71 
Cumulative % (76.70) (71.35) (94.21) (88.25) (89.41) (85.73) (72.39) (65.74) (73.32) (71.17) (80.18) (71.53) 
90th 59 to 65 
% 14.98 20.14 4.41 9.71 8.39 10.66 17.49 23.86 15.57 19.06 14.38 21.21 
Cumulative % (91.68) (91.49) (98.62) (97.96) (97.80) (96.39) (89.88) (89.61) (88.89) (90.24) (94.55) (92.75) 
100th 66 to 68 
% 8.32 8.51 1.38 2.04 2.20 3.61 10.12 10.39 11.11 9.76 5.45 7.25 







Table 4.31. Mathematics Knowledge Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Mathematics Knowledge Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 29 to 37 
% 21.24 14.44 20.60 14.99 19.45 12.56 23.41 15.55 5.18 6.26 5.63 5.17 
Cumulative % (21.24) (14.44) (20.60) (14.99) (19.45) (12.56) (23.41) (15.55) (5.18) (6.26) (5.63) (5.17) 
25th 38 to 41 
% 33.07 17.89 31.35 19.70 23.62 17.96 31.40 22.73 14.70 9.97 15.63 9.10 
Cumulative % (54.31) (32.33) (51.95) (34.69) (43.08) (30.52) (54.81) (38.29) (19.88) (16.23) (21.25) (14.28) 
50th 42 to 48 
% 25.69 29.05 25.34 24.61 25.83 28.95 21.59 24.23 20.09 17.20 24.56 18.43 
Cumulative % (80.00) (61.39) (77.29) (59.30) (68.91) (59.47) (76.39) (62.52) (39.97) (33.42) (45.82) (32.71) 
75th 49 to 58 
% 13.29 26.33 17.85 29.40 17.32 25.09 16.26 24.49 28.28 33.06 30.92 32.28 
Cumulative % (93.28) (87.71) (95.13) (88.70) (86.23) (84.55) (92.65) (87.00) (68.25) (66.48) (76.73) (64.99) 
90th 59 to 65 
% 4.91 9.86 3.91 9.59 10.74 11.58 6.00 9.66 18.26 21.71 16.69 26.05 
Cumulative % (98.20) (97.58) (99.05) (98.29) (96.97) (96.14) (98.65) (96.66) (86.51) (88.20) (93.42) (91.04) 
100th 66 to 68 
% 1.80 2.42 0.95 1.71 3.03 3.86 1.35 3.34 13.49 11.80 6.58 8.96 







Table 4.32. Word Knowledge Test Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Word Knowledge Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 20 to 34 
% 10.40 5.63 33.62 14.29 24.38 9.73 5.52 2.27 11.58 5.84 9.18 5.42 
Cumulative % (10.40) (5.63) (33.62) (14.29) (24.38) (9.73) (5.52) (2.27) (11.58) (5.84) (9.18) (5.42) 
25th 35 to 43 
% 13.68 11.81 28.98 22.11 24.68 22.59 10.24 7.12 12.94 10.80 14.44 12.83 
Cumulative % (24.08) (17.45) (62.60) (36.40) (49.06) (32.32) (15.76) (9.39) (24.52) (16.65) (23.63) (18.25) 
50th 44 to 52 
% 25.65 32.17 21.92 39.93 28.14 39.78 26.26 29.31 24.49 31.23 26.85 33.12 
Cumulative % (49.74) (49.62) (84.52) (76.33) (77.20) (72.10) (42.01) (38.70) (49.01) (47.88) (50.48) (51.37) 
75th 53 to 57 
% 25.62 28.32 9.35 17.20 13.88 19.71 28.90 32.66 25.70 30.21 25.53 26.41 
Cumulative % (75.35) (77.94) (93.87) (93.53) (91.09) (91.81) (70.92) (71.36) (74.72) (78.09) (76.01) (77.78) 
90th 58 to 60 
% 16.44 14.45 4.81 4.55 6.81 6.30 19.20 18.43 16.91 15.37 15.95 13.52 
Cumulative % (91.79) (92.39) (98.68) (98.08) (97.89) (98.11) (90.12) (89.79) (91.63) (93.46) (91.96) (91.30) 
100th 61 
% 8.21 7.61 1.32 1.92 2.11 1.89 9.88 10.21 8.37 6.54 8.04 8.70 







Table 4.33. Word Knowledge Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender  
Word Knowledge Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 20 to 34 
% 36.84 13.85 30.37 14.66 22.63 9.86 26.16 9.58 6.63 2.81 4.34 1.72 
Cumulative % (36.84) (13.85) (30.37) (14.66) (22.63) (9.86) (26.16) (9.58) (6.63) (2.81) (4.34) (1.72) 
25th 35 to 43 
% 26.24 19.83 31.74 24.04 23.31 19.52 26.08 25.91 9.68 6.98 10.83 7.26 
Cumulative % (63.09) (33.68) (62.11) (38.70) (45.93) (29.37) (52.24) (35.49) (16.31) (9.79) (15.17) (8.99) 
50th 44 to 52 
% 21.19 40.92 22.65 39.09 28.82 38.94 27.46 40.69 24.69 28.31 27.90 30.34 
Cumulative % (84.27) (74.60) (84.76) (77.79) (74.75) (68.31) (79.70) (76.19) (41.01) (38.10) (43.07) (39.32) 
75th 53 to 57 
% 8.98 19.33 9.72 15.40 16.32 23.62 11.41 15.49 28.86 33.79 28.95 31.51 
Cumulative % (93.25) (93.93) (94.49) (93.19) (91.07) (91.93) (91.10) (91.68) (69.87) (71.89) (72.02) (70.83) 
90th 58 to 60 
% 5.35 5.01 4.27 4.16 6.58 6.59 7.04 6.00 19.91 19.10 18.46 17.74 
Cumulative % (98.60) (98.94) (98.75) (97.36) (97.65) (98.52) (98.14) (97.68) (89.77) (90.99) (90.48) (88.57) 
100th 61 
% 1.40 1.06 1.25 2.64 2.35 1.48 1.86 2.32 10.23 9.01 9.52 11.43 







Table 4.34. Paragraph Comprehension Test Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Paragraph Comprehension Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 20 to 32 
% 9.54 9.70 26.63 23.16 23.13 14.95 5.61 5.60 11.47 11.58 7.54 7.83 
Cumulative % (9.54) (9.70) (26.63) (23.16) (23.13) (14.95) (5.61) (5.60) (11.47) (11.58) (7.54) (7.83) 
25th 33 to 44 
% 17.11 18.58 32.68 23.76 30.58 31.18 13.40 14.59 18.99 18.84 15.19 18.31 
Cumulative % (26.65) (28.28) (59.31) (46.92) (53.71) (46.13) (19.01) (20.19) (30.46) (30.42) (22.73) (26.14) 
50th 45 to 50 
% 16.76 17.74 17.76 22.76 14.39 20.17 16.84 16.23 16.48 16.84 17.04 18.65 
Cumulative % (43.41) (46.03) (77.07) (69.68) (68.10) (66.30) (35.85) (36.43) (46.94) (47.26) (39.77) (44.79) 
75th 51 to 56 
% 30.94 27.69 16.05 22.62 20.21 22.38 33.94 29.95 29.54 27.79 32.37 27.59 
Cumulative % (74.34) (73.71) (93.12) (92.31) (88.31) (88.68) (69.79) (66.37) (76.48) (75.05) (72.14) (72.37) 
90th 57 to 59 
% 16.70 14.32 5.25 5.30 7.67 6.33 19.31 18.05 16.09 13.92 17.33 14.73 
Cumulative % (91.04) (88.04) (98.37) (97.60) (95.98) (95.01) (89.10) (84.42) (92.58) (88.97) (89.47) (87.10) 
100th 60 to 62 
% 8.96 11.96 1.63 2.40 4.02 4.99 10.90 15.58 7.42 11.03 10.53 12.90 







Table 4.35. Paragraph Comprehension Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender  
Paragraph Comprehension Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 20 to 32 
% 31.95 26.77 21.26 20.10 23.73 16.01 22.52 13.81 7.19 7.54 3.95 3.61 
Cumulative % (31.95) (26.77) (21.26) (20.10) (23.73) (16.01) (22.52) (13.81) (7.19) (7.54) (3.95) (3.61) 
25th 33 to 44 
% 31.37 22.34 34.00 24.97 30.87 31.37 30.27 30.99 15.58 15.40 11.11 13.77 
Cumulative % (63.32) (49.11) (55.26) (45.07) (54.60) (47.37) (52.80) (44.79) (22.77) (22.95) (15.07) (17.38) 
50th 45 to 50 
% 14.96 22.42 20.59 23.06 11.93 18.35 16.90 22.13 16.86 15.47 16.81 17.01 
Cumulative % (78.27) (71.52) (75.85) (68.12) (66.53) (65.72) (69.70) (66.92) (39.63) (38.42) (31.87) (34.40) 
75th 51 to 56 
% 14.92 22.15 17.20 23.02 21.90 22.99 18.48 21.72 32.70 30.03 35.24 29.86 
Cumulative % (93.19) (93.67) (93.05) (91.15) (88.43) (88.71) (88.17) (88.65) (72.33) (68.45) (67.11) (64.26) 
90th 57 to 59 
% 5.26 4.46 5.23 6.00 7.96 5.35 7.37 7.39 18.59 17.64 20.07 18.47 
Cumulative % (98.45) (98.13) (98.29) (97.15) (96.40) (94.06) (95.55) (96.04) (90.93) (86.09) (87.18) (82.73) 
100th 60 to 62 
% 1.55 1.87 1.71 2.85 3.60 5.94 4.45 3.96 9.07 13.91 12.82 17.27 







Table 4.36. General Science Test Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
General Science Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 20 to 36 
% 11.34 11.98 35.67 29.19 32.05 25.62 5.86 5.14 10.56 9.96 12.13 14.01 
Cumulative % (11.34) (11.98) (35.67) (29.19) (32.05) (25.62) (5.86) (5.14) (10.56) (9.96) (12.13) (14.01) 
25th 37 to 42 
% 12.97 14.49 26.37 26.64 19.77 21.61 10.15 10.29 10.16 12.22 15.85 16.77 
Cumulative % (24.30) (26.48) (62.04) (55.83) (51.82) (47.23) (16.01) (15.42) (20.72) (22.18) (27.98) (30.78) 
50th 43 to 50 
% 27.63 25.29 23.58 24.46 24.60 27.33 28.44 25.26 23.27 22.03 32.11 28.55 
Cumulative % (51.93) (51.76) (85.61) (80.30) (76.42) (74.56) (44.45) (40.68) (43.99) (44.21) (60.09) (59.34) 
75th 51 to 56 
% 21.16 21.76 9.14 11.88 11.74 13.82 23.70 25.75 20.71 23.20 21.63 20.31 
Cumulative % (73.09) (73.52) (94.75) (92.18) (88.16) (88.38) (68.15) (66.44) (64.71) (67.41) (81.72) (79.64) 
90th 57 to 62 
% 17.16 17.37 4.14 6.47 8.03 8.69 20.03 21.60 19.76 20.46 14.48 14.27 
Cumulative % (90.24) (90.88) (98.89) (98.65) (96.19) (97.07) (88.18) (88.04) (84.46) (87.87) (96.20) (93.91) 
100th 63 to 68 
% 9.76 9.12 1.11 1.35 3.81 2.93 11.82 11.96 15.54 12.13 3.80 6.09 







Table 4.37. General Science Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
General Science Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 20 to 36 
% 36.12 26.20 35.22 31.73 28.20 21.65 35.97 29.92 5.03 4.22 6.73 6.06 
Cumulative % (36.12) (26.20) (35.22) (31.73) (28.20) (21.65) (35.97) (29.92) (5.03) (4.22) (6.73) (6.06) 
25th 37 to 42 
% 23.42 26.85 29.34 26.46 17.52 17.06 22.06 26.53 7.39 8.15 13.07 12.46 
Cumulative % (59.54) (53.05) (64.56) (58.19) (45.72) (38.70) (58.03) (56.44) (12.42) (12.38) (19.79) (18.52) 
50th 43 to 50 
% 23.38 23.53 23.78 25.26 22.68 30.27 26.54 24.15 22.51 19.97 34.68 30.64 
Cumulative % (82.92) (76.57) (88.34) (83.45) (68.40) (68.97) (84.57) (80.59) (34.92) (32.35) (54.48) (49.16) 
75th 51 to 56 
% 10.14 12.05 8.13 11.73 14.59 16.53 8.85 10.89 23.35 27.21 24.05 24.27 
Cumulative % (93.05) (88.63) (96.47) (95.18) (82.99) (85.50) (93.42) (91.49) (58.28) (59.56) (78.53) (73.44) 
90th 57 to 62 
% 4.74 9.26 3.53 4.12 10.54 10.85 5.48 6.37 23.03 24.86 16.88 18.29 
Cumulative % (97.79) (97.88) (100.00) (99.30) (93.53) (96.35) (98.90) (97.85) (81.31) (84.42) (95.41) (91.72) 
100th 63 to 68 
% 2.21 2.12 0.00 0.70 6.47 3.65 1.10 2.15 18.69 15.58 4.59 8.28 







Table 4.38. Auto and Shop Information Test Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Auto and Shop Information Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 24 to 37 
% 11.27 14.16 36.96 35.83 28.95 26.86 5.61 6.15 6.70 7.13 15.97 21.21 
Cumulative % (11.27) (14.16) (36.96) (35.83) (28.95) (26.86) (5.61) (6.15) (6.70) (7.13) (15.97) (21.21) 
25th 38 to 42 
% 16.54 19.68 29.71 30.83 23.56 24.51 14.03 15.94 7.70 10.14 25.65 29.26 
Cumulative % (27.81) (33.84) (66.68) (66.65) (52.52) (51.37) (19.64) (22.09) (14.40) (17.27) (41.62) (50.47) 
50th 43 to 48 
% 20.23 22.76 19.00 18.22 16.10 19.53 20.73 24.77 10.40 16.07 30.34 29.47 
Cumulative % (48.04) (56.61) (85.68) (84.87) (68.62) (70.90) (40.37) (46.87) (24.79) (33.34) (71.97) (79.94) 
75th 49 to 57 
% 25.83 28.24 10.93 11.95 19.47 21.59 28.82 33.61 26.59 37.83 25.05 18.63 
Cumulative % (73.87) (84.85) (96.61) (96.82) (88.09) (92.49) (69.18) (80.47) (51.38) (71.17) (97.02) (98.57) 
90th 58 to 64 
% 17.09 11.95 2.86 3.18 8.40 6.09 19.88 15.20 30.93 22.59 2.83 1.28 
Cumulative % (90.95) (96.80) (99.46) (100.00) (96.49) (98.58) (89.06) (95.67) (82.31) (93.76) (99.85) (99.84) 
100th 65 to 69 
% 9.05 3.20 0.54 0.00 3.51 1.42 10.94 4.33 17.69 6.24 0.15 0.16 







Table 4.39. Auto and Shop Information Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Auto and Shop Information Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 24 to 37 
% 26.27 20.78 47.76 48.57 17.13 13.62 40.98 41.17 2.66 2.64 8.72 9.71 
Cumulative % (26.27) (20.78) (47.76) (48.57) (17.13) (13.62) (40.98) (41.17) (2.66) (2.64) (8.72) (9.71) 
25th 38 to 42 
% 25.88 26.12 33.58 34.81 18.12 15.66 29.10 34.08 4.02 5.12 24.57 26.95 
Cumulative % (52.15) (46.90) (81.34) (83.38) (35.25) (29.28) (70.08) (75.26) (6.67) (7.76) (33.28) (36.65) 
50th 43 to 48 
% 23.09 22.91 14.88 14.25 13.22 22.90 19.03 15.88 8.50 13.40 33.58 36.33 
Cumulative % (75.24) (69.80) (96.22) (97.63) (48.47) (52.18) (89.11) (91.14) (15.18) (21.16) (66.87) (72.99) 
75th 49 to 57 
% 18.17 23.73 3.62 1.96 28.08 34.12 10.72 8.04 27.93 41.95 29.75 25.13 
Cumulative % (93.41) (93.54) (99.84) (99.59) (76.55) (86.30) (99.83) (99.18) (43.10) (63.11) (96.62) (98.11) 
90th 58 to 64 
% 5.53 6.46 0.16 0.41 16.62 10.97 0.04 0.82 35.69 28.53 3.25 1.65 
Cumulative % (98.93) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (93.16) (97.26) (99.87) (100.00) (78.79) (91.64) (99.86) (99.77) 
100th 65 to 69 
% 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.84 2.74 0.13 0.00 21.21 8.36 0.14 0.23 







Table 4.40. Mechanical Comprehension Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Mechanical Comprehension Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 24 to 37 
% 11.31 16.49 31.91 42.22 26.48 26.25 6.72 9.01 7.48 10.79 15.24 22.21 
Cumulative % (11.31) (16.49) (31.91) (42.22) (26.48) (26.25) (6.72) (9.01) (7.48) (10.79) (15.24) (22.21) 
25th 38 to 40 
% 11.14 11.36 25.44 19.27 18.65 13.77 8.11 8.96 7.02 7.44 15.39 15.29 
Cumulative % (22.45) (27.85) (57.35) (61.48) (45.13) (40.02) (14.83) (17.98) (14.50) (18.24) (30.63) (37.50) 
50th 41 to 48 
% 24.76 24.26 28.33 20.97 25.62 28.95 24.21 23.76 17.72 19.91 32.00 28.63 
Cumulative % (47.21) (52.12) (85.68) (82.45) (70.75) (68.98) (39.04) (41.74) (32.22) (38.14) (62.63) (66.13) 
75th 49 to 57 
% 28.39 27.97 11.06 14.44 19.34 20.97 31.97 32.68 27.93 30.00 28.87 25.93 
Cumulative % (75.60) (80.08) (96.73) (96.88) (90.10) (89.95) (71.01) (74.42) (60.15) (68.14) (91.50) (92.06) 
90th 58 to 63 
% 13.99 12.98 2.48 2.02 6.25 6.89 16.28 16.61 20.92 19.11 6.85 6.84 
Cumulative % (89.59) (93.06) (99.22) (98.90) (96.35) (96.83) (87.29) (91.03) (81.08) (87.25) (98.35) (98.90) 
100th 64 to 70 
% 10.41 6.94 0.78 1.10 3.65 3.17 12.71 8.97 18.92 12.75 1.65 1.10 







Table 4.41. Mechanical Comprehension Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Mechanical Comprehension Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 24 to 37 
% 26.23 33.79 37.65 49.35 17.48 16.23 35.63 37.08 3.72 5.11 9.87 12.99 
Cumulative % (26.23) (33.79) (37.65) (49.35) (17.48) (16.23) (35.63) (37.08) (3.72) (5.11) (9.87) (12.99) 
25th 38 to 40 
% 22.58 16.82 28.32 21.34 13.37 10.12 24.02 17.72 3.97 4.82 12.47 13.17 
Cumulative % (48.81) (50.61) (65.97) (70.69) (30.85) (26.35) (59.65) (54.80) (7.69) (9.92) (22.34) (26.16) 
50th 41 to 48 
% 29.35 22.12 27.30 19.99 24.14 27.56 27.14 30.46 15.21 17.90 33.67 29.72 
Cumulative % (78.16) (72.73) (93.26) (90.68) (54.99) (53.91) (86.79) (85.26) (22.90) (27.83) (56.02) (55.88) 
75th 49 to 57 
% 15.67 21.43 6.40 8.51 27.01 29.30 11.54 11.97 30.30 32.22 33.72 33.15 
Cumulative % (93.83) (94.15) (99.66) (99.19) (82.01) (83.21) (98.33) (97.23) (53.20) (60.05) (89.74) (89.02) 
90th 58 to 63 
% 4.61 3.76 0.34 0.55 11.22 10.95 1.20 2.49 23.83 23.68 8.34 9.43 
Cumulative % (98.45) (97.91) (99.99) (99.74) (93.23) (94.16) (99.53) (99.73) (77.03) (83.73) (98.07) (98.46) 
100th 64 to 70 
% 1.55 2.09 0.01 0.26 6.77 5.84 0.47 0.27 22.97 16.27 1.93 1.54 







Table 4.42. Electronics Information Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Electronics Information Test 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 23 to 34 
% 8.93 11.23 27.81 23.11 24.29 20.34 4.68 6.32 6.33 7.81 11.61 14.65 
Cumulative % (8.93) (11.23) (27.81) (23.11) (24.29) (20.34) (4.68) (6.32) (6.33) (7.81) (11.61) (14.65) 
25th 35 to 42 
% 17.13 20.10 35.42 33.16 28.95 28.89 13.24 15.54 10.68 11.85 23.78 28.37 
Cumulative % (26.07) (31.32) (63.23) (56.27) (53.24) (49.23) (17.91) (21.86) (17.01) (19.66) (35.39) (43.02) 
50th 43 to 49 
% 21.96 28.60 21.41 27.34 21.91 22.83 21.97 30.24 15.09 21.17 29.03 36.06 
Cumulative % (48.02) (59.93) (84.64) (83.61) (75.15) (72.06) (39.88) (52.10) (32.10) (40.83) (64.42) (79.08) 
75th 50 to 56 
% 23.10 25.48 10.64 12.30 12.23 21.44 25.57 29.16 22.37 33.35 23.85 17.59 
Cumulative % (71.12) (85.41) (95.28) (95.91) (87.38) (93.50) (65.45) (81.26) (54.47) (74.18) (88.27) (96.67) 
90th 57 to 63 
% 21.21 11.11 3.96 3.70 9.53 5.52 25.07 14.13 31.65 19.09 10.47 3.11 
Cumulative % (92.34) (96.52) (99.24) (99.61) (96.91) (99.03) (90.51) (95.39) (86.12) (93.27) (98.74) (99.78) 
100th 64 to 70 
% 7.66 3.48 0.76 0.39 3.09 0.97 9.49 4.61 13.88 6.73 1.26 0.22 







Table 4.43. Electronics Information Test Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Electronics Information Test 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 
Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th 23 to 34 
% 22.79 18.44 32.89 27.06 17.32 13.92 31.38 27.27 2.77 4.05 6.68 8.62 
Cumulative % (22.79) (18.44) (32.89) (27.06) (17.32) (13.92) (31.38) (27.27) (2.77) (4.05) (6.68) (8.62) 
25th 35 to 42 
% 29.54 27.41 41.35 38.03 22.21 19.53 35.81 39.02 6.78 7.09 20.02 24.13 
Cumulative % (52.33) (45.85) (74.24) (65.09) (39.54) (33.44) (67.19) (66.29) (9.55) (11.15) (26.70) (32.75) 
50th 43 to 49 
% 22.94 29.17 19.87 25.79 22.25 22.10 21.56 23.62 13.22 19.33 31.17 41.33 
Cumulative % (75.26) (75.03) (94.10) (90.88) (61.79) (55.54) (88.74) (89.91) (22.77) (30.48) (57.87) (74.08) 
75th 50 to 56 
% 16.23 17.46 4.99 7.94 17.56 33.67 6.81 8.24 23.15 36.59 28.11 21.61 
Cumulative % (91.49) (92.49) (99.10) (98.81) (79.35) (89.21) (95.55) (98.15) (45.92) (67.07) (85.98) (95.69) 
90th 57 to 63 
% 7.12 6.67 0.77 1.19 15.06 9.08 3.90 1.68 37.12 24.07 12.39 4.02 
Cumulative % (98.62) (99.15) (99.87) (100.00) (94.41) (98.29) (99.45) (99.83) (83.04) (91.14) (98.37) (99.71) 
100th 64 to 70 
% 1.38 0.85 0.13 0.00 5.59 1.71 0.55 0.17 16.96 8.86 1.63 0.29 








Table 4.44. Verbal Factor Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Verbal Factor 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile Score Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th -3.38 to -1.64 
% 10.00 7.24 32.28 18.07 25.48 12.81 5.18 3.11 11.47 7.75 8.49 6.73 
Cumulative % (10.00) (7.24) (32.28) (18.07) (25.48) (12.81) (5.18) (3.11) (11.47) (7.75) (8.49) (6.73) 
25th -1.63 to -0.57 
% 14.99 16.81 30.57 28.40 27.22 31.07 11.43 11.51 15.25 16.26 14.73 17.36 
Cumulative % (25.00) (24.05) (62.85) (46.46) (52.70) (43.88) (16.61) (14.62) (26.72) (24.01) (23.22) (24.08) 
50th -0.56 to 0.27 
% 24.99 28.01 21.44 30.46 23.39 30.16 25.51 27.00 23.57 27.11 26.46 28.92 
Cumulative % (49.99) (52.06) (84.30) (76.92) (76.09) (74.04) (42.12) (41.63) (50.29) (51.12) (49.68) (53.00) 
75th 0.28 to 0.77 
% 24.98 23.65 9.97 16.59 15.29 15.91 28.24 27.09 23.88 24.90 26.12 22.40 
Cumulative % (74.97) (75.71) (94.27) (93.50) (91.38) (89.95) (70.36) (68.72) (74.17) (76.02) (75.79) (75.41) 
90th 0.78 to 1.06 
% 15.02 13.31 3.70 4.69 4.72 6.40 17.77 16.70 15.00 13.11 15.04 13.52 
Cumulative % (89.99) (89.03) (97.96) (98.20) (96.10) (96.34) (88.13) (85.42) (89.17) (89.13) (90.83) (88.92) 
100th 1.07 to 1.61 
% 10.01 10.97 2.04 1.80 3.90 3.66 11.87 14.58 10.83 10.87 9.17 11.08 







Table 4.45. Verbal Factor Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Verbal Factor 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile Score Range  PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
10th -3.38 to -1.64 
% 36.88 18.63 27.64 17.58 26.19 13.80 24.76 11.73 6.18 3.85 4.12 2.36 
Cumulative % (36.88) (18.63) (27.64) (17.58) (26.19) (13.80) (24.76) (11.73) (6.18) (3.85) (4.12) (2.36) 
25th -1.63 to -0.57 
% 26.96 27.75 34.21 28.95 25.30 27.94 29.18 34.45 12.41 11.78 10.41 11.24 
Cumulative % (63.85) (46.38) (61.85) (46.53) (51.49) (41.74) (53.94) (46.19) (18.59) (15.63) (14.52) (13.60) 
50th -0.56 to 0.27 
% 20.15 29.87 22.75 30.96 21.66 30.72 25.15 29.55 23.68 25.67 27.44 28.35 
Cumulative % (84.00) (76.25) (84.60) (77.49) (73.14) (72.46) (79.09) (75.74) (42.27) (41.31) (41.96) (41.95) 
75th 0.28 to 0.77 
% 9.08 17.27 10.87 16.01 17.06 16.80 13.49 14.95 27.06 28.47 29.47 25.69 
Cumulative % (93.08) (93.52) (95.47) (93.49) (90.21) (89.27) (92.58) (90.68) (69.33) (69.78) (71.43) (67.64) 
90th 0.78 to 1.06 
% 4.93 4.79 2.45 4.61 5.08 7.98 4.35 4.68 17.64 15.71 17.91 17.70 
Cumulative % (98.01) (98.31) (97.91) (98.10) (95.29) (97.25) (96.93) (95.37) (86.97) (85.50) (89.35) (85.34) 
100th 1.07 to 1.61 
% 1.99 1.69 2.09 1.90 4.71 2.75 3.07 4.63 13.03 14.50 10.65 14.66 
Cumulative % (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
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Figure 4.12 Verbal Factor AFQT Distributions by Race/Ethnicity (PAY80) 
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Figure 4.14 Black Verbal Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.16 White Verbal Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.18 Verbal Factor AFQT Distributions by Gender (PAY97) 
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Figure 4.20 Female Verbal Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Technical Knowledge Factor Score Distributions 
Score distributions for the Technical Knowledge factor overall and by race/ethnicity and gender 
are presented in Tables 4.46 and 4.47. Figure 4.21 shows the overall Technical Knowledge 
distributions in PAY80 and PAY97. The PAY97 data show an increase in the number of 
individuals in the lower half of the distribution and a decrease in numbers in the upper quartile. 
Figure 4.22 (PAY80) and Figure 4.23 (PAY97) show distributions by race/ethnicity. The trend, 
which is fairly consistent in both studies, indicates a greater number of Black and Hispanic youth 
in the lower tail and fewer in the upper tail. In Figures 4.24 through 4.26, cross-study 
comparisons are shown for Black, Hispanic, and White youth, respectively. Little change is seen 
in the distribution of Black and Hispanic youth between the two studies. Black youth show the 
largest change in the 1st quartile, with a greater number of individuals in the bottom tail and 
fewer in the middle distribution. Hispanic youth show a slight decrease in the bottom tail and an 
increase in the middle distribution. Data for White youth indicate a slight increase in the number 
of individuals in the low to middle distribution and a decrease in the upper tail. 
PAY80 data in Figure 4.27 show women are more prevalent than men in the lower half of the 
distribution and less prevalent in the top half. The PAY97 data in Figure 4.28 show a similar 
pattern. As seen in Figure 4.29, a greater number of men are in the middle distribution while 
fewer are in the upper tail in PAY97 than in PAY80. Women saw an increase in the lower tail 
and a slight decrease in the middle of the distribution, with virtually no change in the upper tail 







Table 4.46. Technical Factor Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Technical Factor 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 




% 9.99 15.02 34.14 40.40 27.48 26.29 4.67 6.70 5.51 7.26 14.60 22.79 




% 15.02 17.48 32.46 25.40 23.62 22.68 11.63 14.48 7.37 9.09 22.91 25.89 




% 24.97 27.34 21.58 22.31 22.74 24.64 25.70 29.30 13.82 20.47 36.44 34.22 




% 25.02 26.05 9.10 9.31 15.79 18.38 28.00 31.29 26.52 36.19 23.47 15.89 




% 15.00 10.79 2.23 2.54 7.01 6.64 17.71 13.75 27.22 20.52 2.41 1.05 




% 10.00 3.32 0.48 0.03 3.37 1.35 12.28 4.47 19.55 6.47 0.16 0.16 







Table 4.47. Technical Factor Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Technical Factor 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 




% 22.33 24.81 46.07 53.63 15.32 11.86 39.84 41.88 1.95 2.56 7.54 10.90 




% 26.53 20.26 38.45 29.75 16.42 15.79 30.94 30.13 3.75 4.98 19.91 24.13 




% 29.24 32.36 13.84 13.78 22.88 26.59 22.59 22.54 10.86 17.06 41.32 41.74 




% 16.75 16.95 1.38 2.83 24.98 31.12 6.44 4.62 27.85 40.78 28.17 21.66 




% 4.19 5.54 0.25 0.00 13.84 12.03 0.06 0.82 31.84 25.98 2.85 1.33 




% 0.96 0.07 0.00 0.00 6.55 2.61 0.13 0.00 23.75 8.64 0.21 0.24 
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Figure 4.22 Technical Factor AFQT Distributions by Race/Ethnicity (PAY80) 
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Figure 4.24 Black Technical Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.26 White Technical Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.28 Technical Factor AFQT Distributions by Gender (PAY97) 
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Quantitative Ability Factor Score Distributions 
The Quantitative Ability factor distribution overall and by race/ethnicity and gender is presented 
in Tables 4.48 and 4.49. Figure 4.31 shows the overall distribution in PAY80 and PAY97. 
Consistent with the near-zero d value, the distributions are very similar. The PAY97 data show a 
slight increase in the number of individuals in the middle distribution and a slight decrease at the 
lower-middle range. 
Figure 4.32 shows a greater number of Black and Hispanic youth in the lower half and fewer in 
the upper half of the distribution in PAY80, with the trend more extreme for Black youth. Figure 
4.33 indicates a similar pattern in the PAY97 data, though less differentiation exists between the 
Black and Hispanic distributions. 
In Figures 4.34 through 4.36, cross-study comparisons are shown for Black, Hispanic, and 
White youth, respectively. For both Black and Hispanic youth, the pattern is one of fewer 
individuals at the lower tail and very little change in the upper tail of the distribution. Hispanic 
youth saw an increase in the number of individuals in the middle of the distribution. Data for 
White youth indicate a slight increase in the number of individuals in the middle of the 
distribution with little change elsewhere. 
Figures 4.37 and 4.38 show Quantitative factor gender distributions for PAY80 and PAY97, 
respectively. Figure 4.37 shows women are more prevalent in low-middle range of the 
distribution and less prevalent in the top tail in PAY80. Figure 4.38 shows nearly identical 
distributions for both groups, with slightly fewer women in the top tail in PAY97. The pattern in 
Figure 4.39 shows more men in the middle distribution and fewer at the lower tail in PAY97 than 
in PAY80. Women saw a slight decrease in the lower half of the distribution and an increase in 







Table 4.48. Quantitative Factor Distributions by PAY Year and Subgroup 
Quantitative Factor 
   Overall Black Hispanic White Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 




% 10.00 11.28 17.46 20.35 20.69 18.20 7.82 8.15 8.27 11.06 11.78 11.50 




% 15.01 10.29 29.66 17.45 24.12 14.96 11.65 7.71 14.29 9.36 15.74 11.23 




% 25.00 21.90 34.29 27.49 27.09 29.09 23.53 19.80 22.66 20.22 27.42 23.59 




% 24.98 28.91 13.68 25.50 18.02 26.12 26.90 30.45 25.70 29.27 24.23 28.54 




% 15.02 15.97 3.66 6.06 7.00 5.30 17.89 20.02 15.99 16.24 14.02 15.70 




% 10.00 11.65 1.26 3.14 3.09 6.33 12.21 13.88 13.09 13.86 6.81 9.43 







Table 4.49. Quantitative Factor Distributions by PAY Year, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Quantitative Factor 
   Black Hispanic White 
   Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percentile 
Score 




% 15.25 20.70 19.68 20.06 16.82 16.12 24.61 20.45 6.27 8.41 9.46 7.88 




% 29.69 15.90 29.63 18.77 22.12 13.69 26.16 16.32 10.84 6.91 12.50 8.51 




% 35.14 26.90 33.44 27.99 27.24 28.45 26.93 29.78 20.28 17.93 26.94 21.70 




% 13.65 26.35 13.70 24.79 19.56 28.30 16.46 23.77 27.77 30.57 25.99 30.33 




% 4.42 5.97 2.89 6.14 9.31 4.58 4.64 6.09 18.87 20.50 16.85 19.53 




% 1.85 4.18 0.66 2.26 4.95 8.85 1.20 3.60 15.96 15.68 8.27 12.05 
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Figure 4.32 Quantitative Factor AFQT Distributions by Race/Ethnicity (PAY80) 
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Figure 4.34 Black Quantitative Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.36 White Quantitative Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Figure 4.38 Quantitative Factor AFQT Distributions by Gender (PAY97) 
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Figure 4.40 Female Quantitative Factor AFQT Distributions by PAY Year 
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Regression Analyses Using Age, Gender, Region, Education, Race/Ethnicity, and Time as 
Predictors of Test Scores 
The previous analyses are purely descriptive. An overall d of 0.07 on the AFQT indicates the mean 
of the AFQT distribution in the youth population as a whole changed only modestly if at all between 
the two PAY studies; as noted earlier, the d = 0.07 value is not significantly different from zero. The 
underlying basis for these findings, however, is not explained. For example, while one subgroup’s 
scores may have increased, a decline in that subgroup’s proportionate representation in the youth 
population could have resulted in the appearance of no change. To further investigate the AFQT, 
ASVAB tests, and the factor composites, a set of regression analyses were conducted to estimate 
change in scores from PAY80 to PAY97 while considering a limited set of demographic factors—
age, race/ethnicity, gender, education, and region. 
To conduct these analyses, the PAY80 and PAY97 datasets were merged after converting the 
weights used within each dataset to a common relative weight metric. Predictor variables in the 
analyses were as follows. 
 Cohort—coded as 0 for PAY80 and 1 for PAY97 
 Age—in years 
 Gender—coded as 0 for males and 1 for females 
 Race/Ethnicity—coded as Black, Hispanic, and Other dummy variables, with White as 
the comparison group  
 Region—coded as North Central, Southern, and Western dummy variables, with 
Northeast as the comparison group  
 Education—coded as High School Graduate, Some College, and College Graduate as 
dummy variables, with Non-High School Graduate as the comparison group 
Note that we use dummy coding for the categorical variables listed above (e.g., race/ethnicity). In 
such a coding scheme, one group (in this case the White group) is designated as the reference 
group. In the case of a three-group comparison (e.g., White, Black, and Hispanic), group 
membership is captured by two variables. The Black group is coded as “1” on the first and “0” on the 
second; the Hispanic group is coded “0” on the first, and “1” on the second; the White group is 
coded “0” on both variables. With this coding scheme, the resulting coefficients for the Black and 
Hispanic variables can be interpreted directly as the magnitude of the Black-White and Hispanic-
White difference on the dependent variable, controlling for other variables in the model (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).    
As noted earlier in this chapter, standard errors are affected by the sampling design used in the 
research, and thus the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is affected by the 
design effect. To directly take the design effect into account in the regression analyses, the 
primary sampling unit (PSU) value is needed for each individual in the analyses. As mentioned 
earlier, PSU information is not available for the PAY80 data. Thus, we undertook alternate 
strategies to consider the role of the design effect in the analyses. Our approach was to apply a 
number of design effect values, and observe if and under what conditions the significance of 
regression coefficients was affected. 
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Bock and Moore (1986), in their work with PAY80, estimated that a design effect (DEFF) value 
of 1.25 was appropriate for the data when conducting analysis of variance and regressions. 
They observed that for complex designs "with few exceptions, the largest design effects 
observed are about 2" (p. 204). For the total PAY97 sample, the DEFF estimate was 2.1.  
Accordingly, rather than choosing a single DEFF estimate, we tabled values using a .05 
significance level based on the observed data, with no adjustment for design effects. We then 
recomputed the significance tests using three plausible DEFF values: 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5. For 
each DEFF value, the value of the standard error in the formula for the p statistic was increased 
by multiplying the unadjusted standard error by the square root of DEFF. If any of these 
potential DEFF values resulted in a change in the significance of a regression coefficient, a 
superscript was added next to the coefficient in question: 
a = significance changes when using DEFF of 1.5 
b = significance changes when using DEFF of 2.0 
c = significance changes when using DEFF of 2.5 
Moving to additional issues with the regression analyses, the AFQT was rescaled from a uniformly 
distributed percentile score to a normal distribution (mean = 50.0, SD = 10.0) to meet normality 
assumptions. For the AFQT and each of the ASVAB tests, Model 1 was estimated, including the 
six demographic factors and variable sets as predictors. The cohort coefficient in Model 1 
indicates the change in mean test score controlling for the effect of the other predictors. Each of 
the predictor coefficients indicates the overall effect of that predictor on test scores in the full 
dataset, which does not differentiate between PAY80 and PAY97 data. To determine whether the 
relationship between demographic factors and test scores change over time, Model 2 was 
estimated, including added interaction terms between the cohort and each demographic factor. 
The coefficients for these terms can be interpreted as the difference between that demographic 
factor’s relationships to the test score in PAY80 versus PAY97. 
Note that both models include only main effects and one set of interactions with the cohort. 
More complex models certainly are possible, though adding just the full set of two-way 
interactions would add 55 terms. When the full set of two-way interactions were added to the 
AFQT and 10 ASVAB tests, the result was relatively limited incremental variances—between 
0.60% and 1.40% in the squared multiple correlation. For this reason, analysis focused on the 
set of reduced models outlined above. 
Table 4.50 summarizes Model 1 and Model 2 regression results for the AFQT and nine of the ASVAB 
tests, with the Automotive-Shop Information tests combined as they were for PAY80. The Assembling 
Objects test, which replaced the Numerical Operations and Coding Speed tests in PAY80, is not 
included in the analysis because it is categorized as a speeded test. Table 4.51 presents parallel 
results for the three factor scores. To facilitate comparison across tests, coefficients for the predictors 
are presented for each test, with an indication of which of these coefficients are statistically significant 
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Table 4.50. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients by ASVAB Test 
Model Variable AFQT AR MK WK PC GS AS MC EI 
1 (Constant) 63.46 61.51 76.81 52.59 57.26 60.99 43.43 56.42 50.23 
 Age -0.79 -0.62 -1.46 -0.23 -0.51 -0.57 0.52 -0.22 0.09a 
 Sex -1.51 -3.11 -1.59 -0.39c 1.19 -3.83 -9.92 -7.58 -7.33 
 Black -8.58 -8.16 -5.93 -9.00 -8.28 -9.27 -9.24 -9.43 -8.57 
 Hispanic -5.68 -4.96 -3.94 -5.95 -5.45 -6.86 -6.40 -5.79 -5.59 
 Non-White/Other -0.93 -0.66b 0.12 -1.28 -1.00 -0.81c -0.96 -0.76c -0.70b
 North Central Region 0.03 0.43a -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.24 1.33 1.17 0.17 
 Southern Region -1.16 -0.94 -0.93 -1.11 -0.75 -0.47b 0.62 0.01 -0.55c
 Western Region -0.45a -0.26 -1.08 0.26 -0.48a 0.31 2.10 1.24 -0.11 
 High School Education 5.13 4.34 4.90 4.93 5.06 4.44 2.30 3.26 3.71 
 Some College 12.70 10.75 13.49 9.50 10.25 10.01 2.64 6.69 6.74 
 College Graduate 17.68 14.81 19.16 12.23 13.20 13.99 2.74 8.83 8.35 
 Cohort -1.87 -2.18 -1.26 -0.71 -2.21 -1.93 -2.61 -2.75 -3.75 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.45 0.34 0.36 
2 (Constant) 68.53 66.29 79.54 59.72 63.23 62.85 49.51 60.48 53.60 
 Age -1.03 -0.85 -1.55 -0.60 -0.81 -0.66 0.21 -0.42 -0.07 
 Sex -1.54 -3.17 -1.89 -0.28 1.49 -4.00 -10.76 -7.94 -7.57 
 Black -9.64 -9.09 -6.81 -10.46 -9.11 -9.83 -10.02 -9.59 -9.83 
 Hispanic -6.94 -6.43 -5.11 -7.57 -6.89 -7.90 -7.44 -7.03 -7.46 
 Non-White/Other -0.04 -0.23 -0.29 0.37 -0.01 0.56 0.60a 0.38 0.35 
 North Central Region -0.39 0.13 -0.57a -0.25 -0.36 -0.05 1.25 1.01 0.20 
 Southern Region -1.57 -1.22 -1.49 -1.34 -0.82 -0.53a 0.62c 0.01 -0.75 
 Western Region -0.82c -0.47 -1.67 0.34 -0.64a 0.40 2.69 1.60 -0.06 
 High School Education 5.41 4.57 4.86 5.70 5.37 4.58 2.86 3.52 4.03 
 Some College 13.73 11.64 13.75 11.09 10.65 10.57 3.94 7.35 7.65 
 College Graduate 18.29 15.57 18.82 13.95 12.84 14.30 5.25 9.49 9.86 
 Cohort -12.32 -12.36 -8.12 -13.95 -16.48 -4.99b -14.44 -11.43 -9.42 
 Cohort x Age 0.49 0.47 0.21b 0.73 0.68 0.16 0.62 0.43 0.29 
 Cohort x Sex 0.02 0.11 0.80c -0.42 -0.89c 0.41 2.13 0.90 0.57a
 Cohort x Black 2.84 2.49 2.35 3.90 2.29 1.47 2.02 0.43 3.33 
 Cohort x Hispanic 2.11 2.53 2.22 2.56 2.55 1.66 1.59 2.03 3.10 
 Cohort x Nonwhite -3.67 -1.82c 1.60b -6.96 -4.20 -5.47 -6.17 -4.51 -4.56 
 Cohort x NC Region 1.07b 0.83a 1.49 0.17 0.53 0.58 -0.03 0.20 -0.22 
 Cohort x South Region 1.21 0.83a 1.72 0.62 0.15 0.12 -0.06 -0.06 0.51 
 Cohort x West Region 1.16b 0.71 1.66 0.10 0.52 -0.03 -1.26 -0.75 0.06 
 Cohort x High School -0.69 -0.44 0.36 -2.28 -0.09 -0.48 -1.47 -0.42 -1.17c
 Cohort x Some College -1.97 -1.61 -0.23 -3.48 0.00 -1.19b -2.81 -1.09b -2.06 
 
Cohort x College 
Graduate -1.26 -1.43 0.81 -3.71 0.99 -0.68 -5.06 -1.26 -2.94 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.37 
Note. Values in bold denote statistical significance (p <.05). All tests have SD=10 in the 1980 sample; this SD 
value can be used to standardize the reported coefficients. a Not significant for DEFF of 1.5 and higher. b Not 
significant for DEFF of 2.0 and higher. c Not significant for DEFF of 2.5 and higher. 
 
Chapter 4 112 
Table 4.51. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients by ASVAB Factor 
Model Variable Verbal Technical Quantitative 
1 (Constant) 0.59 -0.29 2.45 
 Age -0.04 0.04 -0.13 
 Sex -0.01 -1.03 -0.25 
 Black -0.93 -0.99 -0.60 
 Hispanic -0.63 -0.65 -0.39 
 Non-White/Other -0.12 -0.09 0.00 
 North Central Region -0.02 0.12 0.02 
 Southern Region -0.10 0.03 -0.09 
 Western Region -0.02 0.16 -0.08 
 High School Education 0.53 0.27 0.43 
 Some College 1.07 0.40 1.25 
 College Graduate 1.40 0.47 1.78 
 Cohort -0.18 -0.33 -0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.47 0.32 
2 (Constant) 1.15 0.19 2.67 
 Age -0.07 0.02c -0.14 
 Sex 0.01 -1.10 -0.28 
 Black -1.04 -1.06 -0.66 
 Hispanic -0.79 -0.79 -0.50 
 Non-White/Other 0.03 0.06a -0.03 
 North Central Region -0.05 0.11 -0.03 
 Southern Region -0.11 0.03 -0.14 
 Western Region -0.03 0.22 -0.13 
 High School Education 0.58 0.32 0.42 
 Some College 1.16 0.51 1.27 
 College Graduate 1.46 0.68 1.73 
 Cohort -1.30 -1.19 -0.77 
 Cohort x Age 0.06 0.05 0.02a 
 Cohort x Sex -0.06a 0.16 0.07b 
 Cohort x Black 0.31 0.18 0.15 
 Cohort x Hispanic 0.26 0.21 0.22 
 Cohort x Non-White -0.62 -0.62 0.14a 
 Cohort x NC Region 0.04 -0.02 0.14 
 Cohort x South Region 0.04 -0.01 0.14 
 Cohort x West Region 0.04 -0.11c 0.14c 
 Cohort x High School -0.12c -0.14 0.07 
 Cohort x Some College -0.17 -0.26 -0.01 
 Cohort x College Graduate -0.12 -0.42 0.11 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.49 0.33 
Note. Values in bold denote statistical significance (p <.05). Factors have SD=1 in the 1980 sample. a Not 
significant for DEFF of 1.5 and higher. b Not significant for DEFF of 2.0 and higher. c Not significant for 
DEFF of 2.5 and higher. 
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Interpretation of Table 4.51 is rendered problematic by the education variable. As noted earlier 
in the descriptive section on education, the causal relationship between education and test 
scores is not clear. While education may indeed have a causal effect on test performance, it is 
also the case that the abilities measured by the test have a role in determining whether a given 
individual will pursue higher levels of education. The education effects in a regression model are 
thus unclear. While it is certainly descriptively true, as Table 4.50 shows, that those without a 
high school diploma score on average 5.13 points lower on the AFQT than do high school 
graduates, it is unclear to what degree this should be interpreted as “lower ability students tend 
to drop out” or as “staying in high school increases ability”. 
Of at least comparable importance, this ambiguity regarding education affects the interpretation 
of cohort effects. Continuing to use AFQT as an example, Table 4.50 shows a coefficient of -
1.87 for cohort, which would typically be interpreted as meaning “holding all else, including 
education, constant, AFQT scores dropped 1.87 points between 1980 and 1997.” However, the 
meaning of “holding education constant” is ambiguous. The finding that those with some college 
score 1.97 points lower in 1997 than in 1980 (i.e., the coefficient for the cohort x some college 
interaction term) might reflect a shifting standard for college entry, rather than a decline in ability 
in the population. The earlier observation of a small (d = 0.07) overall mean change in AFQT 
paired with the substantial increase in the proportion of youth pursuing additional education 
supports the shifting entry standards perspective. We view this as a key point: the mean ability 
of those pursuing higher education has dropped between 1980 and 1997, and thus including 
education as a predictor in models aimed at assessing ability change between the 1980 and 
1997 cohort distorts the estimate of the cohort effect. As a result, we turn instead to models that 
exclude education. 
Thus, Table 4.52 presents a set of regression models for AFQT and the 9 ASVAB tests that 
exclude the education variable; Table 4.53 presents parallel models for the three factor scores. 
Compared with Table 4.50, this exclusion of education changes the sign of the coefficients for 
Cohort for AFQT and many other tests from negative to positive. Table 4.52 is used as the basis 
for overall conclusions about changes in test scores from 1980 to 1997. Table 4.52 shows that 
controlling for the effects of age, gender, race, and region, there are small increases in means 
for AFQT, Mathematics Knowledge and Word Knowledge, Arithmetic Reasoning, Paragraph 
Comprehension, and General Science, and modest declines in Auto Shop, Mechanical 
Comprehension, and Electronics Information. Only the Paragraph Comprehension finding varies 
as a result of the design effect estimate used; with a design effect estimate of 2.0 or higher, the 
cohort difference (1980 vs. 1997) is not significant. 
We highlight the difference in the findings based on simple mean comparisons of AFQT means 
(see Table 4.11), which do not differ significantly between the 1980 and 1997 samples, and the 
findings from the regression models discussed here, which do show significant mean AFQT 
change between 1980 and 1997. The apparent conflict is the results of the two analyses 
addressing different questions. The mean comparison reveals that the mean AFQT of American 
youth did not change significantly between 1980 and 1997. However, this is due at least in part 
to the change in population representation of various demographic subgroups, with the Blacks 
and Hispanics becoming a larger proportion of the American population between 1980 and 
1997.  
The mean difference findings by subgroup show that White, Black, and Hispanic groups all 
show higher means in 1997 than in 1980; it is the change in proportional representation that 
leads to the conclusion of no overall mean change. The regression analyses address whether 
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there is a change in AFQT scores controlling for the effects of age, race/ethnicity, gender, and 
region, and find that there has been a significant positive change from 1980 to 1997.   
The regression analysis reported in Table 4.52 does not enable us to attribute the change in the 
cohort coefficient to the change in representation of the various racial/ethnic groups. It shows 
that the cohort effect increases and becomes significant when a set of controls are added 
(gender, race. ethnicity, region). To focus exclusively on race/ethnicity, we estimated a 
regression model using only race/ethnicity and cohort; with that model we obtain a cohort 
coefficient virtually identical to what we report in the full regression model in Table 4.52 (1.42 in 
the full model vs. 1.37 in the race/ethnicity only model, corresponding to d = 0.142 and d = 
0.137), and different from the d = 0.07 obtained from the mean comparison. Thus the 
differences in race/ethnicity representation are key drivers of our results. It is also the case that 
the regression models permit a more powerful test of the cohort effect than are provided by the 
mean comparison between cohorts, which may also contribute to the finding of significance 
in the regression analyses 
Findings in Table 4.52 parallel the descriptive results presented earlier that considered each 
demographic variable separately, rather than in conjunction. First, age effects are typically small 
and positive. Test scores generally increase modestly across the 18-23 age range. Second, in 
the main effects model (Model 1), gender effects vary by test, with women higher than men on 
Paragraph Comprehension, modestly lower than men on the quantitative tests (Arithmetic 
Reasoning and Mathematics Knowledge), and substantially lower on the technical tests, 
particularly Auto Shop, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information.  
Third, while Model 1 shows substantial negative effects for the White-Black comparison, Model 
2 shows a narrowing of the score gap on all tests. This narrowing is roughly in the 0.2-0.3 
standard deviation range on the verbal, quantitative, and technical tests. Despite this narrowing, 
the White-Black gap remains substantial: about three-quarters of a standard deviation on the 
verbal, quantitative, and technical tests. The White-Hispanic gap continues to be smaller than 
the White-Black gap, and there is a general pattern of narrowing the gap across tests, though 
the magnitude of the narrowing is less for Hispanics than for Blacks. Note that Table 4.52 also 
includes a “non-White/other” group; as this is not a homogeneous group, no substantive 
interpretations for this group are made. 
Fourth, the most consistent regional effect in Model 1 is a pattern of lower test scores for the 
Southern region. Model 2 shows this gap narrowing in 1997 and shows a number of instances 
where the North Central and Western regions scored lower than the Northeast region in 1980, 







Table 4.52. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients by Test without Education 
Model Variable AFQT AR MK WK PC GS AS MC EI 
1 (Constant) 43.54 44.73 55.38 38.39 41.91 45.33 39.96 46.27 40.36 
 Age 0.45 0.42 -0.14c 0.68 0.47 0.41 0.77 0.43 0.74 
 Sex -0.83 -2.54 -0.85 0.10 1.71 -3.29 -9.81 -7.23 -6.99 
 Black -9.89 -9.26 -7.33 -9.96 -9.32 -10.30 -9.49 -10.11 -9.24 
 Hispanic -8.03 -6.94 -6.43 -7.71 -7.34 -8.73 -6.89 -7.03 -6.83 
 Non-White/Other -0.93c -0.65a 0.12 -1.27 -0.99 -0.80b -0.95 -0.75b -0.69b 
 North Central Region -0.20 0.24 -0.34 -0.25 -0.24 0.06 1.29 1.06 0.05 
 Southern Region -1.70 -1.40 -1.48 -1.54 -1.20 -0.91 0.48c -0.29 -0.86 
 Western Region -0.68b -0.45 -1.32 0.09 -0.66b 0.13 2.05 1.12 -0.23 
 Cohort 1.42 0.60 2.25 1.71 0.40b 0.66 -1.96 -1.03 -2.04 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.44 0.29 0.30 
2 (Constant) 41.48 43.34 52.51 37.57 42.24 41.74 41.14 45.83 38.17 
 Age 0.58 0.52 0.05 0.74 0.46 0.60 0.73 0.46 0.86 
 Sex -0.97 -2.68 -1.32 0.21 1.95 -3.55 -10.56 -7.62 -7.23 
 Black -10.80 -10.07 -7.96 -11.42 -10.02 -10.74 -10.39 -10.23 -10.50 
 Hispanic -8.72 -7.93 -6.85 -9.11 -8.35 -9.31 -8.07 -8.03 -8.54 
 Non-White/Other -0.27 -0.43 -0.53 0.21 -0.16 0.39 0.56a 0.28 0.24 
 North Central Region -0.91 -0.31 -1.11 -0.62b -0.72b -0.44 1.14 0.75c -0.06 
 Southern Region -2.21 -1.76 -2.10 -1.92 -1.37 -1.04 0.38 -0.36 -1.15 
 Western Region -1.11 -0.72a -1.95 0.07 -0.90c 0.16 2.57 1.42 -0.25 
 Cohort 6.87 4.28a 9.61 4.08a -0.31 10.19 -4.70 0.31 3.82a 
 Cohort x Age -0.36 -0.26c -0.50 -0.16 0.01 -0.51 0.08 -0.10 -0.34 
 Cohort x Sex 0.34 0.37 1.27 -0.38 -0.66a 0.64a 1.92 1.00 0.58a 
 Cohort x Black 2.44 2.16 1.70 3.90 1.89 1.14b 2.33 0.29 3.33 
 Cohort x Hispanic 1.27a 1.83 0.95 2.45 1.73c 0.98 2.05 1.68 2.99 
 Cohort x Non-White -2.56 -0.89 2.88 -6.28 -3.37 -4.64 -6.15 -4.00 -4.11 
 Cohort x NC Region 1.95 1.57 2.45 0.77 1.17b 1.23b 0.08 0.62 0.18 
 Cohort x South Region 1.55 1.12b 1.99 1.02b 0.46 0.39 0.18 0.16 0.79a 
 Cohort x West Region 1.40c 0.92 1.86 0.35 0.77 0.17 -1.10c -0.58 0.25 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.45 0.29 0.31 
Note. Values in bold denote statistical significance (p <.05). All tests have SD=10 in the 1980 sample; this SD value can be used to standardize 
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Table 4.53. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients by Factor without Education 
Model Variable Verbal Technical Quantitative 
1 (Constant) -1.02 -0.85 0.46 
 Age 0.06 0.08 -0.01a 
 Sex 0.05 -1.01 -0.19 
 Black -1.04 -1.03 -0.73 
 Hispanic -0.83 -0.73 -0.62 
 Non-White/Other -0.12 -0.09 0.00 
 North Central Region -0.04 0.11 -0.01 
 Southern Region -0.15 0.01 -0.14 
 Western Region -0.04 0.15 -0.10 
 Cohort 0.10 -0.23 0.16 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.46 0.10 
2 (Constant) -1.17 -0.88 0.19 
 Age 0.07 0.08 0.01 
 Sex 0.07 -1.07 -0.23 
 Black -1.14 -1.10 -0.76 
 Hispanic -0.95 -0.87 -0.66 
 Non-White/Other 0.01 0.06a -0.05 
 North Central Region -0.09 0.10 -0.08c 
 Southern Region -0.17 0.00 -0.19 
 Western Region -0.06 0.20 -0.15 
 Cohort 0.49b -0.12 0.84 
 Cohort x Age -0.02b -0.01 -0.04 
 Cohort x Sex -0.05 0.15 0.11 
 Cohort x Black 0.28 0.20 0.09 
 Cohort x Hispanic 0.21 0.23 0.09 
 Cohort x Non-White -0.54 -0.61 0.26 
 Cohort x NC Region 0.10a 0.00 0.23 
 Cohort x South Region 0.07 0.01 0.16 
 Cohort x West Region 0.06 -0.10b 0.15c 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.46 0.11 
Note. Values in bold denote statistical significance (p <.05). Factors have SD=1 in 
the 1980 sample. a Not significant for DEFF of 1.5 and higher. b Not significant for 
DEFF of 2.0 and higher. c Not significant for DEFF of 2.5 and higher. 
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PAY97 and the Flynn Effect 
While change in ability levels over time has implications for test use in educational admissions, 
the workplace, and the military, there also is broad scientific interest in the question of whether 
ability levels are changing. Flynn (1984) observed that each successive standardization sample 
for the Wechsler and Stanford-Binet tests of intelligence raised the test norms (i.e., a higher raw 
score was needed to attain the same scaled (IQ) score). Flynn put scores from the various 
standardization samples on a common metric and reported a change of about 0.89 standard 
deviations from 1932 to 1978. Thus, he showed that, had the scale been held constant, a 
dramatic rise in mean IQ scores would be observed; the renorming of the tests prevented this 
from being noticed. 
A follow-up study documented this phenomenon of a substantial improvement in test scores in 
14 countries (Flynn, 1987). A more recent analysis focusing on the period 1947-2001 reported a 
change of 1.18 SD (Flynn, 2009). This phenomenon, dubbed the “Flynn Effect,” has generated 
considerable discussion and research (e.g., Neisser’s [1998] edited book, The Rising Curve). 
Questions addressed included whether the increase is artifactual, whether it represents merely 
a change in test-taking skills as opposed to a change in “real” ability, whether it is limited to 
certain types of tests, and whether the pattern continues past the time period studied by Flynn. 
Full-scale IQ measures improved about one third of an IQ point (or 0.02 SD) per year over the 
time period studied by Flynn. An initial expectation might be that, if the Flynn Effect continues, 
one would expect to see a 0.34 SD improvement on an overall cognitive ability measure, such 
as the AFQT, over the 17-year period between the PAY80 and PAY97 studies (i.e., 17 years at 
0.02 SD per year). As results presented earlier in this chapter clearly show, this was not the 
case; in fact, the overall AFQT difference between 1980 and 1997 was 0.07 SD. 
However, more nuanced readings of the Flynn Effect literature suggest that the findings of little-
to-no overall change in the PAY data are not unexpected. Flynn (2009) documented that 
improvements are not consistent across subtests. Differences are largest for tests involving 
abstract information (e.g., the Wechsler Similarities subtest, with an item format of “how are X 
and Y alike?”, and the Raven’s Progressive Matrices). For Wechsler Similarities, Flynn reported 
an improvement of 1.59 SD between 1947 and 2001 (roughly 0.03 SD per year). In contrast, for 
the Wechsler Arithmetic and Vocabulary scales, Flynn reported improvements of 0.14 SD 
(0.003 SD per year) and 0.29 SD (0.005 SD per year), respectively. Since the AFQT comprises 
two mathematics tests and two verbal tests, Flynn’s findings would lead to an expectation of a 
change in the range of 0.10 SD for the AFQT in the PAY data. In short, the ASVAB does not 
include the types of tests for which large changes over time have been found. 
This finding underscores an important fact: that subtests load highly on a common factor does 
not imply that they will behave the same way in terms of change over time. That ASVAB tests all 
have high loadings on a common factor means that those scoring higher, relative to others in 
the sample, on one test also will tend to score higher on other tests. Thus, that mean scores 
change over time in differing ways across tests (e.g., little-to-no change on the mathematics and 
verbal tests; sizable declines in mean scores on knowledge tests such as Electronics 
Information) does not imply that the factor structure of the test battery changes. The factor 
loadings of the ASVAB tests in 1980 vs. 1997 are very similar (e.g., Electronics Information 
loads 0.82 on a general factor in 1980 and 0.79 in 1997). Environmental factors can result in 
mean change (e.g., more students pursuing academic subjects and fewer pursuing vocational 
subjects), yet the patterns of relationships among tests can remain essentially the same.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PAY97 RESULTS ON THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
 
Aside from their use in renorming the ASVAB, the results of the PAY97 study are important to 
the Services in at least two additional ways. First, the results provide new, updated information 
on the cognitive abilities and vocational aptitudes of the nation’s young men and women who 
were of primary recruiting age (18- to 23-years old) for military service at the time of testing in 
1997. This benefit is enhanced by the fact that PAY97 used a computer adaptive testing (CAT) 
format, which had not been studied previously in a nationwide, representative sample. Second, 
the results provide an indication of certain changes in ability that might have occurred during the 
17-year period since the last nationwide administration of the ASVAB in the PAY80 study.  
One possible drawback, however, is that the results are no longer as current as they would 
have been if analyzed and reported prior to the present study. Indeed, as of 2009 the PAY97 
population, now ages 30 to 35, is no longer of prime age for military service. On the other hand, 
as noted in Chapter 8, information gathered in other nationwide studies, such as the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), suggest the PAY97 test scores might be quite 
similar to scores that would be obtained if the PAY survey and ASVAB tests were administered 
to 18- to 23-year-olds 10 or 12 years later. 
This is not to say the test scores of the PAY97 population are of any less value to the Services in a 
broad sense, just that the numbers probably hold more meaning for those who are interested in 
understanding trends of the recent past rather than the present. At the same time, comparing test 
scores from PAY80 with those from PAY97 is useful for identifying changes in ability for the youth 
population as a whole and its various demographic subgroups. Obviously, the one great caveat 
when studying trends or changes from 1980 to 1997 is to not assume the same patterns would 
necessarily continue over the next 17-year period. Social, cultural, educational, economic, and other 
environmental or demographic factors will influence test scores, and each factor should be expected 
to change over time. Another factor to keep in mind is that the PAY80 and PAY97 populations are 
separated by nearly a full generation: the youngest members of the PAY97 population, born in 
1979, were still in diapers when the PAY80 study was conducted; conversely, participants in the 
1980 study could well be a parent of someone tested 17 years later.  
Score Distributions 
Given the PAY97 population’s removal from its predecessor by a generation, it should not be 
surprising that average scores on the AFQT between PAY80 and PAY97 show virtually no 
difference. Indeed, the results might be somewhat disappointing for a society that constantly 
seeks to improve the educational opportunities and levels of scholastic achievement for 
succeeding generations. Yet, when comparing these results with those of other large-scale 
tests, as seen in Chapter 8, the outcome should be predictable.  
As discussed previously, the PAY80 study was undertaken to derive new norms for the ASVAB 
tests. Composites of these tests, such as the AFQT, are used by all Services to determine an 
individual’s qualifications for enlistment and to assist in occupational placement. The PAY97 
study was conducted to update the norms derived from the PAY80 study. The principal 
objective of the PAY80 study is described succinctly in the 1982 Department of Defense (DoD) 
study, Profile of American Youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery:  
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For the past four decades, the aptitude levels of military recruits have been referenced to 
the extensive testing of adult males that took place during World War II. Recently, both 
DoD and Congress have questioned the appropriateness of using the World War II 
“reference population” as a primary basis for interpreting the enlistment test scores of 
today’s youth. Thus, it was decided in 1979 that the vocational aptitudes of current youth 
should be examined to gain a better understanding of the quality and representativeness 
of new enlistees. (p. v) 
 
As in the comparison of results from the PAY80 and PAY97 studies, DoD discovered 
remarkable similarities between the distribution of test scores from the PAY80 effort and that of 
the so-called World War II “reference population.” Indeed, Table 5.1 shows that the distribution 
of scores by AFQT category (see Chapter 1) from the 1980 renorming are virtually the same as 
those from 1944, separated by just a single percentage point in the mid-range.  
Table 5.1. Percentage Distribution of Scores by AFQT Category for the 1980 Youth 
Population (Three Versions) and World War II “Reference Population” 
AFQT Category PAY80(A) PAY80(B) PAY80(C) World War II 
I 5 4 8 8 
II 35 33 28 28 
III 29 32 33 34 
IV 23 24 21 21 
V 8 7 9 9 
Median 53 51 51 50 
Note. PAY80(A) is the distribution of scores reported in the DoD source that describes the PAY80 results 
(p. 15), and was restricted to men only because of the same restriction on the World War II reference 
population. PAY80(B) is adjusted to include women, and is reported in the referenced monograph. 
PAY80(C) is the distribution from norms subsequently developed and employed by DoD through July 
2004. Source. Adapted from Eitelberg (1988, p. 101) and Department of Defense (1982, p. 15). 
 
In the 1988 study for DoD, Manpower for Military Occupations, Eitelberg summarizes the 
differences between the U.S. populations in 1944 and 1980:  
In 1944, there were approximately 132 million U.S. residents. Racial or ethnic minorities 
made up just over 10% of the population—9% were “Negro,” while the remaining 1% 
was split among census groups labeled American Indian, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, 
Hindu, Korean, and “All Other.” Puerto Ricans were treated by the Selective Service 
System as a “special category,” but estimates of the size of the Puerto Rican population 
in New York City ranged from 69,000 to 600,000 (with immigration running at around 
2,000 per month). (p. 102)  
At the same time:  
Blacks were essentially banned from volunteering for the World War II military—and the 
rejection rates for Black [Selective Service] registrants were almost 60% higher than 
those for Whites in 1944. Draft rejection rates for mental reasons [based on testing and 
literacy] were six-to-seven times higher for Blacks than for Whites—and two-to-four 
times higher for everyone from the South than from the North. In fact, in some Southern 
states, as many as 40% of all draft rejections were based on “educational deficiencies”—
in contrast to around 10% in New Jersey or fewer than 3% in Illinois. (p. 102)  
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By the time of the PAY80 study, the U.S. population had grown by an additional 100 million. 
Levels of educational achievement also had increased substantially. The high school graduation 
rate for Black men had increased by sixfold, while the graduation rate for White men had 
doubled. Racial and ethnic minorities also had become a larger share of the U.S. population, 
estimated at 20% or at least twice the proportion in 1944.  
Conventional wisdom at the time of the PAY80 study led many observers to expect greater 
differences in AFQT score distributions, given approximately 40 years of changes in the many 
other factors known to affect test scores of this type. For example, the World War II reference 
population was composed strictly of men on active duty at the end of 1944. As early as 1963, a 
study by Bayroff for the Army Personnel Research Office, titled The Mobilization Base for AFQT 
Norms, looked at “the most realistic definition of the mobilization population in view of the 
manpower demands of current and future warfare” (abstract). Bayroff concluded that enough 
evidence existed to warrant a reexamination of “the assumption that the distribution of general 
aptitude for military service in the mobilization population is the same now [1963] as when the 
standardization base was established in 1944” (abstract).  
Bayroff and many other observers at the time might be surprised to find that 34 years later the 
PAY97 distribution of AFQT test scores is almost a mirror image of the 1944 distribution, when 
grouped by AFQT category. As seen in Table 5.2, the similarity is quite astonishing. The only 
difference is in Category III and V, with the Category III proportion being larger in the PAY97 
sample, and the Category V proportion being smaller in the PAY97 sample. 
Table 5.2. Percentage Distribution of Scores by AFQT Category for the 1997 Youth 
Population and World War II “Reference Population” 
AFQT Category PAY97 World War II 
I 8 8 
II 28 28 
III 37 34 
IV 20 21 
V 6 9 
Median 51 50 
Note. Source: PAY97 distribution is widely reported. See, for example, Segall (2004, p. 6) and 
Department of Defense (2007, Appendix Table B-4).  
 
The median PAY97 score is one percentage point higher, which suggests a slight difference if 
AFQT Category III were divided at the 50th percentile between subcategories IIIA and IIIB.19 
Obviously, this degree of aggregation hides the many differences in scores between the three 
reference populations, particularly for other ASVAB composites and tests (PAY80 and PAY97) 
and when examining scores by demographic subgroups. Thus, comparisons of this type should 
be interpreted carefully. The DoD report, Profile of American Youth (1982), which discussed the 
PAY80 results, stated the point simply:  
                                                
19 Some references to the distribution of scores for the World War II “reference population” divide the 
AFQT Category III total into two equal amounts, 17% in AFQT Category IIIA and 17% in AFQT Category 
IIIB. See, for example, the 1986 Congressional Budget Office, Quality Soldiers: Costs of Manning the 
Active Army, p. 4. Note that the scale-score distribution for PAY97 shows 15% in AFQT Category IIIA and 
19% in AFQT Category IIIB. This is odd, given the median score for PAY97 is above that of the World 
War II population. 
 
Chapter 5 121 
The similarity between the World War II reference population and the 1980 youth 
population does not necessarily suggest that ability, as measured by the AFQT, has 
remained relatively constant over the past 35 years. The data…reflect differences in 
population demographics, test scaling variations, differences in test construction and 
administration, and related factors, and thus do not permit analyses of test score trends 
over time. Even if one makes the assumption that the two test score distributions could 
be reliably compared, aptitudes and test scores may have fluctuated during the 
intervening years in many other ways. In the absence of additional data, further 
interpretations would be speculative. (p. 16)  
 
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) offered its own interpretation of the differences 
between the AFQT score distributions that resulted from the PAY80 renorming in its report, 
Quality Soldiers: Costs of Manning the Active Army (1986). According to CBO analysts:  
Until 1984, these percentile scores [by AFQT categories] were linked to the World War II 
reference population, so that percentile scores from recent versions of the AFQT had 
roughly the same interpretive meaning as the scores from earlier versions, back to 1950. 
Whether a recruit enlisted in 1974 or 1984, a percentile score of 93 to 100 (AFQT 
Category I) meant placement in the top 8% of those mobilized in the 1940s.  
This link was severed in 1985 when DoD changed the reference population to a broad 
sample of youths tested in 1980. As a result, the proportions of recruits in the various 
AFQT categories changed. Some who would have been classified in Category IIIA under 
the old reference population now fell into Category IIIB. When recruits’ scores in 1984 
are interpreted against the old reference population, 63% placed in AFQT Categories I-
IIIA; when their scores are interpreted against the new reference, only 54% place in the 
top three categories. (p. 5)  
 
CBO analysts also surmised that, if the recruits who fell just short of AFQT Category IIIA could 
have taken the test again, many would have “boosted themselves” above the 50th percentile. 
“According to one rule of thumb (used in the past by DoD),” the reasoning follows, “one-third of 
[these recruits] would have [taken the test again]. Thus, the new [PAY80] reference population 
would have reduced the AFQT I-IIIA proportion in 1984 from 63% to 57%, not 54%” (p. 5). 
Consequently, in the study of “quality soldiers” and the costs of manning the active Army, CBO 
analysts opted to express recruiting statistics under the 1944 reference population, “to facilitate 
historical comparisons, using the aforementioned one-third rule of thumb to reformulate the 
Army’s goals” (note 7). To confuse matters even more, the CBO report discounted the entire 
process of establishing new norms as fraught with “uncertainty”:  
Periodically, DoD introduces new forms of the ASVAB for testing recruits. If scores on 
the newer test are to be interpreted in terms of the norms on previous tests, DoD must 
convert the newer test’s scale to that of the older one. This process, known as 
calibration, is like any human endeavour [sic], not error-proof. If mistakes are found, and 
later corrected, the proportions of recruits in the various AFQT categories may again 
change. Hence, the reader should be cautioned against attributing too great a degree of 
precision to any single AFQT statistic, whether based on the old or on the new reference 
population. (note 7)  
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As with this cautionary warning about reading too much into comparisons of AFQT distributions 
over time, the CBO report reinforces the view that a combination of complicated factors, 
including human error on the part of those designing and analyzing the tests, can account for 
much of what is presumed to be true changes in measured ability from one period to another. 
No doubt the CBO report’s rather pessimistic interpretation in 1986 was influenced by 
revelations six or seven years earlier that all forms of the ASVAB then in use had been 
calibrated incorrectly. As a result, noted elsewhere, the military mistakenly accepted nearly 
360,000 male applicants between 1976 and 1980 who should have been otherwise disqualified 
on the basis of their aptitude test scores (Eitelberg, 1988). 
Youth Eligibility for Military Enlistment 
For those on the frontlines of recruiting charged with ensuring the Services meet recruiting goals 
with qualified volunteers, every little change in the supply or demand of potential recruits and 
Service members can be critical. A change in manpower supply—such as the proportion of 
youth considered eligible for military enlistment—can influence standards set for enlistment or 
assignment to occupational training, as well as other policies that might determine whether a 
recruiting quota can be achieved using the allocated resources during any given year.  
With due diligence, the Army evaluated the potential impact of the new ASVAB norms, based on 
results from PAY97, when they were introduced operationally in July 2004. In a study reported 
in Examining the Impact of Renorming Upon Selection and Classification in the Army, 
Greenston (2004) examined the comparative impact of the PAY80 scale scores and those 
developed from PAY97 on the population of Army applicants who went on to enlist in 2002 and 
2003. Using AFQT categories to compare the scores of these applicants with PAY80 scores 
and percentages, Greenston found a noticeable downward shift in the number and proportion of 
recruits on the PAY97 scale. As seen in Table 5.3, more than 10,000 of the Army’s applicants 
who scored in AFQT Categories I-IIIA (upper 50th percentile) slipped into Category IIIB, while 
the number in IIIB also declined. At the same time, the number of applicants scoring in Category 
IV increased by more than 17,000, representing approximately 7% of the Army’s applicants 
during those years.  
Table 5.3. Distribution of Confirmed Army Applicants by AFQT Category, Using PAY80 








Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
I – IIIA 172,421 68.0 162,279 64.0 -10,142 -5.9 
IIIB 81,140 32.0 73,786 29.1 -7,354 -9.1 
IV 0 0.0 17,496 6.9 +17,496 -- 
Total 253,561 100.0 253,561 100.0 -- -- 
Note. Source: Based on Greenston (2004, p. 3). 
 
Greenston also looked at the projected impact these scores had on various demographic 
groups and found downward shifts across the board. The following percentages of AFQT 
Category IIIB applicants shifted to Category IV, making them essentially nonqualified: women, 
8.9%; Black youth, 14.5%; Hispanic youth, 12.9%; “other” minority youth, 12.2%; and White 
youth, 5.8%. (p. 3). Downward shifts also were found for Army Reserve and Guard applicants, 
 
Chapter 5 123 
although to a somewhat lesser degree. The disproportionate effect on women and minority 
applicants, however, was similar.  
To measure the possible impact of the new norms during a relatively poor recruiting year, 
Greenston (2004) ran the same simulation for 1998, a year when the Army fell short of its 
numerical recruiting objectives. In general, results indicated a minor increase in the downward 
shift during the more difficult recruiting year, with certain differences in the amount of decline by 
demographic groups. These findings led Greenston to the following conclusion:  
In summary, the absence of new and/or refocused recruiting efforts, the Army (Regular, 
Reserve, and Guard) is likely to recruit a relatively larger share of [AFQT Category IV 
applicants], and smaller shares of [AFQT Category I-IIIA and AFQT Category IIIB 
applicants] once the 1997 youth population standards are implemented…. The 
renorming is projected to have a disproportionate selection impact upon minorities and, 
to a lesser extent, upon females—especially as recruiting becomes more difficult. (p. 11)  
 
About a month after the new norms were introduced operationally, an online information 
resource, “Your Guide to the U.S. Military,” informed prospective recruits that “The ASVAB Just 
Got a Little Harder” (Powers, 2004):  
The Armed Forces [sic] Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), the basic test used for 
enlistment in the United States Armed Forces, just got a little harder. Well, not really—
the questions aren’t any harder than before—what’s changed is the method used to 
compute the overall ASVAB score, also called the AFQT score, or the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test score…. Over the past 24 years, aptitude levels in the United States 
have increased…. Consequently, the 1980 norms are no longer representative of 
American youth. 
 
“From my observations so far,” Powers added, “the scoring difference does not appear to be 
significant—a few points, at best. In other words, someone who scored an 89 under the old 
‘norming’ would probably have a score of around 85 or so under the new ‘norming.’” Powers 
further stated, “The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have indicated they will not align their 
reporting scores with the new norms at this time, which essentially raises their standards for 
recruiting….”  
DoD directed the Services to study the impact of the PAY97 norms on recruiting and 
occupational classification for their respective programs, much as the Army did in the report 
(Greenston, 2004) discussed above.20 The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Personnel 
Testing Division also studied the potential impact of the PAY97 norms in much greater depth 
and earlier, thereby setting a course for the individual Services. In “1997 Norms and Their 
Impact on the Services,” Segall (2003) reported that “the application of existing cut-scores to 
scores reported on the 1997 scale will result in generally fewer qualified applicants [for the 
active-duty force]” (p. 47). The extent of the expected drop in qualified applicants can be seen in 
Table 5.4.  
                                                
20 This discussion reviews only the Army’s report, recognizing that the Army (a) has experienced the most 
difficulty in recruiting over the recent past, (b) requires the greatest number of new recruits annually (as 
the largest of the Services), and (c) is the main yardstick for gauging the performance of the All-Volunteer 
Force (AVF). 
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Table 5.4. Projected Impact on Active-Duty Enlistment Qualifications Resulting from 
PAY97 Renorming, by Service 
Service 
AFQT Minimum 
Qualifying Score by 
Percentile 
Percentage Who Would Qualify 
1997 Scale 1980 Scale Difference 
Army 31 77.2 82.7 -5.5 
Navy 35 71.8 77.0 -5.2 
Marine Corps 31 81.7 86.6 -4.9 
Air Force 40 76.9 81.2 -4.3 
Note. Source: Adapted from Segall (1997, 2004). 
 
Using a cut-score at the 31st percentile, Table 5.4 shows the Army presumably would 
experience the greatest relative loss at 5.5%. On the other hand, even with a higher cut-score at 
the 40th percentile, the Air Force would be expected to experience a loss of qualified applicants 
in the range of 4.3%. According to Segall (2003), the number of qualified applicants to the 
Reserve and Guard components of each of the Services also would decline, assuming no other 
changes in the policies or conditions for enlistment.  
Similar to the Army’s study (Greenston, 2004), in the DMDC analysis, Segall (2003) found the 
score-scale decline in qualified applicants would be “more severe for Blacks and Hispanics than 
for Whites, especially over the middle and lower score ranges” (p. 55). Using the same cut-
scores at the 31st percentile, the decline of qualified Black applicants to the active-duty force 
was estimated at 11.3%, compared with 4.3% for White applicants; and the decrease in White 
applicants in the Army National Guard would be 5.5%, compared with more than 14% for Black 
and Hispanic applicants. Segall went on to say, “although the choice of score-scale appears to 
impact the qualification rates of Blacks and Hispanics to a significant degree (as compared to 
Whites), this differential impact results in only a minor shift in the racial composition of qualified 
applicants” (p. 57). As it turns out, the proportion of qualified minorities, assuming all policies 
and standards remain the same, would decline by less than one percentage point for each 
group. If the cut-score were lowered from 31 to 26, almost no change would be expected.  
Thus, the key to maintaining a constant number of qualified applicants would entail adjusting 
cut-scores to counteract the predicted loss. This is called “equating enlistment standards” and, 
although the lower cut-scores would seem to open enlistment eligibility to lower-qualified 
applicants, “those qualifying on the basis of the adjusted [PAY97] cut-scores essentially will be 
the same individuals qualifying on the [PAY80] scale (using the unadjusted cut-scores)” (Segall, 
2003, p. 66). In other words, the same number of applicants considered qualified under the 
older norms also would be considered qualified under the newer norms, provided the minimum 
AFQT scores were lowered. Expressed in yet another way, lower standards would not 
necessarily produce more lower-quality recruits, because the same lower-quality recruits 
already were qualifying for military service under the standards established by the older norms.  
In October 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) hosted a workshop to discuss 
the effects of new norms on military recruiting and personnel management. Workshop 
participants included testing policy staff members from OSD and the Military Services as well as 
technical representatives from DMDC and the Service personnel research establishments. Dr. 
Alan Nicewander, then Director of DMDC's Personnel Testing Division, captured the essence of 
shifting norms in a briefing entitled "What Are Norms and Why Are They Important?" In his 
presentation, Nicewander (2003) used height rather than test scores to explain the shifts in 
percentiles. As Nicewander (2003) observed: "In the 1940s, a man 5'8" tall was at the 50th 
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percentile in height. Today, a man 5'8" is only at the 40th percentile—the same height, but a 
lower percentile because of an overall increase in height over the years.” This example of height 
illustrates, in simple terms, how an increase in the overall aptitude level of PAY97 youth would 
cause 1997 ASVAB scores to have lower percentiles than the very same scores in 1980.  
Nevertheless, the possibility of losing qualified applicants, particularly during a ramp-up for war 
(U.S. intervention in Iraq), spurred a number of detailed studies. Estimating the potential impact 
of new norms becomes even more complicated when one examines occupational qualification. 
As Segall (2004) observed, PAY97 ASVAB scores generally are slightly higher or similar to 
those for PAY80 on the AFQT (mathematics and verbal), while proportionate or lower on most 
technical knowledge tests. Segall wrote:  
The new [1997] score-scale will be constructed by linearly transforming PAY97 sample 
scores in a way that results in means and standard deviations of 50 and 10, respectively. 
Consequently, for the PAY97 sample, average scores on the [1997] scale would be 
expected to increase (relative to the [1980] scale) for those [ASVAB tests] having means 
below 50 [General Science, Arithmetic Reasoning, Paragraph Comprehension, 
Automotive and Shop Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics 
Information], and decrease for those [tests] having means above 50 [Word Knowledge, 
Mathematics Knowledge, andVerbal]. (pp. 8-9)  
 
In essence, equating enlistment standards also would be necessary when using aptitude area 
composites of ASVAB tests to assign recruits to occupational training, if the desired outcome is 
to maintain a constant number of qualified applicants. The difference between making 
adjustments in the cut-scores for these aptitude area composites and those for the AFQT, 
however, is that some of the composite scores for occupational eligibility actually would need to 
be raised. That is, the proportion of applicants who would qualify for occupational training based 
on minimum qualifying scores on certain aptitude composites is greater using the PAY97 norms 
than the PAY80 norms.  
As seen here, the PAY97 results can directly affect the standards used by the Services to 
determine enlistment eligibility and recruits’ assignment to occupational training. The most 
immediate consequence of the PAY97 norms is a reduction in the number of qualified 
applicants. Manpower supply, however, is not dependent solely on standards, but on many 
economic, cultural, social, demographic, and political considerations. Further, there is no 
guarantee the Services’ recruitment goals will be the same today as tomorrow. Therefore, when 
considering enlistment standards and the various, less predictable changes in factors that affect 
military manpower supply, the wisest course is to take a broader and longer historical 
perspective. A 1984 study of PAY80 implications for the military’s aptitude and education 
standards by Eitelberg, Laurence, and Waters, provided such perspective:  
Minimum standards for acceptance into the American military are flexible gates that 
open and close in reaction to the shifting needs of national defense and manpower 
recruitment. Like finely engineered dams, constructed to regulate the flow of a river and 
form temporary reservoirs, the military’s entry standards are designed to take the best 
available men and women in the required quantities. Certain circumstances, such as a 
recruiting drought or a need for mass mobilization, typically necessitate less stringent 
physical standards, lower education and ability criteria, and more lenient eligibility 
requirements in other areas. Conversely, during periods of peace when the standing 
army is streamlined to function as a “caretaker,” or during periods of high unemployment 
 
Chapter 5 126 
when military “jobs” are relatively more attractive to the youthful workforce, the Armed 
Services are usually able to be more selective and the qualitative barriers to entry are 
strengthened. (p. 7)  
 
Recruit Demographics 
Historically, the U.S. military has never been a true microcosm of the larger population from 
which it is drawn. Military members do not represent U.S. society in many respects, nor should 
they. In most recent times, as the DoD report, Population Representation in the Military Services 
(2007), indicates, recruits are different to some extent in their home of origin—disproportionately 
from the South; socioeconomic status—disproportionately from the middle and lower-middle 
levels; education—disproportionately more high school graduates; aptitude—disproportionately 
fewer at the high end of cognitive ability and much fewer at the low end; gender—
disproportionately far fewer women; race/ethnicity—disproportionately more minorities; as well 
as various other noteworthy differences. Nevertheless, recruit enlistment trends can be 
analyzed to see if they reflect the characteristics of the PAY97 sample.  
New ASVAB score-scales (norms) were introduced in July 2004, seven years after the ASVAB was 
administered through PAY97 to a nationally representative sample of American youth. The mean 
age of new active duty recruits in 2005, soon after the new score-scales took effect, was 
approximately 20 years, and approximately 90% of new recruits were between the ages of 18 and 
24. Thus, to actually focus on the enlistment behavior of the PAY97 population per se, the prime 
years of military enlistment would stretch from approximately 1992, when the oldest respondent 
would have been 18 years old, to 2004, when the youngest would have been 24 years old. In reality, 
however, the prime recruiting years would fall within a shorter period from 1994 through 1999. 
Estimated military enlistment rates for the PAY97 population are examined in Chapter 6.  
As it turns out, the period from 1994 through 1999 had the lowest recruiting requirements since 
1954 due to force downsizing and other manpower policies. In 1995, for example, the 
requirement for new military recruits was 168,000. The next lowest requirement from 1954 
through 2007 was in 1994 (176,000), followed by 1996 (179,000), and then 1999 (185,000). By 
comparison, the requirement for new recruits in 1973, when the draft ended, was 406,000. The 
year of the PAY80 study, the recruit requirement was 352,000, and in 2006 the requirement was 
190,000 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, Table D-1).  
During the period from 1994 to 1999 the civilian unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds was 
average to below average, based on 32 years of annual data. In 1999 and 2000, however, the 
unemployment rate for this age group hit its lowest mark in three decades (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2007, Table D-2). Higher unemployment rates should make the Services more 
attractive to the nation’s youth, particularly those who are not planning to enroll in college or 
those who prefer to postpone their higher education for personal or financial reasons.  
Service-wide, 1994 through 1998 were relatively good years for high-quality recruits, with more 
than 60% having graduated from high school and scoring at or above the 50th percentile on the 
AFQT (AFQT Categories I through IIIA). The next year, 1999, was the start of a three-year 
descent over which the rate of high-quality recruits fell to approximately 57%. The Army had its 
lowest proportion of high-quality recruits since 1986 (52.2%) in 1999. The Navy had a similarly 
disappointing proportion of high-quality recruits (53.2%) in 1999—its lowest rate since 1989 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, Table D-9).  
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Speculating about the possible implications of the PAY97 results on recruiting during these 
prime, enlistment-age years of the PAY97 population is difficult because so many factors come 
into play. Still, enlistment standards during the period probably were quite favorable for 
applicants from the larger population represented in the PAY97 study. Based on predictions that 
a noticeable decline in the number of qualified applicants would result from the introduction of 
the PAY97 score-scales, the qualification rates of the PAY97 sample generally might have been 
higher than dictated by applicants’ actual AFQT scores, especially for minority applicants.  
An analysis of enlistment applicants and their qualification rates after the introduction of the PAY97 
score-scales in July 2004 would be interesting, particularly the rates for subgroups most affected by 
the new norms, such as minority applicants. Another area of interest would be the qualification rates 
across various regions of the country because regional AFQT scores tend to differ noticeably. 
Comparing Army PAY80 and PAY97 score-scales in DoD’s series of Population Representation in 
the Military Services reports presented in 2002 (2001 data) and 2007 (2005 data), slightly more than 
32% of Black applicants in 2001 scored above the 50th percentile on the AFQT, while slightly less 
than 32% of Black applicants scored in the same range in 2005. Among the Army’s new Black 
recruits, 47% scored above the 50th percentile in 2001, compared with fewer than 46% in 2005. 
Service-wide, the proportion of Black applicants for enlistment with an above-average score on the 
AFQT was slightly higher in 2005 (more than 35%) than in 2001 (33%) (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2007, Tables A-6 and Table A-5, respectively).  
This does not account for the well-publicized drop in the proportion of Black youth who enlisted in 
the military, especially in the Army and Marine Corps, after 2001. In fact, in 2001 the  proportion of 
recruits in the Army who were Black was over 22%, including 36% of women and 19% of men. By 
2005, Black representation declined by nearly half, falling to slightly less than 12% of the Army’s 
new recruits, including 21% of women and 10% of men. In the Marine Corps, fewer than 8% of 
new recruits in 2005 were Black, compared with about 12% in 2001. This is not to say, however, 
that Black youth may still be more likely to enlist than White youth (see Chapter 6).  
The relatively rapid drop in Black recruits caught many observers by surprise. In fact, it is 
generally agreed by All-Volunteer Force (AVF) scholars that the increasing enlistment of Black 
youth and women in the 1970s allowed all-volunteer recruiting to continue during its most 
difficult period. Binkin and Eitelberg (1982) found that in 1978 and 1979 Black youth accounted 
for 34% and 37%, respectively, of all new recruits in the Army—triple the proportion of Black 
youth in the national population. Throughout the history of the AVF, one of the great constants 
has been overrepresentation of Blacks in the enlisted force, particularly in the Army. No wonder 
the popular press perked up when the participation rates fell (Baldor, 2007).  
The reasons for this dramatic decline in the number of Black recruits were attributed largely to the 
growing unpopularity of the war in Iraq and the increasingly important role of so-called 
“influencers” of enlistment behavior, such as parents, siblings, teachers, counselors, ministers, 
coaches, and so on, who were dissuading Black youth from volunteering for military service. 
According to the 2007 DoD Population Representation in the Military Services report, the two 
Services that had a less active role in Operation Iraqi Freedom—the Navy and Air Force—also 
had higher proportions of Black recruits, 19% and more than 14%, respectively, in 2005. 
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The All-Volunteer Force: Quality Concerns 
In the summer of 2007, “as the U.S. military was engaged in its largest and longest operations 
since the Vietnam War,” the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presented a report titled, The 
All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance, that looked at the “the Armed Forces’ ability to 
recruit and retain the personnel they need to carry out those missions” (preface). Yet, another 
impetus for this study was a renewed and reinvigorated debate about “whether a draft would be 
more desirable than an all-volunteer force…as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to 
require substantial numbers of military personnel” (p. 6). According to CBO analysts, “the last 
time debate about the desirability of the draft was prominent and protracted was during the 
Vietnam War” (p. 6). (see also Eitelberg, 1996, pp. 68-69.)  
The 2007 CBO study brought out many of the same issues that have dogged the AVF since its 
inception in 1973. Indeed, if CBO researchers had carefully examined the history of the AVF, 
they would have found the “AVF versus draft debate” preceded the war in Vietnam and has 
never truly ended. Further, by the end of the 1970s, when the AVF was famously described as a 
“hollow force,” several major studies were undertaken on the issue, and calls for a return to 
conscription were considerably more widespread than in 2007.21 Even the most ardent 
supporters of the AVF began to question whether the nation’s defense would be better served 
with conscription. These studies, the ongoing debate, recruiting difficulties, and continuing 
concern about the nation’s preparedness led to the renewal of draft registration, a number of 
changes to bolster the AVF, and the formation of a Presidential Commission on the AVF (see 
Eitelberg, 1996, for a summary of these activities). By 1980, even former President Richard M. 
Nixon, who had ended the draft seven years earlier, called for its immediate return. “The 
volunteer army has failed to provide enough personnel of the caliber we need for our highly 
sophisticated armaments,” Nixon claimed in The Real War (1980).22  
CBO’s 2007 The All-Volunteer Military report assessed the status of the AVF by looking at three 
main areas—Services cost, AVF quality and effectiveness, and force composition and equity. 
When considering quality and effectiveness, particularly AFQT scores, the CBO analysts 
employed findings from a major Army study known as “Project A”:  
Research has also shown that recruits with higher scores on the military entrance 
exam…are more easily trained and perform better in a wide range of military 
                                                
21 In 1980, General Edward “Shy” Meyer, then Army Chief of Staff, first used the term “hollow Army” in 
Congressional testimony.  Meyer claimed that the post-Vietnam Army was essentially a shell, hollow at its 
core: ill-prepared, poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and under-resourced. The term has since been 
used often to characterize a military force that falls woefully short in terms of readiness. The Defense 
Science Board Readiness Task Force in 1994 referred to the military of the late 1970s and later years as 
“hollow forces” that were “less well educated, more involved in drugs, less well trained, less well 
equipped, less well sustained, less strategically mobile, and less highly regarded by the American public.”  
Quoted from Dougherty, R. E. (2005). Leadership during the Cold War: A four-star general’s perspective” 
in Lane, P. B.  & Marcello, R. E. (Eds.), Warriors and scholars: A modern war reader (p. 123). Denton, 
TX: University of North Texas Press. 
22 Nixon (1980, p. 201) explains: “I had considered the end of the draft in 1973 to be one of the major 
achievements of my administration. Now, seven years later, I have reluctantly concluded that we should 
reintroduce the draft…. Even so, it will cause hardships, and whatever its form, the draft is inherently 
unfair; it can only be justified by necessity. But, as we look at the 1980s, necessity stares us in the face: 
we simply cannot risk being without it. To put off that hard decision could prove penny wise and pound 
foolish; our reluctance to resume the peacetime draft may make us weak enough to invite war, and then 
we will find ourselves imposing a wartime draft instead.” 
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occupations than personnel with lower scores do. DoD initiated an extensive multiyear 
study in which researchers watched Service members perform their jobs, calculated their 
effectiveness, and then linked their performance scores to their AFQT scores. 
Researchers concluded that personnel with low AFQT scores (in the 10th to 30th 
percentiles…) scored about 20% lower on performance tests than did members with 
high AFQT scores [30th percentile and above]. Furthermore, by their third year of 
service, those low-scoring Service members had not reached the performance levels 
that recruits with high AFQT scores achieved in their first year on the job (p. 13).23  
 
In their 2007 report, the CBO analysts cited other studies, including Orvis, Childress, and Polich 
(1992), that highlight the connection between occupational performance—such as air combat 
simulations by Army enlisted personnel operating Patriot missile systems—and AFQT scores. 
Because AFQT scores “underpin [DoD’s] definition of personnel quality,” and “the increasing 
technological sophistication of weapons systems and growing complexity of many military jobs” 
are so important, “more-capable personnel [are] especially valuable to DoD (as they are to most 
employers)” (p. 14). “For the most part,” the CBO report concluded, “DoD has been able to 
attract individuals with the education and test score credentials necessary to perform its 
missions. After 2004, however, the Army accepted a higher proportion of recruits who lacked 
high school diplomas, scored lower on the AFQT, or had to obtain special waivers…” (p. 14)  
As reports of the Army’s recruiting difficulties began to appear with greater regularity, so did 
both formal and informal discussions, in public and private, on the costs and benefits of 
returning to compulsory military service. Soon thereafter, as Gold (2006) wrote, the United 
States found itself squarely in “The Great Draft Panic of 2004”:  
The Great Draft Panic of 2004 had its origins in December 2002, when a liberal 
congressman introduced a bill he never intended to go anywhere. It ended in October 
2004, when he voted against it. En passant, the panic, such as it was, provided a 
splendid opportunity to take a good look in the national mirror. America declined. (p. 72)  
 
The legislative bill to which Gold refers was House Resolution 163 (2002), which proposed a 
program of mandatory universal service, either in the military or in alternative civilian positions, 
that was introduced by Congressman Charles B. Rangel of New York. (Senator Ernest F. “Fritz” 
Hollings of South Carolina introduced a counterpart in the U.S. Senate.) Rangel’s main objective 
in introducing the resolution was to “help bring a greater appreciation of the consequences of 
decisions to go to war” and to foster a “patriotic debate” (p. 73). Part of the reasoning behind the 
bill was captured in a book by Roth-Douquet and Schaeffer (2006), the title of which tells the 
story: AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America’s Upper Classes from Military Service and 
How It Hurts Our Country.  
At first, the debate that arose from the so-called “panic” focused primarily on the demographic 
composition of enlisted Service members—mostly race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status—but 
soon moved to the two measures of AVF performance that have always dominated these 
discussions—the quality and quantity of Army recruits. In fact, a good indicator of the important 
issues of the time can be found in the DoD report, Who Is Volunteering for Today’s Military? 
Myths versus Facts (2005), which was designed to dispel “a number of myths…perpetuated 
                                                
23 See also Welsh, Kucinkas, & Curran (1990), Wigdor & Green (1991), Earles & Ree (1992), and 
Mayberry & Carey (1997). 
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about those young people who volunteer to serve” (p. 1). The very first myth to be dispelled 
was: “Military recruits are less educated and of lower aptitude than American youth.” In June 
2007, Boston Globe reporters Bryan Bender and Kevin Baron specifically challenged DoD’s 
evidence against that claim, drawing on the Army’s recruiting statistics in an article titled, “Fewer 
High-Quality Recruits: As War Needs Rise, Exam Scores Drop”:  
The percentage of high-quality recruits entering the Army is the lowest in 10 years, an 
indication that the force is struggling to attract top-grade enlistees…. Over the past 
decade, the percentage of top-level recruits who enlisted in the Army was mostly 
consistent, dipping slightly at the end of the 1990s before spiking in the wake of the 
Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. But since 2003—the same year the [United States] 
invaded Iraq—the Army has steadily taken in more recruits that the force itself considers 
“non-high quality.” Last year, nearly 40% of those who joined the Army had below-
average verbal and math scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test…. In 2003, the 
Army accepted only 28.9% of the low-scoring recruits, but that percentage gradually 
began to rise in subsequent years…. The data…also show a steady decline in the 
number of recruits who have graduated from high school. (p. A1)  
 
With many newspapers reporting and even more commentators discussing the topic, Bender 
and Baron (2007) went on to say, “the Army is experiencing a downward trend in recruit quality 
that military analysts suggest will continue for some time…. The number of applicants seeking 
to enlist in the Army is plummeting, thereby shrinking the pool of qualified applicants. And, with 
the unpopularity of the war, a strong job market, and more high school graduates entering four-
year colleges than ever before, the Army is increasingly willing to take anyone who wants to 
volunteer” (p. A1).24  
(Note: Continuing questions and concerns about the AVF led to the formation of a virtual 
symposium comprised of several leading authorities on military manpower issues and former 
DoD officials. More information about the symposium findings and the panel members is 
provided in Appendix D.)  
The All-Volunteer Force: Fairness Concerns 
In 1967, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (the Marshall Commission) 
recommended a number of changes to the Selective Service System after finding that “social 
and economic injustices in the society are at the root of inequities which exist” (pp. 9-10). The 
essence of the theme was captured in the title of the Commission’s final report, In Pursuit of 
Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? This fundamental question has been asked time and 
again in the era of the AVF, particularly during periods of conflict when the burden of military 
service is seen to outweigh its benefits and to fall on society’s least privileged.  
Questions of equity follow the AVF, just as they were prominent in debates over the fairness of 
the Vietnam-era draft and the preceding systems of compulsory service. When America’s last 
draft ended officially in 1973, concerns about the AVF’s social composition intensified as critics 
claimed “economic conscription” would force poor and disadvantaged minorities to enlist. Some 
observers described the Services as “employers of last resort” for the hapless and hopeless, 
                                                
24 In 2007, the Army’s recruiting problems were a “hot topic” and widely discussed in op-eds, newspaper 
editorials, and Internet blogs. 
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predicting the nation’s wellborn sons would avoid military service during the Cold War just as 
they had avoided the war in Southeast Asia.  
These charges about the AVF’s inherent inequities prompted a number of studies. In addition, 
beginning in 1974 Congress required DoD to submit an annual summary of “population 
representation in the military services,” which it has continued to provide to this day (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2005).  
The notion that America’s military is filled largely with the “dregs of society—the young and the 
indigent, sons of poor farmers, laborers, recent immigrants, redemptioners and convicts, slaves, 
indentured servants and hirelings…and penniless drifters who had no property or family ties”—
is as old as America’s military (Eitelberg, 1988, p. 4). The Conscription Act of March 3, 1863, 
the nation’s first national draft law, allowed a drafted man to hire a substitute or purchase his 
way out of compulsory service by paying $300. The Civil War draft was widely viewed as 
discriminating against the poor, resulting in a popular call of the day: “Rich man’s money, poor 
man’s blood!” (Little, 1969).  
It is hardly surprising, then, that the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force 
(Gates Commission, 1970) was more or less compelled to address these same concerns in its 
final report. In Chapter 2, titled “The Debate,” the Commission addressed nine common 
objections to an AVF. Objection 5 stated, “the higher pay required for a voluntary force will be 
especially appealing to Blacks who have relatively poorer civilian opportunities…thus leading to 
an all-Black enlisted force” (p. 15). Objection 6 stated, “Those joining an all-volunteer force will 
be men from the lowest economic classes, motivated primarily by monetary rewards rather than 
patriotism” (p. 16). Objection 8 stated, “A voluntary force will be less effective because not 
enough highly qualified youth will be likely to enlist and pursue military careers” (p. 18).  
In the earliest, large-scale study of the AVF, Cooper (1977) writes that “the equity issue thus 
became the single most important factor in the move to end the draft and was composed of two 
major components: (a) the burden imposed on young men of military age and (b) the selective 
way in which this burden was applied” (p. 40). Cooper considered it ironic that “one of the key 
issues to emerge from the volunteer debate was whether the AVF would lead to a military 
composed mainly of the poor and Black,” because “the historically unrepresentative nature of 
the draft was a principal reason for its termination” (p. 204). Cooper then proceeded to evaluate 
the economic burdens of conscription as well as social representation in the AVF by offering the 
first systematic attempt to evaluate socioeconomic representation in the AVF.  
“Historically,” observed Cooper, “it has been difficult to deal with these types of questions 
because of a lack of data. As a result, analysts were forced to rely on such measures as the 
proportion of recruits that were Black as a proxy for changes in the socioeconomic composition 
of the force,” (p. 223) assuming that a larger proportion of Blacks means a larger proportion of 
the poor. Cooper developed an alternative procedure for examining socioeconomic indicators by 
identifying the postal zip codes of recruits and then using 1970 Census data to determine the 
per capita income for each zip code, along with average family income, average educational 
attainment, racial/ethnic composition, and related measures.  
Ultimately, Cooper found “individuals raised in middle- and high-income areas, for instance, are 
serving in almost the identical proportions under the volunteer force that they did under the 
draft” (p. 230). Thus, according to Cooper, “military service apparently continues to be viewed 
as an alternative employment option for a very broad cross-section of American society, from 
the wealthiest to the poorest” (p. 231). Cooper’s analytical method of using income by postal zip 
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code established a precedent for studying the socioeconomic composition of AVF military 
recruits, an approach that was followed for many years.  
In a departure from Cooper’s approach, Fredland and Little (1979), two economists at the U.S. 
Naval Academy, studied the socioeconomic characteristics of young, male military personnel 
using the NLSY79 youth cohort from which the PAY80 sample was drawn. This database, which 
was unavailable to Cooper at the time of his study, offered a somewhat expanded view of 
certain related factors, such as aspirations and intentions, job problems, job satisfaction, and 
vocational training. The study compared selected characteristics of 18- to 22-year-olds serving 
in the military to youth of the same age who were not serving. One interesting finding was the 
relationship between the two populations based on race/ethnicity. White Service members 
tended to come from below-average socioeconomic backgrounds, while Black Service members 
tended to come from representative or above-average backgrounds and Hispanic Service 
members were “reasonably representative,” based on socioeconomic variables, “except that 
foreign-born Hispanics [were] underrepresented” (p. 2).  
Some years later, at about the same time DoD began looking more closely at the topic, 
Fernandez (1989) studied measures of socioeconomic status as part of a larger project for the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Returning to the methodology employed by Cooper (1977), 
Fernandez matched military recruits by “home area” to data derived from the Census data for 
each zip code. As is typical in studies using the zip-code-match approach, Fernandez carefully 
explains why the data were limited and warns the results were only “a rough approximation” (p. 
38). With this caveat in mind, he found that generally “the socioeconomic characteristics of 
recruits’ home areas are broadly similar to those of the general youth population, although 
recruits tend to come from areas with somewhat lower family incomes and education levels” (p. 
xii). More specifically, Fernandez found “lower-middle-income areas were most heavily 
represented,” while persons “at the very bottom of the distribution [were] only slightly 
overrepresented” (p. xii). Further, similar to what Fredland and Little (1979) discovered a 
decade earlier, Fernandez identified White-Black racial differences:  
Black and White recruits tend to come from different socioeconomic strata within their 
respective populations, with Black recruits coming disproportionately from areas with 
above-average Black incomes and better-educated Black adults…. Blacks living in areas 
in the highest 10th of Black family incomes are almost twice as likely to enlist as those 
living in the bottom 10th areas; for Whites, areas with the highest incomes are 
underrepresented. (p. xiii)  
 
Concerns about the AVF excusing the privileged from defending their country while 
economically conscripting the poor clearly become magnified when a peacetime force goes to 
war. Such was the case when the AVF had its first combat test during Operation Desert Storm. 
These concerns subsequently were put to rest as the war ended quickly and with minimal U.S. 
casualties. No stark evidence was presented that the burdens of combat fell disproportionately 
on one demographic group or another. As the Chair of the U.S. House Committee on Armed 
Services, Les Aspin of Wisconsin stated, “The…Committee spent some considerable time on 
this [issue] and came to a rather surprising conclusion about it. It’s not true.” (U.S. Department 
of Defense, 1992, p. 39; see also U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, 1991). 
Nevertheless, questions again arose when U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq in the 
early 2000s. Fortunately, a number of researchers were able to shed some light on the issue, all 
using some variation of the approach Cooper (1977) used that matched recruits to their zip 
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codes and then compared them with the relevant civilian population. For example, analysts from 
the National Priorities Project (NPP) (2006) focused on 18- to 24-year-old active-duty Army 
recruits in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Using the zip-code matching methodology, NPP analysts 
found Army recruits were overrepresented from areas with median household incomes in the 
low- to middle range and underrepresented from areas with median household incomes at the 
upper (above $60,000) and lower (below $30,000) ranges.  
In a similar fashion, but with somewhat different results, Kane (2005) attempted to determine “who 
bears the burden” in a study for the Heritage Foundation. Using five-digit zip-code tabulation areas 
that generally correspond to postal zip codes, Kane found the median household income for 1999 
recruits (pre-September 11) was approximately $850 less than that of the national median, and that 
recruits from 2003 (post-September 11) actually came from wealthier households than did their 
1999 counterparts. “In terms of education, household income, race, and home origin,” writes Kane, 
“the troops are more similar than dissimilar to the general population” (p. 4):  
Put simply, the current makeup of the all-volunteer military looks like America. Where 
they are different, the data show that the average soldier is slightly better educated and 
comes from a slightly wealthier, more rural area…. More importantly, we found that 
recruiting was not drawing disproportionately from racially concentrated areas. (p. 15)  
 
Kane conducted a follow-up analysis of military recruits from 2003 through 2005. Somewhat 
surprisingly, he found estimates for recruits’ mean household income actually increased for 
each successive year during the period. As in previous studies, he discovered, “the poorest 
areas continue to be underrepresented, while middle-class areas are overrepresented… [and] 
the richest income brackets are underrepresented…[Overall,] the distribution for recruit 
household incomes is very similar to that of the youth population” (p. 11). Kane’s study also 
showed that Service recruits were drawn disproportionately from the two highest quintiles (top 
40%) of the national income distribution (pp. 4-5).  
In addition to addressing recruit quality, the CBO report, The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and 
Performance (2007), also addressed demographic concerns. When analyzing the family 
incomes of recruits using NLSY97 data, CBO researchers opted to “avoid some of the problems 
of the approach based on zip codes” by identifying NLSY97 participants, ages 17 to 21, who 
were serving in the military in 2000 and then comparing them to their civilian counterparts from 
the NLSY97 study who did not enlist in the military. One advantage of using the NLSY97, as 
CBO observed, is that information on the socioeconomic status of recruits is actually reported 
by their parents; one important disadvantage is the small size (slightly more than 100) of the 
enlisted sample (p. 30).  
The results of CBO’s analysis are consistent with the findings from many previous studies of 
socioeconomic status. That is, recruits tend to be: (a) drawn from all socioeconomic levels, (b) 
underrepresented from the highest and lowest income levels, and (c) overrepresented from the 
lower-middle income levels (the 25th to 50th percentiles). In addition, the CBO report found 
recruits were overrepresented from the upper-middle level (75th to 90th percentile), which 
generally is not seen in previous studies (pp. 30-31).  
The 1988 edition of DoD’s Population Representation in the Military Services report stated, “the 
Directorate for Accession Policy has attempted for several years to develop data to reflect the 
socioeconomic background of military applicants and recruits” (p. I-6). The report continued:  
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In an attempt to ascertain the socioeconomic representativeness of enlistees, the 
Directorate for Accession Policy has been encouraged by Congress to collect 
socioeconomic data directly from Service members and military applicants. By doing 
this, it would be possible to obtain reliable information on the SES [socioeconomic 
status] levels of individuals currently represented in the military, as well as the SES 
levels of individuals being attracted to the military. (p. I-7)  
 
In the 1990 edition of DoD’s Population Representation in the Military Services report, an entire 
chapter was devoted to the “Socio-economic Status of New Recruits,” in which preliminary 
results from DoD’s Socioeconomic Survey were compared with data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). In general, the analysis showed “the parents, step-parents, and 
guardians of recruits entering the military in March and April 1989 are somewhat lower in 
socioeconomic status than the comparison group of CPS parents” (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1990, pp. 8-9). The differences were described as “relatively small on those measures 
that are broadly inclusive” and “more marked on two variables that measure representation at 
the upper end of the socio-economic scale.” Thus, the analysts found “no evidence here that the 
Services are recruiting primarily from an economic underclass…. For the most part, recruits to 
the military seem to come from families that are comparable to the general population but with 
somewhat less education and occupational status” (pp. 8-10).  
This theme is repeated in later Population Representation reports to refute “the oft-cited 
perception of a military drawn primarily from the lower socioeconomic rung of society is not 
supported by the data” (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992, p. 37). The main argument is 
supported in the 1992 edition with results from the 1991 administration of DoD’s Socioeconomic 
Survey. The survey gathered data from approximately 15,000 new recruits on marital status, 
education, employment, occupation, and parents’ homeownership as a proxy for income. In 
comparing these measures with data from the CPS on the general population, the analysts 
found military recruits tended to be “mostly drawn from the middle class, with fairly comparable 
representation [to the CPS] from the lowest and third quartile of the population” (p. 47). Thus, 
although recruits at the time of the survey were not much different from their counterparts in the 
general population, they were disproportionately drawn from the moderately low socioeconomic 
levels and underrepresented in the highest socioeconomic range.  
In the 1993 edition of DoD’s Population Representation in the Military Services report, however, 
the results of the continuing analysis had changed somewhat. As this report stated, “Military 
recruits were primarily drawn from the lower and middle class, with fairly comparable 
representation from the 2nd and 3rd quartiles of the population.” The discussion further noted 
that “while not proportional, there was representation of recruits from the highest [level]” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1993, pp. 3-9). DoD’s Population Representation in the Military 
Services report for the following year (1994) reiterated that “based on a summary of parents’ 
education, employment status, occupation, and homeownership, Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 data 
showed that neither the high nor the low ends of the distribution were as well represented 
among the backgrounds of new recruits as in Census data on parents of civilian youth ages 14 
through 21” (p. vi).  
DoD discontinued its analysis of socioeconomic status after publication of the 2001 Population 
Representation in the Military Services report, which examined FY 1999 data. DoD also stopped 
routinely collecting information from recruits on their socioeconomic status, although the Status 
of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members asked Service members if they could recall certain 
background characteristics of their parents at the time they joined the military (U.S. Government 
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Accountability Office, 2005, p. 41). Thereafter, references to socioeconomic status all but 
disappeared from the annual report until publication of the FY 2007 report in 2009.  
In analyzing FY 2007 enlistment data, DoD used an approach similar to that employed by the 
Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008): determining the home-of-record zip codes for 
new recruits, assigning median household incomes to zip codes, and then comparing 
distributions nationally according to household income quintiles (“using median household 
income by census tract weighted by the relevant population of 18 to 24 year-olds”) (U. S. 
Department of Defense, 2009, p. 12)25. Thus, in a highly unlikely situation of “perfect 
representation,” military recruits would be spread evenly across income quintiles, with 20% in 
each category. The results of these analyses led to the following general conclusions: persons 
from middle-income communities enlist at the highest rate, and those from the poorest 
communities enlist at the lowest rates (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, pp. 12-13). In the 
Army, just over half of all FY 2007 first-time recruits came from communities with a household 
income in the lower-middle to middle quintiles; this compares with about 46-47 percent of 
recruits from the other Services and 40 percent of the national population. The Army had the 
highest proportion of recruits (12%) from the lowest-income quintile as well as the lowest 
proportion (15.5%) from the most affluent (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, Table B-41).26  
DoD’s renewed attempt to document socioeconomic status was clearly influenced by 
congressional interest and the work of independent researchers. In 2005, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), responding to a congressional call for more information, provided 
its own assessment of the demographic composition of the military in a report titled, Military 
Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember Demographics Could Enhance Congressional 
Oversight. GAO analysts included socioeconomic status in their study, again relying on the 
tried-and-true, but somewhat limited, method of matching recruits’ zip codes to public and 
private databases that contained the required information. Although GAO cautioned that “using 
zip codes as the basis for estimates of socioeconomic status and population density is 
admittedly flawed” (GAO, 2005, p. 141), and carefully enumerated the various flaws that pertain 
to measuring socioeconomic status, the report highlighted one particular finding: “A recent DoD 
analysis of over 1 million recruits found recruits came from communities representing all 
socioeconomic levels and, at $44,500, the median income of the communities roughly equaled 
the $44,300 median income of the communities of civilian youth” (p. 4).  
Nevertheless, GAO recommended DoD “conduct research to determine a feasible process for 
assessing the socioeconomic status of recruits and periodically include these findings in annual 
                                                
25 Watkins & Shirk (2008) expand on the work of Kane (2006) and employ “an improved methodology to 
study the demographic characteristics of newly commissioned officers and personnel who enlisted in 
2006 and 2007.” The authors of the updated study write: “Members of the all-volunteer military are sig-
nificantly more likely to come from high-income neighborhoods than from low-income neighborhoods. 
Only 11 percent of enlisted recruits in 2007 came from the poorest one-fifth (quintile) of neighborhoods, 
while 25 percent came from the wealthiest quintile.” Quoted at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda08-05.cfm. Accessed February 2010. 
26 It should be noted that the income range in the highest quintile is much larger than in any other income 
grouping. For example, the range of incomes in the lowest quintile extends from $0 to $33,267. By 
comparison, the range in the highest quintile extends from $65,032 to $244,737. Data show that, DoD-
wide in FY 2007, close to 18% of new recruits came from the highest-income quintile. Critics of the AVF 
over the years have claimed that the nation’s most privileged young men and women are virtually absent. 
Dividing the highest-income quintile into smaller subcomponents would help to shed more light on 
socioeconomic representation at the highest levels. 
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reports on service members” (p. 6). More specifically, GAO elaborated on the perceived 
problem:  
Although there is congressional and public interest in the socioeconomic status of the 
households and the types of communities from which recruits are drawn, DoD has not 
routinely reported such information in recent years. Without current information on the 
socioeconomic status of service members, DoD cannot accurately and reliably respond 
to concerns that particular socioeconomic subgroups are underrepresented among 
those serving in the military. We listed problems associated with the measure DoD 
recently used to identify socioeconomic status for the analyses included in this report. 
The challenges associated with the former and current measurements of socioeconomic 
status might suggest that there is still a need for accurate information on this 
demographic characteristic. (p. 130)  
 
The All-Volunteer Force: Education Concerns 
In FY 2006 the Army enlisted approximately 70,000 recruits without prior service. Of these, more 
than 26% graduated from high school with an alternative credential, that is, without a traditional high 
school diploma or with any college credit. Applicants without a diploma but who possessed a 
General Education Development (GED) certificate or one semester of college are not included in 
this nongraduate category; they are counted as “high school diploma graduate or above.”27 
To put the Army’s 2006 recruiting results into historical perspective, the last time this Service 
had fewer than 80% of its new recruits in the “high school graduate or above” category was in 
1981 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, Table D-7). The “benchmark proportion” for high 
school graduates and the official policy objective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is 
90%, which the Army achieved in only 11 years between 1981 and 2006. The larger proportion 
of Army recruits with a GED is partly attributable to its Army GED Plus Enlistment Program, 
which was designed primarily for disadvantaged youth. This program actually enlisted high 
school dropouts who then were sponsored by the Army to obtain a GED for enlistment purposes 
(Sellman, 1999). To qualify for the program, nongraduates still must score in AFQT Category 
IIIA or above and receive a passing score on the Army’s Assessment of Individual Motivation 
(AIM) test, which predicts the applicant’s likelihood of first-term attrition.28 
                                                
27 See any of various sources on the DoD’s education standards and the distribution of credentials by 
education tier. 
28 For details on the program, see the Army’s online recruiting site, http://www.goarmy.com. It is 
interesting to note that the proportion of high school graduates among recruits in the Army typically are 
higher—by five to seven percentage points—in certain official Army and DoD reports than in the DoD 
reports. CBO analysts believe this consistent difference is due to the fact that Army recruits in special 
education attainment programs, such as the “GED Plus Program,” are excluded from calculations made 
by DoD in certain reports on recruiting results, but not in calculations for the Population Representation 
reports, which are drawn directly from DMDC data by a DoD contractor (Congressional Budget Office, 
2007, p. 15, note 51). Another issue of concern when relying on reported results by education level 
involves certain policies that make it easier for GED holders to qualify on the basis of their AFQT score, 
which, according to anecdotal reports, can be easily abused by recruiters. In military screening policy, a 
GED recipient can qualify as Tier 1 if he or she has completed at least 15 hours (one semester) of 
college-level courses (subjects not specified). According to the policy, the recruit needs to submit “an 
original letter on the [accredited] college letterhead stationery…to verify the status of courses completed.” 
A GAO report discusses the topic of substantiated abuses by recruiters, which have increased noticeably 
since Operation Iraqi Freedom (U.S. Government Accountability Office, August 2006). 
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Why is the GED important in military recruiting and, more so, why in this discussion? To answer 
this question, it first is useful to understand how educational achievement is treated in 
enlistment screening. As previously discussed, an applicant’s education level helps determine 
the AFQT cut-score applied during screening, which is where the so-called “education 
differential” comes into play. In 1987, DoD developed a three-tier system for categorizing the 
many types of education credentials available across various jurisdictions and between the 
Services. As Sellman (2004), DoD’s Director for Accession Policy when the three-tier system 
was introduced, explained:  
DoD uses a three-tier system to classify education credentials. The system was 
developed after research indicated a strong relationship between level of education and 
successful completion of the first term of military service…. Tier 1 includes regular high 
school diploma graduates, adult diploma holders, and nongraduates with at least 15 
hours of college credit. Tier 2 comprises alternative credential holders, such as those 
with General Education Development (GED) diplomas, or certificates of completion or 
attendance, and Tier 3 is composed of non-high school graduates. However, the 
Services prefer to enlist people in Tier 1 (high school diploma graduates) because they 
have a higher likelihood of completing a first term of service than do individuals in Tiers 2 
and 3 (e.g., GED holders or high school dropouts). Consequently, education standards 
refer to the application of progressively higher aptitude test score minimum requirements 
for high school diploma graduates, equivalency credential holders, and nongraduates, 
respectively…. That is, members of Tiers 2 and 3 are about twice as likely to leave 
service prematurely as those in Tier 1. (pp. 6-7)  
 
The main issue of concern, when singling out the GED and its family of alternative credentials, 
is that limitations in the PAY97 data prevent including this education variable in analyses of 
ASVAB scores. Currently, analyses of PAY97 ASVAB scores by education level are restricted to 
high school graduates (or beyond) or nongraduates, with the assumption that, if the GED is a 
stopping point, persons at this level are counted as either high school graduates or 
nongraduates, depending on the number of years completed.29 Often, the GED and similar 
credentials are called a high school equivalency certificate. Yet, from a military manpower 
perspective, the GED is not equivalent to a high school diploma; the average first-term attrition 
rate of a recruit with an alternative credential (50%) tends to be much closer to that of a high 
school dropout (60%) than to that of a standard high school graduate (30%).30 
The inability to isolate GED holders would be an analytical constraint in almost any study of 
military recruiting, given the vast amount of evidence on first-term attrition and the definition of a 
“high-quality” recruit (a standard high school graduate who scores above-average on the 
AFQT). Clearly, DoD’s interest and need to focus on persons with alternative education 
credentials are not shared or perhaps even appreciated by other government agencies, which 
seem content in using less-refined measures. Nevertheless, the problem of not having PAY97 
data on GED holders also limits certain comparisons between PAY80 and PAY97 results. Most 
                                                
29 Apparently, one cannot infer GED status from the education variables in PAY97. The education 
variables include only highest grade completed (years of education), enrollment status, current grade, 
and grade anticipated in the fall of 1997, but nothing that would show that an individual has received a 
GED or similar credential in place of a traditional high school diploma. Thus, completion of 12th grade is 
assumed to indicate high school graduation.  
30 This is drawn from special tabulations on the first-term attrition of military recruits provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). This relationship of educational achievement and first-term 
attrition is widely reported. 
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analyses of PAY80, including those presented in DoD’s Profile of American Youth (1982) and in 
many related studies, isolate the GED variable (pp. 38-40). Further, military recruiting statistics 
typically are reported using the same general categories that define the three education tiers: 
high school graduate (or above), GED, and high school nongraduate.  
Perhaps the best case for finding a way to incorporate the GED variable in future studies of 
PAY97 is presented by Armor and Sackett in “Manpower Quality in the All-Volunteer Force,” 
(2004) a chapter in a book of readings that commemorates the 30th anniversary of the AVF:  
Of particular interest are categories [of high school diploma status] reflecting 
nontraditional education credentials, such as General Education Development (GED) 
certificate holders. Note that GED holders have attrition rates similar to nongraduates; 
enlistees with adult education certificates or high school certificates of completion have 
somewhat lower rates of attrition than those with GEDs, but the rates are still much 
higher than for diploma graduates…. The issue of alternative high school credentials 
becomes increasingly important as alternatives to a traditional high school education 
increase. (pp. 96-97)  
 
The authors go on to discuss alternative high school credentials under “Changing Quality 
Indicators.” They conclude, “Data on the attrition rates of enlistees with different types of 
credentials or attending different types of high schools should be gathered and analyzed (by 
state if possible)…. This type of research could help establish if the classification of various 
education outcomes (e.g., Tiers 1 to 3) should be modified” (pp. 104-105).  
FY 2007 data in DoD’s 2009 edition of the Population Representation in the Military Services 
report show that fewer than 17% of the Army’s enlistment applicants were in education Tier 2, 
predominantly GED recipients; yet, in that same year, nearly 27% of those who actually enlisted 
in the Army were classified as Tier 2 (Tables A-6 and B-6). Expressed another way, the 
selection ratio for Tier 1 applicants to the Army in 2007 was 49%, compared with a ratio of about 
81% for those in Tier 2. In the same DoD report on FY 2007 applicants and recruits, statistics 
are provided for comparing the education levels of military recruits with those of 18-24 year-old 
civilians. Due to missing data on the general population, in the Tier 2 column for civilians, a 
simple notation appears: “civilian numbers and percentages combine Tiers 1 and 2” (Tables A-6 
and B-6). 
The All-Volunteer Force: Future Prospects 
“Absolutely Superb!” So states the cover page of Navy Times (11 March 1991), as “the swift and 
certain blitzkrieg that crushed Saddam Hussein’s army and liberated Kuwait demonstrated to 
the world—and to Americans—that the United States is a power without peer” (p. 3). Flip open 
the Navy Times cover page, and in large, bold type is the title of the lead article: “Resounding 
Victory! Ghost of Vietnam Fades as United States Demonstrates Unrivaled Military Might.”  
Deeper within this “Desert Storm Victory Edition” of the Navy Times, one finds a more sobering 
commentary and assessment of the AVF:  
The post-war appraisal will assuredly find as many questions as answers in the events 
since August. For one thing, would we have been prepared to sustain a much longer 
deployment and a rotational policy for the more than 500,000 personnel sent to the 
Gulf?.... Johnny will come marching home to a grateful nation from a war that has 
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enjoyed a high level of public approval. The military’s sparkling halo may light up 
recruiting offices throughout the land. On the other hand, the reality of war has never 
been faced before in the all-volunteer environment…. Staffing problems are likely to hit 
harder in the Reserves, where weekend warriors now hold a more complete 
understanding of “the total force concept.”…. Desert Storm has turned over the 
proverbial rock in our path, reminding us of unresolved issues while revealing a few new 
ones for the 1990s. (Eitelberg, 1991, p. 25)  
 
Two years later, at a 1993 conference celebrating the 20th anniversary of the AVF, General 
Maxwell Thurman, a legendary architect of the Army’s revamped recruiting programs in the 
1980s, led a chorus of praise for “the superb fighting competency of the U.S. armed forces in 
Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm,” confirming that “a volunteer force can fight and win.” 
Thurman continued:  
The magnificent performance of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and 
Coast Guard personnel—active, National Guard, and Reserve—demonstrated in those 
fights that courage, fidelity, and valor do not reside only with draftees. These traits also 
reside in the quality armed forces of today. (in Fredland, Gilroy, Little, & Sellman, eds., 
1996, p. 53)  
 
Martin Binkin, a renowned authority on military manpower, echoed these sentiments at the 
same government-sponsored conference, finding the nation “fielding the best-trained and most 
highly qualified force in U.S. history.” Nevertheless, as Binkin (1996) observed, indicators of 
force quality are just inputs:  
The “proof of the pudding” is in the output; that is, in how well the force performs the 
combat mission for which it is designed. While the Persian Gulf War, the first major 
combat involvement for the AVF, was not a complete test, there is an overwhelming 
consensus that the assembled U.S. force was probably the most capable one in U.S. 
history. (p. 124)  
 
The 1991 war in the Persian Gulf, although not a “complete test” for the AVF, as Binkin points 
out, found the nation bursting with pride and admiration for its military. This was the same 
military that had symbolized the U.S. “victory” over Soviet communism a few years earlier and 
the same military that had enjoyed record levels of public approval in annual Gallup surveys, as 
it sent the “world’s fourth largest Army” to swift defeat in a hugely popular cause. Indeed, it 
seemed there would be no end to the parades and public adulation heaped on the nation’s AVF 
warriors. Popular tributes to the war and the Services abounded in the form of posters, 
magazines, books, car magnets, bumper stickers, action figures, TV documentaries, ball caps, 
T-shirts, computer games, and Desert Storm trading cards.  
A dozen years later, the AVF again was called on to perform major combat operations in Iraq. 
Many asked if this would be the more “complete test,” the true demonstration of combat 
capabilities for the “most capable [military] in U.S. history?” In March 2003, as U.S. forces were 
deployed, a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll suggested the American people expected no less 
success in Operation Iraqi Freedom than in Desert Storm. Of those surveyed, 80% felt 
Operation Iraqi Freedom would last no more than 6 months; 75% thought the number of 
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Americans killed and injured would be “several hundred”; and 87% believed it “somewhat likely” 
(28%) or “very likely” (59%) the United States would find weapons of mass destruction.  
In a May 2007 study of “the link between our national security and our National Guard,” Korb 
and Duggan quote the Chief of the Army National Guard as saying, “What we’re working out 
right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to death” (cover page). 
The authors then offer a complementary view, saying, “However controversial this escalation 
[sending an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq in 2007] may be, proponents and opponents of the 
war have reached a consensus on an equally important issue—nearly 6 years of war in 
Afghanistan and more than 4 years in Iraq have pushed the total Army (Active, Guard, and 
Reserve) to the breaking point” (p. 1). This unusually heavy reliance on the Guard and 
Reserves has created a crisis, Korb and Duggan claim, and caused significant concern about 
whether these units can continue to be effective both at home and abroad (p. 1). According to 
the U.S. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (2007), “current indicators cast 
considerable doubt on the future sustainability of recruiting and retention [in the Reserve 
components], even if financial incentives continue to increase” (p. 30). 
The U.S. military’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have become one (or two) of the longest 
wars in U.S. history. In 2009, as the nation welcomed a new presidential administration, a 
conclusion to these military operations seemed closer, yet still relatively distant. Further, 
coupled with the promise of a force drawdown in Iraq came the dim prospect of a longer, 
widening military effort in Afghanistan and growing tensions in other areas. At more than one 
point in the history of these operations, many experts and astute observers opined that, given 
the strains of sustained war on the nation and its military, some form of compulsory service 
might be needed well before the last troops returned home. In philosophical terminology, the 
U.S. military could have faced a drastic version of “Morton’s Fork,” two equally unpleasant 
choices: relieve the Army’s recruiting burden by reinstituting a variant of conscription (during an 
increasingly unpopular conflict) or continue using all-volunteer recruiting and watch the AVF 
crack under the burdensome load on its members and their families.  
When looking at the AVF’s nearly four-decade history, one is struck by its seemingly charmed 
existence, by how often it has come to the brink of disaster yet survived, only to rebound with a 
renewed strength. Eitelberg (1996, p. 69) refers to several instances of “rebirth” for the AVF in 
comparing its history to the ancient Egyptian legend of the phoenix—a bird, consumed in fire by 
its own act, that rises in youthful freshness from the ashes. Indeed, one such rebirth came in the 
early 1980s, after the armed services had endured an era of massive neglect. Interestingly, the 
AVF’s survival during this period could be attributed to the fact that recruiting was a great deal 
worse than anyone had imagined—and, by the time DoD, Congress, and the public became 
aware of the horrific state of recruiting, the military was able to improve enough to ward off the 
draft. This was, of course, the period of AFQT miscalibration which began in 1976 and ultimately 
became the “mistake that saved the AVF” (Eitelberg, 1988, p. 25). 
More often than not, the rise and fall of all-volunteer recruiting can be tied to the national 
economy. Periods of rising unemployment may be bad for the nation and its citizens as a whole, 
but higher civilian unemployment propels military recruiting. The U.S. military never stops hiring 
(enlisting) or rehiring (reenlisting) from one year to the next; military recruiting is a constant 
source of some two-hundred-thousand new jobs for young adults annually, bringing steady 
income, heath-care coverage and other benefits, training, job experience, and significant 
scholarships for college. It is no wonder, then, that an economic collapse in 2008, bearing such 
misery for so many, has been a boon for the AVF, and coming at a most opportune time. One is 
reminded of the Navy commander in New York City who posted a sign that only his recruiters 
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could see, just to keep them focused on the driving force behind enlistments during tough times: 
“It’s the economy, stupid!”  
Conclusions 
Changes in the number and proportion of individuals who would be expected to qualify through 
one score-scale (PAY80) or another (PAY97) does not really mean much unless the assumption 
is that the same types of young people applied for enlistment during the periods examined. This 
assumption also must discount the importance of many other factors when determining the flow 
and characteristics of prospective applicants, such as employment conditions, the relative value of 
military compensation and benefits, measures of propensity to enlist, advertising expenditures and 
effectiveness, the number and placement of recruiters, conflict engagement and its level of 
popular support, public opinion toward the military, and so on.  
As demonstrated time and again, enlistment standards are flexible gates that open and close to 
fit the Services’ immediate needs. Consequently, changes in the youth population’s ability to 
meet the Services’ minimum enlistment standards are important to the extent that the standards 
are a rigid dividing line between success and failure—a measure of a recruit’s likelihood to 
complete training, perform admirably, or stay through a full first term of enlistment. These 
measures are not flawless, however. The standards are based on historical patterns of behavior 
for similar groups and reflect some degree of predictability failure. While the Services’ recruiting 
objectives might seem high, especially to those responsible for achieving them, the numbers are 
always there for the taking. Even though the Services must compete with civilian jobs and 
higher education, the pool of potentially qualified men and women is still much larger than 
needed.  
The best evidence to support this premise can be found, once again, in the AVF’s history. 
Throughout most of the 1980s, Service personnel planners and many of their best analysts 
expressed considerable concern about the coming demographic depression, or the declining 
population of military-age youth, which was forecast to fall by 25% through the mid-1990s. No 
truly thoughtful treatment of Service manpower issues published during the 1980s neglected the 
topic. The “baby bust,” as it was called, found a special place of honor in essays that supported 
a return to conscription. The Atlantic Council of the United States, for example, conducted an 
18-month study of military service and issued the following dire warning in 1982: “Given the 
anticipated increase in manpower needs, the diminishing manpower pool, and the prospect of 
economic recovery, it is only prudent that the nation prepare now to resume a form of the draft 
later in the 1980s” (Goodpaster, Elliott, & Hovey, eds., 1982, p. 297).  
At about the same time, Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies 
issued a seven-volume report predicting the ultimate demise of the AVF in the 1990s:  
Buffeted by the triple impacts of improved civilian employment opportunities, the anti-
nuclear, anti-draft registration and peace movements, and the contraction of the prime 
manpower pool in the mid-1980s, the Army will be unable to adequately man an active-
duty all-volunteer force of even 784,000 (about the current size of the Army) in the mid-
to-late 1990s. (Eitelberg, 1993, p. 142) 
 
Reports of the AVF’s death, as it turns out, were greatly exaggerated. Many factors contributed 
to the successful continuation of the AVF, including the end of the Cold War and the dramatic 
downsizing of the Services at about the same time the demographic depression of age-eligible 
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youth bottomed out. Of course, no one predicted the resurgence of recruiting throughout the 
1980s, the deployment of a half-million Service members to the Middle East following the 1991 
terrorist attacks, or a number of other significant events. Nevertheless, the point is that military 
recruiting became progressively stronger as the “population of youth” continued to shrink.  
This is a long way of saying the implications of changes in ASVAB scoring from PAY80 to 
PAY97 likely have had far less impact on the AVF than changes in other areas that influence 
the recruiting and retention of qualified Service members. How the Army goes, so goes the 
AVF, and the Army was clearly having problems in the midst of an unpopular war. As Robert 
Goldich stated during an AVF symposium in 2006, “What I do not see as happening is a return 
to the draft just to deal with troublesome recruiting” (see Appendix D).  
The declining scores on certain ASVAB tests, possibly indicating a drop in vocational skills or in 
technical areas between 1980 and 1997, might hold some implications for the Services as they 
continue to transform toward higher technology. Yet, because the 1997 test results already are 
more than 10 years distant at this point, one would expect to witness or hear of possible 
problems in training or operational performance. This has not happened; indeed, the opposite is 
true. Commanders in the field and various observers have lavished praise on the men and 
women of the military from Operation Desert Storm to the present. Thus, the many important 
changes in test scores between PAY80 and PAY97—most notably, a declining gap in test 
scores between men and women and between Black and White recruits—are likely of greater 
interest to those who track national trends in education and achievement than to those who are 
working to keep the AVF afloat for another 40 years or more. 
In any event, PAY97 and its companion, the NLSY97, are ripe for analysis by military 
researchers. The AVF runs on research, and this is perhaps the greatest lesson in the AVF’s 
most remarkable history of the past four decades. As Bernie Rostker (2006) wrote in his epic 
account of the AVF, "Almost every change to the all-volunteer force has been made after 
research had demonstrated its likely effect, and most programs have been formally evaluated 
through research" (p. 751). Indeed, "many have spoken about the all-volunteer force as a 
classic marriage between political decision-making and policy analysis" (p. iii). While PAY97 has 
not yet been "discovered" by most military manpower analysts as a source of AVF data beyond 
that used for ASVAB norming and other testing applications, it contains rich information about 
the enlistment eligibility of American youth. Such analyses will enhance planning and 
programming for enlisted recruitment activities as well as other military personnel programs as 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
QUALITY AND FAIRNESS31 ANALYSIS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
 
Questions about who decides to enlist in the Services and why have instigated a number of 
econometric studies since the very earliest days of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) (Rostker, 
2006). More recent efforts include the work of Kilburn and Klerman (2000), which updated and 
expanded on a study by Hosek and Peterson (1985). Examining a set of high school seniors 
from 1992 to 1994, Kilburn and Klerman found that students in the two highest AFQT categories 
(see Chapter 1) are equally likely to enlist in the Services and to enroll in college after 
controlling for racial and income factors. Following the finding of a negative effect on income, 
Kilburn and Klerman concluded income is the main barrier to enrolling in college for high-ability 
youth, making the Services the next-best option. They found Black race/ethnicity effects 
statistically insignificant, suggesting Black youth do not disproportionately prefer enlisting in the 
Services compared to White youth.  
The latest study characterizing enlistment decisions in a multinomial choice framework was 
conducted by Kleykamp (2006). Examining enlistment decisions of a set of men who graduated 
in 2002 from a high school in Texas, Kleykamp found youth with a higher high school rank 
actually were less likely to enroll in college than enlist in the Services after controlling for 
recruiter density, educational desires, and parental influence. She also found those from less-
privileged backgrounds were more likely to enlist in the Services and that race/ethnicity played 
no role in enlistment decisions. Although the finding that higher high school rank led to lower 
probabilities of college enrollment is counter to expectations, it does suggest that high school 
rank is either an inadequate proxy for ability or possibly is correlated too highly with the variable 
indicating educational desires to achieve reasonable estimates. Even with a solid model, 
however, the predominantly conservative and otherwise pro-military Texas population makes it 
unlikely the results can be generalized to the nation as a whole.  
In light of current literature, it is important to reexamine the question of enlistment decisions and 
to supplement the knowledge gained from previous studies. Indeed, changing perceptions about 
the suitability of the Services as an option for youth due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
coupled with recruitment policy alterations, likely have created enlistment patterns that differ 
from those delineated in older, peacetime studies.  
Using a sample from the NLSY97, Gardecki and Neumark (1998) incorporated a wide array of 
occupational choices in a multinomial logit framework, as well as a duration model to exploit the 
panel nature of the NLSY97 data. The study sought to answer three questions: How do AFQT 
scores relate to individuals’ education and employment prospects? Do socioeconomic factors 
motivate the enlistment decision? Conditioning on socioeconomic factors, do certain minorities 
have higher probabilities of enlisting? While this approach draws on earlier studies that used 
fully specified structural models to predict how policy changes might affect enlistment decisions, 
such as Brown (1985) and DeBoer and Brorsen (1989), this study focused on demographic 
characteristics using current data.  
  
                                                
31 Note that this chapter presents an econometric perspective on fairness of the AVF. For a psychometric 
analysis of the sensitivity and fairness of the ASVAB, see Wise and colleagues (1992) and Drasgow 
(1992).  
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Data Description 
The NLSY97 sample offers a rich data source for examining the occupational choices of youth 
in their late teens and early twenties, as well as the demographic factors and experiences 
underlying these choices. Since 1997, the survey has collected data annually to supply 
elaborate longitudinal information on a sample of respondents, ages 12 to 17 at the start of the 
survey. While individuals are surveyed annually, they provide employment and enrollment 
information that allows the reconstruction of their monthly employment and school enrollment 
histories. In addition, the survey includes extensive details on individuals’ family makeup, 
demographic characteristics, and participation in a number of social, health, and training 
services.  
In defining the sample data for analysis, individuals who left and did not rejoin the NLSY survey 
before 2003 were removed. Data were restricted to the primary, nationally representative 
sample; supplementary samples of Black and Hispanic youth were not used. All estimates were 
obtained using the 2003 weights, which are from the latest round of the survey in the sample.  
Crucial to the analysis are the following variables: 32 
 ASVAB and AFQT scores  
 Enlistment, enrollment, or employment choice (eight categories in all)  
 Race/ethnicity: White, Black, Hispanic  
 Parent receipt of government aid in youth’s childhood  
 Parent education level  
ASVAB and AFQT Scores 
Because the ASVAB reflects an individual’s abilities in the skills measured by the battery, 
ASVAB scores were used extensively in this analysis, as were AFQT composite scores from 
four tests: Mathematical Knowledge, Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, and Paragraph 
Comprehension. The NLSY97 provides scores from the ASVAB for each individual. Because 
youth in the survey took the ASVAB at different ages, the precaution of norming the AFQT 
scores by age was taken into account for differences in performance due to age alone and to 
ensure the comparability of scores across individuals.  
Enlistment, Enrollment, or Employment Choice 
The key to characterizing youth’s occupational choices was the development of a reasonable 
set of alternatives individuals face when making the decision to enter various activities. The set 
of alternatives were defined with the intention of capturing interesting aspects of the 
heterogeneity in choices and outcomes. The challenge was to keep the alternatives from being 
so extensive that only a few individuals would choose a given category. Broadly speaking, 
choices were categorized as academic enrollment, military enlistment, civilian employment, or 
unemployment. Employment was divided into four categories based on wages to further 
characterize the tradeoffs youth face. Because approximately 20% of all individuals categorized 
as choosing employment did not provide wage information, one of the employment categories 
                                                
32 (a) All wages in the employment categories are deflated to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index-U. (b) The unemployment and disrupted enrollment categories were combined due to the few 
individuals who were placed in these categories. 
 
Chapter 6 145 
was defined as “wage is not reported.” Thus, the NLSY data were used to categorize a youth’s 
choice as one of eight categories:  
 Military enlistment  
 Enrollment in school  
 Employment: Low wage (< $10 per hour)  
 Employment: Mid wage ($10 to $20 per hour)  
 Employment: High wage (>$20 per hour)  
 Employment: Wage not reported  
 Unemployment/disrupted enrollment  
 Disconnection  
An additional challenge was defining when an individual should be placed in a particular category. 
The observance of an individual’s month-by-month enrollment in school and employment choices 
allowed for a wide variety of options when deciding how to determine an individual’s choice 
category. Any transformation of these enrollment and employment histories into choice categories, 
however, inevitably is characterized by advantages and disadvantages. The selected categorization 
method looked at a 6-month period surrounding an individual’s birthday. That is, an individual’s 
choice was categorized by looking at his or her enrollment and employment choices made during 
the last quarter of a given age Y, supplemented by information on choices made during the first 
quarter of Y+1. This method allowed for changes around the individual’s birthday.  
To be explicit about the categorization, a hierarchical algorithm was followed. Military enlistment 
took precedence in the choice categorization. That is, if individuals were enlisted in the military 
for at least one month of the last quarter of age Y, then they were said to have chosen the 
military at that age. As a result, individuals in the military choice category also might be enrolled 
jointly in an academic degree program (MaCurdy, Keating, & Nagavarapu, 2006).  
The notion of disconnection was introduced as a choice category to represent an extreme form 
of unemployment. Individuals were defined as disconnected in any given month if they were not 
employed or enrolled in school in the current month and in at least 8 of the next 11 months. 
Thus, individuals who met these criteria for at least one month in the last quarter of age Y and 
did not fall into the military enlistment category were defined as disconnected.  
Finally, based on patterns seen over the entire 6-month period, individuals were placed into either 
the enrollment in school, employment, or unemployment categories. Individuals were placed in the 
enrollment in school category if, in any given month, they had not been unenrolled for four or more 
consecutive months. This definition accounts for summer breaks and temporary departures from 
school. If individuals were enrolled in consecutive months starting in the last quarter of age Y, they 
were said to have chosen enrollment in school. If an individual was enrolled, not enrolled for four 
months, and then enrolled again, then the person was said to have an enrollment gap and was 
placed in the combined unemployment/disrupted enrollment category.  
If individuals were not disconnected, enlisted in the military, or enrolled in school, then they 
were considered employed, provided they worked at least one week over the 6-month period.33 
Individuals who were considered employed then were categorized into one of the four wage 
                                                
33 Approximately 20% of respondents did not report their wages even though they stated they were 
employed within a given month. An analysis showed these individuals typically had lower ASVAB scores 
and have parents with lower education levels and higher tendencies to be on government aid than 
individuals in other wage categories. 
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categories using the maximum hourly wage earned during the 6-month time period. This 
breakdown better characterized the tradeoffs facing youth because those choosing a high-
paying job were likely to have different skill sets and demographics than individuals in low-
paying jobs.34 Finally, those who did not fall into any of the previous choice categories, and thus 
have not worked for six consecutive months, were considered unemployed.  
Descriptive Statistics 
A review of the basic summary statistics provides evidence that individuals enlisting in the 
Services have AFQT scores above the lowest quartile. They also come from fairly stable 
backgrounds and typically have parents who have achieved at least a high school diploma.  
Activity Choice Distribution by Age Matches Expectations 
The distribution of choices by age is shown in Table 6.1. The results for age Y come from choices 
constructed by individuals’ activities in the last quarter of age Y and the first quarter of age Y+1. 
Military enlistment was greatest at age 21 with 3.19% of the sample population enlisted in the 
Services, a number that essentially was the same as the proportion enlisted at ages 20 and 22. The 
proportion of the population enrolled in school falls steeply as age increases, as would be expected. 
While a high percentage of individuals did not report their wage, especially for age 22, some 
indications of wage growth exist among employed youth.  
Table 6.1. Percent of Youth Ages 18-23 by Occupational Choice 














18 5.30 1.73 57.26 22.74 4.53 0.77 5.50 2.17 
19 5.81 2.61 46.39 26.05 7.81 1.35 7.51 2.48 
20 5.87 3.09 43.38 25.56 10.80 1.54 6.75 3.00 
21 5.50 3.19 38.45 25.58 12.86 2.18 8.65 3.58 
22 3.62 3.08 25.10 26.97 18.79 2.76 14.13 5.54 
Note. Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding.  
 
Disconnection remained stable, before falling by age 22. This is offset, however, by an increase 
in unemployment, which is a looser form of disconnection. Because disconnection was defined 
in a forward-looking way, individuals generally could not be placed in the disconnected category 
in 2003, the last round of the survey, because there was not enough time for them to 
accumulate enough months as not enrolled and not working. Individuals who were not enrolled 
or employed for many months, but not long enough to be disconnected, were placed in the 
unemployment/disrupted enrollment category.  
  
                                                
34 Low-wage is a wage below $10, mid-wage is between $10 and $20, and high-wage is a wage above 
$20, where wage is the maximum wage taken over the 6-month time period of the last quarter of age Y 
and the first quarter of age Y+1. All wages are deflated into 2000 dollars using the CPI-U price index. 
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Military Enlistees Have Relatively High AFQT Scores 
The mean AFQT scores by age and choice are shown in Table 6.2. In general, youth enlisted in 
the Services were slightly above average, with mean AFQT scores ranging from 52.0 to 58.9, 
depending on age. These scores were consistently higher than the scores for all other 
categories, with the exception of youth who choose to continue their education post-high school. 
This provides evidence that Service members represent a fairly selective and high-quality 
group. Of those employed, the mean scores in the mid-wage and high-wage categories at age 
22 were the only points at which the mean score was higher than in the military enlistment 
category. The results suggest AFQT is a strong predictor of whether youth end up disconnected 
or unemployed at each age.  
AFQT Scores as Predictor of Military Enlistment and Labor Market Achievement 
By dividing AFQT scores into quartiles and examining individuals’ choices in each quartile, 
Table 6.3 takes a different approach, though the conclusions are qualitatively similar. Data show 
aptitude was a significant factor in individuals’ choice category at any given age. Those with 
AFQT scores in the 2nd quartile generally had the greatest likelihood of military enlistment for 
almost all age groups. The exceptions were ages 18 and 22, at which point individuals with 
scores in the 3rd quartile had the greatest likelihood of enlisting in the military. In general, most 
military enlistees were drawn from the middle of the AFQT distribution.  
Looking at other occupational categories, individuals with AFQT scores in the lowest quartile had a 
markedly higher tendency to be disconnected and unemployed. These individuals also were more 
likely not to report their wages when they were supposedly employed and less likely to be enrolled 
in school at every age category. Using data in Table 6.3, a simple pattern can be calculated for 
individuals who were employed and provided wage information. Among individuals in this category 
at age 21, approximately 73.0% of those in the 1st quartile worked in a low-wage job, as did 68.5% 
of those in the 2nd quartile. The corresponding numbers for the 3rd and 4th quartiles were 54.1% 
and 58.3%, respectively, which are strikingly lower. Moreover, the decrease in the percentage of 
employed individuals working in the lowest wage category (conditioning on provided wage 
information) was strictly monotonic at age 22. The percentages for the lowest to highest AFQT 
quartiles were approximately 77.6%, 63.6%, 49.1%, and 42.3%, respectively. This strongly suggests 
AFQT scores positively correlate with skills that are valued in the labor market. 
Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Factors Play a Role in Occupational Choices 
Although not the focus of the study, distribution across occupations was examined using 
breakdowns of race/ethnicity, parent education level, and parent receipt of government aid. The 
distribution of choices by age and race/ethnicity categories is provided in Table 6.4. For every age 
group, Black and Hispanic youth had a greater tendency to enlist in the Services in comparison to 
White youth. Individuals in these minority groups also were more likely to fall into the disconnected 
and unemployed categories than White youth and were much less likely to be enrolled in school. 
Among individuals working and with reported wages at ages 21 and 22, White youth were more 







Table 6.2. Youth Mean AFQT Scores by Occupational Choice 












18 26.29 58.95 59.50 42.48 48.11 42.31 42.76 32.83 
19 27.44 54.41 65.41 40.68 48.39 39.23 35.65 30.60 
20 25.31 52.41 67.21 39.44 48.75 42.89 41.21 31.87 
21 25.59 52.01 67.88 40.58 50.63 42.46 43.94 33.67 
22 24.60 54.28 65.84 42.50 58.20 57.98 46.83 30.41 






Table 6.3. Percent of Youth by Occupational Choice and AFQT Quartile Group 
Age 
AFQT 











18 q1 13.63 0.16 40.02 28.72 4.67 1.00 7.39 4.41 
18 q2 5.55 2.10 45.36 31.38 6.00 0.93 6.39 2.29 
18 q3 3.23 2.33 60.21 22.28 4.00 0.99 5.33 1.63 
18 q4 0.72 1.92 78.67 11.27 3.67 0.26 3.00 0.48 
19 q1 15.29 0.90 18.49 38.19 7.16 2.17 12.88 4.92 
19 q2 4.91 3.43 32.76 35.06 8.74 1.86 10.08 3.17 
19 q3 3.60 3.31 50.38 25.96 8.98 1.13 5.00 1.64 
19 q4 1.18 2.29 75.15 12.12 5.18 0.70 2.66 0.73 
20 q1 16.02 0.96 12.82 40.37 10.42 1.97 10.18 7.25 
20 q2 5.77 5.17 30.68 32.49 11.21 2.53 9.00 3.15 
20 q3 2.69 3.13 47.54 24.19 12.82 1.30 6.69 1.63 
20 q4 0.98 2.74 72.73 11.27 6.94 0.95 3.19 1.21 
21 q1 15.06 1.56 10.50 37.94 10.77 3.27 12.62 8.28 
21 q2 6.27 4.22 25.01 34.44 12.38 3.46 10.59 3.64 
21 q3 3.20 3.82 43.46 21.52 17.28 0.98 8.11 1.64 
21 q4 0.82 2.19 66.99 13.64 8.19 1.56 4.95 1.66 
22 q1 9.91 1.78 6.26 43.00 9.94 2.48 16.02 10.63 
22 q2 3.67 2.34 17.17 34.00 16.54 2.90 15.95 7.43 
22 q3 2.51 4.94 29.00 24.08 23.56 2.16 11.97 1.79 
22 q4 0.48 1.62 39.03 19.15 21.86 4.27 11.91 1.68 






Table 6.4. Percent of Youth by Occupational Choice and Race/Ethnicity 











18 Black 12.19 2.01 50.99 21.68 2.67 0.73 5.73 4.00 
18 Hispanic 7.36 2.13 49.50 26.20 4.61 0.94 5.40 3.86 
18 White 3.46 1.60 59.98 22.35 4.92 0.75 5.46 1.48 
19 Black 13.41 2.70 36.35 28.83 4.37 1.38 8.47 4.49 
19 Hispanic 7.05 3.08 34.62 31.34 11.52 0.96 8.60 2.84 
19 White 3.95 2.51 50.69 24.49 7.87 1.41 7.11 1.98 
20 Black 13.63 3.31 32.35 29.33 6.12 2.37 7.12 5.77 
20 Hispanic 7.68 4.28 30.45 29.12 14.45 1.37 8.99 3.67 
20 White 3.89 2.83 48.11 24.11 11.12 1.39 6.26 2.29 
21 Black 10.47 4.00 26.72 30.85 9.22 3.17 8.73 6.84 
21 Hispanic 5.87 3.41 28.10 31.69 15.21 1.07 9.07 5.59 
21 White 4.38 2.98 42.84 23.34 13.20 2.18 8.56 2.52 
22 Black 6.14 4.31 21.23 30.31 12.10 1.98 11.59 12.34 
22 Hispanic 3.89 4.27 22.21 29.25 17.50 2.33 15.39 5.17 
22 White 3.03 2.60 26.46 25.84 20.46 3.01 14.44 4.15 
Note. Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding.  
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Tables 6.5 and 6.6 uncover equally striking correlations. Table 6.5 shows the distribution of 
choices by age and parent’s highest education level, with parents’ education broken into five 
categories. In general, individuals who had a parent who has some college education were most 
likely to choose enlistment in the military. A parent’s education level also appears positively 
correlated with an individual’s school enrollment decision and negatively correlated with 
disconnection status. Overall, the data suggest parents are highly influential in a youth’s 
decision-making process concerning occupation.  
Choice distribution by age and parent receipt of government aid during the individual’s 
childhood is provided in Table 6.6. In general, the likelihood of an individual enlisting in the 
Services was equal whether or not the family received government aid. Individuals from families 
who received government aid, however, were more likely to be disconnected and less likely to 
be enrolled in school. They also were more likely to enter the workforce but had a much greater 
likelihood of being unemployed or working in low-wage occupations.  
Empirical Approach 
The descriptive statistics appear to indicate individuals enlisting in the Services had AFQT 
scores greater than the bottom quartile and came from families of neither very low nor very high 
socioeconomic status. Analyzing the extent to which aptitude and race/ethnicity and other 
demographic factors played specific roles in individuals’ choices required the use of methods 
beyond simple statistics. To address this issue, two separate empirical approaches were used.  
The first was a multinomial logit model that served as a natural extension of the descriptive statistics 
and provided a method for determining the extent to which different characteristics were associated 
with the probability of choosing various activities, holding other characteristics constant. Multinomial 
logit models are used when the dependent variable is a set of categories and the categories cannot 
be ordered in a meaningful way (Hausman & McFadden, 1984; McFadden, 1973), such as from 
lowest to highest (e.g., highest military rank attained). One common use of multinomial logit models 
is how individual characteristics of high school students predict their selected college major (e.g., 
Montmarquette, Cannings, & Mahseredjian, 2002; Nguyen Ngoc & Taylor, 2003; Porter & Umbach, 
2006; Weiler, 2005). Although this approach was informative, the data simply were repeated in 
cross-sections. As a complement, a flexible duration model (Han & Hausman, 1989; van den Berg, 
2001) was employed that utilized the panel nature of the NLSY97 to understand the age profile of 
military enlistment among American youth.  
The analysis used indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, parent education level, and parent 
receipt of government aid to determine the quality of youth enlisting in the Services. While five 
different parent education levels were used initially—high school dropout, high school graduate, 
some college, college graduate, and advanced degree holder—ultimately the category of high 
school graduate was combined with the category of some college, and the category of college 







Table 6.5. Percent of Youth by Occupational Choice and Parents’ Education Level 











18 HS Graduate 6.83 2.00 46.19 29.22 6.16 0.56 7.16 1.88 
18 Some College 4.12 2.32 57.99 21.69 4.73 1.18 6.08 1.90 
18 College Graduate 1.61 1.85 74.04 14.07 3.20 0.89 3.74 0.62 
18 Advanced Schooling 1.52 0.98 79.13 12.15 2.57 0.13 2.07 1.45 
19 HS Dropout 11.36 1.77 28.06 33.89 7.95 1.27 12.00 3.72 
19 HS Graduate 7.49 2.38 32.48 32.41 11.30 1.42 8.71 3.81 
19 Some College 3.64 4.30 45.89 26.87 8.36 1.47 7.82 1.64 
19 College Graduate 3.51 1.84 65.98 16.91 5.73 1.22 3.42 1.39 
19 Advanced Schooling 1.94 1.90 76.83 11.91 1.84 1.23 3.41 0.94 
20 HS Dropout 14.22 2.45 24.29 34.08 9.16 1.49 8.85 5.46 
20 HS Graduate 6.30 3.42 28.76 32.88 15.43 1.91 7.46 3.83 
20 Some College 4.34 4.02 42.84 25.85 11.16 1.76 7.47 2.56 
20 College Graduate 2.32 2.57 65.24 13.82 8.47 0.69 6.00 0.91 
20 Advanced Schooling 1.34 2.15 73.07 12.87 5.51 1.39 2.28 1.39 
21 HS Dropout 11.30 2.24 21.06 35.87 10.12 2.67 10.81 5.92 
21 HS Graduate 6.05 4.30 24.47 29.63 18.28 3.04 9.24 5.00 
21 Some College 4.63 3.44 38.53 24.81 14.84 1.99 9.56 2.21 
21 College Graduate 2.27 2.68 59.01 18.25 8.35 1.33 5.85 2.27 
21 Advanced Schooling 2.24 2.24 66.19 13.77 6.54 1.12 6.22 1.68 
22 HS Dropout 5.79 2.03 17.88 33.68 12.58 1.78 16.49 9.77 
22 HS Graduate 5.13 2.92 18.15 30.91 19.97 3.61 15.25 4.07 
22 Some College 3.80 4.21 22.70 21.76 23.81 1.71 15.57 6.44 
22 College Graduate 1.01 2.15 36.00 29.22 15.80 2.96 8.75 4.11 
22 Advanced Schooling 0.00 3.86 42.18 16.34 18.97 3.90 11.81 2.93 






Table 6.6. Percent of Youth by Occupational Choice and Whether Parent Ever Received Government Assistance 
Age 
Parent Govt 











18 NO 2.88 1.79 66.00 18.27 4.45 0.73 4.44 1.44 
18 YES 8.91 1.65 44.25 29.38 4.68 0.83 7.08 3.24 
19 NO 3.95 2.45 57.13 20.02 7.77 1.26 5.66 1.76 
19 YES 8.63 2.86 30.17 35.17 7.88 1.50 10.23 3.56 
20 NO 3.47 3.16 54.48 19.44 10.84 1.28 5.48 1.86 
20 YES 9.63 3.01 26.10 35.07 10.76 1.94 8.73 4.77 
21 NO 3.27 3.23 48.30 20.87 12.75 1.79 7.60 2.19 
21 YES 8.88 3.14 23.64 32.57 13.05 2.78 10.25 5.69 
22 NO 1.74 3.15 29.91 22.17 22.22 2.92 14.00 3.88 
22 YES 6.49 2.99 17.88 34.14 13.65 2.53 14.37 7.95 
Note. Percentages do not equal 100 because of rounding.
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Although the samples included data from different years, year-fixed effects were not included in 
the multinomial logit models because they produced unstable results, possibly as a 
consequence of the small samples within some categories due to the number of variables. 
Moreover, when a full set of year-fixed effects were used as covariables in the duration model, 
none were individually statistically significant predictors of enlistment. For these reasons, year-
fixed effects were not included. Estimates should be seen as the average predictions over all 
years included in each age sample. For example, age 18 included data from 1997 to 2003, 
while age 22 only included data from 2002 and 2003. Finally, the discussion and tables 
referenced only men because they accounted for the majority of military enlistments. Where it 
was more convenient to provide results for both genders, a few salient differences in enlistment 
patterns for men and women were provided using a term in the multinomial logit model that 
allowed for differences across gender.  
Factors Affecting Individuals’ Activity Choices 
Examining individuals’ activity choices was done through maximum likelihood estimation of the 
multinomial logit model. This estimation used the choice of military enlistment as the reference 
group. The coefficient estimates were used to predict individuals’ probability of making a certain 
choice given their set of characteristics. Table 6.7 shows the relative risk ratios from the coefficient 
estimates for age 18 to provide an idea of what the estimates look like. Because the implications of 
the relative risk ratios were not easy to interpret, however, the predicted probabilities for a selected 
set of ages and characteristics are presented in Tables 6.8 through 6.15.  
Each table shows the predicted probabilities of individuals choosing a certain activity using the 
coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit model. The predicted distribution across 
activities is provided for each AFQT quartile-age combination, with each panel associated with a 
particular AFQT quartile. The probabilities are presented in decimal form. 
AFQT Scores 
Using White men with a parent who is a high school graduate and whose family did not receive 
government aid as a reference group, Table 6.8 shows that at age 18 those with AFQT scores 
in the 3rd quartile had the highest probability of military enlistment at 5%. At age 20, those in the 
2nd quartile had the highest probability of military enlistment at 8%, while at age 22 those in the 
3rd quartile had the highest enlistment rate at 9%.  
The higher proportion of military enlistment at age 20 for White men in the 2nd quartile was 
consistent with a greater number of individuals in this quartile attending two-year versus four-
year colleges. This would be one possible explanation for the 62% decrease in school 
enrollment for these individuals in the 2nd quartile (from 0.44 to 0.27) between the ages of 18 
and 20, versus only a 41% decrease in enrollment for those with AFQT scores in the 3rd 
quartile (from 0.56 to 0.39).  
Enlistment rates were slightly down for White men with AFQT scores in the 4th quartile at ages 
18 and 19 compared to those with AFQT scores in the 3rd quartile. Those scoring in the 4th 
quartile, however, had a much lower enlistment rate than the 3rd quartile at age 22, primarily 
due to greater school enrollment at this age. Few enlistees had AFQT scores in the 1st quartile, 






















0.18*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.51** 0.53 0.36*** 0.19*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.23) (0.11) (0.06) 
Black 
0.67 0.53** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.61 
(0.22) (0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.23) 
Hispanic 
0.53* 0.54** 0.47** 0.46** 0.58 0.37*** 0.71 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.29) (0.13) (0.27) 
Parent HS Dropout 
3.49*** 2.32** 2.84*** 1.98 2.18 2.44** 4.64*** 
(1.43) (0.90) (1.10) (0.84) (1.28) (1.01) (2.03) 
Parent Coll Grad/Advanced 
1.32 2.58*** 1.26 0.87 1.48 1.27 1.83 
(0.48) (0.72) (0.37) (0.30) (0.80) (0.43) (0.79) 
Parent Received Govt Aid 
2.59*** 1.00 1.80** 1.29 1.44 1.85** 2.08** 
(0.75) (0.25) (0.47) (0.38) (0.64) (0.52) (0.68) 
AFQT q2 
0.03*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
AFQT q3 
0.02*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
AFQT q4 
0.01*** 0.10*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 5549 5549 5549 5549 5549 5549 5549 






Table 6.8. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for White Male, Parent HS Grad/Some College, Parent No Aid 
AFQT q1 








Wage Wage Not Reported Unemployed 
18 0.06 0.03 0.45 0.28 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.02 
19 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.37 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.03 
20 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.39 0.21 0.02 0.11 0.05 
21 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.34 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.03 
22 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.36 0.20 0.04 0.23 0.06 
 
AFQT q2 








Wage Wage Not Reported Unemployed 
18 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.29 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.01 
19 0.03 0.06 0.29 0.32 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.02 
20 0.03 0.08 0.27 0.29 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.02 
21 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.30 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.02 
22 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.04 0.21 0.04 
 
AFQT q3 








Wage Wage Not Reported Unemployed 
18 0.02 0.05 0.56 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 
19 0.02 0.06 0.42 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.01 
20 0.02 0.06 0.39 0.23 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.01 
21 0.02 0.07 0.35 0.19 0.27 0.02 0.08 0.01 
22 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.35 0.03 0.14 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 








Wage Wage Not Reported Unemployed 
18 0.01 0.04 0.71 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 
19 0.01 0.05 0.65 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.01 
20 0.01 0.06 0.62 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.01 
21 0.01 0.05 0.56 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.01 






Table 6.9. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for White Male, Parent College Grad/Advanced, Parent No Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.04 0.00 0.63 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 
19 0.12 0.01 0.34 0.30 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03 
20 0.07 0.01 0.27 0.32 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.05 
21 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.32 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.05 
22 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.45 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.06 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.02 0.02 0.63 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 
19 0.04 0.04 0.48 0.25 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 
20 0.03 0.06 0.47 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.02 
21 0.04 0.05 0.38 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.02 
22 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.33 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.04 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.01 0.02 0.73 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 
19 0.03 0.03 0.64 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 
20 0.01 0.04 0.61 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.01 
21 0.02 0.04 0.56 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.01 
22 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.22 0.27 0.03 0.11 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.00 0.02 0.85 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
19 0.01 0.02 0.82 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
20 0.01 0.03 0.80 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 
21 0.01 0.02 0.74 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 
22 0.00 0.02 0.39 0.17 0.24 0.06 0.11 0.01 
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Achievement on the AFQT is significant in predicting individuals’ choice decisions. As Table 6.8 
shows, those with higher AFQT scores had a higher probability of enrolling in school at every 
age and a significantly lower probability of disconnection and unemployment. In particular, 18-
year–olds who scored in the 1st quartile had a 45% chance of enrollment in school and a 6% 
probability of disconnection. In contrast, those scoring in the 4th quartile had a 71% probability 
of school enrollment and only a 1% chance of disconnection.  
Data also show individuals with AFQT scores in the 3rd and 4th quartiles, the top half of the 
aptitude distribution, were more likely to have mid-wage or high-wage jobs at age 22. From the 
data provided, the probability of an individual being in a low-wage job at age 22 can be 
calculated conditionally on employment and a reported wage. The probability falls uniformly 
from the 4th to the 1st quartile in the AFQT distribution. While 59.1% of individuals who scored 
in the 1st quartile were in low-wage jobs at age 22, the corresponding numbers for the 2nd, 3rd, 
and 4th quartiles were 47.4%, 31.3%, and 29.1%, respectively. This suggests the AFQT is a 
good predictor of skills valued in the labor market.  
Socioeconomic Status 
Table 6.9 gives the predicted probabilities of choices for White men with a parent who is at least a 
college graduate and whose family did not receive government aid. Holding parent education level, 
government aid status, and race/ethnicity constant, individuals with these demographic 
characteristics had a lower probability of military enlistment for every age and AFQT quartile in 
comparison to data in Table 6.8. For the 4th quartile, a 20-year old with a parent who is at least a 
college graduate had a military enlistment probability of 3% versus 6% for a similar youth whose 
parent is only a high school graduate. In addition, this population had a greater probability of 
enrolling in school and a lower probability of entering the workforce, but roughly the same 
probabilities of disconnection and unemployment as those with a parent who is a high school 
graduate.  
Table 6.10 provides probabilities of choices for White men with a parent who is a high school 
dropout and whose family has not received government aid. For every age and AFQT quartile, 
these individuals had low rates of military enlistment. This indicates a nonlinear relationship 
exists between an individual’s decision to enlist in the military and parent education level. It also 
suggests children of parents with a mid-level education might perceive the military as a 
relatively better option compared to youth whose parents have a higher or lower education level. 
Individuals with a parent who is a college graduate, however, still had a higher probability of 
enlisting in the military than those with a parent who is a high school dropout.  
Finally, children whose parents are high school dropouts were less likely to enroll in school and 
slightly more likely to be disconnected or unemployed. This provides evidence about the 
importance of parental influence on their children’s choices and indicates military enlistees do 
not necessarily come from less-educated backgrounds.  
The effects of parental finances on the probability that their children will enlist in the military, 
using the parent receipt of government aid indicator as the proxy, appear in Table 6.11. The 
marginal impact of government aid use was assessed by comparing the results of Table 6.11 
with those of Table 6.10. White men with a parent who is a high school dropout and whose 
family did receive government aid had a lower predicted probability of military enlistment for 
every age and AFQT quartile than those individuals whose parents never received government 
aid. The White men depicted in the 2nd quartile of Table 6.10 had a probability of military 
enlistment at age 20 of 6% as opposed to only 4% among their counterparts in Table 
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6.11.Although these are not significant differences, the direction of the difference is in contrast 
to a common notion that the majority of enlistees come from significantly poorer backgrounds.  
Race/Ethnicity 
Comparing the data in Table 6.12 to that in Table 6.8 provides insight into the differences in choice 
probabilities for Black men compared to White men, holding other characteristics constant at the 
values stated in the tables. Black men in every age group and AFQT score had a higher tendency to 
enlist in the military than White men. At age 20, a Black man with an AFQT score in the 3rd quartile 
had a probability of military enlistment of 10% compared to 6% for a similar White man. This finding 
is in contrast to the works of Kleykamp (2006) and Kilburn and Klerman (2000), which found no 
evidence of higher probabilities for Black youth to enlist in the military than White youth after 
controlling for other covariates. These differences in findings may be due to the samples used. For 
example, the Kilburn and Klerman (2000) study used data from the 1988 National Educational 
Longitudinal Study (NELS), while this examination used data from the 1997 National Longitudinal 
Study of Youth (NLSY). The age groups used in both sample also differ in that the NELS study 
employed only 8th graders, while the youth in the NLSY97 were born between 1980 and 1984. This 
difference in sampling appears to be non-trivial. Additionally, Kilburn and Klerman’s (2000) model of 
occupational choice was a three-choice model, with the only modeled choices being enlistment, 
going to college, or working, while this study modeled eight occupational choices. The number of 
response options also may have influenced the results of the Kilburn and Klerman (2000) analysis 
of the NELS data in comparison to this analysis of the NLSY data.  
Data in Tables 6.13 through 6.15 appear to mimic the trends seen for White men. That is, Black 
men with a parent who is high school graduate had somewhat higher probabilities of military 
enlistment than those with a parent who has more or less education. In addition, Black men with 
a parent who is a high school dropout and whose family never received government aid had a 
higher tendency for military enlistment at every age and AFQT quartile than Black men whose 
family did receive government aid.  
Factors Affecting Military Enlistment Probability 
The multinomial logit model gives a fairly accurate picture of enlistment behavior at a given age. 
Because individuals with certain characteristics may have differing tendencies to persist in the 
Services along dimensions of AFQT scores and race/ethnicity, however, the point-in-time 
analysis does not adequately depict overall probabilities that certain groups will enlist in the 
military. For example, one cannot tell whether individuals whose parents did not receive 
government aid have a higher enlistment rate than those whose parents did receive government 
aid, or if this group stays in the military longer once they enlist.  
To answer this question, a duration model was implemented to observe the probability that an 
individual with given characteristics would enlist in the military by a certain age, rather than 
whether the individual was enlisted at a given point in time. In the example of individuals whose 
parents did or did not receive government aid, this analysis looked at whether one group was 
enlisting at a higher rate and whether most individuals were enlisting during the profiled ages. 
The coefficient estimates and an analysis of the implications of these estimates for the 
enlistment age pattern for men and women follow.  
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Socioeconomic Status 
The first and second columns in Table 6.16 present coefficient estimates for women and men, 
respectively. This simple specification captured the basic features of the data given sample size 
limitations. The government aid indicator was used initially, but analyses showed it was 
consistently statistically insignificant in all specifications. This suggests that once other basic 
characteristics were controlled, financial constraints as proxied by a parent receiving 
government aid during an individual’s youth did not have a strong effect on military enlistment 
and confirmed the results found in the multinomial logit model. Thus, this indicator was omitted 
in the final specification.  
These results held for both gender groups. As seen in Table 6.16, women with a parent who is a 
high school dropout had a lower likelihood of military enlistment at any age than women with a 
parent who is a high school graduate but did not complete college. Even though the coefficient 
for the college graduate/advanced degree variable was not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, it did suggest that individuals with a parent who is highly educated were 
less likely to enlist than individuals with a parent who is only a high school graduate.  
The variables for Black and Hispanic women were insignificant. Although insignificant, the 
variables for Black and Hispanic women were both positive. This suggests these minority 
groups had a greater likelihood of first enlistment than White women. In addition, two of three 
AFQT coefficients—the 2nd and 4th quartiles—were statistically significant, suggesting a 
greater propensity for women with these scores to enlist than those with scores in the 1st 
quartile. This basically is true by construction, considering the military selects among applicants 
partly based on AFQT scores. The result for the 3rd quartile is perplexing, but the lack of 
statistical significance might be related to the sample size and the small number of women 
entering the Services. The direction of this coefficient agreed with the direction of the other two 
AFQT coefficients. Moreover, a Wald test failed to reject the null hypotheses that all three AFQT 
coefficients were equal, or that any pair of them were equal.35  
For the most part, the results for men follow the same basic pattern as those for women. The 
variable for Black men was positive and significant, whereas the variable for Hispanic men was 
approximately half the magnitude and insignificant. Men with a parent who is a high school 
graduate were more likely to enlist than those with a parent who was either a high school 
dropout or a college graduate. In contrast to the data for women, however, both of the parent 
education coefficients were statistically significant for men. All three AFQT quartile variables 
entered were significant and positive, suggesting positive selection of military enlistment. A test 
of the AFQT coefficients failed to reject the null hypothesis of joint equality, but only marginally; 
the p-value was approximately 0.13. Moreover, the null hypothesis that the 3rd and 4th quartile 
coefficients are equal at the 10% level can be rejected. This suggests the specific AFQT quartile 
in which an individual’s score falls is significant.  
Demographic Characteristics 
While the data in Table 6.16 are informative with regard to the effects of the covariates, the 
coefficients do not give a sense of the practical significance of the effects. This issue can be 
addressed by using the coefficients to calculate predicted hazard rates for individuals with 
certain characteristic profiles and then manipulating the estimated hazard rates to form a 
                                                
35 A statistical test, the Wald test is used to determine the statistical significance of an independent 
variable to a dependent variable. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wald_test 
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survivor function for each profile. The survivor function gives the probability that an individual 
has ever enlisted in the military by each particular age. These survivor functions, presented in 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18, show that, in general, a large increase in military enlistment occurs 
between the ages of 18 and 19, about the time most students finish high school. The tables also 
show key differences in individuals’ experiences, however, based on specific characteristics. 
Table 6.17 provides the survivor function for men. The first column considers White men with an 
AFQT score in the 1st quartile and a parent who completed high school but not college. The 
model predicts this man has a 1.26% chance of having enlisted in the military by age 20, and a 
2.58% chance of enlistment by age 22. The next three columns show the effect of varying the 
individual’s AFQT score while holding other characteristics constant. A White man with an 
AFQT score in the 2nd quartile or above has a substantially higher likelihood of having enlisted 
in the military by any given age. By age 22, this probability varies from 7.95% for the 4th quartile 
to 11.90% for the 3rd quartile.  
Moreover, the effects of the 3rd and 4th quartiles are statistically different from each other in the 
underlying hazard rates. The effect of parent education level and race/ethnicity on the survivor 
function can be gauged using Table 6.17. By comparing columns four and five, which hold 
AFQT scores constant at the 4th quartile and race/ethnicity constant at White, data show 
individuals with a parent who is a high school graduate were substantially more likely to have 
enlisted at any age than children of high school dropouts. The gap grows from 1.26 percentage 
points at age 19 to as high as 2.92 percentage points by age 22.  
The differences are even greater when column 4 is compared with column 6, which holds other 
characteristics constant and explores the effect of changing the parent education level to the 
college graduate category. Finally, the effects of race/ethnicity are ascertained by comparing 
column 4 with columns 7 and 8. The impact of the large coefficient on the variable for Black men 
results in a survivor function for Black youth that diverges sharply from that of White youth of the 
same profile. Starting at approximately age 19, the gap grows to almost 4.35 percentage points 
by age 22. For comparison, the last column for Hispanic youth was included.  
Keeping in mind the coefficient on the Hispanic variable is not significant at conventional levels, 







Table 6.10. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for White Male, Parent High School Dropout, Parent No Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.08 0.00 0.41 0.31 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.04 
19 0.14 0.01 0.18 0.34 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.04 
20 0.15 0.01 0.13 0.39 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.07 
21 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.40 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.03 
22 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.44 0.15 0.04 0.21 0.06 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.04 0.01 0.42 0.34 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.02 
19 0.05 0.03 0.29 0.32 0.13 0.03 0.12 0.03 
20 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.04 
21 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.37 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.02 
22 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.04 0.18 0.04 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.03 0.02 0.54 0.26 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.02 
19 0.04 0.03 0.43 0.25 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.02 
20 0.04 0.04 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.02 
21 0.04 0.04 0.38 0.25 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.01 
22 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.03 0.13 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.01 0.02 0.71 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.01 
19 0.02 0.02 0.67 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.01 
20 0.02 0.04 0.64 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.02 
21 0.01 0.03 0.59 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.01 







Table 6.11. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for White Male, Parent High School Dropout, Parent Government 
Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.13 0.03 0.27 0.37 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.10 
19 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.41 0.08 0.03 0.18 0.05 
20 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.44 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.10 
21 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.42 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.05 
22 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.55 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.11 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.06 0.01 0.29 0.42 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.03 
19 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.42 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.10 
20 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.42 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.06 
21 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.43 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.03 
22 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.45 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.04 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.05 0.01 0.40 0.35 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.03 
19 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.37 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.03 
20 0.06 0.03 0.23 0.38 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.04 
21 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.33 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.10 
22 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.10 
19 0.03 0.03 0.49 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.02 
20 0.04 0.04 0.44 0.26 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.04 
21 0.02 0.02 0.43 0.27 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.02 







Table 6.12. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for Black Male, High School Graduate/Some College, Parent No Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.17 0.11 0.34 0.27 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 
19 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.39 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.06 
20 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.40 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 
21 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.35 0.13 0.0e 0.11 0.11 
22 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.43 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.09 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.04 0.14 0.53 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 
19 0.05 0.09 0.39 0.26 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 
20 0.04 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.03 
21 0.03 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.03 
22 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.02 0.14 0.05 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.03 0.10 0.63 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 
19 0.04 0.09 0.53 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 
20 0.02 0.10 0.52 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.02 
21 0.02 0.13 0.42 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.05 0.00 
22 0.00 0.20 0.28 0.13 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.01 0.08 0.76 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 
19 0.01 0.07 0.74 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 
20 0.01 0.08 0.72 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 
21 0.01 0.14 0.63 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 






Table 6.13. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for Black Male, Parent College Grad/Advanced, Parent No Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.06 0.00 0.71 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 
19 0.18 0.01 0.42 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 
20 0.10 0.02 0.38 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.06 
21 0.10 0.04 0.26 0.29 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.08 
22 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.40 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.10 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.03 0.04 0.71 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 
19 0.06 0.05 0.59 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 
20 0.03 0.09 0.57 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 
21 0.03 0.09 0.45 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.03 
22 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.06 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.02 0.05 0.79 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
19 0.04 0.05 0.72 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
20 0.02 0.06 0.72 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 
21 0.02 0.07 0.63 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.02 
22 0.00 0.13 0.41 0.16 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.00 0.04 0.88 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
19 0.01 0.03 0.87 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
20 0.01 0.04 0.86 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
21 0.00 0.04 0.79 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 






Table 6.14. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for Black Male, Parent High School Dropout, Parent No Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.12 0.00 0.49 0.23 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 
19 0.22 0.01 0.25 0.28 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.05 
20 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.30 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.09 
21 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.37 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.06 
22 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.40 0.15 0.02 0.17 0.10 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.06 0.03 0.51 0.26 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.03 
19 0.08 0.04 0.39 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.04 
20 0.09 0.10 0.36 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 
21 0.06 0.08 0.29 0.33 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.03 
22 0.01 0.05 0.24 0.28 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.06 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.04 0.04 0.63 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 
19 0.06 0.05 0.55 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02 
20 0.05 0.07 0.53 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.03 
21 0.03 0.07 0.47 0.22 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.01 
22 0.00 0.11 0.36 0.18 0.24 0.01 0.09 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.01 0.04 0.78 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 
19 0.02 0.03 0.77 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 
20 0.02 0.06 0.73 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
21 0.01 0.04 0.67 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 






Table 6.15. Predicted Occupational Choice Probabilities for Black Male, Parent High School Dropout, Parent Government 
Aid 
AFQT q1 











18 0.21 0.00 0.33 0.28 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.07 
19 0.26 0.01 0.13 0.34 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.07 
20 0.29 0.01 0.08 0.34 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.12 
21 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.39 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10 
22 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.51 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.10 
 
AFQT q2 











18 0.11 0.02 0.37 0.33 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.05 
19 0.11 0.04 0.23 0.36 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.06 
20 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.33 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.07 
21 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.40 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.05 
22 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.39 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.07 
 
AFQT q3 











18 0.08 0.03 0.49 0.26 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 
19 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.37 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.03 
20 0.06 0.03 0.23 0.38 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.04 
21 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.33 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.02 
22 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.03 0.13 0.01 
 
AFQT q4 











18 0.03 0.03 0.68 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 
19 0.04 0.04 0.61 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 
20 0.05 0.06 0.54 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 
21 0.02 0.04 0.51 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 
22 0.00 0.03 0.47 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.02 
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Table 6.16. Duration Model of Predictive Ability of Factors Contributing to Military 
Enlistment 







Parent HS Dropout 
-1.23** -0.48* 
(0.53) (0.24) 












Observations 49,313 46,326 
Note. Standard errors in brackets. Spline results not shown here. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p 
< .01. 
 
Parent Education and Race/Ethnicity 
Some of these same patterns are evident in the results for women, shown in Table 6.18. For 
example, the top three AFQT quartiles exhibit greater enlistment probabilities than the bottom 
quartile. A few key differences, however, should be noted. First, as expected, at any age the 
likelihood of having enlisted is much lower for women than men. Second, and more 
interestingly, the parent education level makes a much greater difference for women than men. 
Comparing column 4 and column 5 shows that White women at age 22 with AFQT scores in the 
4th quartile and who have a parent who is a high school graduate were three times more likely 
to enlist than those with a parent who is a high school dropout. Men, given the same 
characteristics, had a much smaller increase from 5.03% to 7.95%. Similarly, race/ethnicity has 
a greater relative effect for women. By age 22, the probability of Black or Hispanic women 
having enlisted is nearly twice that of White women with the same characteristics. 
Conclusions 
Taken together, the study results suggest the Services enlist individuals who are from neither a 
disadvantaged nor an advantaged background. Most young enlistees have a parent who is a 
high school graduate and come from a family that did not receive government aid when they 
were young. Moreover, these individuals generally appear to have outside options for school or 
work based on their relatively high AFQT scores.  
How Do AFQT Scores Relate to Individuals’ Education and Employment Prospects? 
The analysis shows the skills tested by the AFQT as part of the NLSY97 are correlated with skills 
that are valued in the labor market and in academic environments. While this proposition is difficult 
to test directly, evidence in the multinomial logit model showed individuals with scores in the higher 
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AFQT quartiles were more often enrolled in school. For example, in the case of 20-year-old White 
men with a parent who is a high school graduate and whose family did not receive government aid, 
62% of those scoring in the 4th AFQT quartile were enrolled in school. This compares to 39% 
among the 3rd quartile, 27% among the 2nd, and only 14% among the 1st quartile. From these 
results and the results for individuals with the same characteristics at age 22, which show a similar 
decreasing pattern, the assumption can be made that school enrollment, especially in 4-year 
colleges, is more common for individuals with high AFQT scores.  
The evidence concerning the labor market is equally strong. The same 22 year olds considered 
above, when controlled on working and provided wage information, had a 60% chance of 
working in a low-wage job with scores in the 1st quartile, a 45% chance with scores in the 2nd 
quartile, a 32% with scores in the 3rd quartile, and a 28% chance with scores in the 4th quartile. 
This indicates AFQT scores are a good indicator of skills valued by the labor market.  
Do Socioeconomic Factors Motivate Enlistment Decisions? 
The study looked at three primary socioeconomic factors—AFQT scores, parent education 
level, and parent receipt of government aid. The findings show:  
 AFQT scores not only are a predictor of military service, but higher AFQT scores also 
are positively associated with skills valued in the job market or the academic 
environment.  
 Children of parents with a mid-level education—a high school diploma but no college 
degree—are most likely to enlist.  
 Children of parents who received government aid—the proxy for financial need—do not 
show a greater tendency to enlist than those whose parents did not receive government 
aid.  
AFQT Scores 
In the sample, enlistees have mean AFQT scores ranging from 52.01 to 58.95, depending on 
age. In comparison with other variables, the only area in which mean AFQT scores are 
consistently higher is school enrollment. The enlistment numbers for individuals with AFQT 
scores in the 4th quartile are closer to the enlistment numbers for individuals scoring in the 2nd 
and 3rd quartiles than the 1st quartile, though this population also had a much higher rate of 
school enrollment than did populations in the lower AFQT quartiles. As suggested by the 
multinomial logit results, a 20-year old White man with a parent who is a high school graduate 
had only a 1.5% probability of being in the military if his AFQT score was in the 1st quartile.  
In comparison, holding all other characteristics constant, changing the AFQT quartile caused 
the probability of being in the military to change from 5.6% to 8.4%, depending on the quartile. 
The duration model also suggested those scoring higher on the AFQT had a greater propensity 
to enlist. The results for men show those scoring in the 3rd quartile had a higher tendency to 
enlist than those scoring in the 4th quartile, where the tendency was to enroll in school. This 
might be due, however, to more attractive academic or labor market opportunities that are open 





































AFQT q1 AFQT q2 AFQT q3 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 
17 0.04% 0.13% 0.17% 0.11% 0.07% 0.06% 0.18% 0.15% 
18 0.27% 0.99% 1.28% 2.40% 0.52% 0.46% 1.33% 1.09% 
19 1.08% 3.97% 5.14% 3.39% 2.13% 1.86% 5.32% 4.36% 
20 1.26% 6.76% 8.72% 5.79% 3.65% 3.20% 9.02% 7.42% 
21 2.25% 8.12% 10.46% 6.97% 4.40% 3.86% 10.21% 8.91% 
22 2.58% 9.26% 11.90% 7.95% 5.03% 4.41% 12.30% 10.15% 
 
 






























AFQT q1 AFQT q2 AFQT q3 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 AFQT q4 
17 0.02% 0.06% 0.04% 0.07% 0.02% 0.04% 0.12% 0.13% 
18 0.11% 0.39% 0.24% 0.45% 0.13% 0.24% 0.21% 0.22% 
19 0.34% 1.23% 0.77% 1.42% 0.42% 0.77% 2.53% 2.57% 
20 0.58% 2.06% 1.28% 2.38% 0.70% 1.29% 4.21% 4.28% 
21 0.73% 2.61% 1.62% 3.01% 2.90% 1.63% 5.31% 5.40% 
22 2.30% 2.97% 1.85% 3.42% 1.02% 1.86% 6.04% 6.13% 
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Parent Education Level 
The pattern that emerged in relation to parent education level was surprising. In particular, 
individuals with a parent who is a high school graduate and possibly has some college 
experience were most likely to enlist. The enlistment rate for these individuals at age 21 was 
4.30%; the rate was 3.44% of those with a parent who had some college experience. The 
corresponding enlistment numbers for individuals with a parent who is a high school dropout, 
college graduate, or an advanced degree holder, however, were all lower, ranging from 2.24% 
to 2.68%.  
The fact that the effects of parent education on military enlistment were not linear is reflected in 
the results of the study’s duration model as well. In this model, for both men and women, the 
variables for the college graduate or above group and the high school dropout group were 
negative, and both variables were statistically significant for men. For women, the high school 
dropout group was significant and the college graduate or above group was just barely 
insignificant at the 10.0% level. These results again imply greater probabilities of enlistment 
among individuals with parents who have a mid-level education.  
Receipt of Government Aid 
The analysis showed individuals from lower income backgrounds, determined by whether or not 
a parent received government aid during the individual’s childhood, did not have higher 
enlistment rates than other youth. In fact, the multinomial logit results suggested receiving 
government aid was associated with a lower probability of military enlistment. For example, at 
age 22 a White man with an AFQT score in the 3rd quartile and a parent who is a high school 
dropout had an estimated probability of military enlistment of 5% if his parents did not receive 
government aid during his childhood and a 3% probability of enrollment if his parents did receive 
government aid. The duration model showed no evidence of differential probabilities of first 
enlistment.  
Conditioning on Socioeconomic Factors, Do Certain Minorities Have Higher Probabilities 
of Enlisting in the Military? 
Strong evidence was found that suggested, conditional on parent education level, parent receipt 
of government aid, and AFQT scores, Black youth were more likely to enlist in the military than 
White youth. For example, Black men with AFQT scores in the 2nd quartile at age 20 had a 
15% predicted military enlistment rate, while White men had an enlistment prediction of only 
8%. This difference was further evidenced in the duration model for first enlistment. The White-
Black gap in the percentage of those who had enlisted in the military was more than 4.3 
percentage points by age 22 for men with high AFQT scores and a parent with a mid-level 
education. The duration model revealed the relative, though not absolute, differences were 
magnified for women.  
This is an important issue for additional consideration. Whether Black youth enlist at higher 
rates due to actual preference or because they are more likely to be constrained financially than 
White youth, in a way not picked up by the parent receipt of government aid indicator, is an 
open question. A better understanding of the source of this phenomenon is necessary to 
determine whether or not this should concern policymakers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
MILITARY PARTICIPATION BY PAY97 YOUTH 
 
The United States and many of its federal institutions, particularly the military, are good at 
keeping numbers. In the spring of 1790, when Rhode Island became the last of 13 states to 
ratify the U.S. Constitution, the new nation was already preparing to conduct its first decennial 
census or “enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States,” as mandated by the 
Constitution (U.S. Congress, 1793). The results, gathered in August 1790, indicated that the 
total U.S. population was just under 4 million. Included in this count were 807,094 “free white 
males of 16 years and upwards,” as well as 694,280 slaves (representing nearly 18% of the 
total; U.S. Congress, 1793). Around the same time, in 1794, the U.S. Military recorded a total of 
5,669 Service members, divided between the Army (3,813) and Navy (1,856; U.S. Department 
of Defense, 1977). The U.S. Marine Corps had disbanded after the American Revolution and 
was reestablished in 1798 with 83 members. 
Aside from periods of conflict, notably the Civil War and World War I, the U.S. Military remained 
relatively small. World War II marks a significant change in numbers, when the size of the U.S. 
Military quadrupled in one year (by June 1941) and continued to grow to over 9 million by 1943, 
and then to over 12 million by 1945. This massive mobilization for war was matched by an 
equally massive demobilization at the end: by 1946, within a single year, military strength had 
declined to 3 million; by 1947, military strength was down to 1.6 million members (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 1977). 
The total U.S. population in 1940 stood at 132 million, meaning that about 9% of the entire U.S. 
population was in uniform at the height of the war. This does not account for demographic 
restrictions on the military’s population, such as age (upper and lower limits), gender (male), 
and eligibility based on other factors (non-institutionalized and 
medically/physically/mentally/morally fit) - so, it is easy to see how much higher the 
“participation rate” would be for, say, qualified men between the ages of 18 and 40 years. To get 
a sense of the relative magnitude of the mobilization, one could calculate a similar, simple ratio 
using the U.S. population in 2009. Thus, with a U.S. population of 306 million in 2009, a roughly 
comparable force would include 28 million Service members (which is 7 million more people 
than in the entire population of Australia). 
Obviously, numerous limitations should prevent one from playing these demographic games 
over such differing periods of history. This is especially true when considering participation in 
the military, since changing times can affect so many population variables, including the 
numbers and types of people required, acceptance standards, and assignment policies. Added 
to this is the understanding that modern warfare has created the need for increasingly more 
highly skilled people to operate, repair, and maintain the military’s weapons and equipment. 
Theoretically, these are the same weapons and equipment that have allowed the military to be 
more effective and efficient in fulfilling its mission with fewer people (Levy, Thie, Robbert, Naftel, 
Cannon, Ehrenberg, & Gershwin, 2001).  
The Emergence of “Fairness” in Viewing Modern-Day Military Participation 
Heightened concern over social and racial inequality in America – as the Vietnam-era draft 
collided with the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty – left a lasting legacy on how 
the military managed its manpower. Racial integration of the military predated the war in 
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Vietnam by 20 years, but the military had rarely been pressured up to that point by concerns 
over fairness in its policies and practices, at least to the extent that they interfered with mission 
accomplishment (Binkin & Eitelberg, 1982). The Vietnam War pushed fairness to the forefront 
when casualty statistics revealed that African Americans, comprising one-tenth of the American 
population, accounted for nearly one-quarter of the Army’s fatalities by 1966. As the conflict 
continued and draft calls mounted, more and more people questioned the methods and motives 
for fighting. All aspects of the war fell under closer and more critical scrutiny. 
In September 1971, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity) 
assembled an enormous collection of data called “The Negro in the Armed Forces: A Statistical 
Fact Book” (U.S. Department of Defense, 1971). This document of 259 pages - covering “Negro 
participation by rank, occupational and mental category; Negro female participation; Negro 
accession, separation and reenlistment rates; and Negro participation in military education 
programs, in Southeast Asia, and in the Army and Air National Guards” (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1971, p. 1) - is a testament to how important racial fairness issues had become. Of 
note, the “Statistical Fact Book” offered no commentary or text aside from a purely descriptive, 
150-word introduction.  
Prior to the Vietnam War, few questioned the operation or purpose of military conscription. In 
fact, after the Korean War and up to the start of hostilities in Vietnam, the military’s requirements 
for new enlisted personnel declined markedly. This was accompanied by a steadily increasing 
number of young men in the general population who were reaching enlistment age. At the same 
time, rising unemployment rates for teenaged youth (doubling and tripling in some years), along 
with attractive recruiting benefits, made voluntary enlistment considerably more desirable for 
many young men. The net effect of these factors, as Wool (1968) wrote, cut the military’s need 
for new recruits from an average of 900 young men per 1,000 18-year-olds to fewer than 300 
per 1,000 18-year olds.  
As the supply and demand for new recruits shifted in the military’s favor, the Armed Services 
were able to progressively raise their qualification standards following the mid-1950s. The 
impact is most evident in the proportion of voluntary enlistees who were admitted annually with 
an AFQT score in Category IV: 27.2% in 1953; 16.9% in 1957; 7.2% in 1960; and 6.7% in 1963 
(Wool, 1968, p. 101). Although the proportion of draftees who scored in AFQT Category IV 
remained relatively high - ranging from 42% to 35% - the number of these draftees declined 
along with reduced draft calls. 
Changes in the supply and demand for recruits consequently allowed the military to become more 
selective. Additionally, by raising aptitude standards, the Services effectively disqualified 
proportionately larger numbers of youth who scored at the lower end on the enlistment test. Indeed, 
statistics compiled by the Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, show that just 
26% of Black men were found “acceptable” during pre-induction examinations for the draft held 
between August 1958 and December 1965. Almost 63% of Black men were disqualified for failing to 
achieve the minimum score on the AFQT, including 5% who failed both the test and the medical 
examination (Wool, 1968). The failure rate for Black men was highest in the East South Central 
Region (Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi), where over 73% were disqualified due to 
an unacceptably low AFQT score. By comparison, White men had a failure rate on AFQT testing of 
approximately 16% generally, with a high of 28% in the East South Central Region. 
Expressed somewhat differently, pre-induction testing showed that just one-third of the nation’s 
Black young men could achieve a passing score on the military’s enlistment test. Between 1958 
and 1965, a “passing score” amounted to a percentile score of 31 on the AFQT, or an AFQT 
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percentile score between 10 and 30 along with higher scores in two or more aptitude areas of 
the Army Qualification Battery (Eitelberg et al., 1984). In November 1965, the “education 
differential” became a part of draft screening, essentially lowering the minimum required AFQT 
percentile score to 10 for examinees who had graduated from high school.  
The overall failure rate for African Americans during pre-induction screening was 74%. The 
overall failure rate for Whites was considerably lower, at 42%. Apparently, these statistics, 
particularly the White-Black differences, raised a few eyebrows at the time, but not enough to 
cause much concern, let alone outrage for what the numbers said about race relations, racial 
equality, or equal opportunity in America. Certainly, it was not considered the business of the 
military to engage in a discussion of issues that were unrelated to the business of the military; 
as long as the Armed Services were meeting their personnel requirements, and actually 
experiencing a rise in the quality of recruits, few would focus on means over ends. 
Following this line of thought, one of the earliest attempts to look at military “participation rates” 
during the pre-All-Volunteer Force (AVF) draft era focused on the age-eligible male population 
using education and mode of entry (voluntary enlistment, draft, officer programs, or Reserves) 
as special points of interest. In 1964, the Department of Defense attempted to measure military 
participation by educational level using a special sample inventory of Selective Service records, 
a survey of civilian men between the ages of 16 and 34 years, and a concurrent survey of 
military personnel conducted in 1964. The results of the study are depicted in Table 7.1, as 
presented by Wool (1968).  
Table 7.1. Military Service Participation Rates and Mode of Entry into Service, by 














Number in Thousands 
Total Population 9,830 3,877 3,306 1,408 1,212 
Percent Distribution: Military Service Status 
With Military Service 63.3 57.9 73.3 66.1 51.0 
No Military Service 36.7 42.1 26.7 33.9 49.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Military Service Entrants by Mode of Entry 
Enlistment 50.3 61.0 53.8 43.2 8.7 
Induction 34.1 32.8 35.7 39.8 24.8 
Officer Programs 5.5 a 0.2 3.7 48.9 
Reserves 9.4 5.4 9.8 13.0 17.3 
Other/Unknown 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note. aLess than 0.05 percent; Sources: Wool, Harold (1968). The military specialist: Skilled manpower 
for the Armed Forces; From U.S. Department of Defense (Manpower); Based on Census Bureau Survey 
of the Civilian Male Population, Ages 16-34 and DoD Survey of Military Personnel, October 1964. 
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Perhaps the most striking numbers in Table 7.1 are those that show the overall proportion of 
men in the general population who served in the military: 63.3%. This includes 57.9% of high 
school dropouts, 73.3% of high school graduates, 66.1% of men with some college education, 
and, quite remarkably, 51% of men who were college graduates. Wool (1968, p. 104) observes 
that the population used in the study covered a broader age range that “included a large 
proportion of men who had been subject to induction during the early 1950s when military 
requirements were relatively high and selection standards low.” Interestingly, in discussing the 
data, Wool (1968, p. 104) refers to the rate for college graduates as “only 51 percent” (emphasis 
added), and he points out that the participation rate for the 26-year-old population - at 52% - is 
somewhat lower than that of the population with a broader age range. 
Years later, when the anti-Vietnam War movement gained momentum and wartime casualties 
climbed, public attention shifted to differences in military participation that could be linked to race 
or socioeconomic status. College education was again considered important as a variable for 
examining military participation, but from a different perspective. Many questioned the Selective 
Service System’s policies that offered deferments to young men who attended college, since the 
ability to pursue such higher education was based heavily on a family’s finances as well as the 
quality and distribution of educational opportunities for young people across America. The 
Selective Service System had operated under a much lower profile during the years leading up to 
the War in Vietnam. When the burdens of wartime service loomed larger through rising 
deployments and vastly increased draft calls, questions of fairness became inevitable. 
The AVF Arrives: A New Way of Viewing Military Participation 
In 1974, soon after the draft had ended, Congress asked the Department of Defense to study 
population representation in the military and to begin submitting an annual report that would 
compare the demographic characteristics of new recruits with those of the nation as a whole. The 
Fiscal Year 1975 report to Congress on “Population Representation in the All-Volunteer Force” 
was a 17-page summary that examined just a few demographic variables of special interest at the 
time: geographic representation, educational attainment, economic background, and racial 
composition (U.S. Department of Defense, 1975). Over the next few years, as recruiting difficulties 
became apparent, many voiced concern that the military no longer reflected the general 
composition of the nation. As in the days of the Vietnam era, much of this concern focused on the 
less-advantaged groups, particularly Blacks, who were being recruited in disproportionately high 
numbers. In the first full year of the AVF, 1974, Blacks accounted for over 27% of new recruits in 
the Army; five years later, that proportion peaked at nearly 37%, more than three times the 
percentage of Blacks in the general population (Binkin & Eitelberg, 1982). 
The overrepresentation of Blacks in the Army was attributed to numerous factors, many of 
which followed from the economic, educational, and social conditions of the country (Binkin & 
Eitelberg, 1982). At the same time, as previously discussed, the AFQT miscalibration of 1976-
1980 had allowed many young men with relatively low AFQT scores - even below the minimum 
enlistment standards of the Services – to join. Over 200,000 of these otherwise “ineligible” 
recruits joined the Army. As it turned out, the miscalibration benefited minorities the most: more 
than 40% of Black recruits during the miscalibration period had test scores that would have 
normally kept them from joining the military; for Hispanic men, nearly one-third of all recruits 
would have been otherwise disqualified on the basis of their test scores, including half of those 
who did not graduate from high school (Eitelberg, 1988). 
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Estimating Military Participation 
The call for a fair distribution of military burdens across the whole of society grew out of the 
Vietnam-era draft, and it spilled quite naturally into discussions over the feasibility of an all-
volunteer military. Indeed, the President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force (1970), 
known as the “Gates Commission,” inadvertently added credence to the notion of a military 
“filled” with minorities and disadvantaged youths by highlighting the matter as “Objection 5” of 
nine arguments against an all-volunteer military. The Commission dismissed the argument, 
which was summarized in its final report as follows: 
The higher pay required for a voluntary force will be especially appealing to Blacks who 
have relatively poorer civilian opportunities. This, combined with higher reenlistment 
rates for Blacks, will mean that a disproportionate number of Blacks will be in military 
service. White enlistments and reenlistments might decline, thus leading to an all-Black 
enlisted force. Racial tensions would grow because of White apprehension at this 
development and Black resentment at bearing an undue share of the burden of defense. 
At the same time, some of the most qualified young Blacks would be in the military - not 
in the community where their talents are needed. (p. 15)  
 
Over the years since the draft ended, a number of researchers have attempted to estimate rates 
of military participation by various segments of America’s younger population. Rates of 
participation by all youths can be calculated with Department of Defense information on military 
personnel and Bureau of the Census statistics on the general population. Obviously more 
difficult to determine – yet much more meaningful – are participation rates of potentially qualified 
youth. A focus on potentially qualified youth, many researchers felt, could help to evaluate if the 
Gates Commission were justified in refuting the notion that “some of the most qualified young 
Blacks would be in the [all-volunteer] military.”  
One of the earliest estimates of participation by the so-called “qualified” population came from 
Cooper (1977), in his landmark study of the All-Volunteer Force. Cooper used examination data on 
pre-inductees (that is, young men who were summoned to undergo screening for the draft), 
assuming that this group would somehow approximate a representative collection of the military-age 
population. From these statistics on pre-inductees, Cooper estimated about 84% of White young 
men, compared with 33-45% of Black young men, would fall into AFQT Categories I through III. 
With Defense Department data on the number of recruits who scored in these categories, and an 
estimate of Whites and Blacks in the age-relevant population who might be in AFQT I-III, Cooper 
determined that the annual participation rates of “higher quality” youths ranged from 16% (1973) to 
24% (1971 and 1972) for Whites, and from 42% (1975) to 57% (1974) for Blacks (Cooper, 1977). It 
is interesting to note that Cooper (1977) also found “the incredible result that the Black [AFQT] 
Category I-III participation rate averaged more than 80% during the period 1958 to 1963, almost 
twice the participation rate for non-Blacks in these categories” (p. 216).  
Several years later, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) (prior to PAY80), 
Choongsoo Kim and his associates (1980) attempted to estimate military participation rates for 
a specific population during a set period: men, 18 to 21 years old, during 1979 (when the NLSY 
was administered). The researchers were able to calculate participation rates for these young 
men by racial/ethnic group and education. Among young men with 12 to15 years of education, 
participation was relatively higher for minorities than for White young men: 6.2% for Whites; 
10.4% for Hispanics; and 15.7% for Blacks. Overall, Kim et al. (1980, p. 213) reported a 
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participation rate of 6.7% (all groups combined, all levels of education), compared with 7.4% of 
all young men with 12-15 years of education.  
In 1982, Binkin and Eitelberg used PAY80 data in Blacks and the Military to estimate the military 
participation rates of young men in the general population who would be considered eligible for 
military enlistment based on their education and AFQT scores. Specifically, the authors 
calculated the percentage of eligible male youths born between January 1, 1957 and December 
31, 1962 (the birth period of the PAY80 sample), who enlisted in the military (for the first time) 
between January 1973 and September 1981. The participation rates of eligible young men were 
then compared, by race, with the participation rates of all youths in the relevant age groups. The 
authors found that  
close to one out of every five black males born between 1957 and 1962 had entered the 
armed forces by September 1981, although only one of every nine whites had joined by 
then. The contrast is even sharper when account is taken of the fact that blacks are less 
likely to qualify for enlistment. For example, by conservative estimate almost 42 percent 
of all potentially qualified black males had enlisted by the end of fiscal 1981. The 
comparable “participation rate” for potentially qualified white males was less than 14 
percent. (p. 66, emphasis in original) 
 
Perhaps an “even more revealing aspect of youth participation,” as Binkin and Eitelberg (1982, 
p. 66) discovered, was that almost half of all male, military-qualified high school dropouts – 
regardless of race – had enlisted in the armed forces. This was a sharp constrast to the 
enlistment rate of just over 12% of all male high school graduates (or above) considered eligible 
for enlistment. The estimated participation rate of Black high school dropouts who were 
considered qualified – a seemingly incredible 136% – emphasized the effect of the AFQT 
miscalibration on the military; since the test-calibration errors affected principally non-graduates 
with low aptitude scores, the military accepted many more Black dropouts than in the entire pool 
of those who were truly qualified. 
It is important to note here that these participation rates of the so-termed “qualified” groups, as 
high as they are for Black men, understate the true rate of participation for the qualified 
population. For example, the military’s other enlistment standards - including physical 
(height/weight), medical, and moral character requirements - would reduce the base population 
of fully qualified young men, and these additional standards would likely have a greater impact 
on young men with less advantaged backgrounds (President’s Task Force on Manpower 
Conservation, 1964).  
Additionally, the participation rates do not account for young men who joined the military after 
September 1981, those who joined officer programs, and those who may have enlisted in the 
Reserves or National Guard. The combined effect of these factors – increasing the number of 
participants and reducing the base population of fully “qualified” young men – would obviously 
raise the participation rates, and probably more so for minorities than for Whites during the 
years examined. As it was, the original calculation was cited widely as evidence of how the 
attractions of an all-volunteer military caused a racial divide. For example, Charles Moskos 
(1986), a preeminent military sociologist, observed in The Atlantic Monthly: 
A 1982 study published by Martin Binkin and Mark Eitelberg, of the Brookings Institution, 
showed that an astonishing 42 percent of all qualified black youths enter the military, 
whereas 14 percent of their white counterparts do. Since the end of the draft, the 
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proportion of high school graduates among blacks has consistently exceeded that 
among whites, although the gap has narrowed since the 1980s with the overall 
improvement in recruiting…A longtime employee of the U.S. Army in Europe - a German 
- told me during the late 1970s, “In the volunteer Army you are recruiting the best of the 
blacks and the worst of the whites.” At the time, his observation was basically 
correct…And it continues to be true that the black recruits are among “the best of the 
blacks.” (p. 69) 
Eitelberg and his colleagues (1984) updated and refined the calculations of military participation 
rates in their study, Screening for Service, which was based heavily on PAY80 data. The 
authors of this study took advantage of two additional years (through September 1983) to 
identify more participants, compare participation rates by separate Services, and to include 
another minority group, Hispanics, in the calculations. The additional time raised the 
participation rate of “qualified” Black young men to 50%, while the rate for Whites increased 
slightly to 15%. During the 11 years examined (1973-1983), persons of Hispanic origin were 
underrepresented in all Services, so it was no surprise to find that the rate for “qualified” 
Hispanics (nearly 18%) was just a few percentage points above the rate for Whites. The overall 
participation rate of Hispanics (9%) was lower than that of Blacks (20%) and Whites (13%). 
Most remarkable in the results by Service were the participation rates for Blacks in the Army, 
especially for young men who were “qualified”: 26%, accounting for over half of all who 
participated military-wide. The comparable rate for Whites in the Army was just under 5%, about 
one-third of the total for this group. 
In 1988, Eitelberg revisited the topic yet again as part of a larger, more comprehensive study, 
Manpower for Military Occupations, which examined the military’s occupational placement 
system and the effects of aptitude standards on the eligibility of population groups (18-23 years 
old, by gender and racial/ethnic group) for job training in each of the Services. Recognizing the 
enormous impact of the AFQT miscalibration on participation rates generally, and particularly for 
minorities, the authors attempted to recalculate these participation rates by removing enlistees 
who would have been disqualified under normal conditions. In previous calculations, persons 
admitted to the military were assumed to be “qualified.” By removing enlistees who were 
actually unqualified, based on the education and aptitude standards applied between 1976 and 
1980, Eitelberg sought to obtain a more accurate estimate of military participation by the truly 
qualified. As Eitelberg (1988, p. 176) observed, one fundamental problem of counting the 
otherwise unqualified recruits – including several hundred thousand young men – is that they 
are not part of the base population of youth actually estimated as being potentially qualified.  
As expected, all military participation rates for “qualified” young men, regardless of education or 
racial/ethnic group, declined when adjusted for the AFQT miscalibration. The greatest decline, 
also expected, was found for high school dropouts; indeed, the unusually high participation rate 
for Black high school dropouts (well over 100%) fell by over 80 percentage points to 56%. At the 
same time, the overall rate of 50% for “qualified” Black young men declined by 18 percentage 
points to about 32%. Even with these adjustments for the AFQT miscalibration, the proportions 
of qualified Black youth who joined the military between 1973 and 1983 are still “astonishing,” as 
Moskos (1986) might say. 
Table 7.2 shows the military participation rates for all youth born between 1957 and 1962 and 
the subset of those who were deemed to be “qualified,” based on PAY80. Included here are 
changes in rates resulting from an additional year of study and the complete effects of the AFQT 
miscalibration.  
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Generational Changes in Military Participation: Results from PAY97 
PAY97 data provide a unique opportunity to reexamine trends in the military participation of 
American youth and to compare the results obtained in the 1980s with data from two decades 
later. It should be noted, however, that a number of important factors make it difficult to draw 
meaningful conclusions from a simple comparison of participation rates using the PAY80 and 
PAY97 populations. More meaningful are the comparisons of relationships by racial/ethnic 
group and education in the PAY80 cohort with those in the latter cohort – for example, in 
comparing the differences between the participation of Whites and Blacks among the PAY80 
population with differences between the same groups in the PAY97 population.  
Table 7.2. Military Participation Rates of the PAY80 Male Population (Born 1957-1962) by 
Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level 
Racial/Ethnic Group 
Military Participation Rate: 1973-1983 
All Qualified Adjusted/Qualifieda 
Non-High School Graduate 
Whiteb 17.0 40.0 27.9 
Black 12.3 137.8c 56.4 
Hispanic 5.4 46.5 23.2 
All Groups 14.8 45.9 29.7 
GED Recipient 
Whiteb 21.4 29.4 28.2 
Black 16.2 43.0 36.3 
Hispanic 16.1 33.2 28.1 
All Groups 20.4 30.6 29.2 
High School Graduate or Above 
Whiteb 11.5 12.1 10.7 
Black 25.6 42.0 28.9 
Hispanic 12.0 14.0 10.7 
All Groups 13.2 14.4 12.2 
All Education Levels 
Whiteb 13.0 15.0 13.1 
Black 20.3 49.9 31.5 
Hispanic 9.3 17.6 12.4 
All Groups 13.9 18.2 14.5 
Note. Sources: Eitelberg, M. J., Laurence, J.H., & Waters, B. K. (1984). Screening for service: aptitude 
and education criteria for military entry; Eitelberg, M. J. (1988). Manpower for military occupations; 
derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. aAdjusted rate 
excludes military participants who entered during the AFQT miscalibration (1976-1980) and would have 
been disqualified from enlisting if the correct entry standards had been applied by the Armed Services; 
bWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic; cThis figure and others in the table 
column include enlistment results from the AFQT miscalibration. Since the test-scoring errors affected 
principally non-high school graduates with low AFQT scores, the Services enlisted many more (37.8%) 
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Without diminishing the importance of the results from each of the two separate populations, it is 
useful to bear in mind that a number of factors can complicate comparisons of military 
participation rates from PAY80 with those from PAY97. These factors are summarized below. 
 Differences in Reference Population Size. The PAY80 cohort included American youth 
born between 1957 and 1962 (18-23 years old at the time of testing in 1980). Similarly, 
the PAY97 cohort included American youth born between 1974 and 1979 (likewise 18-
23 years at the time of testing in 1997). Nevertheless, the base or reference population 
of American youth in the age cohort was larger for the study in 1980 than in 1997. 
Roughly, the reference population for the 1980 study included 2.1 million more men and 
1.8 million more women, respectively, than did the reference population for the study in 
1997. 
 Differences in Reference Population Composition. Perhaps the most notable difference 
in the composition of the PAY80 and PAY97 reference populations is the relative growth 
of persons of Hispanic origin. In 1980, Hispanics accounted for 6% of American youth 
between the ages of 18 and 23 years. By 1997, the proportion of Hispanics in this age 
group had grown to nearly 15%, which is more than double what it was during the first 
PAY study. During the same period, the proportion of African Americans in the relevant 
age group rose by about 1 percentage point and was approximately equal to the 
proportion of Hispanics. Also of note when looking at participation rates for the PAY97 
reference population is a continuing trend in postsecondary education: proportionately 
more women than men have been attending college and graduating. In 2004, the 
“gender gap” among White college graduates favored women by 7 percentage points; 
the “gap” favoring women was higher for racial/ethnic minorities, with a difference of 9 
percentage points separating women from their male counterparts. 
 Differences in Military Population Size. The differences in reference population size 
could be counterbalanced to some extent, when calculating participation rates, by the 
smaller active-duty military in the 1990s than in 1973-1983. In fact, in 1973, the active-
duty enlisted force totaled 1.9 million; in 1983, the enlisted force was close to the same 
size at 1.8 million. The military “downsized” after the end of the Cold War and conclusion 
of Operation Desert Storm. Consequently, the average annual strength of the enlisted 
force during 1990-2000 was 1.35 million, falling from 1.7 million in 1990 to less than 1.2 
million in 2000. Enlisted recruiting numbers also reflected this change in force size: 
declining from 406,000 in 1973 to 303,000 in 1983 to 224,000 in 1990 to 179,000 in 
2000. On average, 362,000 persons were recruited annually from 1973 through 1983; in 
contrast, the annual average for the 1990-2000 period was 190,000. Simply, reduced 
force strength and lower recruiting requirements mean fewer opportunities for young 
men and women to serve. 
 Differences in Timeframe for Participation. Studies of military participation by the PAY80 
reference population were limited to the 1973-1983 timeframe. Thus, the youngest 
members of the population were 21 years old at the cutoff point for determining 
participation. In the present study of the PAY97 reference population, more years are 
available to measure participation, so the timeframe includes 1990 through 2008. With 
this extended period, the youngest members of the PAY97 population would be 29 years 
old at the cutoff point. Whereas some portion of the PAY80 reference population might 
have enlisted after the 1983 cutoff, it is unlikely that any meaningful number of young 
men or women in the PAY97 population would be missed. In June 2006, the Army raised 
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its age limit from 35 to 42 years; thus, the youngest members of the PAY97 cohort would 
still have another 13 years before reaching the maximum allowable age for enlistment. 
 Differences in Force Composition. This would include a number of demographic 
changes in the enlisted force, including a shift toward somewhat older recruits and 
changes in the racial/ethnic composition of new enlisted accessions (which would be 
reflected in the participation rates). However, the most important change relates to a 
sizable increase in the proportion of women – although the participation analysis focuses 
mainly on men. Indeed, in 1973, women comprised about 2% of the enlisted force; by 
1983, women accounted for 9% of active-duty enlistees. The period from 1990 to 2000 
saw the proportion of women increase again from 11% to nearly 15%. As with the 
reduction in enlisted strength, the rising proportion of women would have a direct impact 
on participation by men. 
 Differences in Reference Population Attributes. In the past, the two key factors in 
determining whether a person is “qualified” were AFQT score and education. The 
changes in AFQT scores from PAY80 to PAY97 are discussed in previous chapters. At 
the same time, education measures for the two reference populations have changed 
over the intervening years, and the combination of these aptitude and education 
changes indicates that proportionately more young men (and women) in the PAY97 
reference population would be considered qualified for enlistment under the standards 
applied for the PAY80 population. This would be most apparent for minorities, and 
particularly so for Blacks. According to the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES), for example, the high school dropout rate for Blacks in 1980 was approximately 
19%; by 1997, that rate had fallen to 13% (Kaufman, Alt, & Chapman, 2001). Further, 
NCES reports that the dropout rate for Hispanics fell from 35% in 1980 to 25% in 1997.36  
Meanwhile, the high school dropout rate for Whites fell from just over 11% in 1980 to 
slightly less than 8% 17 years later. Of importance, too, is the finding that dropout rates 
tend to be higher for men than for women. For example, NCES reports dropout rates for 
male Hispanics (39%) that are as much as 8 percentage points higher than that of their 
female counterparts (31%) during a single year (1991). Added to the confusion in 
comparing rates across the two periods is the fact that many different programs have 
emerged over the intervening years to encourage high school graduation, some of which 
offer relatively new approaches in delivering education. Graduates of these programs 
may be categorized in various ways, without consistency or uniformity across states.  
It should also be noted that the proportion of high school dropouts who go on to 
complete high school through an equivalency program varies considerably by 
race/ethnicity. For example, in 1980, completion rates were reported as 88% for Whites, 
75% for Blacks, and 57% for Hispanics. These increased by 1997 to 91% for Whites, 
82% for Blacks, and 67% for Hispanics (Kaufman et al., 2001). 
 Differences in Enlistment Standards. As previously observed, the PAY80 study was 
used to estimate the number of young men in the reference population who would be 
considered “qualified.” Education and aptitude test scores were the only measures 
                                                
36 Data on high school dropouts presented here are all from Kaufman et al. (2001), a report published by 
NCES. It should be noted that other sources dispute NCES statistics, claiming that the rates are higher 
than reported. Dropout rates often vary between sources because of the different definitions, surveys, 
and standards applied as well as different age groups. 
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employed to determine eligibility for enlistment. The enlistment standards varied for each 
of the Services, requiring separate computations. The Army had the lowest standards of 
the Services. At the time, the Army required that high school diploma graduates achieve 
an AFQT percentile score of at least 16 and a standard score of at least 85 on any one 
of its aptitude composites. General Education Development (GED) recipients and non-
high school graduates needed to have an AFQT percentile score of no less than 31; 
additionally, persons with a GED were required to score no less than 85 on any one 
aptitude composite, and non-graduates needed to achieve the same score on any two 
composites. As of 2009, the Army was still the most “lenient” of the Services in its 
education and aptitude standards, and the Army likewise uses the same minimum test 
scores as it did in the PAY80 timeframe. Nevertheless, because of changes in how the 
Armed Services defined education during the two periods of study, inconsistencies are 
found in scores required for a particular level of education. In 1987, the Department of 
Defense established a uniform, military-wide scheme for classifying the educational 
levels of applicants. This new system for classifying education placed each level into one 
of three “tiers,” with Tier 1 as the highest, or most qualified, and Tier 3 including 
applicants who possessed no high school diploma or equivalency certificate (Sellman, 
2004). 
The three-tier system resembles the Army’s old formula, which divided education into 
the three basic categories of high school graduate and above, GED holder, and all else 
(non-graduate, non-equivalency). Over the past 20 years since the three-tier system was 
established, however, certain educational credentials have shifted from one category to 
another. Home schooled high school graduates are a good example of a credential that 
has been variously classified in Tier 1 and Tier 2 over the PAY97 timeframe. Home 
schooling also is good example of an alternative form of education that has grown 
considerably since the tier system was developed. Hardly recognized during the PAY80 
timeframe, home schooling has become an increasingly popular form of education in the 
United States. Indeed, NCES (2008) reports that approximately 1.5 million children – or 
2.9% of the entire school-age population – were being home schooled in 2007, up from 
1.1 million in 2003 and 300,000 in 1988. 
Further complicating comparisons between the two groups are the following changes in 
standards applied by the other three Services: the Navy raised its minimum AFQT score 
for all three categories of educational level by as many as 19 percentile points (GED 
holders or Tier 2); the Marine Corps raised its minimum AFQT score for two categories 
(Tier 2 and Tier 3), including an increase of 29 percentile points (from AFQT 21 to AFQT 
50) for nongraduates; and the Air Force increased its minimum AFQT score for high 
school graduates by 19 percentile points (from AFQT 21 to AFQT 40). 
Accounting for Limitations 
As noted elsewhere, the PAY97 study contains limited information regarding alternative 
credentials for high school graduation or its equivalency. Because of uncertainties concerning 
the treatment of GED-type credentials, analyses of PAY97 participation rates show “high school 
graduates” in two ways: rates that count GED-type recipients with military service as “high 
school graduates” and rates that count these persons as “non-high school graduates.” This 
allows the participation rates for both “high school graduates” and “non-graduates” to be 
displayed as a range, generally within a few percentage points.  
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Additionally, because the Services have modified their standards over the years and apply them 
differently, the easiest approach in determining eligibility for the military is to use the Army’s 
standards. The Army’s standards would allow the greatest proportion of the reference 
population to qualify for enlistment, so this should be taken into account when viewing the 
participation rates. Basically, “qualification” for military service is limited to the combination of 
education and AFQT score in the following manner: persons who are “high school graduates,” 
have “some college” credits, or hold a college degree must attain a score of at least AFQT 16 
(or AFQT Category IVA); persons who have not graduated from high school must achieve a 
score of at least AFQT 31 (or AFQT Category IIIB). 
Because women comprised a relatively small number of military members and were restricted 
from serving in many positions (namely all jobs that would expose them to combat) during the 
timeframe of the PAY80 study, they were not included in the calculations of participation rates. 
Women were included in the PAY97 analyses of military participation. Although their 
participation rates are still considerably lower than those of their male counterparts, important 
relationships can be seen when examined by race/ethnicity, education, AFQT scores, and other 
variables. 
Military participation rates are calculated very simply as follows: all persons who enlisted in the 
active-duty military for the first time (that is, with no prior service) divided by the respective 
group they represent in the larger U.S. population. For PAY80, this includes 12.7 million men 
born in 1957 through 1962. PAY97 includes 21.4 million men and women born in 1974 through 
1979. Data on the U.S. population are the same as used in the PAY80 and PAY97 studies, 
respectively. Data on persons who joined the military – 886,331 men and 176,255 women from 
the PAY97 population – exclude those who entered officer programs directly or enlisted in 
Reserve components. Military data were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.  
Overall Military Participation Rates: PAY80 vs. PAY97 
Table 7.3 compares the military participation rates – for all male youth and the portion 
considered “potentially qualified” (also called military-qualified) – of the PAY80 population with 
those of the PAY97 population. The PAY80 study of participation included men only and limited 
the racial/ethnic groups to White (including “Others”), Black, and Hispanic; thus, the PAY97 
population is similarly restricted. It is important to note here that the participation rates shown for 
PAY80 in Table 7.3 are revised calculations, subtracting the young men who were mistakenly 
allowed to enlist because of the AFQT miscalibration (see Table 7.2 above). As seen in Table 
7.3, this resulted in a participation rate of 31.5% for Black men who were military-qualified – a 
proportion that is still remarkably high, but also well below the previously calculated rate.  
As expected, all of the participation rates for the PAY97 groups are below those of their 
counterparts in the PAY80 population. The relationships between the racial/ethnic groups in the 
PAY97 population were similar to those in the PAY80 population, with Blacks having the highest 
rates, followed by Whites and then Hispanics. The participation for military-qualified Blacks in 
the PAY97 population fell to 16%, compared with similarly lower rates for qualified Whites 
(9.8%) and Hispanics (7.6%). 
The bottom half of Table 7.3 shows the numbers of men in the respective populations used to 
calculate the participation rates. These numbers are interesting on their own. For example, due 
to the force reduction of the 1990s, the number of men from the PAY80 population who enlisted 
(1,564,410) is nearly 680,000 more than the number who joined from the PAY97 population. 
Further, the PAY80 population of men is just over 2 million more than that of the PAY97 
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population. This also is reflected in the numbers of men who were estimated as potentially 
qualified: 9.7 million men from PAY80 versus 8.7 million from PAY97. Yet, it also is worth noting 
from these numbers (the ratio of “potentially-qualified” to all male youth) that the proportion of 
men who are considered military-qualified is higher for the PAY97 male population (81.5%) than 
for their counterparts in PAY80 (76.3%). This is especially apparent for minorities, where the 
proportion of the male population estimated as potentially-qualified increases for both Blacks 
(from 40.7% to 63.0%) and Hispanics (from 52.8% to 67.5%). This compares with a much 
smaller increase for Whites from 84.1% (PAY80) to 88.3% (PAY97). 
Table 7.3. Comparison of PAY80 and PAY97 Military Participation Rates (Percent) and 
Base Populations (Number) Used for Calculations, Males Only, by Racial/Ethnic Group 
Participation Rate (Percent)a 
PAY Population Whiteb Black Hispanic All Groups 
Male Youth Enlisted 
PAY80 11.5 18.2 8.3 12.3 
PAY97 8.7 10.1 5.1 8.3 
“Potentially-Qualified” Male Youth 
PAY80 13.1 31.5 12.4 14.5 
PAY97 9.8 16.0 7.6 10.2 
Number (in thousands) 
All Male Youth Enlisted 
PAY80 1,178.80 309.12 64.09 1,564.41 
PAY97 653.37 147.87 86.10 886.33 
All Male Youth 
PAY80 10,225.52 1,695.60 768.96 12,720.09 
PAY97 7,548.40 1,462.80 1,687.00 10,698.10 
All “Potentially-Qualified” Male Youth 
PAY80 8,604.38 690.11 406.01 9,705.42 
PAY97 6,662.64 921.49 1,139.08 8,723.21 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; 
aParticipation rate is the percentage of the total population (all male youth and the portion estimated as 
“potentially qualified”) who enlisted in the military for the first time. PAY80 includes men born between 
1957 and 1962; PAY97 includes men born between 1974 and 1979. Thus, 13.1% of “potentially-qualified” 
men from the PAY80 population of Whites had enlisted in the military; this compares with 11.5% of all 
White men in the PAY80 population; bWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. 
 
PAY97 Military Participation by Birth Year 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show the military participation rates of the PAY97 male population and 
female population, respectively. The participation rates for PAY97 men follow a familiar pattern 
when examined by racial/ethnic group: Blacks characteristically have the highest rates and 
Hispanics have the lowest rates. The year 1974 was a “high-water mark” for Black young men, 
as 12.4% of the PAY97 male population enlisted in the military. This compares with 10% of 
Whites and less than 5% of Hispanics during the same year.  
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Table 7.4. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of PAY97 Male Population by Year of 
Birth and Race/Ethnicity 





1974 10.0 12.4 4.7 9.4 160.7 
1975 9.7 11.6 4.6 9.0 149.7 
1976 8.5 9.6 5.1 8.1 142.0 
1977 8.4 9.8 5.4 8.2 145.0 
1978 7.7 8.1 5.3 7.4 141.6 
1979 8.0 9.7 5.6 7.9 147.3 
Total 8.7 10.0 5.1 8.3 886.3 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. 
 
Table 7.5 presents the first glimpse of military participation by women, and the rates are quite 
small, as expected. Overall, just 1.6% of PAY97 women enlisted in the military. Similar to their 
male counterparts, the participation rates for women were highest among Blacks (2.8%), 
followed by Whites (1.5%) and Hispanics (1.1%). Of particular note, the participation rates by 
racial/group hardly vary from one birth year to the next. 
Table 7.5. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of PAY97 Female Population by Year of 
Birth and Race/Ethnicity  
Year of Birth Whitea Black Hispanic 
All Groups 
Percent Number 
1974 1.6 2.7 1.1 1.7 28.7 
1975 1.6 2.9 1.1 1.7 28.7 
1976 1.4 2.9 1.1 1.6 28.5 
1977 1.5 2.6 1.1 1.6 29.8 
1978 1.4 2.8 1.0 1.6 29.5 
1979 1.5 2.9 1.2 1.7 31.0 
Total 1.5 2.8 1.1 1.6 176.2 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. 
 
PAY97 Military Participation by Service 
Table 7.6 splits the military participation rates for PAY97 men and women across Services and adds 
a new racial/ethnic group, “Other,” to the mix. Previous tables included persons of “Other” 
race/ethnicity with Whites, following the methodology employed in studying the PAY80 population 
(Eitelberg et al., 1984; U.S. Department of Defense, 1982). Adding the “Other” group provides a 
new dimension to comparisons by race/ethnicity, as the participation rates for men in this group 
surpass those of their Black counterparts in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Additionally, the 
participation rates for White men are slightly higher than those for Blacks in the Marine Corps and 
the Air Force. Black men and Black women from the PAY97 population have the highest 
participation rates in the Army when compared with their counterparts from other racial/ethnic 
groups. 
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Table 7.6. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of the PAY97 Population by Gender, 
Service, and Race/Ethnicity  
Service Whitea Black Hispanic Other Total 
Male 
Army 3.2 4.2 1.8 3.2 3.1 
Navy 2.3 3.0 1.5 3.4 2.3 
Marine Corps 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.6 
Air Force 1.5 1.3 0.5 1.4 1.3 
All Services 8.7 10.0 5.1 9.6 8.3 
Female 
Army 0.5 1.4 0.4 0.9 0.7 
Navy 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 
Marine Corps 0.1 0.1 b 0.1 0.1 
Air Force 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.4 
All Services 1.4 2.8 1.0 2.3 1.6 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic; bLess than 0.05 percent or missing values. 
 
PAY97 Military Participation by AFQT Category 
Up to this point, the data on PAY97 participation in the military have held few, if any, surprises. 
Further, the participation rates, even those of military-qualified men (Table 7.3), seem 
somewhat low, particularly when compared with the statistics in Table 7.1, where it is seen that 
63% of men between the ages of 26 and 34 served in the military of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Thus far, however, most of the participation rates have been calculated and examined without 
the aid of information on test scores from PAY97. Table 7.7 is the first of four data presentations 
that look more closely at military participation rates by incorporating AFQT scores and the 
combination of AFQT scores and education.  
Table 7.7. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of the PAY97 Population by Gender, 
AFQT Category, and Racial/Ethnic Group 
AFQT Category Whitea Black Hispanic Other Total 
Male 
AFQT I & II 9.5 20.7 10.2 9.5 10.0 
AFQT IIIA 14.1 18.3 8.7 18.2 13.9 
AFQT IIIB 9.7 21.4 9.6 14.7 11.7 
AFQT IVA 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.4 0.7 
All Categories 8.7 10 5.1 9.6 8.3 
Female 
AFQT I & II 1.7 6.4 1.9 3.9 2.0 
AFQT IIIA 2.4 8.6 3.5 3.3 3.2 
AFQT IIIB 1.3 5.2 1.8 2.9 2.1 
AFQT IVA b 0.1  b 0.1 0.1 
All Categories 1.4 2.8 1.0 2.3 1.6 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite includes 
all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic; bLess than 0.05 percent or missing values. 
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Table 7.7 shows the military participation rates of the PAY97 population by AFQT category, 
gender, and racial/ethnic group. In viewing these rates, one should be reminded of two 
important factors. First, the military’s enlistment screening policies severely limit the proportion 
of applicants who can be admitted during any given year with an AFQT score in Category IV. 
Second, persons who score in AFQT Category V are not permitted to enlist by law. 
Consequently, a relatively large number of the PAY97 population - those who score in the lower 
two AFQT Categories of IV and V - are essentially prohibited from enlisting. As reported in 
Chapter 4, the following proportions (rounded) of the PAY97 population had an AFQT score that 
would place them in Category IV or Category V: White, 15%; Black, 49%; Hispanic, 47%; total 
male, 24%; total female, 26%, and total PAY97 population, 25%. The effect of reducing the 
number of military-qualified persons by so much - including half of all minorities - obviously 
drives up the participation rates of the PAY97 population when controlling for aptitude test 
scores. It should also be noted again that these rates actually understate the true level of 
participation, since the population of military-qualified persons would be even further reduced if 
other screening criteria (such as medical, physical, and moral character standards) were 
applied.  
By controlling for AFQT category, as seen in Table 7.7, the military participation rates increase 
quite dramatically. This is most apparent for male Blacks, where the participation rate peaks in 
AFQT Category IIIB at 21.4%. The same holds true for Black women, who have a participation 
rate of 8.6% in AFQT Category IIIA. Recall from Table 7.6 that the overall participation rate for 
Black men is 10%, and the overall rate for Black women is 2.8%. Equally remarkable is the 
participation rate of almost 21% for Black men in the PAY97 population who attain a score in 
AFQT Categories I and II. As seen in Chapter 4, the base population of military-qualified 
persons for this group is about 13%. 
PAY97 Military Participation by Education and Qualifying AFQT Scores 
All Services have enlistment standards that combine education with aptitude test scores. As 
previously observed, the minimum required AFQT score for a high school graduate (AFQT 16 in the 
Army) is set lower than that for an applicant who did not complete high school (AFQT 31 in the 
Army). The Services have a “target market” in their recruiting campaigns, and this market is males 
(and to a lesser extent females) who are high school graduates and score AFQT 31 or above (which 
translates to AFQT Categories I through III, or scores above AFQT Category IV). In fact, 94% of all 
persons from the PAY97 population who enlisted in the military were high school graduates 
(including those with a GED) who scored AFQT 31 or above. This proportion is virtually the same for 
both men and women from the PAY97 population who enlisted in the military. 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the military participation rates of men and women, respectively, who 
scored at least AFQT 31 by education and racial/ethnic group. Words such as “astonishing” and 
“amazing” were used over 20 years ago by commentators and reviewers upon first seeing the 
participation rates of military-qualified Blacks after these numbers were first published in a Brookings 
Institution study (Binkin & Eitelberg, 1982, p. 66). The military participation rates of male high school 
graduates in Table 7.8 are certainly no less stunning. Indeed, the military participation rate for Black 
men who were high school graduates - ranging from 44% to 46% - is higher than the rate of 42% 
that apparently surprised so many people in the early 1980s. The participation rates for male high 
school graduates from other minority groups are also quite high, but almost equally striking are the 
rates for White high school graduates. As a result, as Table 7.8 indicates, approximately one-third of 
the PAY97 male population that falls into the military’s “target market” – that is, high school 
graduates who scored in AFQT Categories I through III – enlisted in the military. 
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Table 7.8. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of the PAY97 Male Population Scoring 
AFQT 31 or Above by Education and Racial/Ethnic Group 
Education Whitea Black Hispanic Other Total 
Non-High School Graduate 
With GED 6.9 7.7 2.4 8.1 5.9 
Without GED 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.2 0.7 
High School Graduate 
With GED 30.1 46.2 31.0 43.5 32.6 
Without GED 27.6 43.7 28.5 39.9 30.1 
Some College 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 
College Graduate 3.6 13.5 7.0 5.1 4.4 
All Levels 10.5 20.3 9.5 12.6 11.4 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. 
 
Table 7.9. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of the PAY97 Female Population Scoring 
AFQT 31 or Above by Education and Racial/Ethnic Group 
Education Whitea Black Hispanic Other Total 
Non-High School Graduate 
With GED 1.0 2.6 0.5 1.5 1.1 
Without GED 0.1 0.3  b 0.2 0.1 
High School Graduate 
With GED 5.7 7.9 6.2 14.1 6.5 
Without GED 5.4 7.6 5.9 13.3 6.2 
Some College b 0.1 b 0.1 b 
College Graduate 0.5 2.1 2.1 2.5 0.8 
All Levels 1.8 6.0 2.2 3.4 2.3 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic; bLess than 0.05 percent or missing values. 
 
If the participation rates for male high school graduates in Table 7.8 were less compelling, one 
might notice that the rates for female high school graduates, as seen in Table 7.9, are relatively 
high as well, especially for women in the “Other” racial/ethnic group. Additionally, the 
participation rate for male college graduates who are Black is over 13%, which is more than 
three-times the rate for male college graduates who are White (3.6%). 
PAY97 Military Participation by AFQT Category and High School Education 
It bears repeating that a large proportion of the PAY97 population would not qualify for 
enlistment because of their low AFQT scores, and an even larger proportion would fail to qualify 
when their educational level is combined with their test scores. The effect on military 
participation rates of combining education with AFQT score can be seen in the Tables 7.8 and 
7.9 above. Since well over 90% of military enlistees in the PAY97 population are high school 
graduates (who have earned no college credits) with qualifying AFQT scores above the 31st 
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percentile, what would happen if we focused on these graduates (and nongraduates) according 
to AFQT category?  
The answer to this question is presented in Table 7.10, which includes males only. It is difficult 
to avoid using hyperbole in describing the participation rates for high school graduates, most 
notably for Blacks and “Other” minorities within AFQT Category IIIA. As seen here, 
approximately three out of five (up to 59%) Black men who were high school graduates (only) 
and scored in AFQT Category IIIA had enlisted in the military. The comparable proportion of 
“Others” is almost 90% (although certain unknown factors in defining “Other” minority groups 
may have caused this seemingly unbelievable rate). 
Table 7.10. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of the PAY97 Male Population Scoring 
by AFQT Category, High School Graduation, and Racial/Ethnic Group 
High School Education Whitea Black Hispanic Other Total 
AFQT Category I & II 
Non-High School Graduate 
With GED 11.5 b 9.1 b 12.9 
Without GED 4.7 b 1.6 b 1.9 
High School Graduate 
With GED 40.9 41.6 26.2 29.3 38.8 
Without GED 38.2 39.3 24.4 27.2 36.2 
AFQT Category IIIA 
Non-High School Graduate 
With GED 13.4 9.7 2.9 10.2 9.4 
Without GED 1.5 1.3 0.4 1.6 1.2 
High School Graduate 
With GED 28.7 59.3 28.7 89.8 32.6 
Without GED 25.1 54.5 25.5 79.4 28.8 
AFQT Category IIIB 
Non-High School Graduate 
With GED 2.2 3.9 1.3 3.0 2.2 
Without GED 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 
High School Graduate 
With GED 23.9 42.4 37.1 49.6 26.4 
Without GED 18.7 40.8 34.6 46.3 24.8 
AFQT Category IVA 
Non-High School Graduate 
With GED 0.1 0.1 b b 0.1 
Without GED b b b b b 
High School Graduate 
With GED 1.7 3.1 1.1 2.6 1.8 
Without GED 1.7 3.0 1.0 2.6 1.8 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic; bLess than 0.05 percent or missing values. 
 
Chapter 7 190 
Almost as striking is the military participation rate of nearly 41% for White men who were high 
school graduates (only) and scored in the top two AFQT categories (I and II). We have come to 
expect remarkably high participation rates for military-qualified minorities, but much less so for White 
men. In fact, the relatively high participation rate for Whites, as well as for minorities, in the top two 
AFQT categories results in an overall rate of about 39% for male high school graduates at this 
AFQT level, which is also the highest total rate for men shown in Table 7.10. 
Implications for the Military and Society 
It is clear from the military participation rates presented here that the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
has found a solid “niche market” in the U.S. population: young people (mostly men) who 
graduated from high school but decided to postpone or forgo further formal education and who 
can achieve a percentile score of at least 31 on the AFQT. As previously discussed, Cooper 
(1977) analyzed this niche group and calculated participation rates for White and Black men in 
AFQT Categories I through IIIA, but did not control for education. Thus, his participation rates of 
16% to 19% for White men in the range of AFQT Categories I-III during the first few years of the 
AVF are somewhat higher than the rate of about 11% displayed in Table 7.8. Further, Cooper’s 
(1977) estimated participation rate of 42% to 57% for Black men in AFQT Categories I-III is over 
twice as high as the total rate for Black men shown in Table 7.8. Interestingly, as seen in Tables 
7.8 and 7.10, even higher participation rates are found for the PAY97 population 30 years later 
by focusing exclusively on high school graduates and by dividing AFQT Categories I-III into its 
component groups. 
Using data on pre-inductees (men tested during pre-induction examinations for the draft) 
originally compiled and analyzed by Karpinos (1978), Cooper (1977) estimated that the 
proportion of Black young men (18 to 24 years old) in the U.S. population who would be in 
AFQT Categories I through III was 13% in 1953-1957, and had increased to 45% by 1974. 
Similarly, the comparable proportion of White young men in AFQT Categories I-III was 
estimated by Cooper (1977) to have increased from 69% in 1953-1957 to 84% in 1974. Actually, 
as seen in Table 7.11 below, the proportion of Whites (men and women) in AFQT Categories I - 
III was calculated at 79%, based on the PAY80 study, increasing to nearly 85% in the PAY97 
study. The proportion for Blacks in AFQT Categories I - III was 30% as of PAY80, rising 
considerably to almost 51% by PAY97. 
Table 7.11. Percentage of PAY80 and PAY97 Populations Scoring AFQT 31 or Above 
(AFQT Categories I through III) by Racial/Ethnic Group 
Racial/Ethnic Group 
Percent Scoring AFQT 31 or Above (AFQT I-III) 
PAY80 PAY97 
Whitea 78.6 84.5 
Black 30.1 50.6 
Hispanic 40.9 52.6 
Total 69.7 74.6 
Note. Source: derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; aWhite 
includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic for PAY80; all racial/ethnic groups were 
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It appears that Cooper (1977) was close to being correct on both counts, but was only about 23 
years off the mark. In fact, it is this rise in the proportion of persons in AFQT Categories I-III 
from PAY80 to PAY97 that makes the numbers in Tables 7.8 through 7.10 all the more 
impressive. Assuming the pool of military-qualified persons expands – and considering the 
many complicating factors, such as the military’s force drawdown, described above – one would 
expect to find participation rates decline accordingly. Yet, we find (Table 7.10) a military 
participation rate of 40% to 59% for Black high school graduates from the PAY97 male 
population who scored in AFQT Categories I-III - along with rates of 19% to 41% for White high 
school graduates and 24% to 37% for Hispanic graduates at this aptitude level. 
The relatively higher participation rates for racial/ethnic minorities would be a good starting point 
for discussing the distribution of educational, social, and economic opportunities in the nation as 
a whole. Indeed, if one sees military service as more of a “burden” than a “benefit” – or 
describes the military as an “employer of last resort,” or as a “fallback” for young people who 
cannot afford college – higher participation rates for minorities stand as evidence of even 
greater racial inequities in society. During times of war, when service equates to hardship and 
sacrifice, such views tend to hold more weight. However, the primary years of military service 
for the PAY97 population, born between 1974 and 1979, were during the post-Desert Storm, 
post-Cold War 1990s, when peace reigned and the nation enjoyed a long span of economic 
prosperity. Still, one cannot look at military participation rates bordering on 30% or 40% or 60% 
and not be struck by a sense of how important military service has become for young men 
across America, minority and majority alike, as an option after graduating from high school.  
One also is struck by how successful the Services have been in tapping their primary recruiting 
market. Overall, just 8% of men, including 10% of those who were potentially qualified, from the 
PAY97 population have enlisted in the military (Table 7.3). But “potentially qualified” casts the 
widest possible net and does not take account of the military’s qualitative requirements that 
severely restrict the number of high school dropouts and persons with low test scores who can 
be recruited during any given year. Additionally, “potentially qualified” says nothing about those 
who are actually available or “potentially interested” in joining the military; the vast majority of 
young people express no interest in enlisting, while others would do almost anything to stay out 
of uniform. Yet, the military has become by far the single-largest employer in the United States 
of male high school graduates who score above AFQT 31 and decide to postpone or forgo 
further education, with about one-third of these men volunteering to enlist at some point in their 
early adult years.  
Whatever the underlying social, educational, or economic causes, it is time to praise the men 
and women who have managed the nation’s all-volunteer military so successfully and for so 
long – from individual recruiters in the trenches to Service and DoD officials in the Pentagon – 
for competing with higher education and civilian employers and filling the enlisted ranks with 
AFQT-qualified high school graduates. The sheer enormity of the task comes through loud and 
clear in the military participation rates for the PAY97 population. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
RELEVANCY OF PAY97 FINDINGS TO OTHER YOUTH LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 
 
It is useful to compare findings on differences between the PAY80 and PAY97 scores and those 
from other recurring assessments of youth at relatively the same point in time, namely, the 
transition from high school to the world of work. Like the PAY studies, which focus on samples 
of youth ages 18 to 23, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and 
Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT), are administered to youth of similar ages. 
NAEP has assessed representative samples of school-enrolled youth at the ages of 9, 13, and 
17 since the early 1970s in the areas of mathematics, reading, and science. Because the age 
17 assessment excludes youth who have dropped out of high school, which constitutes a 
sizable proportion of the population for some subgroups, age 13 samples are used as an 
additional point of comparison. 
The SAT and American College Test (ACT) are two of the most commonly used standardized 
tests in the college admissions process, with one test tending to dominate in different regions of 
the country. For example, the ACT tends to dominate in the Midwest, and the SAT tends to 
dominate on the East and West Coasts. Thus, while data are published annually on the 
performance of SAT test takers, the samples do not constitute a representative sample of 
college-bound youth, much less a representative sample of the youth population in general. In 
addition, the college-bound population changes over time, so changes in test score means over 
time may represent some combination of changes in the ability levels of test takers as well as 
changes in the proportion of the youth population choosing to take the test. Nonetheless, the 
SAT is taken by large numbers of students each year, making it a useful point of comparison to 
the PAY data. 
In the mathematics domain, the ASVAB Arithmetic Reasoning and Mathematics Knowledge 
scores and the Quantitative Ability factor score extracted by factor analysis (see Chapter 4) are 
compared with the NAEP Mathematics assessment at age 13 and age 17 and the SAT 
Mathematics (SAT-M) test scores. In the verbal domain, the ASVAB Word Knowledge and 
Paragraph Comprehension scores and the Verbal Ability factor score are compared with the 
NAEP reading assessment at age 13 and age 17 and the SAT Verbal (SAT-V) scores. In the 
science domain, the ASVAB General Science scores are compared with the NAEP Science 
assessment. 
The PAY80 and PAY97 data are compared with NAEP and SAT data from comparable points in 
time. Because SAT data are reported annually, the comparison to the PAY data is direct. The 
NAEP is not administered annually, however, so data on either side of the 1980 and 1997 
targets are interpolated. For the 1980 NAEP, data on tests between 1978 and 1982 were 
interpolated for mathematics and science; reading was assessed in 1980. For the 1997 NAEP, 
data on tests between 1996 and 1999 for all three subject domains were interpolated. 
NAEP ds were computed from data provided in the study of NAEP long-term trends by 
Campbell, Hombo, and Mazzeo (2000). SAT ds for 1997 were computed from the study of SAT 
long-term trends by Kobrin, Sathy, and Shaw (2006). SAT ds for 1980 were computed from 
tables of subgroup Ns, means, and SDs provided by Kobrin (2007). In these data, separate 
means and SDs were reported for Hispanic youth (Mexican-American and Puerto Rican), which 
were sample-size weighted and pooled to obtain overall Hispanic values. Because the SAT 
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score scales were recentered between the 1980 and 1997 administrations, 1980 means were 
converted to the 1997 metric (Dorans, 2002). 
It should be emphasized that there is no reason to expect comparable findings across these 
different tests. Differences in findings might be attributable to a combination of factors, including: 
 Constructs measured—Tests have been grouped as a function of being in the same 
broad domain. Yet tests within a domain can differ, as exemplified by the fact that 
different patterns of change are seen for the two verbal and two quantitative tests 
included in the ASVAB. 
 Populations tested—The PAY studies are a representative sample of the nation’s youth. 
The NAEP-17 is narrower. As a school-based test it does not include high school 
dropouts. The SAT is narrower still, in that it reflects only those youth applying for entry 
to a post-secondary institution for which the SAT is required or requested. Because 
changes on some ASVAB tests in the PAY samples are concentrated in the lower tail of 
the distribution, changes may be observed in samples that include the lower tail, such as 
the PAY studies, that are not observed in samples less influenced by the lower tail, such 
as the SAT. 
 Links to academic curricula—NAEP covers material linked to school curricula. In theory, 
increases in instructional effectiveness over time would be expected to be manifested 
more directly on this test than on the ASVAB or SAT, which are not linked to a specific 
curriculum. 
1997 to 1980 ds 
Table 8.1 presents standardized mean ds between 1997 and 1980 for the total samples and the 
male, female, White, Black, and Hispanic subgroups for each of these tests. While there are some 
points of convergence between the samples, a number of differences also are apparent. In the 
mathematics domain, for example, total sample change from 1980 to 1997 is estimated at 0.10 
using the PAY Quantitative Ability factor score, 0.13 using SAT-M, and 0.27 using NAEP-17. 
Similar patterns are found for the male, female, and White subgroups in the mathematics domain. 
PAY and NAEP show more substantial score improvement for the Black and Hispanic 
subgroups than for the White subgroup, while SAT-M shows essentially equivalent gains across 
all groups. The smaller gain by the Black and Hispanic subgroups on the SAT-M might reflect 
the finding that the mean gain for these subgroups in the PAY data is driven primarily by a 
change in the lower tail of the distribution. 
In the verbal domain, all tests showed little change in the total sample or for the female, male, 
and White subgroups. All tests did show change, however, for the Black subgroup (d = 0.33 on 
ASVAB Verbal Ability factor, 0.46 on NAEP-17, and 0.22 on SAT-V) and the Hispanic subgroup 
(d = 0.23 on ASVAB Verbal Ability factor, 0.15 on age 17 NAEP, and 0.09 on SAT-V), while the 
White subgroup’s mean scores showed little change (d = 0.07 on ASVAB Verbal Ability factor, 
0.05 on NAEP-17, and 0.03 on SAT-V). 
A marked contrast is evident between findings from the General Science test in ASVAB and the 
NAEP Science assessment in the science domain. The ASVAB test showed little overall change 
(d = -0.01), while the NAEP-17 showed substantial change (d = 0.24). Both measures showed 
greater improvement for the Black and Hispanic subgroups than for the White subgroup. 
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Table 8.1. 1997-1980 ds by Gender and Race/Ethnicity 
Composite Total Male Female White Black Hispanic 
AFQT 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.45 0.25 
Math 
PAY Arithmetic Reasoning 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.22 
PAY Mathematics Knowledge 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.18 0.45 0.29 
PAY Q Factor 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.24 
NAEP 13 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.25 0.46 0.35 
NAEP 17 0.27 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.47 0.50 
SAT-Math 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.10 
Verbal 
PAY Word Knowledge 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.49 0.33 
PAY Paragraph Comprehension -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.18 0.16 
PAY V Factor 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.33 0.23 
NAEP 13 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 
NAEP 17 0.08 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.46 0.15 
SAT-Verbal 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.09 
Science 
PAY General Science —0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.14 
NAEP 13 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.26 
NAEP 17 0.24 0.14 0.30 0.24 0.47 0.42 
 
White-Black and White-Hispanic ds 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the effects of the subgroup changes (see Table 8.1) on the magnitude of 
subgroup differences. Table 8.2 shows subgroup ds by race/ethnicity for 1980 and 1997, as well as 
the percent change in d over this time period; Table 8.3 shows changes by gender. 
The general trend in Table 8.2 is a reduction in the magnitude of White-Black and White-Hispanic ds 
between 1980 and 1997. The NAEP-13 Science assessment is the only exception. Estimates of 
both the magnitude of the reduction and the values of d, however, vary across tests.  
In the mathematics domain, PAY shows both the largest reduction in White-Black d (13.1% on the 
Quantitative Ability factor) and the lowest values of 1997 White-Black d, relative to the other tests (d 
= 0.73 on the PAY Quantitative Ability factor versus d = 1.00 and 1.01 on NAEP-17 and SAT-M, 
respectively). For the Hispanic subgroup, the 1997 ds are quite similar across tests (0.61 for the 
PAY Quantitative Ability factor, 0.71 on NAEP-17, and 0.64 on SAT-M). 
In the verbal domain, NAEP-17 produces a 44.4% reduction in White-Black d, with the 1997 d = 
0.69. Both the PAY Verbal Ability factor and SAT-V produce smaller estimates of the reduction 
(21.5% and 9.8%, respectively), and larger estimates of 1997 d (1.02 and 0.92, respectively). 
For the Hispanic subgroup, the PAY Verbal Ability factor shows the largest reduction (17.9%), 
but also the largest 1997 White-Hispanic d (0.87, relative to 0.64 for the other two tests). 
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Table 8.2. Comparison of 1980 and 1997 White-Black and White-Hispanic ds 
 White-Black White-Hispanic 
Composite 1980 d 1997 d 
% 
Reduction 1980 d 1997 d 
% 
Reduction 
AFQT 1.20 0.97 19.2% 0.92 0.84 8.7% 
Math 
PAY Arithmetic Reasoning 1.13 0.91 19.5% 0.85 0.68 20.0% 
PAY Mathematics Knowledge 0.86 0.68 20.9% 0.73 0.65 11.0% 
PAY Q Factor 0.84 0.73 13.1% 0.70 0.61 12.9% 
NAEP 13 1.05 0.94 10.4% 0.77 0.77 0.0% 
NAEP 17 1.04 1.00 3.8% 0.86 0.71 17.4% 
SAT-Math 1.04 1.01 2.9% 0.66 0.63 4.5% 
Verbal 
PAY Word Knowledge 1.34 1.03 23.1% 1.03 0.88 14.6% 
PAY Paragraph Comprehension 1.11 0.87 21.6% 0.93 0.71 23.7% 
PAY V Factor 1.30 1.02 21.5% 1.06 0.87 17.9% 
NAEP 13 0.91 0.80 12.1% 0.76 0.65 14.5% 
NAEP 17 1.24 0.69 44.4% 0.79 0.64 18.9% 
SAT-Verbal 1.02 0.92 9.8% 0.69 0.64 7.2% 
Science 
PAY General Science 1.22 1.13 7.7% 1.01 0.93 7.9% 
NAEP 13 1.07 1.05 1.9% 0.90 0.95 (+5.5%) 
NAEP 17 1.35 1.11 17.8% 0.90 0.79 12.2% 
 
In the science domain, findings converge to a greater degree. Both the ASVAB General Science 
test and the NAEP-17 Science assessment show similar reductions in d for the Black (7.4% and 
17.8%) and Hispanic subgroups (7.9% and 12.2%), and relatively similar d values for the Black 
(1.13 and 1.11) and Hispanic (0.93 and 0.79) subgroups. 
Male-Female ds 
Table 8.3 also shows divergent findings for female-male ds. In the mathematics domain, all 
three tests show a reduction in female-male ds from 1980 to 1997. The three produce different 
estimates of the size of the gender gap in 1997, however, with the SAT-M d (0.32) substantially 
larger than the PAY and NAEP-17 values of 0.13 and 0.08, respectively. 
In the verbal domain, both PAY and SAT-V produce near-zero differences in both 1980 and 
1997. In contrast, NAEP-17 shows higher d for women in 1980 (-0.20), increasing to -0.33 in 
1997. In the science domain, both PAY and NAEP-17 show higher means for men, and both 
suggest some reduction in the gap.  
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Table 8.3. Comparison of 1980 and 1997 Male-Female ds 
 1980 d 1997 d 
AFQT 0.10 0.08 
Math 
PAY Arithmetic Reasoning 0.28 0.25 
PAY Math Knowledge 0.14 0.02 
PAY Q Factor 0.24 0.13 
NAEP 13 -0.00 0.11 
NAEP 17 0.18 0.08 
SAT-Math 0.41 0.32 
Verbal 
PAY Word Knowledge -0.01 0.03 
PAY Paragraph Comprehension -0.19 -0.12 
PAY V Factor -0.06 -0.01 
NAEP 13 -0.25 -0.31 
NAEP 17 -0.20 -0.33 
SAT-Verbal 0.07 0.04 
Science 
PAY General Science 0.36 0.31 
NAEP 13 0.23 0.19 
NAEP 17 0.38 0.20 
 
 
ASVAB Scores as a Measure of College Preparedness 
The AFQT, composed of two verbal and two quantitative tests, has considerable commonality 
with the SAT, which until recently was composed of verbal and quantitative tests (a writing test 
was added to the SAT in 2005) and to the ACT. Neither the SAT nor ACT include any content 
analogous to the ASVAB speeded tests in PAY80, or to the tests making up the PAY97 ASVAB 
Technical Knowledge factor—Automotive Information, Shop Information, Electronics 
Information, and Mechanical Comprehension. 
Evidence of the relationship between data from the AFQT and the SAT is provided by Frey and 
Detterman (2004), who used NLSY79 data. Follow-up data collection added SAT scores for those 
who took the SAT. Based on a sample of 917 youth, they report a correlation of 0.82 between SAT 
scores and scores on the AFQT. A correlation of 0.94 for the AFQT in both the PAY80 and PAY97 
sample was found, leading to the conclusion that a strong relationship exists between the SAT used 
for college admissions and the AFQT used for military enlistment qualification. 
Consideration of the implications of the PAY80 and PAY97 findings for higher education is aided 
by a concordance between the SAT and ACT and the AFQT. Table 8.4 relates SAT, ACT, and 
AFQT scores using the PAY97 AFQT score scale (Segall, 2006). These values should be 
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treated with caution, however. Broad trends are more appropriate than score projection for a 
given individual on one test than another. 
Table 8.4. Comparison of SAT, ACT, and AFQT scores using the PAY97 AFQT Score-
Scale 
AFQT Category and Percentile SAT(V+M) ACT 
IV-C (10-15) 500-530 11 
IV-B (16-20) 540-590 12 
IV-A (21-30) 600-680 13-14 
III-B (31-49) 690-800 15-16 
III-A (50-64) 810-900 17-18 
II (65-92) 910-1180 19-26 
I (93-99) 1190-1600 27-36 
 
Several insights emerge from examining Table 8.4. For example, clear differences exist 
between the youth population as a whole and the population taking the SAT. The college-bound 
population had markedly higher verbal and quantitative scores on the SAT and AFQT than the 
youth population in general. For example, those working in the college admissions field are 
used to viewing a combined SAT (verbal plus mathematics) score of 1,000 as an average score. 
While average among SAT takers, this score is at approximately the 75th percentile of the youth 
population in general. Conversely, the AFQT score that defines the 50th percentile of the youth 
population corresponds to an SAT Verbal +Math score of approximately 800, which is in the 
10th to 15th percentile among applicants for higher education. 
Such a score marks the low end of the score range that the Military Services define as “high-
quality applicants” (AFQT Categories I, II, and IIIA) and that constitute the top half of the youth 
population. For example, an individual at the 51st percentile in the youth population is viewed as 
a high-quality applicant by the Services but is in the bottom 10% to 15% of college applicants. 
Thus, it is useful to clearly understand that college applicants are markedly higher in ability than 
the youth population in general. 
Another analysis leading to a comparable conclusion was performed by Bridgeman (2005), who 
used results from the Frey and Detterman (2004) study to estimate the Intelligence Quotient 
(IQ) scores from SAT scores. The mean SAT score among this representative sample of youth 
corresponded to an IQ score of 115. As the IQ metric has a mean of 100 and a SD of 15, this 
indicates the average individual taking the SAT scores about 1 SD above the mean in IQ. This 
again shows that the college applicant population is markedly higher in ability than the youth 
population in general. 
This perspective aids in interpreting the implications of the PAY80 and PAY97 findings for 
higher education. First, note that the overall comparison of the AFQT distributions in 1980 and 
1997 shows almost no overall mean difference. In particular, as Figure 8.1 shows, there is 
virtually no change in score distributions in the top half of the AFQT distribution between PAY80 
and PAY97. Thus, to the extent that high scores on cognitive tests such as the AFQT signal 
college readiness, no evidence exists of a meaningful change in the proportion of college-ready 
youth between PAY80 and PAY97. 
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Figure 8.1 Overall AFQT Distributions by Year of PAY Study 
 
Second, a question of great interest to colleges and universities is whether there have been 
changes in the proportion of college-ready minority youth. While findings show mean AFQT score 
gains for Black (0.45) and Hispanic (0.25) youth between PAY80 and PAY97 (see Chapter 4, 
Changes in Mean Test Score by Race/Ethnicity), Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show those gains were 
concentrated in the lower half of the AFQT score distribution in the broad youth population. In light of 
the above discussion about differences between the broad youth population and the college-bound 
population, this finding can be rephrased as indicating that score improvements are primarily in the 
range below the average SAT score of 1,000. Thus, there has been no meaningful increase in the 
proportion of minority youth scoring above the SAT mean of 1,000, which is in the range typically of 
interest to modestly selective colleges and universities. 
 
Figure 8.2 Black AFQT Distributions by Year of PAY Study 
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Third, analyses presented in Table 4.32 of Chapter 4 showed the mean AFQT levels at each 
education level—high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate—
decreased between PAY80 and PAY97. Decreases in mean AFQT for the four education levels 
were -0.28, -0.21, -0.30, and -0.23, respectively. This is the result of combining two facts: (a) overall 
levels of AFQT have not increased in the youth population and (b) the proportion of youth 
completing high school, pursuing college, and completing college has increased. This means the 
mean ability level of the college-enrolled and college graduate populations was lower in PAY97 than 
in PAY80. While many selective colleges and universities have maintained, or even increased, the 
mean ability levels of their students, in the aggregate, the mean level of college-readiness, as 
signaled by AFQT scores, declined as a result of the upward shift in the proportion of youth pursuing 
higher education. Thus, to the extent that AFQT scores signal readiness for college work, a larger 
number of less-prepared students entered college in 1997 than in 1980. 
 
Figure 8.3 Hispanic AFQT Distributions by Year of PAY Study 
 
Interpretation of Results 
The comparisons of results from varying assessments are presented with some trepidation because 
the differences between the assessments are not readily interpretable. The assessments differ in 
the populations studied, the tests used, and the degree to which test content is linked to formal 
instruction. The lack of convergence should not be viewed as evidence of error, however. Each of 
these findings is simply a descriptive fact about the performance of different populations of interest 
that have taken different tests. The comparisons are useful as a warning against quick 
overgeneralizations; that is, a tendency to view any one of these estimates as revealing some 
universal truth about group differences on tests in the domain in question. 
In the grand scheme of things, though, the findings are more similar than different. In all cases, 
for example, racial/ethnic group differences are greater than gender differences. White-Black 
differences are greater than White-Hispanic differences. White-Black and White-Hispanic 
differences were smaller in 1997 than they were in 1980, though the reduction is modest relative 
to the size of the remaining gap. In this sense, there is broad convergence across the three 
assessments. Overall, however, these findings suggest there have not been any critical events 
since PAY97 that would have dramatically affected the test scores.
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CHAPTER 9 
 
PAY97 IN PERSPECTIVE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
 
The military’s selection and occupational assignment process for the enlisted force relies heavily 
on scores from a single test—the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The 
ASVAB currently is normed against a nationally representative sample of young people between 
the ages of 18 to 23. The most recent testing was completed in 1997, and the norms were 
implemented in 2004. Prior to 2004, the ASVAB was normed against a nationally representative 
sample of young people, again between the ages 18 to 23, who were tested in 1980. The 
Department of Labor’s (DoL’s) National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) provided both 
national probability samples, with the earlier sample drawn in the late 1970s and the latter 
drawn in the mid-1990s. Both norming efforts are called the Profile of American Youth (PAY) 
and designated by the year of testing—PAY80 and PAY97. 
This chapter summarizes the substantive differences in test scores in the context of shifting 
socio-demographic factors over the 17-year period between the two PAY studies. PAY97 data 
also are compared to commercial standardized test scores to evaluate their validity more than 
10 years after the study was completed. In addition, the issues affecting decisions for a future 
renorming are examined, followed by “lessons learned” and recommendations that highlight 
topics for discussion. To ensure the effectiveness and accuracy of renorming the ASVAB, 
comprehensive planning should begin soon. 
Differences in Test Scores 
Four high-level aggregate measures are used to assess changes in abilities measured by the 
ASVAB between the PAY80 and PAY97 studies. Measuring general cognitive ability, the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a composite of the Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics 
Knowledge, Word Knowledge, and Paragraph Comprehension tests. Three content-based 
aggregates are used: a Quantitative Ability composite made up of the Arithmetic Reasoning and 
Mathematics Knowledge tests; a Verbal Ability composite of the Word Knowledge and 
Paragraph Comprehension tests; and a Technical Knowledge composite comprising the 
Automotive-Shop Information, Electronics Information, and Mechanical Comprehension tests 
(see Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation of the composites and the tests that comprise 
the ASVAB). 
The well-established metric of the standardized mean difference (d) is used because it permits 
comparisons across tests measured on different scales. This metric divides the mean 
difference—for example, the PAY97 mean minus the PAY80 mean—by the test standard 
deviation (SD). The PAY80 SD is used because it allows change to be expressed relative to the 
test mean and SD at the first testing period. The d index thus expresses change in SD units. For 
example, a d of 0.0 indicates no mean difference; a d of 1.0 indicates the mean has increased 
by 1 SD; and a d of -0.50 indicates the mean has decreased by 0.50 SD.  
Comparisons of PAY80 and PAY97 ASVAB scores rely on two primary assumptions. The first is 
that the two samples are comparable in terms of how accurately they represent the youth 
population at the time the sampling was drawn. The second is that the change in test format 
from paper-and-pencil (P&P) administration in 1980 to computer-adaptive technology (CAT) 
administration in 1997 did not have a meaningful effect on test scores.  
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To address the first assumption, the analyses reported and discussed in this book apply a set of 
weights developed by MaCurdy and Vytlacil (2003) to the PAY97 data (see Appendix C). 
Weighting is required because the PAY97 data were not based on a simple or proportional 
random sample of the youth population. Furthermore, due to coverage and non-response 
problems during the data collection, the PAY97 data contain an under-representation of military-
aged youth (ages 18 to 23). For example, the PAY97 data contain an under-representation of 
military-aged youth (ages 18 to 23) (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003; Ericksen, 2000) due to difficulties 
in finding eligible respondents within the households screened for the NLSY project. 
Consequently, cases were weighted to align sample makeup to the national youth population.  
To address the second assumption, extensive research has been conducted on the 
comparability of P&P and CAT administrations of ASVAB. The general pattern of findings is that 
the two versions can successfully be equated. Caveats remain, and they are discussed later in 
this chapter (for example, equating has been done in military enlisted samples, which do not 
include the bottom 10% of the population).  
Overall Changes in General Cognitive Ability 
A comparison of AFQT scores for the total populations from the PAY80 and PAY97 data show a 
mean difference of d = 0.07, which is not statistically significantly different from zero. However, 
findings from an examination of the major demographic subgroups of race/ethnicity and gender 
look quite different. Differences across PAY samples by gender are extremely small—d = -0.05 
for males and 0.09 for females—and are not reliably different from zero. On the other hand, 
differences across PAY samples by race/ethnicity are considerably larger—d = 0.11 for Whites, 
0.45 for Blacks, and 0.25 for Hispanics. 
At first glance, the race/ethnicity findings appear inconsistent with the overall findings. Both 
findings are compatible, however, due to the change in the proportional makeup of the youth 
population in the 17 years between the studies. Specifically, Black and Hispanic youth 
comprised a larger proportion of the population in 1997 than in 1980.  
MaCurdy and Vytlacil (2003) used the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data to document the percentage increase of the Hispanic youth population from 7.0% in 
1980 to 14.8% in 1997, and the increase in the Black youth population from 12.5% to 14.8%. 
The fact that Black and Hispanic groups have lower AFQT mean scores than Whites results in 
the overall mean difference of d = 0.07. Even though all groups showed mean score increases 
between PAY80 and PAY97, the percentage increases in the Hispanic and Black populations 
result in a very small, and statistically nonsignificant, overall change in AFQT scores. 
Regression analyses conducted to estimate changes in AFQT scores--after controlling for 
race/ethnicity, gender, age, and geographic region--estimated the improvement in AFQT scores 
from PAY80 to PAY97 to be 1.42 points. As AFQT was rescaled from a uniformly distributed 
percentile score to a normal distribution (mean = 50.0, SD = 10.0) to meet normality 
assumptions, this 1.42 point change reflects d = 0.14. Thus, a similarly situated youth of the 
same age, race/ethnicity, gender, and region would be expected to score higher on the AFQT in 
1997 than in 1980 by 0.14 SD units. We attribute the appearance of a nonsignificant score 
change in overall means to the changes in the demographic composition of the youth population 
and to the fact that the mean comparison is a less powerful test than the regression analysis.  
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Changes in Specific Ability Factor Scores 
An analysis of the Verbal Ability, Quantitative Ability, and Technical Knowledge composite 
scores parallels the discussion of the AFQT scores above. Table 9.1 summarizes the findings 
for the AFQT and three composite scores. 
Table 9.1. Test Score Differences between PAY80 and PAY97 
ASVAB Composite 
Overall Youth 







AFQT 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.45 0.25 0.11 
Verbal 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.33 0.23 0.07 
Technical -0.29 -0.36 -0.31 -0.10 -0.02 -0.27 
Quantitative 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.24 0.12 
Note: Table values are standard mean differences (ds); positive values indicate higher scores in 1997 
than in 1980. *Youth population is comprised of 18-23 year olds in comparison of PAY97 to PAY80; 
AFQT=Armed Forces Qualification Test; V=Verbal ability factor; T=Technical ability factor; Q=Quantitative 
ability factor.  
 
As illustrated in the first column of Table 9.1, both the Verbal Ability and Quantitative Ability 
composites, like the AFQT, show small changes not reliably different from zero. Technical 
Knowledge, on the other hand, shows a decrease in scores from 1980 to 1997 of d = -0.29. 
Youth scored lower, on average, on Automotive-Shop Information, Electronics Information, and 
Mechanical Comprehension in 1997 than they did in 1980. The decline in test scores on these 
knowledge tests might be linked to the smaller number of high-achieving students opting to 
enroll in high school vocational education courses versus college-prep courses. This is 
substantiated by an increase in the number of students pursuing post-secondary education 
between 1980 and 1997 (discussed below in the section titled, “Role of Education in 
Understanding Changes in Ability”). 
The next two columns on the right show score differences by gender. Male and female scores 
for Verbal Ability are virtually identical. Both males and females show comparable decreases 
from 1980 to 1997 in Technical Knowledge scores. Male scores are virtually identical for 
Quantitative Ability, while female scores show a small improvement. 
The last three columns in Table 9.1 show minimal changes for Whites on Verbal Ability and 
Quantitative Ability scores, while Blacks and Hispanics show gains in both. For Technical 
Knowledge scores, Blacks and Hispanics hold steady while Whites show a decrease. This 
difference by race/ethnicity is puzzling because national data indicate a comparable reduction in 
vocational education credits during the same period for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. 
Therefore, differential course-taking does not explain these findings. 
In summary, the findings of greatest interest are the overall decline in Technical Knowledge 
scores and the differences by race/ethnicity in the three composites. For Verbal Ability and 
Quantitative Ability, score improvement occurs for Blacks and Hispanics while scores for Whites 
essentially are unchanged. Technical Knowledge scores for Blacks and Hispanics, however, 
remained about the same while scores for Whites decreased.  
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Score Changes by Race/Ethnicity and Gender 
The findings that scores for Blacks and Hispanics improved on the AFQT and the Verbal Ability 
and Quantitative Ability composites, paired with the discovery of virtually no change in scores 
for Whites in these three factors, suggest that mean White-Black and White-Hispanic score 
gaps have narrowed. To set the stage for a discussion of these findings, it is useful to put them 
in the context of the literature on White-Black and White-Hispanic differences. Mean White-
Black differences on tests of general ability of approximately 1.00 SD and White-Hispanic 
differences of approximately 0.67 SD (Bobko, Roth, & Potosky, 1999; Roth, Bevier, Bobko, 
Switzer, & Tyler, 2001; Schmitt, Clause, & Pulakos, 1996) have been reported consistently, 
although conflicting evidence exists about whether these gaps have decreased in recent years. 
Table 9.2 shows the differences for the AFQT and the three composites. 
Table 9.2. Subgroup Score Differences between PAY80 and PAY97 
 White-Black d White-Hispanic d 
ASVAB Composite PAY80 PAY97 PAY80 PAY97 
AFQT 1.20 0.97 0.92 0.84 
Verbal 1.30 1.02 1.06 0.87 
Technical 1.24 1.13 0.88 0.70 
Quantitative 0.84 0.73 0.70 0.61 
Note. Table values are standard mean differences (ds); Positive values indicate a higher value for the 
referent group (e.g., Whites, males); AFQT = Armed Forces Qualification Test; V=Verbal ability factor; 
T=Technical ability factor; Q=Quantitative ability factor. 
 
Without exception, the ds are smaller in 1997 than in 1980. The decrease is proportionately 
larger for Verbal Ability than for the other composites, though in absolute terms the ds remain 
smaller in the Quantitative Ability domain than in the others. While the narrowing of mean test 
score gaps is good news, mean score gaps remain substantial.   
Turning to differences by gender, Table 9.3 summarizes gender differences for the AFQT and 
three composites. AFQT scores for females are lower than for males by a modest amount. The 
female mean score on Quantitative Ability is lower than the male score, although the difference 
has narrowed from 0.24 in 1980 to 0.13 in 1997. The large female-male difference in the 
Technical Knowledge composite might be reflective of the technical knowledge domains, 
namely Automotive-Shop Information, Electronics Information, and Mechanical Comprehension, 
which usually are considered of greater interest to males than to females. 
Table 9.3. Male-Female Score Differences between PAY80 and PAY97 
 Male-Female 
ASVAB Composite 1980 1997 
AFQT 0.10 0.08 
Verbal -0.06 -0.01 
Technical 1.24 1.15 
Quantitative 0.24 0.13 
Note. Table values are standard mean differences (ds); Positive values indicate a higher value for 
the referent group (e.g., Whites, males). 
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Changes Found Throughout the Score Distribution 
While a d of 0.00 indicates “no mean change,” the implication is not necessarily “no change.” 
For example, the distribution might remain centered around the same mean but become flatter 
with more scores in the extreme tails or more peaked with more scores in the central part of the 
score distribution. Similarly, a d of a given magnitude, such as d = 0.30, might result from an 
upward shift throughout the score distribution or from a shift in only one portion of the 
distribution, with other portions of the distribution remaining unchanged. Score distribution plots 
were examined to gain insight into the source of the changes observed in mean scores.  
The finding of greatest significance is that score improvement was concentrated at the lower tail 
of the test score distribution for Blacks and Hispanics on the AFQT and the Verbal Ability and 
Quantitative Ability composites. Figure 9.1 shows the distribution of AFQT scores for Blacks in 
1980 and 1997. The pattern is one of fewer individuals at the lower tail, more in the middle of 
the distribution, but little change in the upper quartile of the distribution. Thus, the finding that 
general cognitive ability mean scores for Blacks and Hispanics were higher in 1997 than in 1980 
needs to be carefully qualified by noting the nature of the score-change pattern. For example, 
the figure shows little change from 1980 to 1997 in the proportion of Blacks scoring above the 
overall 75th percentile.  
  
Figure 9.1 AFQT Score Distribution for Blacks by Percentile 
 
For an institution interested in recruiting Black youth in this segment of the score range, such as 
a selective college or university, the data show no substantial increase in the proportion of Black 
youth scoring in this range. On the other hand, for an institution such as the U.S. military, which 
views scores in the 30th to 50th percentile range as acceptable for certain occupations, the data 
show a marked increase in the proportion of Black youth scoring in this range.  
Role of Education in Understanding Changes in Cognitive Ability 
A strong relationship exists between AFQT scores and educational attainment. In the 1997 data, 
22-year-olds whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school diploma outscore 
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those without a diploma by an average of 0.68 SD; those with some college outscore those with 
a high school diploma by 0.87 SD, and those with a college degree outscore those with some 
college by 0.59 SD. These differences are additive, so those with a college degree outscore 
those without a high school diploma by an average of 2.14 SD.  
A substantial change in educational attainment was observed between 1980 and 1997. 
Proportionately more youth are completing high school and pursuing higher education. MaCurdy 
and Vytlacil (2003) used CPS data to report that the percentage of 18- to 23-year-olds with at 
least some college increased from 30.7% in 1980 to 43.8% in 1997.  
Although estimates of change in overall cognitive ability are positive—d = 0.14—after controlling 
for age, gender, race/ethnicity, and region—the ability changes are smaller than the changes in 
educational attainment. Thus, the mean ability level has decreased at all levels of educational 
achievement. In other words, college graduates in 1997 demonstrated less ability as measured 
by the AFQT than did college graduates in 1980 due to the fact that individuals with lower AFQT 
scores were more likely to pursue and attain a college degree in 1997 than in 1980. 
This change can be viewed through different lenses. Some might lament a decline in 
educational standards; others might be pleased that higher levels of education are available to a 
larger proportion of young people. Regardless of viewpoint, understanding this fact is essential 
to understanding the pattern of ability differences between 1980 and 1997.  
When education is added to the prior set of controls—age, race/ethnicity, gender, and region—
regression models estimate a decline in AFQT scores of 1.87 points, or 0.19 SD. For purposes 
of the present discussion, this is interpreted as the change in the mean ability level of youth 
attaining a given level of education in 1997 versus 1980, likely influenced by the change in 
access to higher education. 
Test Score Validation Post-1997 
PAY97 data now are well over a decade old, raising questions about their value. To determine 
whether significant changes in the mean level of the abilities measured by the ASVAB have 
occurred in the ensuing time period, data from two college admissions testing programs—the 
Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) and the American College Test (ACT)—and the 12th grade 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) are compared with the PAY97 data.  
While the PAY studies are unique in their attempt to sample the full youth population, college 
admissions tests are taken by self-selected samples of college-bound youth. Thus, score changes 
can reflect real changes over time or changes in the portion of the youth population choosing to 
take the tests. NAEP, a high school-based test, does not include individuals who have dropped 
out of school. Score changes therefore can reflect real changes over time or changes in the 
portion of the youth population persisting through 12th grade. The motivation of 12th graders taking 
the NAEP also may be an issue because test scores are not used to determine high school 
graduation or college admission (U.S. Department of Education, 2004). Even with these caveats, 
however, it is useful to look to these data for indications of score changes. 
Overall Test Score Changes Post-1997 
Table 9.4 shows mean differences between the most recent available data and 1997 data for 
the components of the ACT, SAT, and NAEP. These values generally are small and offer no 
consistent pattern. For example, the English/Verbal/Reading domain shows small negative 
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effects for the SAT and NAEP and a small positive effect for the ACT. Averaging across tests 
produces a mean of d = -0.02. For the mathematics domain, the mean is d = 0.03. Thus, the 
three testing programs do not suggest any substantial test score changes since 1997. 
Table 9.4. Test Score Changes Post 1997 of Selected Standardized Tests 
 Article I. 2007-1997 
ACT English 0.04 
ACT Mathematics 0.04 
ACT Reading 0.00 
ACT Composite 0.02 
 2008-1997 
SAT Verbal -0.03 
SAT Mathematics 0.04 
 2004-1997 
NAEP Mathematics 0.00 
NAEP Reading -0.07 
Note. Table values are standard mean differences (ds); positive values indicate higher 
scores for the comparison year compared to 1997. 
 
Test Score Changes by Race/Ethnicity Post-1997 
Table 9.5 shows data drawn from Sackett and Shen (2009) on White-Black and White-Hispanic 
ds for 1997 data and for the most recent data available at the time of their writing. While 
individual samples do show some differences in the White-Black comparison, averaging the 
SAT, ACT, and NAEP verbal scores and the SAT, ACT, and NAEP mathematics scores results 
in small differences on the order of d = 0.02 between 1997 data and post-1997 data.  
Table 9.5. White-Black and White-Hispanic Mean ds Post 1997 
 White-Black White-Hispanic 
 1997 2007 1997 2007 
ACT English 0.89 0.95 0.60 0.70 
ACT Mathematics 0.86 0.92 0.44 0.53 
ACT Reading 0.84 0.89 0.52 0.61 
ACT Composite 0.98 1.02 0.59 0.68 
 1997 2008 1997 2008 
SAT Verbal 0.91 0.92 0.68 0.69 
SAT Mathematics 1.01 1.04 0.64 0.71 
 1997 2004 1997 2004 
NAEP Mathematics 1.05 1.05 0.79 0.88 
NAEP Reading 0.75 0.70 0.59 0.70 
Note. Table values are standard mean differences (ds); Positive values indicate a higher value for the 
referent group (e.g., Whites, males). 
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The White-Hispanic differences are greater than the White-Black differences and consistent 
across all three datasets, with average increases of approximately d = 0.08. While the PAY data 
show a decrease in White-Hispanic differences from 1980 to 1997, the SAT, ACT, and NAEP 
data show an increase in White-Hispanic differences post-1997. Determining whether these 
effects could be replicated in a population-based sample, such as a new PAY data collection, 
would be useful. 
Test Score Changes by Gender Post-1997 
The question of whether the female-male gap in mathematics is changing is of considerable 
interest. For example, Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, and Williams (2008) published a study 
claiming the female-male gap had been reduced to zero. The authors based their conclusions 
on two data sources. The first was data from 10 individual state testing programs linked to the 
federal No Child Left Behind legislation. Pooling data on approximately 7 million students, they 
report a mean difference of less than 0.01 SD. One concern, as pointed out by Rigdon, Kuncel, 
and Sackett (2009), however, is that these are minimum competency tests. As Rigdon et al. 
(2009) contend, showing no differences on tests that document whether students have reached 
a relatively low threshold of mathematics achievement does not substantively address the issue 
of whether historic female-male achievement gaps have been eliminated. 
Hyde et al. (2008) also drew on a unique dataset resulting from the fact that two states—
Colorado and Illinois—recently have started administering the ACT to all high school seniors. 
Hyde et al. looked at recent data from these states and reported that gender gaps have been 
eliminated, with mean differences now slightly favoring females. Ridgon et al. (2009) point out, 
however, that Hyde et al. focused on the gender gap in the composite score, which included 
measures of English, reading, and science as well as mathematics. Ridgon et al. analyzed 
solely the mathematics subset from these ACT data for Colorado and Illinois and reported that 
female-male differences for Colorado and Illinois are both d = 0.16, showing males score 
higher.  
To further examine this issue, Table 9.6 draws on ACT, SAT, and NAEP data on mean score 
changes by gender since 1997. Averaging across the three data sources, the mean change for 
verbal tests is 0.00 and the mean change for mathematics tests is a 0.04 reduction in the male 
advantage over females. In all three datasets, males maintain an advantage over females in 
mathematics. As noted earlier, the SAT and ACT results are based on self-selected samples, thus 
different findings may result from more nationally representative samples. A new nationally 
representative PAY sample would be of great use in addressing the issue of the gender gap in 
mathematics achievement. 
Potential Uses of PAY80 and PAY97 Data 
Both the PAY80 and PAY97 datasets are not only rare, but unique. For example, PAY80 
marked the first time a vocational aptitude test was administered to a nationally representative 
sample. PAY97 marked the second administration of a vocational aptitude test to a nationally 
representative sample of youth, but this time using CAT. As seen in Chapter 2, both studies also 
were conducted in times of rigorous national discussion regarding socio-demographic factors as 
well as the relevancy of cognitive testing. 
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Table 9.6. Male-Female Mean ds Post 1997 
 Male-Female Male-Female 
 1997 2007 
ACT English -0.15 -0.13 
ACT Mathematics 0.24 0.22 
ACT Reading -0.05 -0.08 
ACT Composite 0.06 0.04 
 1997 2008 
SAT Verbal 0.04 0.04 
SAT Mathematics 0.32 0.29 
 1997 2004 
NAEP Mathematics 0.17 0.10 
NAEP Reading -0.33 -0.33 
Note. 1997 values for NAEP represent averages of 1996 and 1998 data. 
Standard errors should be used to interpret all d values in columns; Positive 
values indicate a higher value for the referent group (e.g., Whites, males). 
 
Indeed, while Department of Defense (DoD) researchers were still analyzing results from 
PAY80 and meeting privately with minority interest groups to discuss the study, Stephen Jay 
Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (1981) was rapidly becoming a widely read, hotly debated 
book in scholarly and non-academic circles alike. Among other matters, Gould’s central thesis 
questioned the use of psychological testing to measure certain abstract concepts of basic 
human ability. Just prior to the PAY97 study, another book appeared that would reignite debate 
over the value of testing and the meaning of individual differences in cognitive ability. In 1994, 
The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) 
set off a firestorm of debate that has continued to this day. Of particular importance to the timing 
of the PAY97 study, The Bell Curve used PAY80 data as a principal source for estimating levels 
of “intelligence” and population differences based on this measure.  
Just as DoD was set to administer PAY97, social scientists and various other scholars were 
ferociously arguing the merits of ability testing in a resurgent controversy over intelligence 
testing and its implications. Gould’s revised edition of The Mismeasure of Man (1996)—along 
with a torrent of other commentary and publications spawned by The Bell Curve and its later 
paperback edition (1996)—were fueling academic and policy debates throughout the country. 
Amid this heated discussion, PAY97 quietly pursued the goal of updating PAY80, which had 
become the unexpected center of a controversy upon its initial release and then again with the 
publication of The Bell Curve years later.  
The most obvious potential use of PAY97 would relate to the continuing controversy regarding 
group differences that still drives research among many scholars in the behavioral and social 
sciences. Less obvious perhaps are the potential uses in numerous other areas of interest, 
captured best in the extensive bibliography of studies that utilized PAY80 data by combining the 
military’s enlistment test results with information available through NLSY. This bibliography 
includes research relating to social policy and issues, education and training, labor-force 
behavior and economic well-being, as well as various aspects of the military’s human-resource 
policies and programs (see Appendices A and B).  
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In a paper prepared for a panel discussion at the American Psychological Association’s annual 
convention in August 1982, Eitelberg and Doering summarized what they perceived to be “The 
Policy and Research Implications of the ‘Profile of American Youth.’” The authors identified 
three general areas of interest—the social context, the military context, and the nonmilitary 
context more generally. Because the PAY80 results were released about five months prior to 
this presentation, and the testing data were still not available for use by the general public, the 
authors could only speculate—based on their imagination and the specific data available in 
PAY80/NLSY—on the topics future researchers might examine.  
Under “social context,” the authors briefly addressed issues of importance in the early 1980s: 
equality of opportunity; differences in basic social services (education, health, nutrition) across 
states based on wide differences in test scores across census regions and states; educational 
opportunities, particularly for minorities within certain regions of the country; government 
spending to educate the poor and disadvantaged; and the decentralization of federal control of 
states (the “new federalism”) regarding educational, social, and economic programs.  
Other suggestions for research have been drawn from the commentary of writers who 
responded to DoD’s initial release of PAY80 results. Among those quoted by Eitelberg and 
Doering (1982) was the syndicated columnist, Carl T. Rowan, who coupled “the appalling 
diversity of educational, economic, and other opportunities across the nation” with what he saw 
as the ultimate disintegration of the country’s defense:  
That Pentagon study says to Americans: you may think that arguments over “white 
flight,” housing discrimination, gerrymandering of school districts, tax exemptions for Jim 
Crow “Christian academies” and universities, and affirmative action programs are 
separate episodes of emotionalism. But they all go to the heart of national defense—to 
the question of whether we remain strong enough to deter any foe. (pp. 62, 65)  
 
A Washington Post editorial, also quoted by Eitelberg and Doering (1982), similarly pointed out, 
“the Pentagon draws that crucial connection” between the social needs of the nation and 
national defense:  
At a time when the country is increasing its defense spending and holding down just 
about everything else, these scores provide compelling notice that there is more to 
military strength than buying tanks. The distinction between a strong defense and social 
programs is not quite as clear as you might think from listening to the current budget 
debate. (p. 65) 
 
The connection between social programs and military strength is an important one, as are the 
parallel conditions in federal spending—stressing “guns” over “butter”—at the time of PAY80 
(the Cold War) and post-PAY97 (the Global War on Terrorism). Less obvious are the effects of 
future conditions when defense priorities continue to dominate during a devastating economic 
recession that ultimately might result in sizable spending cuts across-the-board. 
Soon after release of the PAY80 results, researchers who were close to the study brainstormed 
over the many possible uses of the longitudinal database in both a military and nonmilitary 
setting (Eitelberg & Doering, 1982). The military discussion included topics or research 
questions that related to enlistment screening and the effects of varying standards, military 
personnel requirements, occupational training needs, population mobilization (under various 
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scenarios), population aptitudes for military service (geographically, demographically, and 
educationally), population participation in the military, and more generally, the role of the military 
in society.  
Research in the nonmilitary context was described as mainly an “uncharted path,” given the 
unique characteristics of the PAY80 data. Eitelberg and Doering (1982) thus wrote: “As we 
reflect on the addition of the ‘Profile’ data to the NLSY, we can only conclude that its utility, 
importance, and contribution to social science research is limited merely by the creativity, 
imagination, and perseverance of our colleagues—and, of course, the availability of funds.” The 
point about funding probably elicited a quiet laugh from academic researchers in the early 
1980s. For many in more recent times, that smile probably has been replaced by a lengthy sigh. 
A 1986 book by R. Darrell Bock and Elsie G. J. Moore, Advantage and Disadvantage: A Profile 
of American Youth, merits special mention for its groundbreaking use of PAY80 data as well as 
its essentially nonmilitary focus. This effort, funded initially by DoD, employed PAY80 “to test a 
number of contemporary theories about the origins of individual and group differences in 
vocational prospects.” As the authors wrote, “Out of this confrontation of theory and data we 
have tried to find reasons for the positions of advantage and disadvantage in which young 
people find themselves as they begin their life careers.” (p. 2.)  
Advantage and Disadvantage presents more than a dozen major conclusions about group 
differences in PAY80, divided among three primary categories—socio-cultural groups, mother’s 
education along with years of formal schooling, and gender. Considering White-Black 
differences, the topic of greatest interest in the 1980s, the study gained some measure of 
attention for its emphasis on the influence of socio-cultural factors. On this point, Bock and 
Moore found:  
It is easy to understand how education level and economic factors can affect 
performance; they measure rather directly the time and resources that go into the 
development of requisite skills. It is much more difficult, however, to explain the socio-
cultural group differences when they are considered jointly with the education and 
economic background. . . . [W]e find compelling reasons for believing that socio-cultural 
context has a much greater effect on cognitive development, and eventually on personal 
skills and vocational potential, than has previously been recognized. We find support for 
this conclusion both in the results of the Profile study and in other critical studies of 
individual differences in cognitive test performance. . . . (p. 63.) 
 
Bock and Moore (1986) offered a more encompassing conclusion that “evidence from recent 
studies contradicts the theory that differences in the average test performance of the socio-
cultural groups are of genetic origin.” (p. 155). This and other findings—particularly differences 
in test performance by youth who had the same educational level but came from different socio-
economic environments—led to a recommendation for more comprehensive and uniform 
standards of educational attainment. (p. 164). Indeed, the authors cited evidence that 
educational restructuring in the 1970s might have helped to narrow the White-Black gap in 
school achievement. “This trend is unmistakable,” Bock and Moore wrote, “and applies to 
almost all of the important school subjects at these age levels. If it continues through the 1980s 
and 1990s, we can look forward to much-reduced differences between advantaged and 
disadvantaged young people at the end of this century” (p. 164). 
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“The end of this century” likely seemed quite distant when Bock and Moore and others analyzed 
PAY80 data. With the availability of PAY97 data, which suggest a narrowing (though slight) of 
the White-Black gap on the AFQT, critics of The Bell Curve and similar studies might now argue 
that intervention and social change do matter. Similarly, those who subscribe to the “Flynn 
Effect”—including the argument that intelligence test scores rise over generations, particularly at 
the lower end of the distribution—might turn to the PAY97 results for supporting evidence. At 
the same time, others might point out that the reduction in White-Black differences is dwarfed by 
the magnitude of the remaining disparity. And Bock and Moore, who expressed hope of a 
significant closing of the gap in school achievement, now might have evidence in the narrowing 
differences in test scores on PAY97. Connecting test-score changes for different demographic 
groups of young people from PAY80 to PAY97 with environmental factors, including educational 
quality, would be a complicated task, but one that may ultimately be pursued with the unique 
PAY datasets.  
Analysts also might debate whether the 17-year period between the two PAY studies should be 
considered “enough time” for any significant closing of the White-Black gap on such tests, or 
whether the modest reduction should be viewed as comparatively important given the 
environmental influences of a single generation after many previous generations of inequality. 
Undoubtedly, the discussions and research will go on and on, as is appropriate with the PAY 
results of the past and the prospect for continuing studies in the future. The use of the PAY 
data—both by DoD and the broader research community—raise the question about when the 
next PAY study will be conducted, how it will be administered, and what abilities it will measure. 
Military Participation Rates and All-Volunteer Recruiting 
It is often said that a society should be judged by how it treats its weakest members. Perhaps 
another measure of a just society can be found in the lower enlisted ranks of a nation’s military. 
That is, who among a nation’s citizens are called upon to bear the heaviest burdens of that 
nation’s defense, possibly risking life and limb to protect the greater good? Expressed 
differently, as a national advisory commission on the Vietnam-era draft once asked, “Who 
serves when not all serve?”  
Participation in the American military is viewed variously as a right, a privilege, and a 
responsibility. Consequently, when African Americans, Japanese Americans, women, foreign-
born immigrants, or persons from other defined groups are denied serving in some capacity at 
some point in history, questions of fairness inevitably follow. Conversely, when members of 
certain groups serve in disproportionately high numbers, particularly during times of conflict, we 
likewise hear calls of inequity or injustice. A determination of fairness or social justice ultimately 
incorporates some measure of population “representation,” or the degree to which each group 
participates in proportion to its presence in a larger population. 
Soon after the release of PAY80 data, a study was conducted to determine the military 
participation rates of the PAY80 population, which included youth born from 1957 through 1962. 
The study focused on the participation rates of the PAY80 male population potentially qualified 
for military enlistment. The results of the study—showing a military participation rate of nearly 50 
percent for male Blacks who were eligible for enlistment based on aptitude and education 
standards—received widespread attention in the national news media. Some called these 
findings “astonishing,” while others praised the military for being such an important employer of 
minorities. Still others asked: what kind of society permits this to happen? 
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PAY97 results, although limited by certain demographic variables, facilitated a similar analysis of 
military participation among young adults who were born in 1974 though 1979. Noteworthy results 
are summarized in Table 9.8, which shows the military participation rates of men and women in 
the entire population as well as in select categories combining level of education and aptitude test 
scores. These select categories constitute the all-volunteer military’s primary “target market”: high 
school graduates, predominantly men, who achieve an AFQT percentile score of at least 31 and 
choose to forego college or postpone additional education. As seen in Table 9.7, a modest 8.3% 
of all men in the PAY97 population enlisted in the U.S. military. This compares with nearly one-
third of the military’s male target market and an even higher proportion (38.8%) of male high 
school graduates who scored in AFQT Categories I and II.  
In much the same way as discovered earlier for PAY80, racial/ethnic minorities in the PAY97 
population have military participation rates that tend to be remarkably higher than those of 
Whites. Indeed, over 46% of Black men who were high school graduates (only) and scored at 
least AFQT 31 had enlisted in the military. The participation rate was even higher—at over 
59%—for Black men who were high school graduates and scored in AFQT Category IIIA 
(percentile scores from 50 to 64).  
The peak enlistment years for the PAY97 population extended from the post-Desert Storm 
period (1992) through the end of the 1990s. This was a time when the Armed Forces were 
“downsizing” their ranks, following the end of the Cold War, while the nation began a long 
stretch of relative peace and economic prosperity. Clearly, the All-Volunteer Force had become, 
and continues to be, a major employer of young men who have graduated from high school and 
choose to either forego or postpone postsecondary education. This is particularly true for those 
who can achieve a “passing” score on the AFQT, and more so for minorities than for Whites. 
The considerably higher participation rates for Blacks than for Whites in this education-aptitude 
range may also reflect the distribution of opportunities for young people across society. Aside 
from the social, economic, or educational implications, these participation rates speak to the 
enormous task of the military in filling its ranks with volunteers.  
Table 9.7. Military Participation Rates (Percent) of the PAY97 Population: Selected 
Results by Gender, Racial/Ethnic Group, and Education Combined with AFQT Score 
PAY97 Population White Black Hispanic Other Total 
Total Population Born 1974-1979 
Men 8.7 10.0 5.1 9.6 8.3 
Women 1.4 2.8 1.0 2.3 1.6 
High School Graduates ≥ AFQT 31 
Men 30.1 46.2 31.0 43.5 32.6 
Women 5.7 7.9 6.2 14.1 6.5 
Male High School Graduates 
AFQT Cat I&II 40.9 41.6 26.2 29.3 38.8 
AFQT Cat IIIA 28.7 59.3 28.7 89.8* 32.6 
AFQT Cat IIIB 23.9 42.4 37.1 49.6 26.4 
 
The numbers of “recruitable” youth are constrained by at least three major factors: eligibility 
(whether a person can pass the military’s education and aptitude standards, as well as meet a 
number of other requirements, such as medical, physical, and moral character fitness); 
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availability (whether a person is non-institutionalized, not working in the civilian sector, and not 
college-bound or headed to other postsecondary schools); and interest (whether a person is 
inclined to volunteer for enlistment). It also should be noted that over 80% of persons recruited 
annually are men. The study of military participation focuses on only one factor, eligibility, for 
both men and women—and then for just education and aptitude criteria. Consequently, the 
participation rates for the military’s so-called niche market actually understate the true rates 
among youth who are potentially-qualified, available, and interested. 
This understanding adds greater meaning to the participation rates of 30%, 40%, and higher. 
First, one cannot help but speculate about the underlying causes of differences in participation 
rates between the racial/ethnic groups. Further, one cannot help but be impressed by the fact that 
proportionately high rates of potentially-qualified high school graduates volunteer to serve their 
country. Equally impressive, if not more so, is the performance of those responsible for recruiting 
these young men and women, from Defense officials in the highest positions of authority to the 
many recruiters searching for “prospects” day in and day out. Perhaps, the sheer magnitude of the 
effort—and the accomplishment—is nowhere more apparent than in a single statistic: at least one-
third of the military’s target market volunteered for enlistment during the 1990s. 
Lessons Learned 
DoD contracted with the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), through DoL, to administer 
both the PAY80 and PAY97 ASVAB to a nationally representative sample of American youth. While 
testing for PAY80 went smoothly, serious problems were encountered during the conduct of PAY97, 
resulting in a number of lessons to be applied to any future PAY study. Details about the PAY80 and 
PAY97 sampling and weighting can be found in Appendix C.  
Project Management 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics assigned two 
senior DoD staff officers, Drs. W. S. Sellman (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and Z. D. 
Doering (Defense Manpower Data Center [DMDC]) to interact directly with DoL and NORC 
representatives on all aspects of the PAY80 study. In turn, the DoL and NORC leadership were 
determined to “get PAY80 right” and pleased to be working with DoD on a significant effort to 
renorm the ASVAB. In fact, in many respects it seemed that DoL and NORC perceived their role 
as “coming to DoD’s rescue” in the aftermath of the ASVAB miscalibration. Sellman and Doering 
established great rapport with NORC project personnel and were frequently invited to visit 
testing sessions in Washington, DC and Chicago as well as other sessions around the country. 
NORC project personnel also reported progress on PAY80 to Sellman and Doering on a weekly 
basis.  
Dr. Jane M. Arabian was the DoD staff official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
responsible for policy oversight for the PAY97 project. In that role, she was directly involved in 
all aspects of PAY97 from the initial stages of planning and conducting the study, through 
compiling, interpreting and applying its results. Dr. Arabian also had the daunting task of 
obtaining funds for PAY97. Clearly, this would be challenging under the best of circumstances 
within the federal bureaucracy. In the case of PAY97, funding issues became even more 
complicated when the DoL’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) advised DoD partway through the 
project that it had run out of money. Much credit goes to Dr. Arabian for “finding the money” and 
saving the project. Dr. Arabian later led the DoD-wide effort to implement updated norms for the 
ASVAB using the PAY97 national probability sample as the base.  
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Assigned to DMDC’s Washington, DC office, Dr. Linda T. Curran was the original DoD technical 
point-of-contact for PAY97. She worked closely with BLS and NORC on sample screening and 
selection and provided guidance to those organizations about ASVAB and its computer-
adaptive administration. Sadly, Dr. Curran fell fatally ill as PAY97 progressed; consequently, her 
responsibilities were transferred to Dr. Clessen Martin in DMDC’s Monterey, California office. An 
accomplished psychometrician, Dr. Martin was cast into the project just as NORC experienced 
significant difficulties in sampling, weighting, and administering ASVAB. Thus, while DMDC 
provided strong DoD technical management for PAY97, project personnel were never able to 
establish the same level of rapport with BLS and NORC personnel that was developed during 
PAY80. Moreover, there was some question about the motivation of the BLS and NORC 
representatives working on PAY in 1997, as compared with that of the representatives who 
worked on the 1980 study. Although BLS and DoD were financial partners for PAY97, BLS’s 
main priority was the successful conduct of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY97). From BLS’s perspective, while important, PAY97 was only a subset of NLSY97 as 
DoD “piggybacked” on the BLS study to collect ASVAB results on a nationally representative 
sample of youth. 
Because of PAY80’s high visibility as a vehicle to fix the ASVAB miscalibration (see Chapter 2), 
support for the project came from the highest echelons of DoD and Congress. This overall 
dedication and commitment to renorm the ASVAB was not evident with PAY97. ASVAB 
enlistment testing was not seen as “broken” – indeed, it was working well. But, to meet the 
professional standards of civilian employment testing, the Defense Advisory Committee on 
Military Personnel Testing encouraged DoD to press ahead with revised norms. Thus, senior 
DoD officials were informed of PAY97 but never viewed it as an imperative.  
With money for PAY97 placed routinely in the DMDC budget for testing research and 
development, no sense of urgency existed within senior DoD ranks, especially the Office of the 
Comptroller. Consequently, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics abruptly notified DoD about the 
PAY97 funding shortages, DoD staff officers and DMDC scientists responsible for the study 
were required to virtually start over at the bottom of the DoD chain of command and report 
upward about the importance of the renorming effort.  
Lesson Learned #1. The DoD chain of command must be aware of what is occurring and offer 
100-percent support for the next ASVAB norming study, as must members of Congress, 
congressional staffers, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) analysts. The Joint 
Service Job Performance Measurement/Enlistment Standards Project is an excellent example 
of this lesson (Sellman, 1994; Wigdor & Green, 1991a; Green & Wigdor, 1988). In the aftermath 
of the ASVAB miscalibration, DoD embarked on a multiyear, multimillion-dollar project to 
validate the ASVAB against measures of hands-on job performance and to develop a statistical 
model that links aspects of recruit quality, such as aptitude and education, to the costs of 
recruiting, training, attrition, and job performance. This project spanned a period of 
approximately 15 years and cost more than $40 million. The most remarkable aspect of the 
effort was its wide acceptance by both Democratic and Republican administrations and 
Congress as the technical underpinning for enlistment standards and recruit quality 
benchmarks. This project validates the notion that “good” science tied to important policy issues 
can receive support and funding from high-level policymakers. Perhaps the lesson learned here 
is that a strategy for “repairing” a problem is different from a strategy for “housekeeping.” 
Lesson Learned #2. Defense representatives involved in study design and oversight must 
establish rapport with the project personnel from the government agency and contractors who 
will actually conduct the study. Everyone involved in the research must know what is happening 
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at all times; there should be no surprises. For example, the project officers from the relevant 
government agency, such as BLS for PAY97, must have more than a modicum of interest in the 
DoD portion of the project. The next ASVAB norming study should not be a “piggyback” project 
if non-DoD project officers are likely to feel little responsibility for its successful completion. 
These project officers must be as dedicated to achieving DoD’s goals as they are to obtaining 
their own objectives. In addition, senior officials within the agency, such as DoL for PAY97, also 
must be informed about and fully endorse the collaborative research performed by their agency 
and DoD. 
Funding 
NLSY97 data collection delays and the need to extend the testing period caused BLS to run 
short on funds. Consequently, the BLS project officer advised DMDC that $2 million was 
required immediately to complete the remaining PAY97 testing—an amount that exceeded the 
funds available from DMDC. The investment of time, effort, and money in PAY97 made it 
unthinkable not to complete the testing. The funding was procured—$1 million from money set 
aside for short turn-around recruiting studies and analyses mandated by Congress and $1 
million from the DoD Comptroller. Should those funds not have been available (as might have 
been the case in times of serious Defense spending cuts), PAY97 would not have been 
completed; and, without accurate ASVAB norms, DoD would have been unable to enforce 
Service enlistment standards and preserve the quality of the force.  
Lesson Learned #3. The importance of the renorming effort must be accepted and endorsed by 
senior DoD officials to ensure that sufficient funding is placed in the DMDC budget in advance 
of the study, including access to additional money, should the need arise. As is generally true 
for other social science research, it is challenging to convince senior leadership to invest 
substantial funding to maintain or even upgrade aspects of the enlistment process that do not 
appear “broken” or even breaking. This requires careful justification by DoD staff officers and 
DMDC scientists regarding the importance of the project and the consequences to the system if 
the project is not accomplished. 
Just as important is for DoD and DMDC, in the case of an inter-departmental “piggybacking” 
arrangement, to monitor expenditures by the partner agency and contractors throughout the 
study to ensure accountability and to be able to step in before budgets are exceeded. Sufficient 
funding is inextricably linked to the rapport established among project officers, the selection of 
an appropriate sample, and an efficient and effective test administration format. 
Sample 
Norming the ASVAB is a major undertaking, with design and validation of an appropriate 
sampling a primary concern. Consideration must be given to using pre-existing samples from 
ongoing surveys conducted by BLS or the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) or to 
designing and developing a sample exclusively for a military application. Further, DoD needs to 
carefully assess whether it should use contractors from another agency, such as was done for 
the previous two PAY studies, or its own scientists and contractors to carry out the fieldwork.  
If DoD were to decide to conduct an ASVAB norming study without collaborating with outside 
agencies, several experts not currently assigned to DMDC would need to be employed. For 
example, sampling statisticians and demographers well acquainted with the youth population 
would be required to design and validate the sample. In addition, DMDC would also face issues 
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such as modes of test administration (Internet testing, CAT) and the number and types of 
personnel required to actually conduct the fieldwork.  
Lesson Learned #4. If DoD norms the ASVAB again following the 17-year cycle, the date for the 
new norming effort would be 2014. Given the effort required to accomplish such a study, it is not 
too early to take these initial planning steps: (a) become familiar with relevant outside agencies, 
(b) analyze available samples to determine which sample to use, (c) initiate the budget process 
to obtain and allocate sufficient funds for the study, and (d) brief senior DoD officials, Congress, 
congressional staffers, and OMB analysts.  
Lesson Learned #5. If DoD elects to “piggyback” on another agency’s sample, it would be 
important for both DoD policy and scientific representatives and project personnel from the 
relevant agencies to get to know one another, to become familiar with each other’s work, and to 
establish mutual trust and respect. The getting-to-know-you effort should begin as early as the 
DoD budgetary process, so DoD officials understand their responsibilities in the collaborative 
effort.  
Test Administration 
Differences in test administration between the PAY80 and PAY97 studies (see Chapter 3) 
affected the efficiency of the testing, the timeframe of the study, and the cost. Two factors, in 
particular, must be considered when designing a future study—testing locations and test 
administration method. 
Testing Locations 
For PAY80, NORC field representatives administered the P&P-ASVAB at more than 400 testing 
sites throughout the United States and abroad, including schools, motels, churches, community 
centers, and libraries. The PAY97 CAT-ASVAB was administered at approximately 150 Sylvan 
Prometric Testing Centers and 120 temporary facilities located across the country, including 
Alaska.  
While testing for PAY80 went smoothly, serious problems were encountered during the conduct 
of PAY97. NORC experienced difficulties in screening the sample, which led to delays in the 
collection of ASVAB test data (Ericksen, 2000). In addition, several factors affected the 
participation rates. First, NORC representatives experienced difficulties getting youth to travel to 
the Sylvan centers, which often were outside their familiar neighborhoods and in some cases 
substantial distances from their homes. During PAY80 the variety of available testing locations 
meant young people never had to go far to take the ASVAB. Second, because the Sylvan 
centers also administered tests other than the PAY97 CAT-ASVAB, participants often had to 
wait for an open seat while other examinees took other standardized tests. Since the Sylvan 
centers were part of a franchise, NORC field representatives frequently experienced difficulties 
in negotiating ASVAB testing times with individual owners. 
Another factor that might have contributed to a lack of interest in PAY97 participation by young 
people was the amount of the stipend paid to examinees during the two PAY studies. PAY80 
participants received $50 for taking the ASVAB. For PAY97, the stipend increased to $75. 
Based on inflation rates over the 17-year period, $50 in 1980 would be the practical equivalent 
of about $97 in 1997, $22 higher than the stipend given to PAY97 participants. As noted in 
Chapter 2, research was conducted to determine the most cost-effective amount for the PAY97 
stipend. While a stipend of $100 would have resulted in the highest level of participation, the 
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$75 stipend was almost as effective (Martin, 1997; McBride & Waters, 1996; McBride, Waters, & 
Curran, 1995). Consequently, the decision was made to go with the lesser amount. It also is 
true that the Office of Management and Budget had advised DoD that it would not approve a 
$100 stipend. Obviously, this influenced the decision to offer the $75 incentive.   
In addition, today there is added emphasis on increased testing in high schools to measure 
student achievement under educational accountability legislation. Students are becoming 
sensitive to and aware of the differences between “high-stakes testing” (e.g., high school 
graduation, college admissions) and “low-stakes testing” that will have no effect on their future. 
This may create even more of a motivation challenge (e.g., willingness to test, or doing their 
best if they do test) for examinees involved in studies such as norming the ASVAB. 
Lesson Learned #6. Testing locations must be accessible to the young people asked to 
participate in the study. The requirement to travel long distances or to wait at a testing center 
discourages participation. Alternate test administration formats should be investigated to 
facilitate test-taking and update the format to include technologies now used by most American 
youth. 
Lesson Learned #7. The stipend paid participants in future PAY studies must reflect the value of 
the time and effort young people make to participate in the study. The total estimated stipend 
cost should be factored into the study budget.  
Test Administration Method 
A great deal of research has addressed the issue of comparability of test scores for the P&P 
and CAT administrations of the ASVAB (see Chapter 3). Despite the scope and rigor of this 
work, several issues remain. First, much of the research on comparability of scores for P&P and 
CAT administrations has been done using enlisted military samples. Such samples miss the 
extreme lower end of the test score distribution because individuals in the bottom 10% of the 
population are not eligible for military service. Thus, while score comparability has been 
established above this score threshold, data examining comparability at the extreme lower end 
of the distribution do not exist. Note that there is no reason to expect that a relationship that 
holds through the rest of the score distribution will not hold at the lower tail; the point is simply 
that comparability has not been established at this end of the score range. 
Second, research to equate P&P and CAT administrations has been done using broad samples. 
Comparability of broad sample scores does not guarantee comparability among the various 
subgroups (e.g., gender and race/ethnicity) that make up the sample. Research documents a 
small number of ASVAB tests for which scores for particular groups are not comparable among 
P&P and CAT administrations. For example, Blacks score higher on P&P than CAT 
administrations of the Mathematics Knowledge and Automotive-Shop Information tests. 
Females score lower on CAT than on P&P administrations of Paragraph Comprehension and 
Automotive-Shop Information.  
One reason for focusing on broad composites such as the AFQT and the Verbal, Quantitative, 
and Technical Knowledge factors, rather than on individual tests, is to limit the effects of any 
lack of complete comparability across P&P and CAT formats. Although these few tests show 
format differences by gender and race/ethnicity, the fact that multiple tests are combined in the 
broad ASVAB composites examined limits the effects of lack of complete comparability. The 
estimate is differences in race/ethnicity or gender of up to 0.05, which means that the 
differences in race/ethnicity or gender are only 0.05 SD units. These small differences on the 
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composites might reflect format differences rather than true effects. Consequently, effects less 
than 0.05 are not considered as meaningful. 
Determining the testing mode for a new PAY study will require research. Quite a number of 
testing programs have moved from P&P administration to computer administration. Sometimes 
this involves administering the same test content on a computer screen rather than in a test 
booklet, primarily to improve test security or to better standardize testing conditions, thereby 
ensuring each candidate is given precisely the same amount of testing time. Another reason to 
move to computer administration is to employ an adaptive test format in which the response to 
each item influences which item is administered next. This format quickly hones in on an 
examinee’s ability level, thereby obtaining more information about a candidate in less testing 
time.  
Many testing experts believe Internet testing is the wave of the future. One important concern 
with Internet testing, however, is whether proctors are necessary to protect the validity of test 
scores. Adaptive testing, including the CAT-ASVAB, can be administered over the Internet, but 
the possibility of examinee fraud—the person taking the test is not the designated examinee—or 
inappropriate assistance for the examinee—an unauthorized person in the testing room helps 
the examinee respond to test questions—must be considered in the absence of a proctor. 
Research is ongoing in the area of biometrics designed to ensure the identity of examinees.  
One application currently in use offers greater administrative convenience and control. 
Individuals complete tests using the Internet, but in a traditional monitored testing environment, 
while responses are captured immediately via the Internet, thereby permitting on-the-spot test-
scoring and decision-making. More controversial is the growing trend toward unproctored 
Internet testing in which candidates may access a test at any time and in any place (Tippins, 
2009). One appealing feature of this approach is the potential for increasing the size of the 
applicant pool. Individuals not willing or able to take the time to travel to a testing center might 
be disposed to take a test if they could do so at their own convenience.  
As noted above, formats that allow individuals to take a test at home and without proctoring 
raise several concerns. One is cheating, specifically whether the test-taker received assistance 
from others and if the individual designated to take the test was the actual test-taker. A second 
concern is security, specifically whether the testing organization can prevent the capture and 
disclosure of test items.  
One way to address the cheating issue is to frame the unproctored test as an initial screening. If 
responses produce a favorable score, the test-taker then is invited to a second stage in the 
process where additional testing is done under monitored conditions. Some organizations, 
however, view the cost of a two-stage testing process as an impediment and accept the 
unproctored score (Hense, Golden, & Burnett, 2009). Advances in technology eventually will 
permit an individual’s identity to be accurately authenticated, removing the examinee fraud 
concern. 
The security of the test items can be addressed by a multistage process in which a small portion 
of a large test item bank is used for initial unproctored testing. Should the test-taker obtain a 
high score as a result of prior item access, the follow-up testing under monitored conditions 
should detect a marked change in test scores. Realistically, it is not practical to expect a 
participant in a PAY-type study to undergo two separate test administrations. Moreover, 
exposure of an entire item bank in an unproctored setting would jeopardize a testing program.  
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Internet testing currently is the focus of intense interest. Useful overviews on the topic are 
provided by Tippins, Beatty, Drasgow, Pearlman, Segall, and Shepherd (2006) and Tippins 
(2009). Internet testing is rapidly being accepted within the employment environment and holds 
great promise for future military recruiting. Proctored Internet testing also has potential for 
application in the next DoD PAY norming project. Young people could take a proctored 
computer-adaptive Internet test at a variety of locations such as military training facilities and 
National Guard sites, commercial testing centers, state employment offices, and even school 
computer laboratories. While unproctored testing is appealing from the perspective of cost and 
convenience, the issues of examinee fraud and test security are as yet unresolved. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that unproctored Internet testing will be the mode of administration 
for the next PAY study.  
If the next PAY study were conducted within the coming decade, changes in testing technology 
probably would not be significant, although imagining how ongoing trends might affect the future 
of military personnel testing as well as a possible PAY study in the longer term still would be 
useful. 
Lesson Learned #8. Given the revolution in testing technology now underway, as well as the 
cost of administering a multi-aptitude battery to a nationally representative sample (even one 
borrowed from another agency’s research), it is unlikely that DoD will again undertake another 
PAY study similar in methodology to those conducted in 1980 and 1997. DoD officials and 
DMDC scientists should continue to follow the research about Internet testing formats to 
understand the available options as well as the progress of biometric recognition/authentication 
applications that will satisfy security concerns. 
Modifications 
The next PAY study and sample must address demographic factors and potentially new skills to 
be measured. The following have been identified from PAY97 data as topics for discussion. 
Demographic Factors 
PAY80 and PAY97 were studies of American youth within a specific age range. Recently 
enacted legislation now permits enlistment by both younger (17 years old) and older (up to 42 
years old) recruits. In Fiscal Year 2006, more than 17% of the Army’s new enlistees (with no 
prior military service) were age 24 and older; during the same period another 5% of the Army’s 
recruits were 17 years old. In total, nearly 23% of the Army’s new recruits were outside of the 
age range covered in the PAY80 and PAY97 samples. Stated another way, in Fiscal Year 2006 
almost one-quarter of the Army’s recruit population was either younger or older than the age 
range used to norm the current ASVAB. (This trend, in somewhat reduced proportions, also 
holds true for the other Services.) This age difference might not be considered important if not 
for the consistent finding that mean ASVAB scores tend to be lower for persons in their teens 
than for those in their twenties.  
Another demographic issue relates to the nation’s Hispanic population, which is expanding 
relatively rapidly. Furthermore, because of immigration issues and census procedures, official 
estimates may understate the true number of persons of Hispanic descent, especially those in 
the age groups of interest to the Military Services. This situation also is true for other 
racial/ethnic groups such as Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. While it is not yet clear how 
this population factor might influence planning for a future PAY study, it is reasonable to 
speculate that, beyond numbers alone, planners might need to account for varying levels of 
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English proficiency, particularly among youth whose families are more recent immigrants to the 
United States.  
Lesson Learned #9. To ensure the highest level of national representation of American youth in 
the next ASVAB norming, the demographic factors identified in PAY97 and post-1997 studies 
and research must be taken into account when considering the test administration format and 
locations of testing centers, among other factors. With a significant period between studies and 
the significance of the ASVAB norming to the Military Services and the All-Volunteer Force 
(AVF), attention to demographic factors is paramount. 
Skills Measurements 
The issue of the changing nature of work required by the Military Services must be considered 
in future norming studies. To the extent that tomorrow’s work environment will be different from 
that of today, the possibility exists that the content of the ASVAB might need to change to 
enhance its ability to predict training success and performance for future jobs. For example, 
many jobs are becoming more oriented toward information and communication technology 
(ICT)—the so-called cyber jobs—requiring knowledge of ICT and computer literacy. Research is 
underway to develop and validate a test that measures ICT aptitude to be included as part of 
the enlistment process (Russell & Sellman, 2009). Statistically linking the PAY97 CAT-ASVAB 
with an advanced ASVAB with different content also poses significant research challenges for 
future ASVAB norming studies.  
Improved measurement within the cognitive domain also is needed. While the ASVAB is 
focused on cognitive abilities, questions remain about whether measurement of these types of 
abilities might be improved. Drasgow, Embretson, Kyllonen, and Schmitt (2006) recently 
completed a review of the ASVAB and offer a wide range of recommendations. For example, 
they suggest investigating the possible addition of a nonverbal reasoning test as well as the 
information/communication test to the ASVAB battery. 
Moving beyond the cognitive domain to tap personality, temperament, interests, motives, 
values, and the like is another consideration. A common criticism of such tests as the ASVAB, 
SAT, and ACT is that their focus on the cognitive domain neglects other important aspects of 
individual differences. The sense is that a general interest exists in finding effective ways to 
measure these other noncognitive domains. The Drasgow et al. (2006) review of the ASVAB 
calls for attention to the noncognitive aspects of military performance. Attempts to measure 
these noncognitive attributes in highly visible, high-stakes settings, such as military enlistment 
or college admissions, however, have proven difficult primarily because they rely on self-
reporting.  
 Self-reporting makes conceptual sense because attributes such as values, motives, and 
interests are generally seen as internal to a person; the natural way to find out what people 
value or are interested in is to ask them. A long history of using such self-reporting measures 
successfully can be found in settings such as vocational counseling, where a person seeking 
guidance responds openly and candidly because it is in his or her best interests to do so. In 
high-stakes settings, however, such as selection or admissions testing, a test-taker might be 
motivated to make a good impression and thus might report characteristics that could be 
perceived as desirable rather than responding candidly.  
Such attempts at favorable self-presentation might be aided by others, such as commercial test 
preparation firms or recruiters who wish to help a given candidate qualify for a desired position. 
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Thus, interest remains high in identifying strategies that will deter or prevent candidates from 
“faking good.” Drasgow et al. (2006) suggest the possibility of using noncognitive measures to 
classify individuals into occupational specialties rather than for selection. This would reduce a 
test-taker’s incentive to fake noncognitive measures because the test results would be used to 
place the person in a specialty for which he or she is well-suited, rather than as the basis for an 
“accept-reject” enlistment decision. 
Lesson Learned #10. DoD and DMDC should reevaluate the desired data from the next ASVAB 
norming study, especially given the lengthy period of time between studies and the difficulties in 
norming the ASVAB. Changing any of the study attributes—demographic factors, test 
administration format, measurement of new cognitive abilities, and assessment of noncognitive 
abilities such as personality, temperament, interests, motives, values, and so forth--will create 
challenges when comparing data from previous studies. The benefits of such data to potentially 
better inform enlistment and occupational decisions, however, should be weighed against the 
challenges of designing new cognitive ability tests and revamping the parameters of the next 
norming study. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Seventeen years divide the two PAY studies. In a sense, then, PAY80 and PAY97 connect 
parents with their children; that is, considering the length of time between the studies and the 
age ranges (18 to 23) of the two populations, it can be assumed that members of the PAY80 
population would have children in the PAY97 population. Is 17 years between PAY studies, 
amounting to a generation of youth, too long? Is it too short? Is it just about right? The present 
study of cognitive abilities across generations indicates that important changes did occur over 
the intervening period — but these were only apparent for the larger youth population after 
looking at subgroup differences and demographic shifts in the composition of that population. It 
was in the “drilling down,” as analysts say, that pay dirt was found.  
Without timely assessments, DoD may be unable to remain “current” in determining how its 
recruits compare with civilian youth on cognitive attributes—or, for that matter, whether certain 
enlistment screening methods have become outdated by changes in military roles, technology, 
or the nature of work. More importantly, and more subtly, periodic appraisals of the civilian youth 
population ensure that the qualitative needs of the military are accurately developed and 
gauged over the longer term. Indeed, given the complexity of analyzing PAY results, new 
ASVAB norms were not implemented operationally from PAY97 data until July 2004. Moreover, 
data analysis for the present study required yet another eight years beyond normative 
implementation.  
No precedent exists for determining when the military’s enlistment test should be normed again. 
The decision must take into account the nexus of politics and science that so often is 
encountered when large-scale, time-consuming, and costly research is required to inform public 
policy. While there are no firm answers to the question of timing, this chapter attempts to 
address the primary issues—including lessons gleaned from the past—that face Defense 
officials as they plan the next norming effort. As always, the most difficult decisions hinge on 
how well we learn from the past and anticipate the future. The present is far easier to see. 
The U.S. military has been an all-volunteer force since 1973. Regardless of the volunteer nature 
of service, the military needs enlistees capable of completing its assigned mission. This requires 
certain abilities and aptitudes on the part of new recruits and seasoned Service members. To 
achieve its mission, the military tests applicants in a number of cognitive dimensions via the 
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ASVAB. By using a nationally representative sample of civilian youth to norm the ASVAB, DoD 
can determine if the Services are enlisting young people with the requisite abilities to get the job 
done. Norms allow this determination to be made across time, across Services, and across 
military occupations. 
The comparison of PAY80 and PAY97 indicates that, while few differences were found in the 
abilities of the youth population tested between 1980 and 1997, subgroup differences endured. 
Further, the demographics of the United States have changed with respect to the representation 
of minority groups. In light of changes in the youth population composition, the backlash 
resulting from the racial/ethnic subgroup findings in PAY80, the persistence of subgroup 
differences in PAY97, and the sampling difficulties encountered in PAY97, why should DoD 
continue to compare testing results of potential recruits against nationally representative norms 
instead of some other type of norms (e.g., military applicants or high school seniors) that are 
easier to compute? 
In addition to knowing how military enlistees stack up against civilian youth from a recruit quality 
perspective, perhaps the best answer comes from the social goals considered important by 
many for military service. Young people and their adult influencers may view entrance into the 
military as an opportunity for upward mobility. Further, policy-makers and commentators may 
view military service as an opportunity to overcome social injustice for certain minority groups. 
Additionally, there is the argument that the military should encompass all aspects of society and 
not just reflect groups such as the economically disadvantaged, the less-educated, or minority 
group members. Understanding these issues requires knowing the characteristics of the civilian 
youth population. By chronicling and learning from the events surrounding PAY80 and PAY97, 
DoD officials can improve the process of insuring a more competent and representative military 
to the benefit of all concerned. 
The present effort set out to compare the results of PAY80 with those of PAY97. These are two 
monumental studies in the history of aptitude testing. Calling these studies “monumental” is no 
stretch, if only for the fact that they have a direct impact on the nation’s Military Services as well 
as on the millions of men and women who enlist or who take the ASVAB for career exploration 
purposes. Since the two studies use a nationally representative sample of military-age youth, 
they are unlike other studies that rely on self-selected samples or may be limited in their reach 
across an entire population of youth. When combined with background and survey data through 
the NLSY, it is easy to see why PAY80 has been the focus of so much scholarly attention from 
its very beginnings to present-day. It is equally understandable that PAY97 will command as 
much attention one day in the scholarly community—particularly when used as a second data 
point, a connecting of the dots, or a way for determining the nature and extent of test-score 
differences over a generation of American youth. 
The present work focuses on generational changes in cognitive skills, as differences in ASVAB 
results were explored for the larger youth population and its various subgroups. These changes 
also were examined as they relate to the military and society—looking at selected subjects such 
as fairness, education, occupational choices, military readiness, military participation, and the 
future of all-volunteer recruiting in uncertain times. Additionally, it was the authors’ intent from 
the outset that this effort be viewed as a “groundbreaker” or a catalyst of sorts for continuing 
research by others. Given the great variety of applications and richness of the data, the present 
effort could only scratch the surface of a vast array of possible studies. 
A few areas of future study will likely dominate. As demonstrated by PAY80, many scholars will 
be drawn to further investigate population subgroup differences and to search for underlying 
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reasons. Others will seek to explain why test scores have shifted, generally and within separate 
subgroups, for certain domains such as technical knowledge. Still other researchers will be 
drawn to explore and debate evidence regarding a possible “Flynn effect” (Flynn, 2007) across 
the generations represented by PAY80 and PAY97. Throughout these future studies, old-
standing issues will become better illuminated as new questions arise. And these researchers 
will undoubtedly be gripped by the same restless anticipation for more information, for more 
evidence, for another Profile of American Youth. Two data points are nice; three would be so 
much more meaningful. Thus, on behalf of all current and future military manpower analysts and 
scholars, we encourage the DoD officials responsible for planning, funding, and executing the 
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APPENDIX A 
 
REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE OF RESEARCH USING PAY80 DATA 
 
PAY80 data have been used by psychologists to address a variety of issues. This literature 
review is intended to provide a sense of the range of questions addressed using these data and 
a brief description of a prototypic study, where appropriate. To ensure the results were restricted 
to studies using cognitive testing variables, the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) Annotated 
Bibliography (www.nlsbibliography.org) was searched using keywords such as AFQT, ASVAB, 
and Profile of American Youth. To reduce the initial collection of more than 500 studies to a 
more manageable number, the decision was made to focus on studies published in 
psychological journals such as Child Development and Intelligence.  
Maternal Characteristics and Child Outcomes 
Participants of the 1997 National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY97) are studied in the 
follow-up NLSY Child and Young Adult longitudinal effort, a common research strategy that 
examines the relationship between maternal characteristics and child outcomes. These studies 
use ability measures to relate mother’s ability to child’s ability or mother’s ability to some 
noncognitive outcome, such as poverty, home environment, or social adjustment. For example, 
Deary, Der, and Shenkin (2005) used PAY80 data in conjunction with data from the NLSY79 
Child and Young Adult sample to determine whether the mother’s AFQT score explained the 
association between child’s birth weight and cognitive ability. The authors found that including 
the mother’s AFQT score in the model explained approximately 66% of the relationships 
between child’s birth weight and reading comprehension and mathematics scores between the 
ages of 5 and 14 years.  
Parcel and Dufur (2001) used the mother’s AFQT score as an indicator of maternal human 
capital in a study designed to determine the effects of school and family capital, as well as 
maternal and child human capital on a child’s social adjustment. A small, negative relationship 
was found between the mother’s AFQT score and the child’s behavior problems. In addition, the 
mother’s AFQT score was found to offer compensating effects when the child (a) attends a 
school with problems, such as crime attendance, or (b) attends a school with a high student-
teacher ratio.  
Education and Training 
Among studies that did not fall under the umbrella of developmental psychology, a number of 
research questions were related to:  
 Education and training—What is the role of cognitive ability in the rise in economic return 
to education? How is cognitive ability related to the likelihood of receiving training?  
 Intelligence or general cognitive ability—Is the relationship between abilities constant 
throughout the cognitive ability (g) score distribution? What is the relationship between g 
and Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) scores?  
 Subgroup differences—How well can late schooling investments close racial/ethnic skill 
gaps?  
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Additional topics might be characterized better as sociological research, including the economic 
mobility of single mothers, and using PAY80 data to forecast the supply of high-quality recruits 
for the Services.  
One study that focused on training and education sought to determine who, among young 
adults, were most likely to receive training (Veum, 1993). Using data from NLSY79 and PAY80 
to address this question, Veum found that, among other individual differences such as 
race/ethnicity and gender, individuals with higher AFQT scores were more likely to receive both 
company-provided and outside training. In addition, individuals with AFQT scores exceeding 80 
(out of a possible 99) spent more time in company training, on average, than individuals with 
lower scores.  
Structure of Cognitive Ability 
The structure of cognitive ability also has been investigated using ASVAB scores from PAY80 
data. Ree and Carretta (1994) conducted a series of six confirmatory factor analyses to assess 
the latent structure of the ASVAB. Their results indicate that a three-factor hierarchical or 
Vernon-like model best fit the data. The model included a higher-order general g factor and 
three first-order factors—Verbal, Speed, and Technical Knowledge.  
Racial/Ethnic Group Differences 
PAY80 data have been used for a number of investigations related to both the nature of 
intelligence and subgroup differences. Among the most prominent (and controversial) 
treatments using these data is The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life 
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). This book used PAY80 data to explore variations in ability among 
American youth, including a discussion of subgroup differences in ability. Criticism of the The 
Bell Curve often involves a reanalysis of the data (Hout, 2002), which makes further use of the 
PAY80 data.  
For example, Scullin, Peters, Williams, and Ceci (2000) looked at racial subgroup differences in 
cognitive ability and the role of educational attainment in both ability and labor market 
outcomes. This study was conducted, in part, as a response to Herrnstein and Murray’s 
decision to exclude educational attainment from the set of predictors used in their analyses. 
Again using PAY80 data, Scullin et al. found that Black-White differences in cognitive ability 
were approximately two-thirds greater than were the differences in educational attainment. In 
addition, the authors discovered that throughout the educational attainment and AFQT score 
distributions, Whites had higher mean labor market outcomes (income, wages, and 
occupational socioeconomic index) than Blacks and that educational attainment mediated the 
relationship between ability and labor market outcomes.  
Cognitive Ability and Labor Force Mobility 
Several studies in the psychological literature have used the PAY80 data to examine the 
“gravitational hypothesis,” which assumes that jobs differ in their cognitive demands. This theory 
suggests that over time individuals eventually gravitate to a particular job in which there is a match 
or alignment between the job’s cognitive demands and the individual’s level of cognitive ability.  
Wilk, Desmarais, and Sackett (1995) and Wilk and Sackett (1996) showed individuals who were 
“underplaced,” that is, their ability was greater than the cognitive complexity of the occupation, 
tended to move to more complex occupations, while individuals who were “overplaced,” that is, 
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their ability was less than the cognitive complexity of the occupation tended to move to less 
complex occupations. These studies suggest a lack of information about employee ability levels 
and individuals, through a matter of trial and error, over time move up or down the occupational 
hierarchy to a place with a good person-occupation fit. The Services’ use of the AFQT and the 
Service-specific ASVAB composites reflects an attempt to more efficiently match recruit ability 
and the cognitive demands of various military occupational specialties.  
In short, PAY80 data have been used to address a number of research questions, in particular 
those in the fields of social science and psychology. The results of these studies have made 
considerable contributions to researchers’ understanding of cognitive ability and its relationship 
with other variables.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUMMARY OF ECONOMICS LITERATURE USING NLSY79 DATA  
 
Given the large number of studies undertaken with the NLSY79, it is appropriate to step back 
and take stock of this body of research to demonstrate the importance of the NLSY79 data, to 
understand how future data sources might be better designed to maximize their utility, and to 
illustrate open questions that might be addressed by the NLSY97 data. This review of the 
economic research on youth and labor market outcomes, which pays particular attention to 
measures of ability, is by no means exhaustive. Instead, it seeks to provide a clear picture of the 
research areas that have been addressed using NLSY79 data for representative studies.  
Job Search and Job Mobility 
A variety of explanations exist for the job mobility among youth early in their careers. The 
NLSY79 is suited to understanding this phenomenon (e.g., Holzer, 1987b; Klerman & Karoly, 
1994; Light, 2005; and Yates, 2005). Most of the debate in this area concerns explanations for 
why youth so often change occupations and the consequences of these job changes. Gilleskie 
and Lutz (2002) provided an example of special-topic studies in this area. Their research 
estimated the impediment to mobility caused by employer-provided health insurance.  
Farber (1994) was an early attempt to use the data to explore the various explanations of 
mobility. First, Farber noted that previous studies that used lower frequency data were unable to 
pick up a fact central to his analysis. Namely, if hazards were done on a weekly or monthly 
basis, the probability of leaving an occupation actually increased slightly in the first quarter of 
employment before falling. Second, Farber found evidence against the proposition that some 
fixed worker heterogeneity was the source of turnover, showing with basic logit models that 
current turnover was dependent on past mobility in subtle ways.  
Light and McGarry (1998) build on this line of inquiry and categorized the explanations for 
mobility into three broad categories—“mover-stayer” models, “search good” models, and 
“experience good” matching models. In their categorization, mover-stayer models implied the 
least able workers move the most often; search good models implied job changes happen only 
when a better quality job is found; and the experience good matching models suggested 
workers must spend some time in an occupation before understanding whether or not it was a 
good fit for them. The authors followed a sample of White men from the NLSY79 for eight years 
after they left school. They found that, even when occupation-specific or individual-specific 
unobservables were accounted for with instrumental variable techniques, total mobility in the 
first two years and first eight years after leaving school affected wages throughout the post-
schooling time period. While this could be consistent with a wide array of explanations, they 
claimed this was evidence against both the mover-stayer and search good models (in a related 
study, Gronberg & Reed [1994] used mobility in the NLSY79 data to estimate the value workers 
place on various occupational attributes, defining quality not just as monetary remuneration).  
Still, some authors have found evidence supporting search models (e.g., Dellavigna & 
Paserman, 2005; Eckstein & Wolpin, 1990; Ferrall, 1997; Parsons, 1991; and Stern, 1989). An 
early use of NLSY79 data using structural estimation on youth job search was done by Wolpin 
(1987). The author proposed a conventional job search model, in which new labor market 
entrants face job offers that arrived in random fashion and decided whether to accept or wait for 
a better offer. Meanwhile, they faced a cost to searching. Using data on a small number of youth 
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who graduated from high school in 1979 and did not reenroll in school or enlist in the military for 
the next three years, Wolpin estimated the offer probabilities, search costs, and reservation 
wages. Many of the estimates were reasonable, especially given the smaller amount of flexibility 
in the model as compared to more complicated models estimated recently. The estimates 
implied that post-graduation unemployment lasted an average of 46.2 weeks, and that the low 
offer probabilities accounted for a sizeable portion of this number. Moreover, as expected, 
children with higher Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores and with a parent (father) 
with a higher education level tended to have higher mean wage offers and higher reservation 
wages.  
Other work has expanded on the experience good matching framework. The early years of the 
NLSY79 included questions about individuals’ expectations of how long they would remain in 
the same occupation and whether or not they would be promoted. Munasinghe (2006) took 
advantage of this to estimate the effect of these expectations on turnover rates. His motivating 
model, which relied on the acquisition of information about the quality of a job match over time, 
suggested those with more positive expectations should face lower and flatter tenure-turnover 
curves than those with negative expectations. That is, those with positive expectations were 
less likely to turn over, but their probability of turnover fell less sharply as their tenure increased. 
His empirical analysis, which included both conventional and random effects logit models, 
confirmed the basic predictions of the model.  
Finally, the analysis of Neal (1999) helped to explicitly connect the job search and mobility 
literature to the occupational choice literature summarized in the next section. The author used 
the NLSY79 information on industry and occupation for a subsample of men to provide support 
to a two-stage search model, in which labor market entrants tried to find good firm-specific and 
career matches. His model implied youth should find it optimal to search first over careers and 
then over firms within a particular career. A large number of violations of this simple rule exist in 
the data, though a fair amount of support for the theory also exists. Among his results, Neal 
found that a much larger percentage of youth followed the two-stage search rule than would be 
expected if career changes happened with constant probability at every occupational change. 
Moreover, he showed that, as expected from the model, youth who make a within-career 
occupational change early were much less likely to make a career change later. His evidence 
showcased the close ties between occupational mobility and the choice of a particular 
occupation (see related studies by Gardecki & Neumark, 1998; Light & McGarry, 1998; 
Neumark, 2002; and Royalty, 1996).  
Occupational Choice 
The NLSY79 also is a proven resource for researchers interested in youth’s occupational 
choices. The literature in this area is intimately related to the occupational mobility and 
occupation search literature. The focus here is on the particular type of occupation individuals 
choose, however, rather than the labor market churning that is characteristic of the youth labor 
market. The detailed employment and enrollment histories available in NLSY79 data allow 
researchers to carefully delineate which occupation a youth chooses—where occupation is 
broadly construed to include being a student—and to pinpoint changes in occupation. One way 
researchers use this information is by conducting an in-depth analysis into youth’s choice of one 
particular occupation. For example, Seeborg (1994) uses NLSY79 data to make an early 
contribution to the large and growing literature on the determinants of military enlistment.  
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Another line of inquiry groups occupations into a small number of broad categories, where one 
category might be, for example, blue-collar work. From there the research proceeds to estimate 
structural models of the occupational decision process, taking into account important  
features such as occupation-specific human capital. Keane and Wolpin (1997) constituted an 
initial contribution to this area. The authors posited a dynamic model in which a youth can 
attend school, do white-collar or blue-collar work, enlist in the military, or stay at home. When 
making the choice, the youth took into account expectations about future returns to each path 
and the building of occupation-specific experience. They estimated the model using data on a 
subset of White men from NLSY79 data and found a substantial role for pre-market skill 
endowments in labor outcomes, as well as interesting differences in how experience in each 
occupation increased skill in other occupations. Later work extends this type of framework into a 
general equilibrium setting (see also Bacolod & Hotz, 2006, and Rothstein, 2001). 
A recent contribution to this line is Lee and Wolpin (2006). The authors examined the growth of 
the service sector in the United States over the past 50 years. In implementing a simulated 
method of a moments estimation procedure, the authors used NLSY79 data to find the 
proportions of youth in specific occupations, mean wages by work experience and occupation, 
and information on occupation-specific work histories. They found evidence for substantial 
mobility costs between the goods and service sectors (see also Heckman, Lochner, & Taber, 
1998).  
McCall (1990) took a different perspective on the dependence of occupational choices over time 
and used substantially different methods, though his study was closely related to that of Neal 
(1999). He determined whether there was support for the hypothesis that individuals learned 
occupation-specific information during each job match, in addition to job-specific information. 
Deriving a basic implication from his economic model, McCall tested it using NLSY79 data on 
youth who have held at least two jobs. The primary implication of the model was that the 
negative relationship between tenure in the first job and the hazard of leaving the second job 
should be greater in magnitude (more negative) for those who stayed in the same occupation. 
After using a variety of methods to estimate hazard rates, his findings supported this theory. 
This result further supported the more general proposition that occupational choice 
consideration in a dynamic setting was crucial to understanding labor market behavior.  
Effects of Gender and Race on Labor Market Outcomes 
The panel nature of the NLSY79 allows for a detailed understanding of how the early career 
trajectories of youth differ based on gender and race/ethnicity. Some work focused on simple 
earnings equations. For example, Griffin and Ganderton (1996) examined the impact on racial 
earnings gaps by including family background measures and measures of school quality in 
earnings equations. An array of studies, however, examined very specific aspects of gender and 
race/ethnicity differences in labor market experience in a more detailed fashion. These studies 
use the specific strengths of NLSY79 data more sharply.  
In regards to gender differences, Loprest (1992) showed men and women experienced 
significantly different wage growth in the first four years of labor market experience. Her analysis 
indicated that full-time male and female workers had similar rates of occupational mobility and 
similar wage growth conditional on staying in the same occupation from year to year. The 
source of the difference was wage growth conditional on changing occupations. She explored 
this further by estimating simple wage growth equations and including changes in occupation 
characteristics as covariates. While the fact that more women changed to occupations with 
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reduced hours explained part of this difference, it cannot account for most of it. Moreover, 
Loprest suggested occupational differences by gender did not account for the difference either 
(see also Ahituv & Tienda, 2004; Royalty, 1998). 
Gupta (1993) looked into these occupational differences by gender in more detail to understand 
whether they arise because of worker preference, employer preference, or both. She used the 
NLSY79 data to estimate a model in which a worker ended up in a particular occupation if and 
only if the worker preferred that occupation to all others and the employer selected the worker 
out of the queue for that occupation. One of her results indicated that not only are young women 
less likely to choose professional/managerial occupations, but employers also were less likely to 
choose them out of the queue for these occupations.  
Researchers also have looked for reasons why the wages of minority individuals differ from 
those of Whites. Bratsberg and Terrell (1998) assessed the returns to general experience and 
firm-specific tenure for young Black and White men in the NLSY79 data. To estimate 
conventional wage equations for each group, they implemented both ordinary least squares 
regression analyses (OLS) and instrumental variables procedures. The latter methods were 
suggested in the literature as a method of addressing the endogeneity of tenure. The authors 
found that young Black and White men had similar returns to tenure, but that Black men had 
markedly lower returns to general experience (see also D’Amico & Maxwell, 1994; Holzer, 
1987a; Keith & Williams, 2002; Wolpin, 1992).  
An important set of papers shifted the focus to differences between Black and White youth 
before they enter the labor market. Neal and Johnson (1996) wrote an early paper in this line of 
inquiry. More recently, Keane and Wolpin (2000) modeled the decision process of Black and 
White men over schooling and occupation in a dynamic setting. The differing returns to general 
experience found by Bratsberg and Terrell (1998), as well as others, were allowed to affect 
basic decisions from age 16 onward. The authors followed Black and White men ages 13 to 16 
in 1979 for 11 years, an opportunity unique to the NLSY79. After estimating a structural model 
similar to the one discussed for occupational choices, they found wage discrimination played 
some role in the divergent career earnings of Black and White men, but that an even larger role 
was played by skills that were developed prior to age 16 (see also Oettinger, 1996).  
Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005), among others, explored these racial differences in 
pre-market factors and emphasized the importance of thinking about early childhood 
development. For their study, the three authors utilized several sources, including the Children 
of the NLSY sample, which consisted of children of women in who participated in the NLSY79 
study.  
Births, Marriage, and Labor Market Effects 
Getting married and having children often are thought to limit a woman’s career opportunities. 
The extent to which there are costs to marrying or giving birth earlier in life, however, is 
debatable. In particular, identifying the impact of birth and marriage choices on career 
opportunities is confounded by women with higher ability and greater career aspirations 
delaying marriage and births to later in life. NLSY79 data have served as an effective dataset 
with which to investigate these questions (see Berger & Waldfogel, 2004, and Klepinger, 
Lundberg, & Plotnick, 1999).  
Baum (2002) found career interruptions, such as giving birth, only affected the wages of women 
who changed occupations, but not those who remained in the same occupation. Miller (2005) 
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used biological fertility shocks to instrument for fertility timing. Using race, education, and AFQT 
scores as additional controls, she found delaying motherhood can lead to significant increases 
in career earnings by about 10% per year and 3% in wage rates. College-education women who 
were in professional or managerial occupations had the greatest returns to delaying birth (see 
also Blackburn, Bloom, & Neumark, 1993).  
Unlike births, marriage typically does not lead to career interruptions. Marriage often can lead to 
an individual making extensive compromises, however, and thus lead to lower returns in the 
labor market (see also Reed & Harford, 1989). Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2004) used 
NLSY79 data to investigate whether there are gains to delaying marriage. They found delaying 
marriage leads to increased wages for women, but not for men. The gains from delaying 
marriage and receiving higher wages, however, is somewhat negated because women often 
end up marrying men with lower wages.  
Besides the wage differences between men and women due in part to the marriage or birth 
decision, Black and Hispanic women statistically face lower wages, lower schooling, and lower 
rates of marriage than White women. Keane and Wolpin (2006) used a dynamic model of the 
labor supply, marriage, births, and welfare receipt of women to investigate the extent to which 
labor market and marriage market opportunities contribute to these differences. They found 
some evidence that lower opportunities account for much of the differences seen in terms of 
schooling, marriage, birth, and career choices.  
Ability, Schooling, and Labor Market Outcomes 
Many of the papers discussed in this overview use ASVAB scores that are provided in the 
NLSY79 data. The ASVAB 10-test battery was administered to approximately 90% of the 
NLSY79 sample in 1980. Four of these tests—two verbal and two quantitative—comprise the 
AFQT, which is used to determine enlistment eligibility. Many have noted the AFQT and ASVAB 
are good measures of cognitive skills for the general population as well. Accordingly, research 
using NLSY79 data commonly controls for AFQT or ASVAB scores when analyzing labor 
market outcomes.  
One branch of the literature is concerned with estimating the returns to schooling independent 
of ability (see Elias, 2004). The most straightforward way to address this issue is by estimating 
standard Mincer wage equations with and without AFQT scores or some other measure 
constructed from the ASVAB scores as a control (see Belzil & Hansen, 2002). Some authors, 
however, recently have used more involved methods, such as nonparametric analysis. These 
different approaches are used out of concern for the validity of assumptions necessary to 
identify these effects. Many approaches often make linearity assumptions to obtain identification 
due to minimal observations on low-educated, high-ability individuals or vice versa.  
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) used the ASVAB scores provided by NLSY79 data to show that 
parametric methods that assume linear age and time effects to obtain identification were invalid 
in the context of the NLSY. By using a nonparametric approach that allows the relaxation of 
linear age and time effects, they found the college-high school premium increased for 
individuals in the highest quartile of ability but found no change for individuals in the 3rd quartile 
of ability. The authors were unable to draw conclusions for individuals at lower ability levels.  
The wealth and detail of the NLSY79 data allow researchers to take many different approaches 
to estimate returns to schooling. Because NLSY79 contains highly detailed data on all 
individuals within a family, Bronars and Oettinger (2006) used matched sibling data on 
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schooling, wages, and ability to instrument for an individual’s schooling choice. This 
instrumental variables approach found older siblings and women have higher returns to 
schooling.  
Other studies have examined how controlling for ability affects gender- and race/ethnicity-based 
wage gaps. Neal and Johnson (1996) looked specifically at White-Black wage differentials for 
youth in their early twenties. They limited their sample to individuals ages 18 or younger in 1980 
when the AFQT was administered. The authors showed that including the AFQT in standard 
wage regressions removed the White-Black differential for women, and considerably reduced it 
for men. This reflected the fact that the distribution of AFQT scores for Black youth lay to the left 
of that for White youth. In perhaps the most widely known and controversial use of the AFQT in 
the NLSY79, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) take the exam as a measure of inherent ability and 
view the White-Black score gap in this light. Neal and Johnson (1996), however, submitted 
evidence indicating the AFQT score itself is the product of human capital investments before the 
test-taking age.  
Recently, this view has received broad empirical support in a variety of papers. That is, while it 
was long accepted that higher ability leads to higher schooling levels, it has become clear that 
ability measures themselves are the product of early human capital investment through 
schooling, parental involvement, and so forth. In Hansen et al. (2004), for example, the panel 
features of the NLSY are exploited to obtain measures of latent or unobserved ability and 
assess ability and schooling impacts on AFQT scores. The administration of the AFQT test to 
youth at different points in their education is used to compare and confirm the results using a 
nonparametric method of identification. The authors found that for a given level of ability, the 
effects of schooling on test scores were linear. For individuals of lower ability, however, the 
effects of schooling have slightly greater magnitudes than for those who are endowed with high 
ability.  
More recent work by Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) also suggested standard ability 
measures were produced rather than inherited. The authors took steps to control for this 
feedback effect as they assessed the role played by cognitive and noncognitive abilities in 
explaining wages, employment, schooling choice, occupational choice, and a variety of 
behavioral outcomes. Among these behavioral outcomes are smoking and anticipated 
incarceration. As measures of noncognitive abilities, the authors utilized the Rotter Locus of 
Control Scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, both provided in the NLSY. Their 
estimation techniques allowed unobservable cognitive and noncognitive attributes to play a 
large role in the determination of labor market outcomes as well. They found evidence, 
confirmed by previous authors, that noncognitive skills might be just as important for outcomes 
as cognitive skills. Moreover, the authors found that even noncognitive skill measures were 
affected by early human capital investments.  
Crime, Drug Abuse, and the Labor Market 
The relationship between crime and drug abuse on the one hand, and the labor market on the 
other, runs in both directions. Economists are interested both in how labor market conditions 
can cause crime and drug abuse, and the impact of criminal activity and drug abuse on labor 
market performance. Because of questions about criminal activity and drug use, NLSY79 data 
can be helpful in addressing both issues. Unfortunately, the NLSY79 asked questions about 
criminal activity in the 1980 survey, but not in later surveys. This is a limitation the NLSY97 does 
not face (see Bouffard, 2005; Gill & Michaels, 1991; and Sickles & Taubman, 1991).  
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Three studies by Gould, Weinberg, & Mustard (2002), Grogger (1998), and Lochner (2004) 
used NLSY79 data to confirm that the incidence of crime is responsive to local labor market 
conditions or individual opportunity costs. The authors took divergent approaches, though all 
used only men in their analysis. Grogger formulated a static economic model of time allocation, 
in which crime was one possible activity. Tying his estimation relatively closely to the model, he 
estimated structural parameters from which he could determine the responsiveness of crime to 
changes in wages. Gould et al., on the other hand, estimated OLS equations for the number of 
crimes committed during the year prior to the 1980 survey, as well as for the fraction of income 
from crime. Instead of using an individual’s labor market status as a covariate, they used an 
indicator of the wage level and unemployment rate in the individual’s state in 1980. These 
indicators were constructed separately for low-educated and high-educated youth. The authors’ 
results varied depending on the type of crime considered, but in general found responsiveness 
to labor market conditions among low-educated youth.  
Lochner indicated concerns with studies that gauged the response of crime to wages because 
wages for young adults typically reflected a large amount of on-the-job training for some 
segments of the population. He posited a dynamic human capital model in which crime had 
opportunity costs that were dependent on human capital attainment. Using NLSY79 data and 
other data, he found increased educational attainment and increased ability were negatively 
correlated with unskilled crime (see also Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006, and Lochner & 
Moretti, 2004).  
Assessing the effects of criminal activity on future labor market outcomes was not 
straightforward because the NLSY79 only provided a one-year snapshot of criminal activity at 
1980, when the respondents varied in age. Grogger (1992) was one such attempt. While the 
primary dataset used in his analysis was a longitudinal dataset on arrests in California, he 
conducted a modified version of the analysis with the NLSY79 data to confirm his results. 
Estimating a probit model that assessed the effect of prior employment status and prior arrests 
on whether or not a youth was employed in the next year, Grogger found a strong negative 
effect of arrests on employment. This was not simply an effect of imprisonment, because his 
sample did not include those who were in prison at the time of the interview in 1980. Using a 
variety of controls, the author attempted to address potential problems caused by individual 
heterogeneity leading to joint selection into crime and employment. His inability to utilize panel 
methods, however, exposed a shortcoming in the NLSY79. This was not as significant a 
problem when it came to assessing the impact of drug use on labor market outcomes, however, 
because questions on drug use were asked in both 1984 and 1988.  
Kaestner (1994a) provided a key paper on this topic, for which there was substantial literature. 
The author made the first use of the panel dimension in addressing this issue, as previous 
authors had only the 1984 information available to them. Previous literature typically found a 
positive relationship between wages and drug use. Kaestner noted this could result from wages 
and drug use being jointly determined and used fixed-effects methods to get improved 
estimates. He found this method produced the expected negative relationship between wages 
and drug use for men, but that the results were mixed, and for women, often statistically 
insignificant (see also Burgess & Propper, 1998; Desimone, 2002; Gill & Michaels, 1992; 
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Conclusion 
Access to panel data is crucial to understanding labor market phenomena, especially among 
youth. Such data allow researchers to control for individual fixed heterogeneity or to examine 
dynamic decision making. Moreover, the breadth of the NLSY79 data is extremely useful, as 
decisions in non-work aspects of life, such as those regarding marriage, intimately are tied to 
labor decisions. Occasionally, even the NLSY79 is too limited in its coverage, however. For 
example, the limited instances of questions about crime and drug use forced early studies of 
these topics to be very narrow. As noted earlier, this particular weakness was corrected in the 
NLSY97.  
Moreover, and more importantly, the NLSY79 does contain some data quality problems. 
MaCurdy, Mroz, and Gritz (1998) showed that attrition in the NLSY79 was nonrandom. Of 
course, many longitudinal datasets suffer from this problem, and whether or not this problem 
had large consequences for a particular research topic depends on the question at hand. For 
example, Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, and Scott (1999) claimed attrition does not markedly 
affect their conclusions about job instability, where their analysis relied on a comparison of the 
NLSY79 cohort with an earlier NLS cohort. In designing future panel surveys, however, much 
can be gained from thinking about the limitations of the NLSY79.  
Still, the NLSY has proven to be an excellent resource for labor economists. Individual 
heterogeneity is crucial to consider, as different youth have very different experiences in terms 
of occupational mobility in their early careers. Occupation search and “experience good” 
matching models both have claimed successes in explaining occupational churning among 
youth, while there is little support for the idea that some individuals are simply “high turnover.” 
Employment histories also are important to consider because the presence of occupation-
specific human capital and switching costs turn the occupational choice decision into a 
fundamentally dynamic choice.  
Moreover, the dynamic decisions that youth face differ markedly based on gender and 
race/ethnicity. For example, the timing and occurrence of childbirth can significantly affect 
earnings paths and can be dependent on other demographic characteristics of the mother. In 
the case of race/ethnicity, significant evidence suggests Black youth face lower returns to 
general experience than White youth. Research also suggests ability plays a significant role in 
labor market outcomes, but that conventional ability measures themselves are produced by 
investments earlier in childhood. Finally, some results suggest crime is fairly responsive to 
economic conditions, as accords with intuition.  
Even with this large amount of research, open questions remain that can be addressed fruitfully 
by the NLSY79 or its successor, the NLSY97. For example, the impact of occupational turnover 
in the early career on earnings in adulthood is still a point of controversy. While one might 
conjecture that there is no one “impact,” questions remain about heterogeneous impacts that 
vary across youth subpopulations, perhaps in ways that are related to these youths’ non-market 
choices. In regards to non-market choices, in general the NLSY97 provides a more complete 
picture than even the NLSY79, and will no doubt be a valuable resource for further research on 
the link between crime and labor market behavior.  
As one final example of a fruitful area of future research, a wide body of work has determined 
that early childhood experiences have long-lasting implications. While the NLSY79 is not 
conducive to work on this area, it would be valuable to find datasets that can help economists 
understand better the early childhood experience.
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APPENDIX C 
 
PAY80 AND PAY97 SAMPLING AND WEIGHTING PROCEDURES 
 
The PAY80 and PAY97 cohorts were based on a full probability sample design, meaning all 
American youth had a non-zero chance or probability of being selected into the sample. The 
basic sample designs were developed and implemented by the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago and in cooperation with the Department of Defense 
(DoD), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Department of Labor (DoL). The sample 
selection was based on multistage-stratified area probability sampling methods. Sample 
households initially were screened for eligible youth using door-to-door personal interviewers. 
This appendix outlines the technical sampling issues that occurred in both PAY80 and PAY97. 
As such, it draws liberally from the technical sampling reports prepared for PAY80 and PAY97 
(Frankel & McWilliams, 1981; MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003; Martin, 1998; Martin, 1999; Martin & 
Welsh, 1999; Moore, Pedlow, & Wolter, 1999). In addition, other complementary works are cited 
(e.g., Ericksen, 2000; Wolter, 1998). The interested reader is urged to consult these sources. 
Sample Screening for PAY80 
The individuals selected for PAY80 included all the age-eligible men and women who were part 
of the ongoing cohort identified for the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY79), which 
was sponsored by the DoL. Because the PAY80 participants were part of the ongoing NLSY, 
field investigators had interacted with participants three times by the start of ASVAB testing in 
1980. This rapport helped the sampling and testing process go smoothly, and resulted in a 
sampling percentage of 94%. It is important to note that this sampling percentage is based on 
the number of individuals completing the ASVAB in proportion to those completing the base 
year NLSY interview. However, if comparing the number of individuals completing the ASVAB in 
proportion to those eligible individuals identified in the screening process, the response rate is 
82% (Frankel & McWilliams, 1981). The major difference in sampling percentage of ASVAB 
completion rates is in the denominator; there were more individuals screened in the screening 
process than there were individuals who completed the NLSY base year interview.  
Three samples were compiled for PAY80; a cross-sectional (CX) sample intended to represent 
the U.S. youth population; a supplemental (SU) sample in which Blacks, Hispanics, and 
economically disadvantaged Whites were oversampled; and a military sample comprising 
enlisted personnel. Between the three samples, PAY80 resulted in 9,173 completed ASVABs, 
the scores of which would be used to renorm the ASVAB. 
PAY80 Cross-Sectional Sample 
The CX sample for PAY80 was selected in four basic stages. In the first stage, primary sampling 
units (PSUs) were formed. A PSU is a metropolitan area or one or more counties with a 
population of at least 2,000 housing units. PSUs were formed from metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs), counties, certain New England county parts, and independent cities. Prior to sample 
selection, the PSUs comprising PAY80 were stratified by Census division, including MSA, non-
MSA, county size, and percentage Black population. Selection of the PSUs was based on 
probability proportional to size sampling using 1970 Census population data. The overall NORC 
sample design, from which the PAY80 sample was derived, consisted of 204 selected PSUs 
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divided into four basic replicates. The PAY80 sample consisted of two of these four basic 
replicates, with the CX sample made up of 102 selected PSUs. 
In the second stage, Census block groups (BGs) and enumeration districts (EDs) were selected. 
Prior to sample selection, these secondary sampling units were stratified on the basis of median 
household income and percentage Black population. Selection was carried out with probabilities 
proportional to size based on housing units. A total of nine secondary units were selected from 
each PSU. 
When possible, secondary selections were further subdivided into smaller geographic units with 
a minimum size of 100 housing units. A single third-stage unit was selected for each of the nine 
secondary units. These third-stage units were designated as listing units. Interviewers visited 
each of the 102 (PSUs) x 9 (secondary units) = 918 listing units. The master sample listing, 
which initially had been included as part of the NORC national sample design, also was updated 
or relisted. Listings included both dwelling units and individual (noninstitutional) living quarters. 
In the fourth stage, the listings were subsampled to produce 22,077 sample addresses 
designated for screening. A screening interview was completed in approximately 91% of the 
occupied households. This screening yielded 6,922 eligible youth in the CX sample. 
PAY80 Supplemental Sample 
The SU sample specifically targeted three youth cohorts designed for oversampling: (a) 
Hispanics, (b) Blacks, and (c) economically disadvantage Whites. As in the CX sample, four 
stages of sample selection were used to produce the households that were screened for eligible 
youth. Unlike the CX sample wherein selection was based on probability proportional to size in 
each stage of sampling, probabilities of selection in the SU sample was based on estimates of 
size relative to the targeted population. That is, selection in the SU sample was based on 
probability proportional to the targeted population size in each stage (i.e., size of the Black, 
Hispanic, and/or disadvantaged White population in the PSU, BG and ED, listing unit, and 
addresses in listing units).  
Primary sampling units consisted of single counties, single county parts, and independent cities. 
Unlike the PSUs used in the CX sample, PSUs were formed from single counties rather than 
groupings of counties in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) because the distribution of the 
targeted oversampling groups was not uniform across the various counties that comprise a 
single metropolitan area. MSAs often have counties with widely differing minority rates (e.g., 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island MSA) so sampling was concentrated within 
counties in MSAs in order to get a more accurate probability of minority residency in the 
oversample.  
Stratification for the first stage of selection was based on nine Census divisions and two levels 
of urbanicity—MSA and non-MSA. Prior to sample selection, PSUs were ordered by the 
proportion of the target group population. Probability proportional to size sampling was based on 
a measure of size that was equal to a weighted combination of estimated target population 
sizes:  
probability = (Hispanics + .5 Blacks + economically disadvantaged Whites) 
A total of 100 PSUs were selected for the SU sample. 
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Stages two and three of the SU sample used the sample measures of size employed in the first 
stage, but applied them to the individual Census block groups (BGs) and enumeration districts 
(EDs). A total of nine third-stage listing units were selected for each selected PSU. In the fourth 
stage, the 900 listing units were subsampled to produce 68,861 sample addresses designated 
for screening. A screening interview was completed in approximately 92% of the occupied 
households, yielding a sample of 6,855 eligible youth for the SU sample. 
Special PAY80 Procedures 
Two special procedures were used to assure proper coverage of students living in college 
dormitories or other noninstitutional group quarters. Prior to household screening and 
interviewing, each of the CX and SU sample segments was field-enumerated for all structures 
except college dormitories. Listings were constructed of all individual quarters (beds, rooms with 
beds, and so on) within dormitory units and noninstitutional group quarters. Each unit within the 
dormitory and noninstitutional group quarter listings was sampled at the same rate used for 
dormitory units in the segment in order to accurately estimate the number of college-aged 
individuals while also accounting for group residency environments (i.e., sampling dormitories at 
the same rate as households would underestimate the college-aged population). Second, 
explicit rules were established to link college-aged students living in shared quarters outside of 
dwelling units in college dorms. Interviewers were specially trained to apply these linking rules 
and to refer ambiguous situations to the central office. Based on post-weighting analysis, these 
procedures were determined to have resulted in sufficient coverage of the non-dormitory unit 
population of eligible youth so separate post-stratification was not required. 
PAY80 Military Sample 
As part of the cohort design, a SU sample of military members (Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps), ages 17 to 21 as of January 1, 1979, was selected from lists provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). To make the in-person interviewing cost effective, 
clusters of eligible military youth were formed on the basis of unit identification codes (UICs), 
which typically were groups of individuals residing at the same physical location. The sample 
was stratified by gender, Service, and location. In the final sample, women were selected at a 
rate approximately five times that used for men. The overall sample size was 1,280, of which 
1,158 took the ASVAB (Frankel & McWilliams, 1981). 
Weighting the PAY80 Civilian Sample Data 
The weighting procedures used for the civilian PAY80 samples were consistent with the weighting 
procedures used for the overall NLSY79 study. As noted in the NLSY79 Technical Sampling Report 
(Frankel & McWilliams, 1981), the objectives of the weighting procedures were the same for both 
the civilian and military portions of the youth sample. In general, these objectives included a 
correction for differential probability of selection, a correction for differential completion rates among 
the basic design cohorts, and poststratification to known total subpopulation sizes. Because the 
civilian and military samples were selected using different sampling frames and procedures, the 
weighting of the separate samples was somewhat different. Together both weighted samples were 
combined to provide a weighted sample of the entire youth population. The weighting process for 
the civilian sample involved five main steps. 
 Step 1. Weights were assigned to each completed individual in the sample on the basis 
of the selection probability associated with the family unit with which the respondent 
 
Appendix C 265 
initially was identified and located. The weight was the inverse of the probability of 
selection. 
 Step 2. At the final interviewing cluster level (918 CX clusters and 900 SU sample 
clusters) an adjustment was applied to compensate for the differential completion rates 
in the screening family units. The weight was equal to the number of family units 
selected within the cluster divided by the number of family units from which screening 
information (a roster of youth) was obtained. 
 Step 3. An adjustment was made for the additional stage of subsampling applied to 
Black and Hispanic youth screened in the SU sample prior to initial interview. In addition, 
adjustment factors were applied to all selected respondents to compensate for 
differential response rates in the initial interview. These adjustments were applied 
separately at the PSU level (102 CX PSUs and 100 SU PSUs) within each of eight basic 
design cohorts: (a) Hispanic men, (b) Hispanic women, (c) Black men, (d) Black women, 
(e) economically disadvantaged White men, (f) economically disadvantaged White 
women, (g) Other men, and (h) Other women. This adjustment factor was the ratio 
designated for individual interviews divided by the completed individual interviews. An 
upper limit of 1.5 was applied to the ratio. 
 Step 4. In this step, the weights for the individuals in Design Cohorts 1 through 6 were 
rescaled so the CX and SU samples could be combined in an optimal way. Using the 
inverse of 1 plus the coefficient of variation from the Step 1 through 4 weights as a 
measure of statistical efficiency, the CX and SU portions of the samples were combined 
within the design cohort in proportion to their effective sample size. Their effective 
sample size was computed as the unweighted sample size times the sample efficiency. 
 Step 5. The final step involved the poststratification of the resulting sample weights to 48 
poststratification cells. These poststratification cells were defined by six gender and 
race/ethnicity categories: (a) Hispanic men, (b) Black men, (c) Other men, (d) Hispanic 
women, (e) Black women, and (f) Other women; and by eight single birth years: 1957 
through 1964. In subsequent waves of data collection, the weighting followed Steps 1 
through 5, with adjustments for changes in the cohort size as well as substratification 
into two propensity-of-response groups formed within each of the 48 poststratification 
cells. 
Weighting the PAY80 Military Sample Data 
Because the military sample was drawn from a list of Service members, the weighting process 
reflected the sample design selection process as well as the actual list size and characteristics. 
Three weighting steps were used.  
 Step 1. Initial weights were assigned to sample individuals as the inverse of the 
probability of selection. Two probabilities were used, one for men (1 / 496.124) and one 
for women (1 / 78.851). 
 Step 2. An adjustment was made in the second step for differential response rates within 
each of the selected PSUs. An upper limit of 1.5 was imposed on this adjustment.  
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 Step 3. In the final weighting step, weights from Steps 1 and 2 were adjusted to 80 
poststratification cells that reflected information available from the sampling frame. 
These cells were defined by Service (4), gender (2), birth year (5), and race/ethnicity (2). 
The composition of the PAY80 sample is shown in Tables C.1 and C.2. The corresponding size of 
the 1980 national youth population (weighted sample) is shown in Table C.3 by year of birth, 
racial/ethnic group, and gender. All data in Tables C.1-C.3 were originally presented in the DoD 
report, Profile of American youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (1982a). Tables C.1 through C.3 may be found at the end of this appendix.  
Limitations of the PAY80 Sample 
As is the case with any information obtained from a sample, users of the PAY80 sample should 
bear in mind certain limitations that might exist with respect to inferences to the full population 
represented by the sample. The PAY80 sample, which is based on the NLSY79 cohort, 
generally is regarded as one of the highest quality longitudinal sample surveys conducted in the 
United States. The sample was, however, subject to some degree of nonresponse, 
noncooperation, and noncoverage. Further, because the administration of the ASVAB was 
conducted by interviewers in contexts and situations that were somewhat different from 
standard test administration settings, some differences in scores might have occurred that 
would not have been observed had standard administration procedures been applied. 
Additionally, language barrier cases were not removed from ASVAB testing in PAY80 as they 
were in PAY97. That said, no fundamental errors, flaws, or criticisms have been raised in the 
literature by either academic or military researchers during the 25 years the PAY80 sample 
generally has been available. 
Sample Screening for PAY97 
Individuals selected for PAY97 were not part of the NLSY97 youth cohort, but were age-eligible 
individuals identified in the same screening process used to identify the NLSY97 sample. The 
PAY97 sample comprised two samples: the Student Testing Program (STP), which included 
youth in 10th, 11th, and 12th grades, and the Enlistment Testing Program (ETP), which included 
youth ages 18-23. Both PAY80 and PAY97 collected ASVAB scores on youth ages 16-23; 
similar to PAY80, 94% of households were sampled. However, only 5,660 ASVABs were 
completed from these households by the ETP sample (the sample used for comparison to 
PAY80). ASVAB norms were calculated based on the ETP sample from PAY97 (MaCurdy & 
Vytlacil, 2003). 
PAY97 Cross-Sectional Sample 
The procedures for selecting the cross-sectional (CX) sample of households for the PAY97 
screening sample were similar to those used for PAY80. Because more geographically detailed 
information was available for the 1990 Census than for the 1970 Census, the selection of 
screening households was carried out in three, rather than four stages. These stages were: (a) 
primary sampling units (PSUs), (b) segments, and (c) households (Moore et al., 1999). Similar 
to PAY80, the probability of selection for PSUs and segments was proportional to the size of the 
PSUs. However, for the household level, the number of housing units selected per segment was 
roughly constant; the only variation in household selection across segments occurred as a result 
of changes in the number of housing units between the 1990 Census and 1997 estimates 
(Ericksen, 2000). 
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In the first stage of sampling, a total of 100 PSUs was selected. The PAY97 design made use of 
certainty selections (i.e., selection probability = 1.00) for the 19 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs ) in determining 19 PSUs. These 19 MSAs were certainty selections because of their large 
populations. The remaining 81 PSUs consisted of MSAs and non-MSA counties. Prior to sample 
selection, the non-certainty PSUs were stratified by Census division, MSA versus non-MSA, 
percentage of Black or Hispanic population in 1990 Census, and per capita income.  
Segments within PSUs were sampled independently from PSU to PSU using a systematic 
sampling scheme with probabilities proportional to the 1990 Census count. Segments were 
allocated in proportion to the 1990 household count in the certainty and noncertainty PSUs. 
In the fall of 1995, NORC visited the 1,151 segments selected for PAY97 and listed all of the 
addresses found therein. Blocks were linked to assure that each segment included at least 75 
households. The within-segment sampling rate was constant across all housing units in the 
segment. This allowed the final cluster sizes within the cross-sectional (CX) sample to be 
roughly constant, varying only due to discrepancies between 1990 Census figures and the 
actual number of households in 1997. Household sampling was also independent from segment 
to segment. Household selection was a function of the 1990 count of household units in the 
PSU divided by the 1990 household count of units across all noncertainty PSUs in the sampling 
universe (Moore et al., 1999).  
In the third stage, the listings were subsampled to produce 64,654 households designated for 
screening, with 94% of eligible households completing the screener interview (MaCurdy & 
Vytlacil, 20003; Moore et al., 1999). The screening yielded 6,801 eligible youth in the CX 
sample (Moore et al., 1999). 
PAY97 Supplemental Sample 
The supplemental sample (SU) was designed to produce a sample that specifically targeted the 
Hispanic and Black youth cohorts for oversampling. There were a few differences in the 
sampling of the CX sample and the SU sample. For example, PSUs were defined as single 
counties in the SU sample to improve targeting of Hispanics and Blacks. In addition, 
stratification was introduced in the last stage to increase the identification of Hispanics and 
Blacks. 
Additionally, counties were separated by the percentage of minorities residing there, and 
counties were merged into PSUs to get minimum household headcounts. All 100 PSUs for this 
sample were single counties. Stratification of the sample PSUs prior to selection was based on 
sort-ordering by the following variables: minority youth density (thirds), Census region, Census 
division, metropolitan status, state, and per-capita income. 
A systematic sample of 100 PSUs was selected. A total of 17 were certainty selections and the 
remaining 83 were noncertainty selections. The selection probability was proportional to the 
PSU measure of size. That is, selection probability was a function of the overall sampling rates 
for Hispanic and Black youth in NLSY97 and the 1990 Census counts of Hispanic and Black 
youth.  
Segments were selected among all segments in the PSUs. Defining the segments was done by 
collapsing Census block groups (BGs) to reach a minimum size of 75 households. Prior to 
selection, segments were stratified by sorting on PSU (county), minority youth density (grouped 
in thirds), percentage of Hispanic youth (grouped in thirds), place within county, percentage 
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minority quartile, and Census track. A systematic sample of 600 segments was selected. 
Selection probability was again proportional to the segment’s measure of size, which was a 
function of the 1990 Census counts of Hispanic and Black youth in the segment.  
Households in the SU sample were divided into two strata: “high minority” and “low minority.” 
High minority strata were defined as segments where the ratio of Blacks or Hispanics under age 
18 to the number of households was 1:5 or greater (Ericksen, 2000). If the sum of Black and 
Hispanics under age 18 was greater than 1:5, the segment was not “high minority.” Any 
segments that did not meet the standard of greater than 1 in 5 for Blacks of Hispanics was 
deemed “low minority” regardless of the ratio of Blacks and Hispanics to the total number of 
households in the segment.  
In general, selection of households within both strata was made by dividing the household 
sample size (31,753) by the estimate of the nation’s housing stock. Finally, households were 
oversampled in segments with large concentrations of Blacks and Hispanics. That is, high 
minority segments were sampled at a rate of 10:1. In the SU sample, 25,485 households were 
designated for screening, with 93% of eligible households completing the screener interview 
(MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003; Moore et al., 1999). From this sample, 2,045 eligible youth were 
screened (Moore et al., 1999). 
Information on the PAY97 sample is presented in Tables C.4 and C.5. The data are similar to 
those presented in Tables C.1 through C.3, albeit for the PAY97 sample. Tables C.4 through 
C.6 may be found at the end of this appendix. 
Limitations of the PAY97 Sampling Strategy 
The problems with PAY97 began with the screening timetable. Screening started for PAY97 in 
February 1997. This sample date was only four months prior to the start date of testing. In 
comparison, the sample for PAY80 was drawn two years prior to testing participants with the 
ASVAB. There were multiple problems related to screening the sample. For instance, screening 
did not yield as many minorities as were hoped for, and the sample had to be drawn three 
times. By the time the third draw occurred, screening was almost completed. However, at this 
same time, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
decided to pursue 1,200 break off cases in the fall of 1997 (Martin, 1998; Martin, 1999; Martin & 
Welsh, 1999). Testing with the ASVAB had begun in June 1997; screening was not complete 
until October 1997. During this period 6,678 ASVAB-eligible youth were located. For PAY97, 
8,000 youth were expected to be identified. 
During this same period, screeners were expected to schedule ASVAB testing for youth. 
However, when testing began, only 16 field staff members were available despite the 250-300 
that were planned for because many field staff members were still involved in screening. By 
mid-July 1997, only 717 youth had completed the ASVAB. The delays caused by the failure to 
complete screening prior to the start of testing caused financial problems in the form of test 
overruns that resulted in a work stoppage from November 4-December 10, 1997. 
Additional problems occurred in the screening of college students. While PAY80 had ensured 
that college students were counted by ensuring that group quarters were screened, in PAY97, 
NORC only asked screened households about whether individuals who might normally live at 
residence were “temporarily away” (Ericksen, 2000). This may have been the result of failure to 
define “household” and who was connected to the household up front; that is, NORC 
contractors were asked to propose their own methods for identifying and interviewing individuals 
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in colleges/universities as well as numerous other temporary-residence locations (e.g., jail, 
halfway houses, foster homes) (Curran, 1994). Ericksen (2000) theorized that persons reporting 
on their household composition are less likely to include persons who are around less 
frequently. Additionally, the NORC data collection form did not allow field interviewers to record 
the contact information of a college-aged student who was living on campus. The better 
alternative would have been to follow PAY80 procedures and define a stratum of dormitories 
and select and interview college students living there (Ericksen, 2000). In PAY97, high school 
students were overrepresented by 5.3% and college students were underrepresented by 2.6%, 
perhaps indicating that college dormitories were not well covered. 
Coverage may have been affected by NORC field investigators as well. Roughly 38% of field 
interviewers reported disclosing the ages of youth eligible to participate to heads of households 
(Horrigan et al., 1999). Likewise, the NORC brochure provided to PAY97 participants listed the 
target-age range for PAY97: in the “commonly asked questions” section of the brochure, the 
age range that was being asked to take part in NLSY97 was shown. Furthermore, in the 
paperwork accompanying the survey introductory letter to parents, the age range of those who 
would be asked for an interview (i.e., the NLSY sample) was listed (Wolter, 1998).  
These disclosures seemed to result in a number of sampling composition anomalies. For 
example, youth appeared to have been hidden from the interview. The household coverage of 
PAY97 (i.e., the degree to which the sampling results were representative of the number of 
households comprising the U.S. according to the Current Population Survey) was acceptable. 
The problem was finding eligible respondents in the households screened by interviewers. For 
instance, fewer households were observed in drawing the PAY97 sample than were present in 
the CPS. Specifically, the shortfall of 18-23 year olds resided in households of only one youth 
within that age range (Horrigan et al., 1999); only 40% of youth in single-child households were 
sampled. Likewise, the ETP sample was highly under-representative of 23 year olds, but more 
24 year olds were in the sample than was possible in the population. In comparison to the 
NLSY97, the ETP sample had too few youth; the deficit for youth ages 18-23 was about 
438/year (Wolter, 1998). PAY97 also screened only about 50-60% of youth that the CPS 
indicated it should have covered.  
Because population estimates require large samples, PAY97 having too few participants is an 
issue. Weighting could have accounted for having too few youth had the sample been 
representative (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003). However, sample characteristics were problematic 
(MaCurdy, 2001, 2002). ETP97 was too educated; 28% of ETP were college graduates. The 
CPS indicated only 15% of the 18-23 year old population was college graduates. Further, even 
after post-stratification by age, race, and gender, youth in PAY97 were overeducated. 
In addition, the sample size design developed by NORC for minority segments depends on the 
assumption that residential distribution of Blacks and Hispanics was essentially the same in 
1997 as in 1990. Analysis of the 1980-1990 Census growth in Black & Hispanic populations 
indicated a growth rate of Black and Hispanic youth of 79% (Ericksen, 2000). Cities where 
Blacks and Hispanics were less than 20% accounted for only 5.84% of the 1997 Black and 
Hispanic population; in 1990, it was 7.7%. NORC didn’t account for movement of Blacks and 
Hispanics away from areas where they were most concentrated in 1990. 
Complementing the failure to account for the movement of Blacks and Hispanics from areas of 
high concentration, NORC also selected high minority segments at 10 times the rate of low 
minority segments for PAY97. Because of this sampling procedure, high minority segments 
were oversampled. To produce a representative sample, the low minority segments should have 
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been weighted at 10:1 (Ericksen, 2000). However, NORC decided to cap the weights of the low 
minority segments to reduce sample variability and prevent extreme weights from the SU 
sample. Therefore, households from the high minority segments received too much weight. An 
inadvertent consequence of this procedure was that the SU sample demonstrated massive 
undercoverage of Black and Hispanic youth because of the reduction in the sum of the sample 
weight. Because of the reduction in the sum of the sample weights, the coverage for the ETP 
sample was low; it was only 50%.  
In summary, a multitude of issues plagued the screening and sampling process for PAY97. 
Many of these issues contributed to the difficulty of using the weights that NORC constructed for 
the PAY97 data. The weighting process that NORC used for PAY97 is outlined in the next 
section. 
Weighting the PAY97 Sample Data 
Weighting allows the sample screened in PAY97 to be compared to the general population. 
That is, weighting remedies any discrepancies found between the probabilities of demographic 
representation of the population in comparison to the demographic representation of inclusion in 
the sample. Weights of PAY97 were done for the combined sample of the CX and SU samples, 
as well as for the CX sample. Each set of weights required six steps. 
 Step 1: Weights were assigned to each housing unit. This adjustment was for the 
stratified sampling procedure. Each unit was assigned a weight equal to the inverse of 
its probability of being selected into the screener sample. 
 Step 2. Weights were then adjusted for screener nonresponse. Each household that 
completed a screener was assigned a weight to adjust for the screener nonresponse. 
The weight was equal to the inverse of the probability of completing the screener among 
the eligible households in a given segment. 
 Step 3. Weights were adjusted for sampling into the ETP sample. Field interviewers 
screened in more non-Black, non-Hispanic youth into the ETP than they desired. 
Therefore, they multiplied the weight of non-Black, non-Hispanic youth in the ETP by 
0.878. 
 Step 4. The CX and SU samples were combined. Precision weights were used to 
combine both samples in the CX sample. Precision weights were designed to capture 
the relative effective sample sizes. The variance of the weights in the SU was used. The 
weight was not changed from non-Hispanic, non-Black youth for these youth. Because 
of the capping, the SU sample overweighted Hispanics and Blacks from high minority 
areas; thus, the combined sample did the same. The statistics from this sample 
indicated the overweighting of Blacks and Hispanics. Likewise, the average weights in 
the CX and SU are different, so the coverage rate based on the sum of the weights was 
affected. 
 Step 5. Weights were adjusted for youth nonresponse. Each youth completing the 
ASVAB was assigned a weight to adjust for ASVAB nonresponse.   
 Step 6. NORC poststratified the weights by age, race, and gender to match the 
population size of age, race, and gender cells estimated by the Current Population 
Survey.  
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Problems with the PAY97 Weights 
The weights that NORC produced for the ETP sample of PAY97 were poststratified by age, 
race/ethnicity, and gender. However, because of the undercoverage of youth and the low 
response rates of the sample, these weights produced a sample that was overeducated when 
compared to the general population. In response to this finding, DoD asked the Norming 
Advisory Group (see Chapter 2) comprising nationally known testing experts and sampling 
statisticians to provide more technical expertise and advice on issues related to the PAY97 
sample (Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing, 2002). Ultimately, the 
Defense Manpower Data Center commissioned Dr. Thomas E. MaCurdy, an eminent Stanford 
University economist and a member of the Norming Advisory Group, to address the PAY97 
sampling challenges and to provide recommendations for corrective actions.  
MaCurdy’s evaluation of the NORC weighting concluded that because NORC screeners 
identified fewer youth per household than would be expected based on the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), the ETP sample was not representative of American youth ages 18 to 23. 
MaCurdy believed the PAY97 data were usable, but the dataset and weights needed to be 
adjusted (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003).  
MaCurdy and Vytlacil (2003) constructed several alternative weighting strategies to address the 
problems in the sample. Their analyses indicated that it was possible to estimate proper weights 
using age, race, gender, and level of education. They noted that it was important to base weighting 
of youth’s education on a reference dataset that properly aligned the age of the youth and the timing 
of the educational attainment with the protocols adopted in ETP97. When the CPS was used as the 
reference dataset to determine the representativeness of the PAY97 sample, level of education was 
measured at different points in time. That is, CPS97 measured education level in March 1997; data 
collection for the ETP sample continued as late as October 1997, leading to a higher level of 
educational attainment for youth in the ETP97 sample than for the youth in CPS97. This mismatch 
on age of youth and measurement of educational attainment resulted in the PAY97 participants 
appearing better educated than the CPS would suggest (MaCurdy & Vytlacil, 2003).  
Consequently, MaCurdy and Vytlacil (2003) examined the PAY97 sample in reference to the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP96) instead of the CPS. Since educational 
attainment in SIPP96 was measured at a similar time period (October 1997) as when 
educational attainment was measured in PAY97, MaCurdy recommended using SIPP96 as a 
reference dataset in weighting youth’s education. 
Implementation of PAY97 Weights 
Because of the importance of accurate norms in ensuring a high-quality military, DoD took 
several concrete actions to address technical issues surrounding the PAY97 weights as 
developed by NORC. Based on recommendation from the PAY97 Norming Advisory Group (see 
Chapter 2) and the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing (2002) (see 
Chapter 2), PAY97 was re-evaluated in an attempt to construct improved weights. Dr. Thomas 
MaCurdy examined the PAY97 sample by comparing it to other national probability datasets 
and developed replacement weights referenced to SIPP96 that addressed the weaknesses of 
the NORC weights. After a thorough review by DoD’s own testing experts and the Defense 
Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing (2002), new ASVAB norms based on the 
MaCurdy weights (Segall, 2004) were implemented on July 1, 2004. These weights resulted in a 
nationally representative sample appropriate for underpinning the new norms and for making 
comparisons between the cognitive skills of PAY97 and PAY80 youth. 
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Table C.1.Composition of the PAY80 Sample: Racial/Ethnic Group and Gender 
 Gender  
Racial/Ethnic Group Male Female Total 
Whitea 3,531 3,496 7,027 
Blackb 1511 1511 3,022 
Hispanic 902 927 1,829 
TOTAL 5,944 5,934 11,878 
Note. aWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic; bBlack does not include 
persons of Hispanic origin. Source: U.S. Department of Defense. (1982a). Profile of American youth: 
1980 Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. Washington, DC: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics). 
 
Table C.2. Composition of the PAY80 Sample: Year of Birth, Racial/Ethnic Group, and 
Gendera 
  Racial/Ethnic Group   




Whiteb Blackc Hispanic Total  
Year of 
Birth 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
1962 18 458 401 213 210 108 145 779 756 1,535 
1961 19 363 418 207 211 129 116 699 745 1,444 
1960 20 445 448 197 206 123 110 765 764 1,529 
1959 21 490 519 169 195 108 109 767 823 1,590 
1958 22 477 505 190 167 92 102 759 774 1,533 
1957 23 632 488 167 166 93 107 781 761 1,542 
TOTAL  2,865 2,779 1,143 1,155 653 689 4,550 4,623 9,173 
Note. aRestricted to persons in the sample born between January 1, 1957 and December 31, 1962 (18 
through 23 years at time of testing; July-October, 1980). Source: U.S. Department of Defense. (1982a). 
Profile of American youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 










Table C.3. Composition of the1980 National Youth Population Based on Profile of American Youth Sample: Year of Birth, 
Racial/Ethnic Group, and Gendera (In Thousands)b 





Age at Time of Testing 
(Years) 
Whitec Blackd Hispanic  
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
1962 18 1,677.9 1,616.1 295.4 292.1 139.5 123.5 2,112.8 2,031.7 4,144.5 
1961 19 1,701.6 1,643.9 296.6 293.1 140 124.3 2,138.2 2,061.3 4,199.5 
1960 20 1,729.6 1,669.8 295.9 290.2 134.8 127.8 2,160.3 2,087.8 4,248.0 
1959 21 1,753.2 1,675.3 285.2 289.3 120.1 131.8 2,158.5 2,096.4 4,255.0 
1958 22 1,755.5 1,708.7 284.1 289.5 122 131.7 2,161.6 2,129.9 4,291.4 
1957 23 1,762.8 1,700.4 275.7 282.9 121.2 127.5 2,159.7 2,110.8 4,270.4 
TOTAL  10,380.6 10,014.2 1,733 1,737.1 777.6 766.6 12,891.1 12,517.9 25,409.1 
Note. aRestricted to persons in the sample born between January 1, 1957 and December 31, 1962 (18 through 23 years at time of testing, July-
October 1980). bFigures are rounded. cWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. dBlack does not include persons of 
Hispanic origin. Source: U.S. Department of Defense. (1982a). Profile of American youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery. Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics). 
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Table C.4. Composition of the1997 Profile of American Youth Sample: Racial/Ethnic 
Group and Gender 
 
Student Testing Program 
(STP) 
Enlistment Testing Program 
(ETP) 
 
 Gender Gender  
Racial/Ethnic Group Male Female Male Female Total 
Whitea 1,335 1,311 1,538 1,755 5,939 
Blackb 459 518 498 744 2,219 
Hispanic 401 392 505 620 1,918 
TOTAL 2,195 2,221 2,541 3,119 10,076 
Note. aWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. bBlack does not include 
persons of Hispanic origin.  
 
Table C.5. Composition of the1997 Profile of American Youth Sample: Year of Birth, 
Racial/Ethnic Group, and Gendera 
  Racial/Ethnic Group  
 Age at Time 
of Testing 
(Years) 
Whiteb Blackc Hispanic Total 
Year of 
Birth 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1979 18 282 311 121 152 119 114 522 577 
1978 19 263 305 111 134 91 114 465 553 
1977 20 263 293 82 120 95 101 440 514 
1976 21 244 309 75 118 61 107 380 534 
1975 22 245 257 43 103 74 93 362 453 
1974 23 202 261 53 103 54 78 309 442 
TOTAL  1,499 1,736 485 730 494 607 2,478 3,073 
Note. aAges represent age as of June 1, 1997. bWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or 








Table C.6. Composition of the National Youth Population Based on the 1997 Profile of American Youth Sample: Year of 
Birth, Racial/Ethnic Group, and Gendera (In Thousands)b 
  Racial/Ethnic Group 
Total 
 
Year of Birth 
Age at Time of 
Testing (Years) 
Whitec Blackd Hispanic  
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
1979 18 919.1 836.9 148.7 199.1 176.9 222.0 1,244.7 1,258.0 2,502.7 
1978 19 1,391.0 1,262.4 228.5 239.0 285.1 250.7 1,904.6 1,752.0 3,656.6 
1977 20 1,214.2 1,258.7 197.1 301.2 265.0 217.4 1,676.3 1,777.3 3,453.6 
1976 21 1,234.5 1,227.5 220.4 228.5 292.4 245.4 1,747.2 1,701.4 3,448.6 
1975 22 1,257.1 1,203.0 199.0 256.3 286.8 254.9 1,742.9 1,714.2 3,457.1 
1974 23 1,117.2 1,266.2 234.6 230.6 267.3 238.4 1,619.2 1,735.2 3,354.4 
TOTAL  7,133.2 7,054.6 1,228.2 1,454.7 1,573.5 1,428.8 9,934.9 9,938.1 19,873.0 
Note. Population totals presented here are based on weights derived using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP96). aAges 
represent age as of June 1, 1997. bFigures are rounded. cWhite includes all racial/ethnic groups other than Black or Hispanic. dBlack does not 
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APPENDIX D 
 
A VIRTUAL SYMPOSIUM: PROSPECTS FOR THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
 
Continuing questions and concerns about the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) led to the formation of 
a virtual symposium, comprising several leading authorities on military manpower issues and 
former U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials, to evaluate AVF recruiting prospects. The 
original objective of the symposium was to review a book on the evolution of the AVF, written by 
Bernard Rostker37 and published by the RAND Corporation in 2006.38 The symposium later was 
expanded to cover a wider array of topics relating to the AVF, from events or factors that might 
lead to compulsory military service to the importance of research in shaping military manpower 
policies under the AVF.  
Methods and Members 
The main panel consisted of 10 individuals with considerable AVF expertise. In alphabetical 
order, the panel included Martin Anderson; Phillip Carter; Mark Eitelberg (panel chair); Eli Flyer; 
Robert Goldich; Paul Phillips; Robert Pirie; Christopher Jehn; Patricia Shields; and John 
Warner. A brief biographical note on each participant follows, along with references to the 
publications cited.  
The symposium was conducted almost entirely by e-mail; Martin Anderson was interviewed by 
phone. (Citations are from panel members’ e-mails or Anderson’s phone interview unless 
otherwise noted.)  
The symposium began in November 2006. Most panel members responded by December 2006 
or January 2007. Panel members were asked to answer 10 questions. Six of the 10 questions 
focused on Rostker’s book; the remaining questions asked panel members to evaluate the AVF. 
The 10 questions were relatively detailed and provocative and included a total of 28 queries that 
probed for extended responses.  
General Assessment of the AVF 
If one were to look for clues that might foretell the AVF’s failure, where best than in the factors 
that were largely responsible for its creation and long-term durability? Rostker identifies four 
major reasons in I Want You! for the AVF’s success: (a) leadership; (b) research and its 
applications; (c) managing and developing successful programs; and (d) adequate budgets. He 
also chronicles AVF leaders’ ability to learn, adapt to change, and overcome many difficult 
problems during the past 40 years. Yet, in closing the book, Rostker poses a question: “Is the 
all-volunteer armed force sustainable?” And his answer to this question is simply: “Only time will 
tell” (p. 756).  
                                                
37 Bernard Rostker (Author of I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force, RAND, 2006) is a 
senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. His previous positions include Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, Under  Secretary of the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower 
and Reserve Affairs, and Director of Selective Service. He is the author of numerous publications.  
38 The book review and symposium were requested by the editors of Public Administration Review, an 
official publication of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). The quotations that appear 
here are all taken from written responses by the panel members to the questions, with the lone exception 
of Martin Anderson. Quotations attributed to Anderson are from notes taken by Eitelberg during two 
telephone discussions that covered the symposium’s themes and questionnaire.  
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Panel members were asked to assess the AVF’s prospects and several related topics, in light of 
Rostker’s appraisal and closing statement, which implies the future of all-volunteer service is 
essentially uncertain. Martin Anderson, to whom President Richard M. Nixon gave “the major credit 
for conceiving the idea and implementing” the AVF (p. 748), observed that only a catastrophe would 
compel the nation to reintroduce a draft—and this, according to Anderson, is basically “unthinkable.” 
Consequently, Anderson puts the odds of returning to conscription at “one-hundred to nothing.”  
Chris Jehn shares Anderson’s perspective, commenting that, “if we want an AVF, we can have 
it.” Jehn explains:  
Every crisis that has confronted the AVF so far is a self-inflicted wound. And all have been 
easily (in retrospect) overcome by application of one or more of Rostker’s four factors. So, 
once we accept [Milton] Friedman’s assertion that conscription is inconsistent with our 
country’s principles of freedom, and we have the will to apply Rostker’s four factors, 
especially leadership, there are no imaginable circumstances short of total mobilization, as 
for World War II, that would require resumption of conscription.  
 
John Warner expresses a similar opinion, finding the future of the AVF “will require the commitment 
of politicians to support it adequately,” and stating his belief that the research community must 
“continually inform [politicians] about the state of the AVF and the consequences of ending it.” At the 
same time, although Warner sees a “lack of political will to provide the resources needed” as a 
factor that might threaten the AVF, he considers a return to the draft unlikely. When pressed to 
describe the first signs of failure—that the AVF is unraveling—Warner is nevertheless able to 
pinpoint a possible scenario, which is not necessarily catastrophic:  
The main thing that would make the AVF a failure is an ineffective fighting force. By all 
accounts, U.S. forces in Iraq have done everything asked of them, but a decline in 
combat effectiveness or unwillingness to fight would be the AVF’s Achilles heel, more 
than supply-side difficulties. So far, the AVF has performed superbly in conflict and has 
the perception of being a much more effective fighting force than a conscripted force 
would be. If this perception were lost, I think there would be more calls for conscription. 
But I don’t see that happening.  
 
The notion of ineffectiveness, or at least a perception of it, is not mentioned by other panelists. 
Most do agree, however, as Jehn and Warner found, that a critical element in the future of the 
AVF is the continuing support of the American people and their leaders. For example, Phillip 
Carter writes:  
Rostker’s four factors are all necessary to the development and sustainability of the 
AVF, but they are not themselves sufficient. In my opinion, the key variable is will. The 
American people must have the will to support the AVF, and this will must be expressed 
in concrete terms by the willingness of young, qualified Americans to join the military. 
This will must be nourished by America’s political leaders, and it must be sustained 
through effective use of the military and through victory. But if and when this will 
evaporates, so too [will] the AVF.  
 
“Even if the AVF had outstanding leadership, brilliant research, excellent management, and 
adequate resources,” Carter continues, “it still could fail.” Indeed, he sees “a limit to the AVF’s 
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ability to recruit American men and women.” Theoretically, Carter states, “it may always be 
possible to pay one more dollar for the next most costly recruit. But, in practice, there exists a 
point where the AVF becomes too costly, and where the American public (and Congress) may 
be willing to consider conscription as the proper course of action.”  
Paul Phillips likewise draws less on theory than on practice and experience when evaluating the 
AVF’s near-term prospects. As Phillips points out, “the Army part of the AVF seems not to work 
in long, unpopular wars.” Expanding on this point, he observed that in 2006, “the Army had to 
take drastic steps to meet its recruiting goals. It had to recruit non-U.S. citizens with the promise 
of a quick track to citizenship, waive criminal records, reduce quality standards, offer bonuses 
up to $40,000, enlarge the enlisted force by 1,000, and extend the eligible age for enlisting to 
42, a time when most career soldiers are qualified to retire.” Although the AVF’s prospects are 
still “probably good” and “we will muddle through,” Phillips thinks “the next two years will tell us 
whether to continue with the AVF or return to a draft”:  
By then, we will either be mostly out of Iraq or still committed with large forces there. If we 
are out and are satisfied that an Army of about 500,000 is right, that there will be no more 
Iraqs—at least not without allies sharing the ground combat mission—and that we will not 
have to go it alone in any other matter affecting our national interests, the AVF can continue.  
 
“The AVF is about as secure as anything in public policy,” Robert Pirie states, “because none of 
the alternatives can command enough of a following to swing a change—and rightly so.” In any 
event, Pirie continues, even if the political setting becomes “ugly,” it is difficult to imagine that 
conscription would emerge as more desirable than the AVF:  
Completely incompetent and foolish leadership may stress the force beyond tolerable 
limits, but even then it is hard to see how a draft would help. The time will come when 
we have withdrawn from Iraq, and there is a clamor for a “peace dividend” when the 
Armed Forces will be in pretty sorry shape. Then the “Outs” will start accusing the “Ins” 
of letting readiness slide, and the “Ins” will try to fix readiness without spending any 
money, and things will be generally ugly; but I doubt if the country will believe we need to 
start up conscription to make things better.  
 
Pirie’s conclusion is based on historical trends and what has become a typical, cyclical pattern 
of politics and defense spending. Robert Goldich also looks to history when evaluating the 
longer-term prospects of a return to the draft, but is far less optimistic:  
At some point in the future, there will be a big, manpower-intensive war. We will have to 
enlarge the force to the tens of millions. Casualties will be in the millions. We’ll need to draft 
then. When will it happen, I cannot say…. We’ll do what we have to do. We fought two land 
wars in Asia from 1950 to 1973, costing us 500,000 casualties, and we’re fighting a smaller 
one in Eurasia that’s cost us 26,000. One member of Congress asked Woodrow Wilson, 
shortly after the declaration of war in 1917, “You’re not going to send soldiers over there, are 
you?” Wilson…knew that the currency of international politics was the lives of American 
soldiers, and so off went the American Expeditionary Forces—two million of them.  
 
Basically, this scenario brings the discussion full circle, to the catastrophic event that Anderson 
termed “unthinkable.” “If history is any guide,” Goldich observes, “the absolutely inevitable 
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nature of international political competition means we will face, if not a peer competitor, at least 
a regional competitor in an area of the world important to us.” Without a dependence on nuclear 
weapons, this type of warfare would call for massive ground forces and a return to military 
conscription. Goldich proceeds to describe two broad scenarios—both requiring a massive, 
total, or near-total mobilization—that likely would lead to conscription.  
“What I do not see as happening,” Goldich asserts, “is a return to the draft just to deal with 
troublesome recruiting. Whether or not it ought to happen is unimportant. It won’t.” As Goldich 
and others observe, “any conscription regime ultimately depends on popular, voluntary 
compliance” or “a strong popular consensus that a draft is necessary”; and that will not occur, 
absent extreme scenarios.  
Role of Research 
According to Anderson, who served on the Defense Manpower Commission from 1975 to 1976 
and the Defense Policy Board in 2001, studies of the Army’s recruiting problems at the turn of 
the millennium revealed “four areas of importance” that required attention. These were 
advertising, recruiters, money—pay, bonuses, and educational benefits—and standards. The 
Army responded by increasing its advertising funding, raising the number of recruiters, boosting 
its monetary incentives to attract more recruits, and lowering its standards.  
Some might argue the Army’s achievements in recruiting, against the backdrop of an unpopular 
war, are commendable; it could very well be a lot worse.39 Some also might argue that lowering 
standards should be viewed only as a temporary solution because doing so expands the pool of 
potential recruits and eases the strain on recruiting. The question is, at what cost over the long 
term? Because entry standards obviously are not arbitrary, but based generally on performance 
factors, such as the probability of success in training or the likelihood of completing a first term 
of enlistment, lowering these standards holds consequences. The spillover effects of the other 
three factors are relatively minimal; however, a number of recruits who join with lower 
qualifications—be it aptitude, education, or physical condition—could remain in the organization 
for years to come. Current recruit cohorts will provide future Service leaders and senior 
technicians. Without lateral entry, the Services can only “hire” new employees at the lowest 
level; thus, as a senior economist at RAND puts it, “if you want a high-quality staff sergeant, 
you’d better recruit him” (Beth Asch quoted in Bender & Baron, 2007).  
The importance of properly screening applicants at the point of entry cannot be overemphasized. 
Indeed, despite all of its problems in three-plus decades without a draft, the military is 
unquestionably the world’s leader in this area and a pioneer in aptitude testing, having developed 
the initial prototypes for large-scale, group-administered testing during World War I (Eitelberg, 
Laurence, & Waters with Perelman, 1984). From its earliest days designing these screening tools to 
the present, other armies of the world have turned to the United States and its military personnel 
researchers for knowledge and guidance. This preeminent position and leadership in the field has 
been achieved through nearly a century of research and experience. Consequently, it seemed 
appropriate to ask panel members about the future of research and its role in sustaining the AVF.  
                                                
39 According to a senior noncommissioned officer in Army personnel and recruiting, the Army was “scraping 
the bottom of the barrel to get people to join.” From Paul von Zielbauer, “Army is Cracking Down on 
Deserters,” New York Times, 9 April 2007; also quoted in “Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee,” 17 April 2007, p. 6. As Korb (p. 5) observes, money helps, too: 
“Spending on enlistment and recruitment bonuses tripled from $328 million before the war in Iraq to over $1 
billion in 2006. The incentives for Army Guard and Reserve have grown ten-fold over the same period.” 
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As Rostker (2006) writes in I Want You!, “research has been a critical part of the AVF from its 
very beginning” (p. 751). Given this understanding, panel members were asked to respond to 
four related questions: Has the importance of research grown or declined over the course of the 
AVF? What sorts of research programs are needed for the future? Are DoD and the Services 
using their research dollars most effectively? And, have research and policy succeeded or failed 
in certain areas more than in others? (For example, should first-term attrition [as up to one-third 
of new recruits continue to be discharged before completing their initial tour] be considered a 
notable, long-term failure?)  
“As in most fields of research,” Jehn writes, “this field’s research has grown in quality over the 
past 40 years. There are always unanswered questions (and always will be), like what causes 
first-term attrition, and its policy twin, how can we better identify recruits more likely to 
successfully complete a first-term of enlistment?” Thus, Jehn sees no diminished interest by 
policymakers, “either career (military and civilian) or political appointees”:  
Indeed, if anything, interest has increased over the past several decades as policymakers 
come to their jobs better educated about the value of analysis…. But I think we need more 
doing, not always more analysis. We need a modern military compensation system 
(including retirement), better management of training quantity and timing through the 
course of careers, a better system for estimating manpower requirements, to name just a 
few more deficiencies (in addition to attrition management)…. In all these cases and many 
others, it’s time for the leadership factor to engage.  
 
In contrast to Jehn’s assessment, Pirie finds that “the importance of research has clearly 
declined” and implies the decline is a cyclical phenomenon with “much less interest when things 
are running smoothly than when there is a crisis.” Pirie’s comments also seem to suggest that, 
because declining interest continues, the Army’s widely reported recruiting difficulties have not 
yet alarmed enough policymakers to raise their level of interest in associated research. Yet, 
when asked if DoD and the Services were using their research funding most effectively, Pirie 
was most emphatic: “Without even looking, this is a no-brainer: NO!”  
Most panel members who responded to the questions on research were more critical than 
complimentary regarding its present condition. Anderson, for example, comments that much of what 
he sees is “biased” in some way and not particularly groundbreaking. On a similar theme, and 
considered a “sensitive matter,” Goldich believes certain organizations rule the world of military 
manpower research, and not necessarily to the benefit of the most enlightened policy decisions:  
Right now, [research organization] has a virtual lock on complex and lengthy manpower 
research projects. They deserve to. No organization has the depth they do, although 
other, much smaller FFRDCs [Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers] 
and ex-FFRDCs can also do excellent work. This is, and has been, unhealthy. 
[Research organization] has its own ideological and professional perspective—the 
former establishment liberal, the latter economic. More dollars could result in the market 
being able to sustain manpower analysis organizations with a wider range of intellectual 
approaches to analysis.  
 
Patricia Shields offers a similar observation when commenting on the research highlighted in 
Rostker’s book. Shields sees in the book, which purports to examine the influence of economic 
analysis on policy, “the true dominance of economists and of research arms that are almost 
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attached to DoD (RAND, General Research Corporation, Hoover Institution) in the world of policy…. 
The emphasis [of the book] was not scholarly (university-based) research. It was really dominated 
by think-tank research. And, perhaps it shows how important this kind of research is in practice.”  
Warner, an economics professor, cites hearsay evidence that research has “played a smaller role in 
policy formulation” than in many previous periods. Warner, as does Pirie, sees research as 
“problem-driven,” and notes that it “ebbs and flows with the crises of the day.” According to Warner, 
the Iraq war and its “need for immediate fixes to immediate problems have diverted attention from 
long-term research in support of long-term objectives.” Warner points to the following example:  
DoD and the Services have too often supported recruiting and retention research when 
there is a crisis and ignored it when problems are not apparent. A prime example is that 
DoD supported the collection and analysis of advertising expenditure data on a 
haphazard basis. This has caused gaps in the data and has limited the capacity to study 
the effects of advertising on recruiting. DoD needs to support the collection and analysis 
of data on recruiting and retention on a more sustained basis. [Moreover,] advertising 
research needs to focus on the effectiveness of the advertising message and not just the 
effects of the amount of spending. What messages work best, and who responds to the 
messages (youth, parents, etc.)?  
 
Goldich joins the prevailing chorus that the role of research has diminished considerably, 
especially the “in-house analytical capability of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 
Service manpower shops.” As Goldich writes:  
Most of this appears to result from endless slicing of budgets, particularly those of 
supposedly always-bloated organizations, [and] headquarters staffs. I would also add to 
this the enthusiasm displayed by the Administration…for contracting out capabilities 
formerly held in-house. One of the results of this is that there are fewer and fewer people 
within the DoD who have the expertise to manage and control contract analysis.  
 
“This is true throughout the federal government, not just DoD,” Goldich adds. “Mostly, I would 
suggest that the kind of research programs needed for the future are better funded ones—right 
now there is a lot that is not happening.”  
Eli Flyer, the senior member of the symposium panel with more than 50 years experience conducting 
and supervising military manpower research, responded to the questions by reflecting on his 
distinguished career and by developing a list of eight “lessons learned,” as summarized below. 
 Many military personnel program managers do not favor evaluation of their program’s 
effectiveness—for them, it often is a losing proposition.  
 Research sponsors frequently are long gone by the time research results come in, and 
their successors could care less about the findings.  
 High-level sponsorship is needed within OSD, both to conduct research as well as to 
handle objections by the Services to the needed operational changes identified by 
successful research.  
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 Relatively few researchers today have the degree of talent seen among leading 
psychologists of the early 1950s who headed the Service Labs; this shows up in the 
quality of research now being performed.  
 Lack of productivity and ineffective management have led to the demise of the Air Force 
personnel research activity and a sharp reduction in Army research capability, with only 
the Navy personnel research activity surviving, and this on the usual promise of future 
benefits from its efforts.  
 Timing and persistence on the part of researchers occasionally can lead to the 
acceptance and use of study findings.  
 Major problems in personnel procurement, utilization, and retention continue, and can be 
identified, addressed, and rectified through well-directed personnel research efforts, 
leading to substantial dollar savings and a more effective force.  
 Most personnel-related problems cut across Service boundaries, calling for DoD-wide 
research efforts rather than individual Service initiatives.  
On the Matter of Personnel Attrition 
In the 1970 movie, Little Big Man, the character of Old Lodge Skins performs an ancient ritual 
that would allow him to pass from his earthly existence into the afterlife. When he wakes up 
some time later, still alive, he matter-of-factly states: “Sometimes the magic works, and 
sometimes it doesn’t.”  
Since the AVF’s earliest days, DoD and the Services have devoted considerable resources to 
reducing recruits’ first-term attrition rates. These rates have been as high as 40% or more—that 
is, 40% or more of an annual class of recruits would be discharged before completing a first 
term of enlistment. One easily can imagine the personnel turbulence and expense of replacing 
up to 40% of recruits annually—with some recruits leaving early, before significant training, and 
others departing after the military’s major investment in occupational training and acculturation 
has been completed. Given that first-term attrition still ranges from 25% to 30% or higher, 
depending on the method used to calculate these loss rates, one might paraphrase Old Lodge 
Skins; sometimes, the magic of research doesn’t work precisely according to plan.40 
Interestingly, a majority of panel members feel first-term recruit attrition is just one of many 
persistent problems facing the Services, and one that is not as important as some others, such 
as compensation, retirement, and almost anything pertaining to the Reserves. Two outspoken 
exceptions to this view are Phillips and, especially, Flyer.  
  
                                                
40 Statistics on first-term attrition are from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data 
Center. In fact, in the years since Operation Iraqi Freedom, first-term attrition has declined, undoubtedly 
due to the pressing need to keep recruits in uniform, the relatively high number of troops on overseas 
deployments, and the strict application of “stop loss” policies. Reportedly, in the Army, which has been 
struggling to maintain its manpower levels, attrition during the first six months of 2006 fell to 7.6% from a 
level of 18.1% during the previous year. According to Lawrence Korb, the Army’s basic training has thus 
become a “rubber-stamping ritual,” instead of a tool for weeding out poor performers. See “Testimony of 
Lawrence J. Korb before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” 17 April 2007, p. 5.  
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Flyer discovered in the 1950s that Air Force recruits who had dropped out of high school were 
twice as likely as high school graduates to be discharged before completing their first-term of 
enlistment (Flyer, 1959). His findings on the importance of high school graduation eventually led 
to changes in the Air Force enlistment screening policy in 1961, with the introduction of what 
came to be known as the “education differential”; that is, applicants to the Air Force who had 
dropped out of high school were required to have a higher score than high school graduates on 
the AFQT. The basic reason for requiring a higher AFQT score relates to the higher risk of 
recruiting high school dropouts. It is all in the “law of averages”—the higher the AFQT score, the 
lower the risk of training failure. With a probability of first-term attrition at a level of 50% or 
higher, this can mitigate some of the risk. The Army introduced its own education differential in 
1962, followed by the Navy and the Marine Corps in 1965 (Eitelberg et al., 1984, pp. 137-152).  
Not surprisingly, Flyer sees first-term attrition as “a key factor in sustaining a volunteer force.” He 
observes that the end of the draft all but guaranteed attrition would require far greater attention:  
High attrition rates accompany a volunteer force. During the draft, most misbehaving 
military personnel were not rewarded with a separation, but were subject to punishment 
through the stockade and retraining. With the end of the draft, the Services appear to 
have adopted a vastly different philosophy: “volunteer in, volunteer out”; “you don’t want 
us, then we don’t want you”; and “misbehave, and out you go!”  
Flyer then asks (and answers):  
Can attrition be managed? My experience suggests that it can. [Further], numerous studies 
have shown that first-term attrition can be reduced with improved applicant screening. 
Traditionally, the Services’ recruiting commands have been opposed to any additional 
restrictions on applicant supply, even during favorable recruiting periods. But enlistment 
screening can work in two directions. It can also increase supply, as well. As far back as the 
early 1980s, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended improved screening 
of the very large General Education Development (GED) applicant population to enlist those 
most likely to do well in service. While [the DoD] developed a screening device for this 
purpose over a decade ago, the Services were unwilling to implement the measure in fear it 
would be applied to high school graduate applicants as well.  
Severe Army recruitment problems since FY1999 have led to following the GAO 
recommendation made some 20 years ago to screen and enlist from the large GED 
applicant pool. Since FY2000, the Army has been meeting its accession requirements in 
this manner. Unfortunately, more effective screening procedures are not being applied 
that would actually reduce first-term attrition rates for this high-risk population, and [DoD] 
has not played an active role here.  
 
Permanent Problems and Innovative Approaches 
If one is seeking evidence to criticize the AVF or its management, first-term attrition is definitely 
the “go-to” example. The continuing, high rates of attrition under the AVF form a large target, 
since they are so striking, so costly, and have been studied for so long and in so many different 
ways. Attrition also is a convenient vehicle for flaying the AVF itself or for lashing out at 
perceived problems in the social and educational upbringing of American youth. Much of the 
criticism for these high turnover rates has fallen on those who design and apply the military’s 
enlistment screening standards, because these standards are formulated largely on their 
 
 
Appendix D 284 
presumed ability to predict a recruit’s first-term attrition or failure to complete training. Thus, the 
first-term loss of recruits is viewed as a breakdown in applicant screening; higher attrition rates 
are attributed more to the military than to society or to environmental influences, such as 
education, the economy, parenting, youth culture, public opinion, national policies, program 
funding, or various conditions that can affect military life. 
Obviously, environmental influences also affect the number and composition of youth who will 
be drawn to volunteer for military service. In times when these influences, including an 
unpopular war, make military recruiting challenging, emphasis shifts to filling vacancies with the 
best-qualified members of the lower-quality, best-available pool; at other times, when 
unemployment rates are running high, recruiters can “cream the crop.” In military recruiting, 
quality and quantity go hand-in-hand, but the senior partner in this union will always be quantity 
when compromise is required. The interaction of environmental influences with personnel 
policies and the persistent need to “make goal” help to explain why recruiting can be remarkably 
frustrating and stressful one year while rewarding and fulfilling the next.  
The environment will additionally influence the attractiveness of military service during any given 
period, often in ways that are well beyond the control of the institution itself. The military is a 
veritable monster of an organization that is “short-leashed” by laws, rules, codes, culture, 
tradition, budgets, and the ever-watchful eye of Congress. The military usually reacts slowly and 
moves deliberately toward change. When recruiting becomes difficult, it cannot alter its level of 
attraction for youth as easily or quickly as it can change its entry standards. Nature abhors a 
vacuum, just as the military abhors personnel vacancies, and rising first-term losses have a 
direct impact on annual recruiting needs. In this way, the personnel problems of yesterday spill 
over into the present as well as the future, further complicating the military’s ability to react and 
to overcome environmental obstacles. 
Perhaps it is time to recognize that first-term attrition is one of many permanent problems facing 
the all-volunteer military. Perhaps it also is time to commend, rather than condemn, the AVF’s 
policy makers and managers for performing the preventative maintenance that has kept first-
term attrition relatively stable. Permanent problems are never fixed; they are merely controlled 
and softened at best. It is possible that, given the strength of existing environmental influences, 
first-term attrition rates could have been a lot higher and far more troublesome without the 
military’s substantial investment in “solving” the problem through enlistment screening.  
Throughout the AVF symposium, panel members emphasized that research is continually 
needed to inform decision makers and the body politic. In well over 30 years of experience with 
the AVF, there has never been a time when all ran smoothly, when one could sit back 
comfortably, basking in the glory of the moment, and not be concerned about some hot issue or 
potential crisis looming on the horizon. A military manpower analyst and scholar captured the 
point at a conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the AVF: 
Staffing a three-million member force, active and reserve, with highly capable and well-
trained volunteers for two decades—against a backdrop that shifted between economic 
recession and growth, critical and favorable public opinion, rising and diminishing world 
tensions, battlefield victories and embarrassing defeats, scandals and achievements, 
budgetary boosts and budgetary busts, baby boomers and the birth dearth, force 
buildups and drawdowns—has been a monumental undertaking that more than a few 
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It is in the nature of public policy that problems are minimized and never fully resolved. Patricia 
Shields expresses this sentiment best by quoting Aaron Wildavsky (1979, pp. 4-5) in Speaking 
Truth to Power: 
The reforms of the past lay like benign booby traps, which could make one stumble even 
if they did not explode. . . . More and more public policy is about coping with 
consequences of past policies. . . . The more we do, therefore, the more there is for us 
to do, as each program bumps into others and sets off consequences all down the line. 
In this way, past solutions, if they are large enough, turn into future problems. . . . 
Instead of thinking of permanent solutions, we should think of permanent problems in the 
sense that one problem always succeeds and replaces another. 
 
It could be said that “thinking of permanent problems” is a pessimist’s view of reality rather than 
reality itself. Yet, this conceptual approach recognizes more realistically the fact that public 
policy issues—including impediments to sustaining and strengthening the AVF—are not only 
quite complicated, but interrelated with many other issues. Thus, the all-volunteer military 
cannot be expected to resolve its most persistent problems on its own. Just as the military’s 
manpower managers deserve some praise for their efforts to stem the rising rates of first-term 
attrition, so too should those who have prepared youth for the world of work assume some 
responsibility for the military’s problems.  
Further, accepting the notion of permanent problems does not take the military’s policy makers 
off the hook for poor decisions or short-sighted actions. Permanent problems cry out for 
innovative approaches. All too often, modern approaches seem locked into the “tried-and-true” 
courses of the past, particularly when it comes to applicant selection and classification. The 
vehicles may change, such as replacing paper-and-pencil tests with computer adaptive 
systems, but the core principles and use of testing information ultimately remain the same. 
Returning again to the example of first-term attrition, the military’s approach to enlistment 
screening has almost always emphasized “selecting out”—that is, eliminating the unqualified or 
those considered bad risks. As DoD explains in Aptitude Testing of Recruits (Department of 
Defense, 1980), “paper-and-pencil tests have been used . . . since the end of World War II to 
reject draft registrants and applicants for enlistment who have a low probability for success in 
service” (p. 1); and “as a reliable index of basic verbal and numeric skills, [today’s enlistment test] 
is used to screen out applicants for military service who function at the lowest ability levels” (p. 6).  
Historically, minimum entrance standards were introduced for practical purposes: with an 
overabundance of volunteers and draft registrants, including millions of potentially eligible young 
men, these standards proved effective in reducing the pool to a manageable size and removing 
obvious outliers. Three years after compulsory service ended, in 1976, the Defense Manpower 
Commission (p. 199) was still using the same language that characterized the draft era, 
implying that the AVF has many more applicants than it can handle: “enlistment standards are 
the rules the Services employ to screen out individuals believed to be unsuitable for enlistment”; 
and “occupational selection standards are the rules the Services employ to screen out 
individuals believed to be unsuitable for assignment to specific occupations from the pool of all 
people eligible for enlistment.” 
After nearly four decades of research, policies, and programs that have failed to reduce first-term 
attrition appreciably, the time may be right for a significant change of direction. One fairly obvious 
change of direction would be to place greater emphasis on “selecting in,” as suggested by Flyer in 
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the discussion above. Military recruiting since the end of the draft can be compared with a large-
scale fishing expedition: cast the widest net possible and pull in as much as can be caught; the very 
small fish may be lost, while the rest of the haul can be sorted out by type and size, and rejects can 
be returned to the ocean. “Selecting in,” on the other hand, would call for a different strategy with 
possibly different tools and techniques. In simpler terms, alternative approaches to selecting new 
recruits—targeting measures of success rather than failure—could prove to be more fruitful than the 
methods developed during the early twentieth century. If less time and effort were spent 
reformulating the old instruments and striving to achieve historical continuity, more resources could 
be devoted to innovation. Then, maybe some permanent problems of all-volunteer recruiting would 
be less disturbing, and we wouldn’t need to keep asking whether the AVF can survive. 
Biographical Information on AVF Symposium Participants (in Alphabetical Order) at the 
Time of the AVF Symposium 
Martin Anderson is the Keith and Jan Hurlbut Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University. His previous positions include Director of Research, Nixon presidential campaign; 
Senior Policy Adviser, Reagan presidential campaigns; member, Defense Manpower 
Commission; and member, Defense Policy Board, among numerous others. He is author or 
coauthor of several books, including two on the military draft.  
Phillip Carter is an associate in the law firm of McKenna, Long, & Aldridge and a frequent 
contributor of articles on national security issues to Slate, the Washington Monthly, the New York 
Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, Legal Affairs, and other publications. He was 
mobilized by the Army for service in Operation Iraqi Freedom from July 2005 to December 2006.  
Mark Eitelberg (panel chair) is Professor of Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California. Previously, he was a senior scientist with the Human Resources Research 
Organization. He is author of numerous publications and has studied the AVF since 1975. He 
has consulted with many government agencies and private organizations on defense manpower 
issues, and is a former editor of the journal, Armed Forces & Society.  
Eli Flyer is a personnel psychologist and military manpower authority who has worked for more 
than 50 years in the manpower and personnel arena, including senior positions with the Air Force 
and Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a private consultant. He created a repository for 
military manpower data in the 1970s that later became the Defense Manpower Data Center. He 
also was instrumental in creating the Defense Personnel Security Research Center.  
Robert Goldich recently retired from federal service as Specialist in National Defense in the 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
Library of Congress. He has published widely, including numerous CRS Issue Briefs and is an 
authority in military manpower and personnel issues as well as other defense areas. At the time 
of the symposium, his son was serving with the Marine Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
Christopher Jehn is Vice President-Government Programs with Cray Incorporated. His 
previous positions include Assistant Director for National Security in the Congressional Budget 
Office; member of the Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans Transition Assistance; 
executive positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Center for Naval Analyses; and 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel.  
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Paul Phillips served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) 
of the Army from 1971 to 1979. He retired from the Army in 1979 as Brigadier General. At the 
time of the symposium, his grandson was serving with the Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
Robert Pirie has an impressive career in federal service, including Acting Secretary of the Navy; 
Under Secretary of the Navy; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. His previous positions in the private sector 
include President of the Essex Corporation and Vice President of the Center for Naval Analyses.  
Patricia Shields is Director of the Texas State University Master of Public Administration Program. 
She is editor of the journal, Armed Forces & Society, and has published more than 40 articles in 
journals such as Administration and Society, American Review of Public Administration, Public 
Administration Quarterly, and the Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management.  
John Warner is Professor of Economics at Clemson University, and author of numerous 
publications on military manpower issues. He is widely regarded as an authority on the AVF. He 
is North American Editor of Defence and Peace Economics, and previously was a staff 
economist at the Center for Naval Analyses and Office of the Secretary of Defense.  
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1 Please note that the organizational affiliations presented were the affiliations of the Defense 
Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing chairpersons during their tenure as chair. 
2 Studies showed that women scored considerably below their male counterparts on the AFQT, 
attributable largely to much lower scores on the Mechanical Comprehension test. As noted in a 
1971 analysis, “These findings suggest that the AFQT can probably be adapted for use in 
screening WAF [Women in the Air Force] applicants if appropriate keys and norms are 
developed to accommodate for recognized sex differences in certain aptitude areas” (Vitola & 
Wilbourn, 1971; 8). 
3 Simply calculating for inflation, a $50 incentive in 1980 was equivalent to $99 in 1997. For 
added perspective, a $50 incentive in 1980 was worth about $130 in 2008. See “inflation 
calculator” at http://www.westegg.com/inflation. Accessed 5 February 2010. 
4 Perhaps the most telling indicator of the current and future controversy was the presence of 
Arthur Jensen, conspicuously sitting in the front row at the APA presentation. At the time, 
protestors openly stalked Jensen, a UC-Berkeley research psychologist and “father” of what 
was called “Jensenism” (a derisive term equated with “scientific racism.”). 
5 See, for example, a review in Commentary (Seligman, 1989) and an essay from Society by 
Gottfredson (1994). Perhaps the best evidence of “controversy” is that Wikipedia, the online 
encyclopedia, includes a special entry for the Snyderman and Rothman study—and within this, 
a section on “Criticism”—in its comprehensive coverage of “Race and Intelligence.” Rothman, 
with Lichter and Lichter, is the coauthor of a somewhat related study and equally controversial 
work, The Media Elite: America’s New Powerbrokers, published in 1986. 
6 Analyses in The Bell Curve use NLSY in conjunction with the PAY80 component, including 
later administrations of the NLSY (through the 1990 interview wave) as well as special studies 
linked with PAY80. 
7 The Bell Curve preceded PAY97 by about three years; however, its influence on discussions 
of testing differences and outcomes extends even to the present-day. The paperback version of 
The Bell Curve was published in 1996 and several books responding to The Bell Curve 
(positively or negatively) were published in 1997 and years later. The paperback version of The 
Bell Curve reinvigorated the debate about race and cognitive ability testing around the time of 
PAY97 and thereafter despite the fact that its findings were based largely on the results of 
PAY80. This debate continued into the first decade of the 21st century; even the current 
president, Barack Obama, was involved in the debate during the later half of the 1990s. Without 
PAY80 data, the Herrnstein and Murray book may not have existed, or it would have been a 
minor blip of a monograph in the history of testing research. Commencing PAY97 testing at a 
similar point in time with the release of the paperback version of The Bell Curve refocused 
attention on the continuing debate on race and cognitive ability testing that is still going on in the 
popular and academic literature.  
8 The 1981 book sold 250,000 copies and was translated into 10 languages. Discover magazine 
named Gould’s book the 17th “greatest science book of all time.” 
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9 One should also mention The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability, by Arthur Jensen 
(1998). According to a reviewer in the Wall Street Journal, Jensen’s 650+ page “brick of a book” 
makes The Bell Curve “look like a biography of Leonardo DiCaprio. 
10 Transcript appears at http://www.gnxp.com/blog/2008/09/barack-obama-on-bell-curve.php. 
Accessed January 2009. 
11 See Bell’s Web site at: http://www.wkamaubell.com. The one-man show ran in 2008 and 2009 
to good reviews. Bell was named the “2008 Bay Area Comedian of the Year” by San Francisco 
Weekly. 
12 Text of speech from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/18/obama-race-speech-read-
th_n_92077.html. Accessed 3-18-09. 
13 “Generation X” falls between the “Baby Boom” and “Y” generations. No formal process exists 
for delimiting generations, and definitions of the precise years may vary across various studies, 
societies, and nations. 
14 Segall (1997) did not provide rationale for why Hispanics were not included in the subgroup 
equating of p&p and CAT-ASVAB, although one can assume that it is because he stated that 
the equating sample “was expected to provide nationally representative samples with respect to 
race, gender, and AFQT distributions”, and Hispanic is not considered a “race”. 
15 A varimax rotation seeks to maximize the factor variance on the new axes to obtain as much 
diversity as possible and facilitate interpretation. 
16 A technical note: Principal components analysis was used because the goal was data 
reduction rather than common factor estimation. For reading ease, the term factor scores is 
used to describe the resulting composites with the recognition that component scores 
technically is the correct term given the use of principal components analysis. 
17 It should be noted that any direct comparison between test scores on NAEP and ASVAB may 
be influenced by differences in the motivational levels of examinees on the two tests (cf. Bloxom 
and colleagues, 2006). Motivational level differences between tests can impact the distribution 
of scores across individuals within tests, thereby impacting comparisons between mean 
changes over time in both the NAEP and ASVAB. 
18 Some references to the distribution of scores for the World War II “reference population” 
divide the AFQT Category III total into two equal amounts, 17% in AFQT Category IIIA and 17% 
in AFQT Category IIIB. See, for example, the 1986 Congressional Budget Office, Quality 
Soldiers: Costs of Manning the Active Army, p. 4. Note that the scale-score distribution for 
PAY97 shows 15% in AFQT Category IIIA and 19% in AFQT Category IIIB. This is odd, given 
the median score for PAY97 is above that of the World War II population. 
19 This discussion reviews only the Army’s report, recognizing that the Army (a) has experienced 
the most difficulty in recruiting over the recent past, (b) requires the greatest number of new 
recruits annually (as the largest of the Services), and (c) is the main yardstick for gauging the 
performance of the AVF. 
20 In 1980, General Edward “Shy” Meyer, then Army Chief of Staff, first used the term “hollow 
Army” in Congressional testimony. Meyer claimed that the post-Vietnam Army was essentially a 
 
 
Appendix E 290 
shell, hollow at its core: ill-prepared, poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and under-
resourced. The term has since been used often to characterize a military force that falls woefully 
short in terms of readiness. The Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force in 1994 referred 
to the military of the late 1970s and later years as “hollow forces” that were “less well educated, 
more involved in drugs, less well trained, less well equipped, less well sustained, less 
strategically mobile, and less highly regarded by the American public.” Quoted from Dougherty, 
R. E. (2005). Leadership during the Cold War: A four-star general’s perspective” in Lane, P. B. 
& Marcello, R. E. (Eds.), Warriors and scholars: A modern war reader (p. 123). Denton, TX: 
University of North Texas Press. 
21 Nixon (1980, p. 201) explains: “I had considered the end of the draft in 1973 to be one of the 
major achievements of my administration. Now, seven years later, I have reluctantly concluded 
that we should reintroduce the draft…. Even so, it will cause hardships, and whatever its form, 
the draft is inherently unfair; it can only be justified by necessity. But, as we look at the 1980s, 
necessity stares us in the face: we simply cannot risk being without it. To put off that hard 
decision could prove penny wise and pound foolish; our reluctance to resume the peacetime 
draft may make us weak enough to invite war, and then we will find ourselves imposing a 
wartime draft instead.” 
22 See also Welsh, Kucinkas, & Curran (1990), Wigdor & Green (1991), Earles & Ree (1992), 
and Mayberry & Carey (1997). 
23 In 2007, the Army’s recruiting problems were a “hot topic” and widely discussed in op-eds, 
newspaper editorials, and Internet blogs. 
24 Watkins & Shirk (2008) expand on the work of Kane (2006) and employ “an improved 
methodology to study the demographic characteristics of newly commissioned officers and 
personnel who enlisted in 2006 and 2007.” The authors of the updated study write: “Members of 
the all-volunteer military are significantly more likely to come from high-income neighborhoods 
than from low-income neighborhoods. Only 11 percent of enlisted recruits in 2007 came from 
the poorest one-fifth (quintile) of neighborhoods, while 25 percent came from the wealthiest 
quintile.” Quoted at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda08-05.cfm. Accessed 
February 2010. 
25 It should be noted that the income range in the highest quintile is much larger than in any 
other income grouping. For example, the range of incomes in the lowest quintile extends from 
$0 to $33,267. By comparison, the range in the highest quintile extends from $65,032 to 
$244,737. Data show that, DoD-wide in FY 2007, close to 18 % of new recruits came from the 
highest-income quintile. Critics of the AVF over the years have claimed that the nation’s most 
privileged young men and women are virtually absent. Dividing the highest-income quintile into 
smaller subcomponents would help to shed more light on socioeconomic representation at the 
highest levels. 
26 See any of various sources on the DoD’s education standards and the distribution of 
credentials by education tier. 
27 For details on the program, see the Army’s online recruiting site, http://www.goarmy.com. It is 
interesting to note that the proportion of high school graduates among recruits in the Army 
typically are higher—by five to seven percentage points—in certain official Army and DoD 
reports than in the DoD reports. CBO analysts believe this consistent difference is due to the 
fact that Army recruits in special education attainment programs, such as the “GED Plus 
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Program,” are excluded from calculations made by DoD in certain reports on recruiting results, 
but not in calculations for the Population Representation reports, which are drawn directly from 
DMDC data by a DoD contractor (Congressional Budget Office, 2007, p. 15, note 51). Another 
issue of concern when relying on reported results by education level involves certain policies 
that make it easier for GED holders to qualify on the basis of their AFQT score, which, 
according to anecdotal reports, can be easily abused by recruiters. In military screening policy, 
a GED recipient can qualify as Tier 1 if he or she has completed at least 15 hours (one 
semester) of college-level courses (subjects not specified). According to the policy, the recruit 
needs to submit “an original letter on the [accredited] college letterhead stationery…to verify the 
status of courses completed.” A GAO report discusses the topic of substantiated abuses by 
recruiters, which have increased noticeably since Operation Iraqi Freedom (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, August 2006). 
28 Apparently, one cannot infer GED status from the education variables in PAY97. The 
education variables include only highest grade completed (years of education), enrollment 
status, current grade, and grade anticipated in the fall of 1997, but nothing that would show that 
an individual has received a GED or similar credential in place of a traditional high school 
diploma. Thus, completion of 12th grade is assumed to indicate high school graduation.  
29 This is drawn from special tabulations on the first-term attrition of military recruits provided by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). This relationship of educational achievement and 
first-term attrition is widely reported. 
30 Note that this chapter presents an econometric perspective on fairness of the AVF. For a 
psychometric analysis of the sensitivity and fairness of the ASVAB, see Wise and colleagues 
(1992) and Drasgow (1992).  
31 (a) All wages in the employment categories are deflated to 2000 dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index-U. (b) The unemployment and disrupted enrollment categories were combined due 
to the few individuals who were placed in these categories. 
32 Approximately 20% of respondents did not report their wages even though they stated they 
are employed within a given month. An analysis showed these individuals typically had lower 
ASVAB scores and have parents with lower education levels and higher tendencies to be on 
government aid than individuals in other wage categories. 
33 Low-wage is a wage below $10, mid-wage is between $10 and $20, and high-wage is a wage 
above $20, where wage is the maximum wage taken over the 6-month time period of the last 
quarter of age Y and the first quarter of age Y+1. All wages are deflated into 2000 dollars using 
the CPI-U price index. 
34 A statistical test, the Wald test is used to determine the statistical significance of an 
independent variable to a dependent variable. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wald_test 
35 Data on high school dropouts presented here are all from Kaufman et al. (2001), a report 
published by NCES. It should be noted that other sources dispute NCES statistics, claiming that 
the rates are higher than reported. Dropout rates often vary between sources because of the 
different definitions, surveys, and standards applied as well as different age groups. 
36 Bernard Rostker (Author of I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force, RAND, 
2006) is a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. His previous positions include Under 
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Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Under Secretary of the Army, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Director of Selective Service. He 
is the author of numerous publications.  
37 The book review and symposium were requested by the editors of Public Administration 
Review, an official publication of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA). The 
quotations that appear here are all taken from written responses by the panel members to the 
questions, with the lone exception of Martin Anderson. Quotations attributed to Anderson are 
from notes taken by Eitelberg during two telephone discussions that covered the symposium’s 
themes and questionnaire.  
38 According to a senior noncommissioned officer in Army personnel and recruiting, the Army 
was “scraping the bottom of the barrel to get people to join.” From Paul von Zielbauer, “Army is 
Cracking Down on Deserters,” New York Times, 9 April 2007; also quoted in “Testimony of 
Lawrence J. Korb before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” 17 April 2007, p. 6. As Korb 
(p. 5) observes, money helps, too: “Spending on enlistment and recruitment bonuses tripled 
from $328 million before the war in Iraq to over $1 billion in 2006. The incentives for Army 
Guard and Reserve have grown ten-fold over the same period.” 
39 Statistics on first-term attrition are from special tabulations provided by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center. In fact, in the years since Operation Iraqi Freedom, first-term attrition 
has declined, undoubtedly due to the pressing need to keep recruits in uniform, the relatively 
high number of troops on overseas deployments, and the strict application of “stop loss” 
policies. Reportedly, in the Army, which has been struggling to maintain its manpower levels, 
attrition during the first six months of 2006 fell to 7.6% from a level of 18.1% during the previous 
year. According to Lawrence Korb, the Army’s basic training has thus become a “rubber-
stamping ritual,” instead of a tool for weeding out poor performers. See “Testimony of Lawrence 
J. Korb before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” 17 April 2007, p. 5.  
 
 
